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Introduction
T he genesis  of th is  book  cam e ab o u t th ro u g h  a  tho roug h  an a ly s is  of 
K a n t’s a rtic le , “Id e a  for a  U n iv e rsa l H isto ry  w ith  a  C osm opolitan  In te n t .” 
T h is  a rtic le  w as w ritte n  sh o rtly  a f te r  th e  p u b lic a tio n  o f th e  Critique o f Pure 
Reason, a n d  m ak es  som e seem in g ly  g ra n d  c la im s a b o u t th e  course  o f h u m a n  
h is to ry . H ow  g ra n d  a re  th e s e  c la im s?  T he a rtic le  focuses on th e  n ecessa ry  
p ro g re ss  of h u m a n  b e ings th ro u g h  h isto ry , p a r t ic u la r ly  moral p ro g ress  
th ro u g h  h is to ry . B u t w hy  is  su c h  p ro g ress  n ecessa ry ?  How stro n g ly  does 
K a n t  w ish  to advance  th is  c la im ? A nd, im p o rtan tly , how  does such  a  c laim  
f it  w ith  th e  r e s t  o f h is  ph ilosophy?
T h is  a rtic le  is  a lso  in te re s t in g  b ecause  o f th e  s tro n g  lin k  K a n t m ak es 
b e tw een  m o ra lity  a n d  po litics. K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  m o ra l p rog ress is  n o t to  
be  h a d  w ith o u t p o litica l p ro g ress , a n d  th a t  w o rk in g  n a tio n a l a n d  in te rn a ­
t io n a l  co n stitu tio n s  a re  n e c e ssa ry  to  e n su re  th e  se c u rity  betw een  p e rso n s  a n d  
n a tio n s . C e rta in ly  w e know  from  K a n t’s Metaphysics of Morals t h a t  th e  fo r­
m a tio n  o f law s is  a  m o ra l q u estio n , since bo th  h a v e  to  do w ith  th e  exercise o f 
freedom  in  a  w orld  w h ere  o th e r  peop le  ex is t a s  w ell. B u t th is  connection  is 
m a d e  s tro n g e r in  th e  “Id e a ” d u e  to  th e  n e c e ss ita tin g  o f ju s t  p o litica l in s t i tu ­
t io n s  in  o rd er to  e n su re  n o t on ly  leg a lity  b u t  a lso  m orality . A t le a s t  po litics 
seem s to be  a  n ecessa ry  fo u n d a tio n  fo r th e  m o ra l p ro jec t. A gain, w h a t a re  w e 
to  m a k e  o f th e se  s tro n g  c la im s?
T he secondary  l i te ra tu re  is  ex trem ely  lim ite d  on  th is  sub ject, th o u g h  
th e re  a re  tw o g e n e ra l schools o f th o u g h t re g a rd in g  th e  “Idea .” T he  f i r s t  ta k e s  
K a n t a s  try in g  to  en g en d e r a  p ro jec t w hich  is  s im ila r  to  H egel’s, nam ely , 
som e so r t of s tro n g  s tan ce  on th e  n ecessa ry  d ev e lo p m en t of rea so n  in  th e  
w orld . T he com m en ta to rs th e n  a rg u e  th a t  K a n t (n a tu ra lly )  fa ils  in  th is
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3a tte m p t, for h e  h a s  no p h ilo so p h ic a l fram ew ork  w hich  a llow s h im  to say  
a n y th in g  ak in  to th e  m a n ife s ta tio n  o f th e  “A bsolute” o r o f “M in d .” I f  th is  is  
re a lly  K a n t’s p ro ject, s u re ly  th e  co m m en ta to rs’ e v a lu a tio n  is  co rrect.
T he  o th e r school o f th o u g h t  is  to  a rg u e  t h a t  th e  “Id e a ” re p re se n ts  a n  
e a r ly  a tte m p t to  w re s tle  w ith  th e  q u e s tio n  o f teleology. T h ey  m a in ta in  th a t  
K a n t  is  try in g  to  w ork  o u t  th e  c h a ra c te r is tic s  of n a tu r a l  d ev e lo p m en t in  th e  
w orld , a n tic ip a tin g  th e  Critique o f Judgment. H ow ever, K a n t’s no tion  o f 
te leo logy  is  e v a lu a te d  a s  b e in g  in co m p le te  h ere , a n d  c o m m e n ta to rs  su rm ise  
t h a t  K a n t  h a s  n o t y e t a d e q u a te ly  m a d e  th e  d istinc tion  b e tw e e n  th e  re g u la ­
tiv e  a n d  co n stitu tiv e  u se  o f teleo logy. K a n t’s s ta te m e n ts  r e g a rd in g  p rog ress  
a re  ta k e n  a s  b e in g  s im p ly  too s tro n g , th o u g h  i t  is  c la im ed  t h a t  h e  w ill rec tify  
th is  p rob lem  w ith  th e  th i r d  Critique. S u re ly  i f  K a n t is  a c tu a lly  try in g  to  u se  
te leo logy  a s  a  c o n s titu tiv e  p rin c ip le , h e  h a s  overs tepped  th e  l im its  of th e  f i r s t  
Critique, a n d  i f  in s te a d  h e  h a s  in  m in d  th e  u se  of teleo logy a s  a  m ere ly  re g u ­
la t iv e  p rin c ip le , h e  o u g h t to  h a v e  a p p lie d  i t  m ore carefu lly .
In  add ition , in h e r e n t  in  m a n y  com m en ta to rs’ a n a ly se s  is  th e  b e lie f 
t h a t  K a n t  is  rea lly  t ry in g  to  te l l  u s  ab o u t how  to in v e s tig a te  h is to ry , th a t  is , 
th e  b e lie f  th a t  K a n t is  co n ce rn e d  w ith  a  speculative q u e s tio n  a b o u t h isto ry . 
M o s t com m en ta to rs a ssu m e  t h a t  K a n t’s  w ritin g s ab o u t h is to ry  a re  of th e  
sa m e  n a tu re  as h is  w ritin g s  a b o u t m a th em a tic s , geom etry , o r p h y sics  th a t  is, 
th e y  concern  th e  q u e s tio n  of h o w  w e a re  to  s tu d y  h is to ry  i ts e l f  a s  a  science. 
T h is  p roposition  is  n o t a rg u e d  for; i t  is  m ere ly  a  ta c it  a s su m p tio n .
I  re jec t th e se  tw o m a in  l in e s  o f in te rp re ta tio n , p a r t ic u la r ly  a s  th e y  
co n ce rn  th e  “Id ea .” A s th e s e  b e lie fs  re p re se n t  w h a t seem  to  b e  th e  m ajo rity  of 
th e  few  co m m en ta ries  c o n ce rn in g  th is  a sp ec t of K a n t’s p h ilo so p h y , a  m ajo r 
t a s k  o f th is  book w ill be  to  p o in t o u t  th e  prob lem s w ith  su c h  an a ly se s . W e 
m ig h t ca ll th is  th e  “n e g a tiv e ” a sp e c t o f th is  work, a n d  “S ec tio n  O ne” is  la rg e ly  
d ev o ted  to  a rg u in g  a g a in s t  th e s e  in te rp re ta tio n s , bo th  d irec tly  a n d  ind irec tly .
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T h e  overa ll p ro jec t of S ec tio n  O n e  is  to ex am in e  K a n t’s d iscussion  in  
a ll  o f h is  w ritin g s  re g a rd in g  th e  (m oral) p ro g ress  o f th e  h u m a n  species. Two 
concep ts  becom e m ost im p o rta n t, n a m e ly  K a n t’s concep tion  o f  p rogress (Fort- 
schritt) and. o f “th e  h ig h e s t good” (das hochste Gut o r th e  summum bonum). 
T h e re  a re  tw o im p o rta n t fin d in g s  in  su c h  a n  an a ly sis . T h e  f i r s t  is  th a t  K a n t 
in te n d s  th e re  to b e  two lo ca tions fo r  th e  h ig h e s t  good, n a m e ly  one in  a  a f te r ­
life , a n  “o therw orld ly” h ig h e s t good, a n d  o n e  in  th e  n a tu r a l  w orld , an  
“e a r th ly ” h ig h e s t good. W h a t th is ,  in  tu rn ,  in d ica te s , is  t h a t  m o ra l p rog ress 
in  th is  w o rld  is  a  n e ce ssa ry  a ssu m p tio n , a  “p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l reason ,” fo r 
b a r r in g  th is  possib ility , we sh o u ld  h a v e  to  a b an d o n  th e  q u e s t  fo r th e  h ig h e s t 
good, a  q u e s t  w hich  K a n t th in k s  i s  m a n d a te d  by  rea so n . T h is  le a d s  to  K a n t’s 
co ncep tion  o f  p rog ress, a n d  h is  d isc u ss io n  of teleology. T h e  o th e r  im p o rta n t 
th in g  w e d iscover is  t h a t  K a n t does, in  fac t, sp e a k  o f  p ro g re ss  in  h u m a n  h is ­
to ry  n o t a s  a  specu la tive  p rob lem , b u t  a s  a  p ra c tic a l p rob lem . K a n t is con­
c e rn e d  n o t w ith  th e  s tu d y  o f h is to ry , b u t  w ith  th e  in v e s tig a tio n  o f h is to ry  in  
o rd e r  to  f in d  clues th a t  th e  h u m a n  ra c e  is  in d ee d  p ro g ress in g . K a n t u ses 
la n g u a g e  w h ich  sp e a k s  of p ro g re s s  in  h is to ry  as a  n o tio n  from  a  p rac tica l 
p o in t o f v iew , b a s in g  h is  a n a ly s is  o n  d u ty  a n d  m orality .
T h e  o u tlin e  o f th e  f i r s t  se c tio n  is  a s  follows: C h a p te r  O n e  tak es  a  
b r ie f  overv iew  of th e  Critique o f Pure Reason in  o rd e r to  e s ta b lis h  the  p a ­
ra m e te rs  w h ich  K a n t s e ts  for a n y  m e ta p h y s ic a l d iscussion . T h is  ch ap te r is  
s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  a n d  u n co n tro v e rs ia l.
C h a p te r  Two ex am in es  K a n t’s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f te leo logy  an d  h is  i n ­
tro d u c tio n  o f  th e  h ig h e s t good. M o st im p o rta n tly , I show  t h a t  K an t, a lread y  
in  th e  f i r s t  Critique, u n d e rs ta n d s  t h a t  te leo logy  m u s t be  u s e d  a s  a  reg u la tiv e  
p r in c ip le  only . T h is allow s u s  to  lo o k  a t  th e  “Id e a ” from  a  n e w  perspective: i t  
seem s d e a r  t h a t  K a n t know s fu ll  w e ll th e  l im ita tio n s  o f th e  n o tio n  of te leo l­
ogy, so e i th e r  h e  h a s  sim ply  fo rg o tte n  h is  s ta n c e  from  th e  f i r s t  Critique, or h e  
h a s  a  d iffe re n t k in d  o f p o in t to m a k e  w ith  th e  “Id ea .” K a n t’s in tro d u c tio n  of
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th e  h ig h e s t good h e re  is  b rief, b u t  I  w ill look  a t  i ts  conception. Also, I  t ry  to  
show , in  p a r t ,  how  th e  “Id ea ” is  th e  n a tu r a l  r e s u l t  of K a n t’s s tru g g le  w ith  th e  
in h e re n t  te n s io n  b e tw een  th e  a n sw ers  to  th e  questions of, W h a t c an  I  know ? 
an d , W h a t c a n  I  hope?
C h a p te r  T h ree  th e n  ta k e s  a  f ir s t  im p o r ta n t  look a t  th e  “Id e a  for a  
U n iv e rsa l H is to ry  w ith  a  C osm opolitan  In te n t .” A fter a n  overv iew  o f th e  
piece, I  ex am in e  th e  n a tu re  of th e  l in k  b e tw ee n  politics a n d  m o ra lity . H e re  I  
show  w hy  K a n t  th in k s  po litics to  be  so im p o r ta n t  as a  fo u n d a tio n  fo r m o ra l­
ity . I  also t r y  to  h e a d  off a n  objection re g a rd in g  th e  n a tu re  o f th is  lin k  b y  in ­
tro d u c in g  a n  a rg u m e n t th a t  po litica l in s t i tu t io n s  a re  n e ce ssa ry  b u t  n o t su ff i­
c ien t cond itions o f m o ra l developm ent.
In  C h a p te r  F o u r  I  p re s e n t  a  b r ie f  acco u n t o f K a n t’s m o ra l theory , fo ­
cu sin g  m a in ly  on  th e  Critique o f Practical Reason. O f ch ie f in te r e s t  to  u s  
h e re  is  K a n t’s  a rg u m e n t fo r th e  h ig h e s t good a n d  h is  d iscussion  of how  so m e­
th in g  becom es a  p o s tu la te  o f p u re  p ra c tic a l rea so n . In  th e  f i r s t  sec tion  I  g ive 
a  b r ie f  overv iew  of K a n t’s  m o ra l philosophy; in  th e  second I give K a n t’s a r ­
g u m en t for th e  h ig h e s t good; in  th e  th ird  I  d iscuss th e  n e ce ssa ry  p o s tu la te s  o f 
God a n d  im m o rta lity ; in  th e  fo u rth  I  d iscuss  th e  location of th e  h ig h e s t good; 
a n d  in  th e  l a s t  I  b rie fly  p o in t o u t K a n t’s s tru g g le  w ith  th e  q u es tio n  of th e  
“ex p an sio n ” o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . T h is  c h a p te r  show s th e  fu r th e r  im p o rtan ce  
of p o s tu la te s  o f  p ra c tic a l rea so n , a s  w ell a s  o p en ing  up th e  p o ss ib ility  of tw o  
loca tions for th e  h ig h e s t good.
C h a p te rs  F ive  th ro u g h  E ig h t a ll d e a l w ith  th e  Critique o f Judgment. 
T his w ork  o f K a n t’s  is  im p o rta n t because  o f i ts  dealings w ith  teleology. I  t r y  
to show  th a t  w h ile  K a n t  c e rta in ly  m ak es  g re a t  co n trib u tio n s to  h is  no tion  o f  
teleology in  th is  book, h e  does n o t go beyond  th e  o rig ina l p a ra m e te rs  w h ich  
h e  e s ta b lish e d  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique. Teleology re m a in s  a  re g u la tiv e  no tion , 
w hich  a g a in  o u g h t to  le a d  u s  to  su sp ec t t h a t  K a n t w as q u ite  a w a re  of th e  
lim its  to  teleology w h en  h e  w ro te  th e  ‘I d e a .” In  fact, w hile  co m m en ta to rs
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6seem  to th in k  th a t  th e  th i r d  Critique involves m ajo r c h an g e s  from  th e  “Id ea ,” 
I  a rg u e  t h a t  i t  a c tu a lly  su p p o r ts  a lm ost a ll th e  c la im s from  th e  “Id e a .” In  h is 
w ork ing  o u t o f th is  Critique, K a n t discovers fu r th e r  re a so n s  to  be lieve  in  the  
p ro g ress  o f h u m a n k in d , th o u g h  h e  never v io la tes  th e  f i r s t  Critique by  th in k ­
in g  th a t  teleo logy  is  in h e re n t  in  n a tu re  or is  c o n s titu tiv e  o f ex p erien ce . In  
th is  w ork, K a n t  c o n tin u es  h is  ta lk  abou t p rog ress, th e  h ig h e s t  good, a n d  even 
h is  concep t o f a n ta g o n ism  o r “u n so c ia l sociability” w h ich  h e  be liev es to  be  the  
d riv in g  force b e h in d  p o litic a l developm ents.
C h a p te r  N ine  looks a t  th e  “Id ea” a g a in  in  l ig h t  o f th e  p rev io u s  a rg u ­
m en ts . I  a rg u e , finally , t h a t  th e  “Id e a ” is b e s t  th o u g h t o f in  te rm s  o f a  p o s tu ­
la te  o f p ra c tic a l reason , a  n e ce ssa ry  be lief fo r th e  p u r s u i t  of th e  h ig h e s t  good. 
H ence, th e  “Id e a ” is  n o t in te n d e d  by  K a n t to  be  so m e th in g  lik e  H egel’s devel­
op m en t o f th e  “A bsolu te ,” c an n o t m is tak e  teleology as  a  c o n s titu tiv e  p rin c i­
ple, a n d  does n o t deal w ith  h is to ry  a s  a  sp ecu la tiv e  questio n . W hile  p rog ress 
is  c e r ta in ly  a  reg u la tiv e  id e a , i t  is  by  no m ean s merely reg u la tiv e , in  th e  sam e 
w ay th a t  G od a n d  im m o rta lity  a re  n o t mere id e a s  o f rea so n . K a n t  is  con­
ce rn ed  w ith  m o ra l p ro g re ss  a n d  o f th e  conditions o f th e  p u r s u i t  o f  th e  h ig h ­
e s t  good. T hose  co nd itions invo lve  po litica l in s t i tu t io n s  a s  w ell a s  p ra c tic a l 
p o s tu la te s .
C h a p te r  T en is  a  t r a n s it io n  betw een  th e  tw o “S ec tions” o f th is  book. I 
m ak e  som e su m m ary  re m a rk s  concern ing  S ection  O ne, a s  w ell a s  m a k in g  
som e a d d itio n a l com m en ts on th e  secondary  l i te ra tu re .
H a v in g  re jec ted  th e s e  g e n e ra l app roaches to  K a n t’s p o sitio n , I  w a n t 
to  say  so m e th in g  m ore co n cre te  a b o u t K an t’s n o tio n  o f p ro g re ss  a n d  th e  h ig h ­
e s t  good, a n d  hence  “S ec tio n  Two” is  o f m ore o f a  “p ositive” a n a ly s is . W h a t is 
th e  n a tu re  o f th e  l in k  b e tw e e n  m o ra lity  a n d  politics?  W h a t i s  th e  e x ac t n a ­
tu re  o f th e  h ig h e s t good? H ow  w ill p rog ress ta k e  sh a p e  in  th e  w orld? T hese  
a re  th e  ty p es  o f q u estio n s w h ich  I add ress .
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C h a p te r  O ne is an  in te n s iv e  a n a ly s is  o f K a n t’s no tion  of th e  h ig h e s t  
good a n d  i ts  recep tio n  in  th e  seco n d a ry  l i te ra tu re . I  t r y  to  sa y  w h a t th e  h ig h ­
e s t  good is  a n d  w h a t i t  is  no t. T h e re  a re  m an y  c ru c ia l p o in ts  h e re , a n d  I t r y  
to  e s ta b l is h  th e  p a ra m e te rs  o f f u tu re  d iscussions co n ce rn in g  th e  h ig h e s t  
good. M a n y  o f th e  p o in ts  I ta k e  to  b e  se ttle d , w h ile  m a n y  rem ain  c o n tro v e r­
s ia l.
C h a p te r  Two deals w ith  w h a t  I  ta k e  to  be  se r io u s  p rob lem s w ith  
K a n t’s  fo rm u la tio n  o f th e  “o th erw o rld ly ” h ig h e s t good. O ne m a in  p ro b lem  
h a s  to  do specifica lly  w ith  K a n t’s in s is te n c e  t h a t  v ir tu e  be  rew ard e d  w ith  
proportionate h a p p in e ss . N o t on ly  does th e re  seem  to  be  no rea so n  w h y  w e 
sh o u ld  acc ep t th is  equation , b u t  i t  a lso  seem s to  b e  in  v io la tion  of m a n y  o f 
K a n t’s  o th e r  te n e ts . I  a rg u e  t h a t  w e o u g h t to re jec t th e  eq u a tio n , a n d  in s te a d  
be  co n ce rn e d  on ly  w ith  h a p p in e ss  w h ich  is  e ith e r  m in im a lly  n e c e ssa ry  a s  a  
fo u n d a tio n  fo r m o ra l action, o r w h ich  is  m ere ly  p e rm itte d  a n d  n o t d ese rv ed .
I  t ry  to  sh o w  t h a t  th is  h a rm o n izes  b e t te r  w ith  th e  r e s t  o f K a n t’s p h ilo sophy , 
even  th o u g h  K a n t  h im se lf  in s is ts  on  th e  n ecessity  o f  th is  eq u a tio n  th ro u g h ­
o u t h is  w ritin g s . In  add ition , I e x am in e  K a n t’s  no tio n  o f  h a p p in e ss  i ts e lf , a n d  
t ry  to  sh o w  t h a t  th e re  a re  se rio u s  p ro b lem s w hen  w e t r y  to  conceive o f  h a p p i­
n e ss  in  a n  a fte rlife . I t  is  s im ply  n o t conceivab le  t h a t  h a p p in e ss  cou ld  b e  a  
re w a rd  fo r  m o ra lity  in  a n  a fte rlife .
I n  C h a p te r  T h ree  I  look a t  th e  l in k  b e tw een  m o ra lity  a n d  po litics . I  
a rg u e d  (in  p rev io u s  c h ap te rs ) th a t  th e r e  a re  tw o lo ca tio n s  for th e  h ig h e s t  
good; i f  w e  a re  to  ta k e  th is  se riously , th e n  we m u s t b e  concerned  w ith  th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  how  th is  h ig h e s t good on  e a r th  is  to  com e ab o u t. T h is  is  la rg e ly  a  
p o litica l q u e s tio n . I  exam ine  K a n t’s  p o litica l w ritin g s , a n a ly z in g  th e m  in  
ch rono log ica l o rder. I  try  to  s u b s ta n t ia te  th e  fo llow ing c la im s w ith  th is  c h a p ­
te r : 1) K a n t  does p o s it  th e  n e ce ssa ry  b e lie f  in  th e  m o ra l p ro g ress  o f th e  s p e ­
cies, 2) th is  b e lie f  concerns h is to ry , th o u g h  i t  is  a  b e lie f  b a se d  on m o ra l e n d s  
a n d  is  n o t  m e a n t  to  be  a (m erely) re g u la tiv e  id e a  fo r th e  s tu d y  o f h is to ry  a s  a
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science, a n d  3) c e r ta in  po litica l o rg an iz a tio n s  a re  n e ce ssa ry  (bu t no t su ffi­
c ien t) fo r m o ra l p ro g re ss  to  occur. In  th e  la s t  sec tion , I a lso  d iscuss K a n t’s 
seem ing ly  s t r a n g e  c la im  th a t  n a tu re  a lo n e  m u s t  be  th e  g u a ra n to r  o f peace. I 
a rg u e  t h a t  th i s  is  a  p e rfec tly  u n d e rs ta n d a b le  c la im , a n d  fu rth e rm o re  is  a  
n ecessa ry  one, g iven  th e  re q u is ite  co n d itio n s fo r th e  m o ra l p ro ject to  beg in  in  
e a rn e s t.
In  C h a p te r  F o u r  I  o u tlin e  w h a t I  ta k e  to  be  K a n t’s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
how  m o ra l p ro g re s s  is  to  ta k e  p lace. K a n t se em s to  o u tlin e  five specific s tep s  
to w a rd  m o ra l p e rfe c tio n  of th e  h u m a n  species: 1) to ta l  s ta te  of n a tu re , 2) n a ­
tio n a l/in te rn a l  c o n s titu tio n , 3) fed e ra tio n  o f n a tio n s , 4) c u ltu re  a n d  ecclesias­
tic a l fa ith , a n d  5) th e  h ig h e s t  good on e a r th . A g a in , th e  l in k  betw een  m o ra l­
i ty  a n d  p o litic s  w ill be  ex am in ed  a n d  e s ta b lish e d . I  t ry  to  show  how  th e  
s ta g e s  in te r a c t  a n d  to  ex p la in  w h a t th e  n a tu r e  o f e ac h  o f th e se  s tag es  m ig h t 
be.
In  C h a p te r  F iv e  I  a tte m p t to  ju s tify  w h y  a  b e lie f  in  th e  h ig h e s t good 
is  n ecessa ry . T h is  f a r  in  th e  w ork, I  h a v e  a rg u e d  on ly  th a t  K a n t in d ee d  ta k e s  
th e  h ig h e s t  good to  b e  th e  a p p ro p ria te  ob ject o f  m o ra l w illing , w hile now  I 
p re s e n t  a rg u m e n ts  a s  to  w hy  b e lie f in  i ts  p o ss ib ility  m ig h t be  necessary . I t  is 
a n  a tte m p t to  a n sw e r  th e  q u estio n  of, W h a t w o u ld  th e  consequences be  i f  w e 
re jec ted  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f  th e  h ig h e s t good? I  th in k  th e re  a re  six  possib le  
re a so n s  fo r i ts  n e c e ss ita tio n , th o u g h  th e y  v a ry  g re a tly  in  s tre n g th . U lti­
m ate ly , I  th in k  th e  b e s t  ju s tif ic a tio n  is  one w h ich  seem s to  be  v ir tu a lly  ig ­
n o red  in  th e  se c o n d a ry  l i te ra tu re , n am e ly  t h a t  th e  b e lie f  is  n ecessa ry  i f  th e  
w o rld  is  to  h a v e  a n y  m e a n in g  or v a lu e . K a n t’s  d e ta ile d  ex am in a tio n  of te le ­
ology in  th e  th i r d  Critique le a d  h im  to th re e  s tro n g  a rg u m e n ts  fo r th e  l in k  
b e tw een  th e  w o rld  a s  a  possib le  c rea tio n  a n d  th e  m o ra l vocation  of h u m a n  
be ings. K a n t b e liev es  t h a t  i f  h u m a n k in d  c a n n o t p ro g ress , th e n  th e  w orld  is  a  
c ru e l joke.
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C h a p te r  S ix  deals w ith  th e  q u estio n  o f w hy  God m ig h t re m a in  a s  a  
n e c e ssa ry  p o s tu la te  of p rac tic a l re a so n . T he p ro b lem  a rises  th ro u g h  th e  re ­
jec tion , in  C h a p te r  Two, of th e  e q u a tio n  of h a p p in e ss  a s  a  p ro p o rtio n a te  r e ­
w a rd  fo r m o ra lity . I f  God is  no lo n g e r  n eeded  to  d is tr ib u te  p ro p o rtio n a te  
h a p p in e ss , w h y  is  a  be lie f in  G od necessary?  I  b eg in  by e x am in in g  c la im s by 
S h a ro n  A nderson-G old  a n d  C h a rle s  R ossi th a t  G od is  necessary  fo r  in d i­
v id u a ls  to  overcom e th e ir  n a tu r a l  e n v y  o f each  o th e r, a n  envy  w h ich  le a d s  
p e rso n s  to w a rd  ev il. I  a rg u e  th a t ,  w h ile  th is  is  in d e e d  a  p rob lem  w h ich  n e ­
c e s s ita te s  a  b e lie f  in  God, I  do n o t  th in k  th a t  A nderson-G old’s a n d  R ossi’s  in ­
te rp re ta t io n s  re a lly  get to th e  ro o t o f th e  p rob lem  o f evil, a n d  h en ce  th e y  do 
n o t so lve a ll  th e  p roblem s w hich  th e y  th in k  a re  solved. I a rg u e  in s te a d  th a t  
w e m u s t  s t i l l  be lieve  in  God b ecau se  w e m u st be lieve  in  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  
m o ra l re sp o n siv en e ss  of n a tu re . I f  n a tu r e  does n o t ex is t w ith  som e b e n t to ­
w a rd  m o ra lity , th e n  th e  hope  for p o litic a l p rog ress w ould  h a v e  to  b e  a b a n ­
doned, a n d , su b seq u en tly , m o ra l p ro g re ss  as w ell. N a tu re  m u s t b e  th e  g u a r­
a n to r  o f p eace , a n d  peace is  n e c e ssa ry  fo r th e  m o ra l project. In  th e  f in a l 
p a g es  o f th is  c h a p te r , I exam ine  th e  difference b e tw een  n a tu re  a s  e x is tin g  
a n d  n a tu r e  a s  h a v in g  been  c re a te d  by  a  m oral a u th o r.
C h a p te r  S even  is  th e  conclusion . I  m ake  som e su m m ary  re m a rk s  an d  
try  to  show  th e  a d v an tag e s  o f m y  in te rp re ta t io n  of K an t. O ne su ch  a d v a n ­
ta g e  is  t h a t  w e a re  r id  of H egel’s p ro b lem  of p ro v in g  th a t  n a tu re  is , in  fac t, 
te leo log ical. A n o th e r  is  th a t  w e re m a in  free  to d iscuss a n d  p u rsu e  “everyday” 
po litics , n a m e ly  p roblem s of how  to  p rov ide  (m in im al) services fo r p e rso n s , 
how  to a d m in is te r  law  a n d  ju s tice , a n d  how  to in te ra c t  w ith  o th e r  c o u n trie s . 
T he  so lu tio n s  to  th e se  po litica l a n d  so c ie ta l p rob lem s m u st u ltim a te ly  involve 
e m p iric a l know ledge  of people a s  c re a tu re s  of n a tu re , n o t only  ra t io n a l  b e ­
in g s . In  a d d itio n  to  p rov id ing  w h a t  I  ta k e  to  be  a  m ore  accu ra te  a n a ly s is  o f 
K a n t’s  ph ilo so p h y , I  hope m y in te rp re ta t io n  frees b o th  K a n t a n d  o u rse lv es 
from  th e  p ro b lem s encum bered  by  a  H egelian  accoun t of n a tu re  a n d  h is to ry , 
a n d  a llow s u s  to p u rsu e  a b e tte r  w o rld  m ore effectively.
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IChapter One
Overview to the Critique o f Pure Reason
L
In  h is  1784 piece, “Id e a  fo r a  U n iv e rsa l H isto ry  w ith  a  C osm opolitan  
I n te n t ,” Im m a n u e l K a n t d iscusses m o ra l p rog ress, p o litica l in s t itu t io n s , a n d , 
in d ire c tly , th e  “h ig h e s t good.” K a n t  m a k e s  som e ex trem ely  c ru c ia l c la im s in  
th is  r a th e r  sh o rt piece, l in k in g  th e s e  th re e  concepts to g e th e r  a n d  p ro v id in g  a  
fo u n d a tio n  for h is  la te r  m oral, po litica l, a n d  relig ious w ritin g s . W hile  only  a  
few  c h a p te rs  o f Section O ne o f th is  book  d e a l d irectly  w ith  th e  “Id e a ,” K a n t’s 
a r t ic le  a n d  th e  concepts invo lved  a re  th e  m o tiv a tin g  forces b e h in d  th is  book. 
V e ry  few  com m enta to rs h av e  fo cu sed  on  th is  a rtic le  o r on  th e  im p lica tio n s i t  
h a s  fo r K a n t’s ph ilosophy  a s  a  w hole . W e w a n t to u n d e rs ta n d  how  K a n t e n ­
v is io n e d  a n d  u tilized  th e  no tion  o f m o ra l p rogress, w hy  h e  m a d e  i t  d ep en d en t 
u p o n  po litics , a n d  how  i t  is  l in k e d  w ith  th e  h ig h es t good.
In  o rd er to beg in  th is  in v e s tig a tio n , w e m u st beg in  w ith  K a n t’s f ir s t  
“c ritic a l” w ork , th e  Critique of Pure Reason. T h is  w ork  is  im p o r ta n t  for u s  
b e c a u se  i t  is  h e re  th a t  K a n t g ives u s  th e  n ecessa ry  p a ra m e te rs  o f a n y  su b se ­
q u e n t  d iscussion  of m orality , re lig io n , po litics , o r th e  self. I n  ad d itio n , m an y  
o f  th e  k ey  id e a s  a n d  concepts fo u n d  in  th e  “Id e a ” a re  a lso  d isc u sse d  for th e  
f i r s t  t im e  in  th e  Critique, a n d  a re  r e ta in e d  in  th e  second e d itio n .1 W hile 
m u c h  is  n ew  in  the  ‘Id e a ,” esp ec ia lly  th e  com bination  o f po litics  w ith  m o ra l­
ity , a  su rp r is in g  am o u n t is  a lre a d y  m e n tio n e d  in  th e  f ir s t  Critique.
1 The “Idea for a Universal History for a Cosmopolitan Intent” was published between the first 
and second editions of the first Critique.
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In  th e  n e x t tw o c h ap te rs , I  w ill e x am in e  th e  n e ce ssa ry  p rin c ip le s  a n d  
c r i te r ia  fo r  o u r  d iscussion  of m ora lity , re lig io n , a n d  po litics  as th e y  a re  p re ­
se n te d  b y  K a n t  in  h is  f ir s t  m a jo r (“c ritic a l”) w ork . In  th is  c h ap te r, I  w ill 
b rie fly  d isc u ss  K a n t’s  m a in  conclusions in  th e  f i r s t  Critique a s  th e y  p e r ta in  to 
o u r la te r  d isc u ss io n  of m orality . T h is  c h a p te r  is  n o t m e a n t  to b e  c o n tro v e r­
s ia l, n o r  i s  a n y  d efen se  a ttem p ted , b u t  o n ly  s e ts  a  basic , th o u g h  n ecessa ry , 
g ro u n d  fo r  l a te r  d iscussion . T hose  m ore  fa m ilia r  w ith  th e  f ir s t  Critique m ay  
w ish  to  sk ip  th is  c h a p te r . In  th e  n e x t c h a p te r , I  w ill d iscu ss  th o se  p a r t ic u la r  
concep ts w h ic h  K a n t  in tro d u c es  in  th e  “Id e a l  o f P u re  R eason” a n d  th e  
“T ra n s c e n d e n ta l  D octrine  o f M ethod” th a t  a re  e x p o u n d ed  upon  in  la te r  w r it­
in g s, p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  “Id ea .” T h is  seco n d  c h a p te r  offers new , i f  n o t con tro ­
v ers ia l, in te rp re ta t io n s .  I w ill t r y  to  show  t h a t  m u ch  o f th e  la te r  m o ra l a n d  
re lig io u s w r it in g s  a re  a n tic ip a te d  h e re , th o u g h  th e y  w ill u n d erg o  im p o r ta n t  
c h an g e s  a s  K a n t’s th e o rie s  develop.
n .
In  g e n e ra l, th e  Critique o f Pure Reason is  K a n t’s  a tte m p t to  f in d  th e  
fo u n d a tio n s  fo r h u m a n  experience  a n d  know ledge. K a n t  tr ie s  to  a n sw e r th e  
b ro a d  q u e s tio n s  o f  how  experience  i ts e lf  is  p o ss ib le  a n d  w h a t  k in d  o f k n o w l­
edge is  a t ta in a b le .  K a n t ta k e s  m a th e m a tic s  a n d  geom etry  to  be  th e  p r im e  
ex am p les  o f  th e  ach iev em en ts  o f h u m a n  re a so n . K a n t  w a s  c e r ta in  o f th e  
t r u th s  o f th e s e  sc iences, a n d  w as im p re sse d  a t  th e i r  a p p lica tio n  to  n a tu r a l  
science, e sp ec ia lly  th e  d iscoveries o f N ew ton . B u t  w hy  a re  w e m o st c e r ta in  of 
th e  k now ledge  fo u n d  in  th e se  a re a s  o f s tu d y ?  W h a t a llow s for th e  ju s tif ic a ­
tio n  o f su c h  k now ledge  a n d  in  w h a t  w ays c a n  w e be  c e r ta in  of it?
E sse n tia lly , K a n t  concludes t h a t  th e re  a re  tw o e le m e n ts  w h ich  allow  
fo r ex p erien ce  a n d  fo r know ledge b a se d  on  th e s e  experiences . T he  f i r s t  e le ­
m e n t is  th e  “in tu i t io n ” of space a n d  tim e. I n  o rd e r  to  h a v e  a n  experience  of 
a n  object, w e m u s t  h a v e  som e in it ia l  s e n sa tio n  o f th e  object, since “in tu it io n
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ta k e s  p la c e  on ly  in  so f a r  a s  th e  object is  given to  u s .”2 B u t th is  s e n sa tio n  a l­
w ay s com es to  u s  in  specific w ays, nam ely , a s  o c cu rrin g  in  sp ace  a n d  in  tim e. 
T h ro u g h  a  se r ie s  o f a rg u m e n ts ,3 h e  con tends t h a t  i t  is  th e  n a tu r e  o f th e  h u ­
m a n  m in d  to  in tu i t  a ll  ob jects in  accordance w ith  th e  fo rm s o f space  a n d  tim e. 
S p a c e  is  th e  fo rm  o f e x te rn a l  in tu itio n , w hile  tim e  is  th e  fo rm  o f in te r n a l  as 
w e ll a s  e x te rn a l  in tu itio n . In d ee d , K a n t  a rg u e s  t h a t  w ith o u t space  a n d  tim e, 
w e4 w o u ld  n o t be  ab le  to  ex p erien ce  objects a s  s e p a ra te  from  each  o th e r  a n d  
a s  s e p a ra te  from  o u rse lv es in  th e  f i r s t  place.
T h u s  space  a n d  tim e , K a n t  m a in ta in s , a re  tw o g u a ra n to r s  o f  th e  pos­
s ib ili ty  fo r  know ledge. T h is  i s  b e ca u se  we, a s  h u m a n  b e in g s , a re  c e r ta in  th a t  
i f  w e  a re  to  h a v e  a n y  ex p erien ce  o f a n  object w h a tso ev e r, w e w ill experience  
i t  i n  sp a ce  a n d  tim e . T h e  p ro p o sitio n s  of geom etry , th e n , a re  t r u e  b e c a u se  of 
th e  n e c e ssa ry  c h a ra c te r  o f o u r  in tu it io n s  of space;5 re g a rd le s s  o f w h a t  k in d  of 
ob ject is  in tu i te d , w e c a n  k n o w  tr u e  p ropositions o f geom etry , b e ca u se  o u r  in ­
tu it io n s  o f  sp ace  a n d  tim e  e x is t p r io r  to  an y  in tu i te d  object.6 T h ese  t r u th s  a re  
g e n u in e  d iscoveries, b u t  th e y  a re  d iscoveries on ly  i f  w e re a liz e  t h a t  sp a c e  an d  
tim e  a re  n o t  som ehow  “o u t th e re ,” som ehow  e x is tin g  a p a r t  fro m  th e  in tu itio n ; 
“sp a ce  does n o t  re p re se n t  a n y  p ro p e rty  of th in g s  in  th em se lv e s , n o r does i t  
r e p re s e n t  th e m  in  th e ir  re la tio n  to  one an o th e r... S p ace  is  n o th in g  b u t  th e
2 A19 = B33. All citations from the Critique o f Pure Reason will give the first and second edi­
tion Akademie page numbers and come from: Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965).
3 See especially in the “Aesthetic” and the “Antinomies.”
4 At least we as human beings. Other beings might be able to differentiate objects without in­
tuiting them through space and time, though we could not conceive how. See: Isabel Cabrera, “Two Ori­
entations for Kant’s Transcendental Arguments: An Example,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth Interna­
tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 164*5.
5 Kant, of course, thought this space to be necessarily Euclidean in character. Several commen­
tators have written on this fact. See: P.F. Strawson, “Imagination and Perception,” in Kant on Pure Rea­
son (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 82-99; James Hopkins, “Visual Geometry,” Philosophi­
cal Review, 82 (1973): 3-34; and Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant’s “Critique o f Pure Rea­
son" (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1992), 117-120.
6 It seems we would have to have some experience or other before we could be aware of the 
forms of the intuitions, though there are sections where Kant seems to think we might have a direct expe­
rience of the forms themselves.
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fo rm  o f a ll  ap p ea ran ces  o f o u te r  s e n se .”7 A t le a s t  in  th e  case  o f m a th e m a tic s  
a n d  geom etry , K a n t c an  show  th e  fo u n d a tio n  for experience  a n d  know ledge.
K a n t  m a in ta in s  th a t  i t  w as  n o t  u n til  th e  m a th e m a tic ia n s  a n d  geom e­
te r s  o f o ld  ch an g ed  th e ir  w ay  o f  th in k in g  abou t th e ir  d isc ip lin e  t h a t  th e y  
w e re  a b le  to  discover im p o r ta n t  t r u th s .  In  th e  “P reface” to  th e  second  e d itio n  
o f  th e  Critique, K a n t c la im s t h a t  th e s e  m en  h a d  to m ove from  th in k in g  ab o u t 
w h a t  co u ld  be deduced  from  th e  n a tu r e  o f th e  m a th e m a tic a l objects th e m ­
se lves , to  th e  rev o lu tio n a ry  a t te m p t
to bring out w hat was necessarily implied in the concepts th a t he had  himself 
formed a priori, and had p u t into the  figure in the construction by which he 
presented it to himself... [H]e m ust not ascribe to the  figure anything save 
w hat necessarily follows from w hat he has himself se t into it  in accordance 
w ith his concept.8
In  th is  w ay, th e  focus sh if ts  fro m  ho w  th e  objects m u st b e  in  th em se lv es, to  
h o w  th e y  m u s t be  fo r u s, how  th e  h u m a n  m in d  gives th e m  sh a p e  a n d  p ro p e r­
tie s . W e app ly  concepts o f m a th e m a tic s  a n d  geom etry  to  o u r  in tu it io n s , a n d  
w e a re  th u s  able to  p ro cu re  n e w  know ledge, b u t only by  d iscovering  th e  n a ­
tu r e  o f o u r own in tu it io n s  o f sp a ce  a n d  tim e, n o t by d iscovering  th e  n a tu re  
th e  objects them selves. Im p o rta n tly , K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  th is  m e th o d  a p ­
p lie s  n o t on ly  to objects o f m a th e m a tic s  a n d  geom etry, b u t  to  th e  objects o f 
sc ience  a s  well.
T h is  edict th a t  w e m u s t  n o t co n sid er ou r know ledge a s  con fo rm ing  to 
ob jects, b u t  r a th e r  t r e a t  ob jects o f th e  n a tu r a l  w orld  a s  con fo rm ing  to  o u r in ­
tu it io n  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g , h a s  com e to  be  know n as K a n t’s “C o p em ican
7 A26 = B42. Kant argues for this assertion not only in the “Aesthetic,” but also particularly in 
the “Antinomies,” where he asserts that space and time must necessarily be understood only as forms of 
intuition, because if they are taken to exist “out there” apart from our intuitions, many incongruities exist 
which can not otherwise be resolved.
8 B xii.
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R evo lu tion .”9 In  th e  sa m e  w ay  th a t  C opern icus rep laced  th e  E a r th  w ith  the  
S u n  a t  th e  cen te r  o f th e  so la r  system , K a n t now  rem oves th e  n a tu r a l  object 
from  th e  cen te r  of know ledge, rep lac in g  i t  w ith  h u m a n  reaso n :
By nature, in the  em pirical sense, we understand  the connection of appear­
ances as regards th e ir  existence according to necessary rules, th a t  is, according 
to laws. There are certain  laws which first make a nature possible, and  these 
laws are a priori. Em pirical laws can exist and  be discovered only through ex­
perience, and indeed in  consequence of those original laws through which ex­
perience itself first becomes possible.10
T h is  le a d s  u s  to  th e  seco n d  o f  tw o e lem en ts  w h ic h  allow  fo r ex p erien ce  a n d  
fo r know ledge b a se d  on  th e s e  experiences. K a n t’s  in v es tig a tio n  in to  th e  d is­
c ip lin es o f  m a th e m a tic s  a n d  geom etry  le a d  u s  to  th e  discovery o f in tu it io n s  of 
space  a n d  tim e. K a n t’s in v e s tig a tio n  in to  th e  fo u n d a tio n s  w h ich  a llow  fo r 
ex p erien ce  of th e  n a tu r a l  w o rld  lead s  u s  to  com bine  th e  p u re  in tu i t io n s  w ith  
p u re  concepts. T h ese  concep ts K a n t ca lls “c a teg o rie s” or “p u re  concep ts o f the  
u n d e rs ta n d in g .”
W hile  in tu it io n s  give h u m a n  b e ings th e  n e ce ssa ry  ra w  d a ta  of 
em p irica l se n sa tio n , th o u g h  on ly  a s  re p re se n te d  in  space a n d  tim e , th e  
ca teg o ries  allow  u s  to  th in k  a b o u t th is  d a ta . K a n t  d iv ides h u m a n  cognitive  
capacity , to  be  u n d e rs to o d  b road ly , in to  in tu it io n  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g .11 In  an  
o ften  c ite d  q uo ta tion , K a n t  say s  th a t , “w ith o u t se n s ib ility  no  ob ject w o u ld  be 
g iven  to  u s , w ith o u t u n d e rs ta n d in g  no object w o u ld  be  th o u g h t. T h o u g h ts  
w ith o u t c o n te n t a re  em p ty , in tu itio n s  w ith o u t concep ts  a re  b lin d .”12 In  o th e r  
w ords, w ith o u t se n sa tio n s , w e w ould, a t  best, h a v e  only  em p ty  concepts, w ith
9 Though there is at least one additional understanding of Kant’s “Copemican Revolution” 
which takes it to be the abandonment of the theoretical project for the practical project.
10 A216 = B263. First italics mine. See also A116 and A126-7.
11 Certainly there is some question about just how many faculties Kant gives us in the first Cri­
tique, but this is beyond the scope of this chapter. There may also be the faculty of reason, though this 
may simply be the understanding in its transcendent, unschematized employment. There may also be the 
faculties of judgment and imagination.
12 A51 =B75.
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n o th in g  to app ly  th em  to, a n d  w ith o u t u n d e rs ta n d in g , w e w ould  h a v e  som e 
ju m b le  o f im press ions to  w h ich  w e cou ld  give no  o rd e r  o r sign ificance.
H u m a n  be ings n eed  m a te r ia l  in  o rd e r  to  th in k , a n d  th u s  K a n t  ag rees, in  
p a r t ,  w ith  H um e’s conclusions t h a t  th e re  could  be  n o  know ledge w ith o u t f i r s t  
h a v in g  experience. B u t w h ile  som e experience  is  n e c e ssa ry  to  fu rn ish  th e  
h u m a n  m in d  w ith  e le m e n ts  o f  th o u g h t, “th o u g h  a ll  o u r  know ledge b eg in s  
w ith  experience, i t  does n o t fo llow  t h a t  i t  a ll  a r is e s  o u t  o f experience .”13 
S pace , tim e, a n d  th e  c a teg o rie s  e x is t  a priori in  th e  m in d  in  o rd e r th a t  th e  
ob jec ts o f experience m ig h t b e  a b le  to  be  th o u g h t in  th e  f i r s t  p lace.
N ow  K a n t is  ab le  to  a t te m p t  a n  an sw er to  th e  q u e s tio n  of know ledge  
in  th e  n a tu r a l  sciences. B e ca u se  ob jec ts m u s t conform  to  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g , 
a n d  b ecau se  th e  ca tego ries o f  th e  h u m a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a re  u n iv e rsa l, w e 
c a n  be  a s su re d  th a t  w h a te v e r  ob ject is  a n  object o f p o ss ib le  experience, i t  w ill 
h a v e  to  conform  to th e  c a teg o ries . C oncep ts o r c a teg o rie s  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d ­
in g , th o u g h  em p ty ,14 ex is t a priori, in  o rd e r th a t  th e  m a te r ia l  fu rn ish e d  by  
th e  se n se s  can  be th o u g h t. T h e  p a r t ic u la r  e m p iric a l law s  o f n a tu re , su c h  a s  
t h a t  o f th e  accelera tion  of g ra v ity  o r th e  m otion  o f th e  p la n e ts , w ill b e  b a se d  
on  th e s e  ru le s .15 N a tu ra l  sc ien ce  is  se cu re d  a s  a  body  o f know ledge b ecau se  
a n y  n a tu r a l  object we m ig h t e x p e rie n c e  m u s t conform  to  space , tim e, a n d  th e  
la w s  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , w h ic h  a re  n ecessa ry  a n d  u n iv e rs a l  for a ll  h u m a n  
b e in g s : “w e th e n  a s se r t  t h a t  th e  co n d itio n s o f th e  possibility o f experience in  
g e n e ra l a re  likew ise  co n d itio n s o f  th e  possibility o f the objects of experience, 
a n d  th a t  for th is  rea so n  th e y  h a v e  objective v a lid ity ...”16 H ence  in tu it io n  a n d
13 Bl.
14 “Thus the function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of the subject to predi­
cate... But as regards the merely logical employment of the understanding, it remains undetermined to 
which of the two concepts the function o f the subject, and to which the function of predicate, is to be as­
signed... Similarly with all the other categories” (B128-9). See also A.C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on 
K ant‘s  Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 132-75.
15 “...all empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding, un­
der which, and according to the norm of which, they first become possible” (A 127-8).
16 A158 = B197.
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u n d e rs ta n d in g  a re  th e  two e le m e n ts  w h ich  allow  fo r e x p erien ce  a n d  for 
k n o w led g e  b a s e d  on th e se  experiences .
S u c h  a  p o s itio n  h a s  tw o (im m ed ia te ) im p o rta n t co nsequences. T h e  
f i r s t  is  th e  fa c t t h a t  w e m ay  h a v e  know ledge  only  o f th o se  ob jec ts w h ich  s e n ­
s a tio n  p rov ides:
Objects are  given to us by m eans of sensibility, and i t  alone yields us intui­
tions', they  are  thought through the  understanding, and  from the understand­
ing arise concepts. But all thought m ust, directly or indirectly, by way of cer­
ta in  characters, relate  ultim ately  to intuitions, and  therefore, w ith  us, to sen­
sibility, because in no o ther way can an object be given to u s.17
H en ce , p u re  “ra t io n a l” ph ilosophy , l ik e  t h a t  o f L eibn iz  a n d  W olff, is  ru le d  o u t 
b y  K a n t, b e ca u se  th e  on ly  objects a b o u t w h ich  we m ay  h a v e  kn o w led g e  a re  
ob jec ts o f p o ss ib le  experience, a n d  ex p e rien ce  req u ire s  e m p iric a l in p u t  th a t  
con fo rm s to  th e  se n s ib le  in tu it io n s  o f  sp ace  a n d  tim e . T h e  ca teg o ries , ta k e n  
by  th e m se lv e s  a n d  n o t a p p lied  to  th e  in tu it io n s  (u n sch em atized ), a re  em pty . 
T h e y  p o ssess  on ly  log ical form s, a n d  h a v e  no  co n ten t. T h u s , n o  n e w  im p o r­
t a n t  k now ledge  c a n  b e  g a in ed  by  th e  m ere  a n a ly s is  o f concep ts. B ecause  
h u m a n s  a re  f in ite  in te llig en ces , w e c a n n o t c re a te  th e  ob jects th ro u g h  th o u g h t 
a lo n e  fo r w h ich  w e  m ig h t h a v e  a  concept; G od w ould  be  a b le  to  do su c h  a  
th in g , i.e ., b r in g in g  so m e th in g  in to  b e in g  th ro u g h  th o u g h t a lone , b u t  w e c a n ­
n o t .18 S u b se q u e n tly , how ever, th is  a lso  n e c e ss ita te s  th a t  w e c a n  d iscover 
n o th in g  a b o u t m e tap h y s ic s  sav e  fo r w h a t  c a n  be g iven  to  u s  a s  a n  object o f 
ex p erien ce .
T he  seco n d  co n sid erab le  consequence  o f K a n t’s p o s itio n  i s  t h a t  i t  p u ts  
a n  in c re d ib le  l im it  on  w h a t w e c a n  k n o w  in  sp ecu la tiv e  p h ilo so p h y ; w e c a n  
n e v e r  g e t to  th e  “th in g  in  itself* (die Sache an sich selbst o r  das Ding an sich),
17 A19 = B33.
18 We can, of course, bring geometrical objects “into being” through the construction of con­
cepts, but such objects have to be constructed in space, which means for Kant that they too are not known 
analytically.




a n d  a re  th e re fo re  re leg a ted  to  d e a lin g  w ith  m ere  a p p e a ra n c e s  (Erscheinung). 
B ecau se  a n y  object m u st f ir s t  be  sy n th e s iz e d  th ro u g h  th e  in tu it io n s  of space 
a n d  tim e  in  o rd e r  to be th o u g h t, w e a re  n e v e r  ab le  to  h a v e  a n  experience o f 
a n  ob jec t a p a r t  from  exp erien c in g  i t  in  sp ace  a n d  tim e. H ence , w e a re  only 
ab le  to  th in k  a b o u t ap p ea ran ces, n o t th in g s  in  them selves:
Since we cannot trea t the special conditions of sensibility [space and  time] as 
conditions of the possibility of things, b u t only of their appearances, we can in­
deed say  th a t  space comprehends all th ings th a t appear to us as external, bu t 
no t all th ings in themselves, by w hatever subject they are intuited, or whether 
they  be in tu ited  or not.19
T h u s , th e  ob jec ts we h av e  to  th in k  a b o u t, a n y  object of poss ib le  experience, 
m u s t  n o t  b e  th in g s  in  them se lves, b u t  on ly  a p p ea ran ces , t h a t  is , objects a l­
re a d y  in tu i te d  th ro u g h  space a n d  tim e . As N o rm an  K em p S m ith  su m m a­
rizes: “E x is te n c e  tak e s  a  th ree fo ld , n o t  a  m ere ly  d u a l form . B esides rep re ­
s e n ta t io n s  a n d  th in g s  in  th em se lv es, th e r e  e x is t th e  objects o f o u r  rep re se n ­
ta t io n s  — th e  e x te n d ed  w orld  o f o rd in a ry  experience  a n d  o f sc ience.”20 The 
p rice  fo r  th e  t r u th s  of science is  t h a t  k n o w led g e  of th e  n a tu r a l  w orld  m u s t be  
u n d e rs to o d  a s  know ledge only  o f a p p e a ra n c e s , n o t o f th in g s  in  them selves. 
T h e  d iscoveries o f science a re  in d e e d  s e c u re d  a s  know ledge, b u t  only  as 
kn o w led g e  o f th in g s  as th ey  a p p e a r  to  u s  in  space  a n d  tim e . H u m a n s , ac­
co rd in g  to  K a n t, h av e  no access to  th e  re a lm  o f th in g s  a s  th e y  a re  a p a r t  from  
o u r e x p e rien ce  o f  them , no experience  o f  w h a t  h e  te rm s th e  “n o u m en a l” 
re a lm . W e c a n  on ly  h ave  know ledge o f  w h a t  w e can  experience , a n d  we can  
only  e x p e rien c e  w h a t is  g iven to u s  a s  in tu i te d  th ro u g h  sp ace  a n d  tim e  an d  
th o u g h t b y  th e  categories.
19 A27 = B43.
20 Smith's Commentary, pp. 248-9.
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m .
T he h u m a n  se lf  is  also su b je c t to  su ch  a  re s tric tio n  of sp e c u la tiv e  
know ledge. T h is  re s tr ic tio n  is  e sp ec ia lly  im p o rta n t in  th is  book b e c a u se  o f 
o u r  fo rth co m in g  d iscussion  o f freed o m  a n d  im m o rta lity . A s H u m e  a rg u e d  so 
conv incing ly  in  A  Treatise o f Human Nature, w e sim ply  h a v e  no  e x p erien ce  of 
a  u n if ie d  “se lf.” W e h a v e  experiences o f th is  a n d  th a t  th o u g h t o r  som e p a r ­
t ic u la r  se n sa tio n , b u t  nev er of a  self; “fo r m y  p a r t ,  w h en  I  e n te r  m o s t in t i ­
m a te ly  in to  w h a t  I  ca ll myself, I  a lw ay s  s tu m b le  on som e p a r t ic u la r  p e rc e p ­
tio n  o r o th e r... I  n e v e r ca tch  myself at a n y  tim e  w ith o u t a  p e rcep tio n , a n d  
n e v e r can  observe  a n y  th in g  b u t  th e  p e rc ep tio n .”21 O n  one h a n d , K a n t  m u s t  
d isa g ree  w ith  H u m e ’s conclusion t h a t  th e re  is  no  u n ified  self. W h ile  th e  a r ­
g u m e n t for th i s  p o sitio n  is  m uch  too d e ta ile d  to  cover h e re , i ts  m a in  p re m ise  
is  in tu itiv e ly  s im p le : th e re  m u s t  be  a  u n i ty  o f experience in v o lv ed  i f  w e a re  
to  experience  ob jects a s  objects, t h a t  is , to  be  ab le  to d iffe ren tia te  b e tw e e n  
id en tica l, c h an g in g , o r d iffe ren t ob jects. W ith o u t such  a  u n ity  of ex perience , 
w h ich  K a n t c a lls  th e  “tra n s c e n d e n ta l u n i ty  o f appercep tion ,” th e re  w ou ld  
on ly  be  f le e tin g  im p ress io n s  of th e  m an ifo ld  o f experience, i f  even  th a t ;  “th e re  
can  b e  in  u s  n o  m odes o f know ledge, n o  connection  o r u n ity  o f one  m ode of 
know ledge w ith  a n o th e r , w ith o u t t h a t  u n i ty  o f consciousness w h ich  p reced es  
a ll d a ta  o f in tu itio n s , a n d  by re la tio n  to  w h ich  re p re se n ta tio n  o f ob jec ts  is  
a lone  possib le .”22
O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , how ever, K a n t  ag rees  w ith  H u m e t h a t  w e c a n  
h a v e  no  ex p erien ce  of a  self, n o r  c a n  w e h a v e  a n y  specu la tive  kn o w led g e  o f it. 
T h is  is  p r im a r ily  due  to  th e  fac t th a t ,  a s  se e n  above, w e can  only  h a v e  k n o w l­
edge o f ob jects a s  th e y  a re  g iven to  u s , a n d  th e  se lf  a s  g iven  is  o n ly  g iven  
th ro u g h  th e  in tu i t io n  o f tim e:
21 David Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), Book 1, Part IV, Section vi, pp. 252.
~  A107. See especially A107-8. A119. and B157-9.
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Consciousness of se lf according to the determ inations of our s ta te  in inner per­
ception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self 
can present itself in  th is  flux of inner appearances... W hat h as necessarily to 
be represented as num erically identical cannot be thought as such through 
empirical data .23
T he  se lf  can  only  be k n o w n  by  u s  as a n y  o th e r  ob jec t o f poss ib le  experience, 
n a m e ly  a s  i t  is  p re s e n te d  to  u s  th ro u g h  th e  in tu it io n . T h is  is  n o t  th e  se lf  a s  
th in g  i t  itse lf, b u t  on ly  s e lf  a s  a p p ea ran ce . T h is  is  th e  s e lf  w h ich  is  n o t only  
g iven  in  tim e, b u t  a lso  th o u g h t  th ro u g h  th e  ca teg o ries , a n d  h e n c e  m u s t b e  
sub jec t to  th ese  ca teg o ries . W e a re  ig n o ra n t o f  th e  t ru e  n a tu r e  o f th e  se lf  a s  
i t  m ay  b e  a p a r t  from  ex p erien ce .24 As K a n t concludes, b e ca u se  th e  categories 
or concepts o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a re  fo rm s on ly  a n d  invo lve  n o  c o n te n t per 
se, “th o u g h t ta k e s  no  acc o u n t w h a tso ev er o f th e  m ode o f in tu it io n , w h e th e r  i t  
be  sensib le  o r in te lle c tu a l. I  th e re b y  re p re s e n t m y se lf  to  m y se lf  n e ith e r  a s  I  
am  n o r a s  I a p p e a r  to  m yse lf. I  th in k  m y se lf  o n ly  a s  I  do a n y  ob jec t in  gen­
e ra l from  w hose m ode o f  in tu i t io n  I  a b s tra c t.”25 W e c an n o t k n o w  th e  se lf as  
su b s tan ce . W e c a n  h a v e  no  experience  o f th e  s e lf  a s  i t  is  in  itse lf . W e are  
only  p riv y  to receive  e m p iric a l im p ress io n s  w h ich  h a v e  b e en  in tu i te d  th ro u g h  
tim e  a n d  th o u g h t th ro u g h  th e  categories. W e c a n n o t say  w ith  specu la tive  
rea so n  w h e th e r  th e  so u l is  a  sim p le  su b s tan ce , w h e th e r  i t  w ill e x is t e te rn a lly , 
o r w h e th e r  i t  c an  m a in ta in  a  p e rso n a lity  over t im e .26
A  n a tu r a l  c o n s id e ra tio n  a fte r  th is  lin e  o f  th in k in g  is  to  in q u ire  
w h e th e r  sp ecu la tiv e  p h ilo so p h y , w hile  p ro v id in g  u s  w ith  no  p o sitiv e  
know ledge of th e  self, m a y  n e ce ss ita te  som e p ro h ib itio n s  re g a rd in g  th e  self. 
T he  specific concern  o f K a n t’s  is  w h e th e r  sp e cu la tiv e  p h ilo so p h y  ru le s  ou t th e  
p ossib ility  of freedom , d u e  to  i ts  in s is ten ce  on  th e  law s o f m ec h an ica l
23 A107. See also A350-1 and A381-2.
24 See especially A398-402, B409-413, and B421-2.
25 B428-9.
26 Such a position may lead to even more radical conclusions regarding the self, but we need 
not discuss them here. See: Smith’s Commentary, pp. 248-84.
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c a u sa tio n . K a n t can  a n sw e r  th is  q u e s tio n  on ly  a f te r  h is  d iscussion  o f th e  
“T h ird  A n tinom y .”
T h e  p ro b lem  o f  th e  “T h ird  A ntinom y” co n ce rn s freedom  a n d  m e c h a n i­
c a l c a u sa lity , a n d  a r is e s  in  th e  fo llow ing  w ay: r e a s o n  h a s  a n  in te re s t  in  
s e a rc h in g  o u t th e  u n c o n d itio n ed , th e  “entire sum o f conditions, and conse­
quently the absolutely unconditionedF fo r a n y  g iven  co n d itio n ed .27 T h e re  a re  
tw o  p o ss ib ilitie s  w h e n  c o n s id e rin g  a  co n d itio n ed  o c c u rr in g  w ith in  a  se r ie s  of 
e v e n ts  in  tim e: e i th e r  th e re  is  a  f i r s t  cau se , a n  u n c o n d itio n e d  w hich  b e g in s  
th e  s e r ie s  (i.e., freed o m 28), o r no  su c h  u n c o n d itio n ed  e x is ts , in  w hich  case  
th e re  i s  a n  in f in ite  s e r ie s . N ow  K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  su c h  a n  an tin o m y  a ris e s  
n a tu r a l ly  a n d  u n a v o id a b ly  fo r re a so n  b ecau se  i t  m u s t  a ssu m e  th a t  both th e se  
p o ss ib ilitie s  a re  co rrec t. O n  th e  one  h a n d , th e  th e s is  (freedom ) m u st b e  a s ­
s u m e d  t r u e  becau se  o th e rw ise  w e w ou ld  h av e  th e  p ro b lem  of a n  effect w ith  
no  c au se , only  a n  in f in ite  c h a in  o f effects. As L ew is W h ite  B eck exp la ins:
in  a  series of conditions and  conditions of conditions, there  is never a first con­
dition; bu t the law of na tu re  is th a t  nothing occurs w ithout a  condition th a t  is 
a  priori sufficient. Hence... the  law of nature  is self-contradictory when taken  
in  unlim ited generality .29
O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  a n ti th e s is  m u s t  h o ld  t r u e  i f  w e  a re  to  m a in ta in  th e  
co n cep t o f m ech an ica l c a u s a lity  fo r th e  experience  o f n a tu r e .  B eck  su m m a ­
rizes:
I f  there  is a  spontaneous cause or an  absolute beginning in the natural causal 
series, the la te r m em bers of the series are independent of the earlier, and 
thereby the “unity  of experience,” which depends upon the  lawfulness of events
27 A409 = B436. See also: A409-21 = B435-49. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter when dealing with the “Ideas of Reason.”
28 “By freedom... in its cosmological meaning, I understand the power of beginning a state 
spontaneously. Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under another cause determining it in time, 
as required by the law of nature.” A533 = B561.
29 p. 184. Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, Midway reprint. 1984).
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in tim e, is made impossible, and  thereby no criterion of em pirical tru th  or ob­
jectivity is possible.30
T h u s  re a so n  is  u n av o id ab ly  le a d  in to  a n  an tinom y, a n d  K a n t  t h i n k s  th a t  i t  is  
a b so lu te ly  c ru c ia l for re a so n  to  f in d  a  so lu tio n  to  th is  a n tin o m y  b e ca u se  i t  is  
o f re a so n 's  ow n m ak ing .31
T h e  so lu tion  to  th is  p ro b lem , o f course, is  t h a t  th e  n a tu r a l  w orld, 
w h ile  objective, is  only th e  w o rld  in tu i te d  th ro u g h  space, tim e , a n d  sub ject to 
th e  c a teg o rie s , a n d  th u s  is  o n ly  th e  em p irica l rea lm  of a p p e a ra n c e . T h is  is 
n o t th e  on ly  rea lm , for K a n t h a s  a lre a d y  a rg u e d  for th e  d iv is io n  b e tw e e n  ap ­
p e a ra n c e s  a n d  th in g s  in  th em se lv e s . T h u s,
if appearances are things in them selves, freedom cannot be upheld. Nature 
will th en  be the complete and  sufficient determining cause of every event. If, 
on the  o ther hand, appearances are  not taken for more th an  they  actually are; 
if they  are  viewed not as th ings in themselves, bu t merely as representations, 
connected according to em pirical laws, they m ust them selves have grounds 
which are not appearances... While the  effects are to be found in the  series of 
em pirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together w ith its causality, is out­
side the series. Thus the effect m ay be regarded as free in respect of its intel­
ligible cause, and a t the sam e tim e in respect of appearances as resulting from 
them  according to the necessity of na tu re .32
I f  one co n sid e rs  a p p ea ran ces  a s  th in g s  in  them selves, th e n  one m u s t  e lim i­
n a te  th e  p o ss ib ility  of freedom , b u t  a s  one  tak e s  th em  to b e  m e re  a p p e a r ­
ances, K a n t  concludes t h a t  freed o m  is  n o t  incom patib le  w ith  n a tu r a l  c au sa l­
ity . W h ile  w e n ecessa rily  a p p ly  th e  ca tego ry  o f c a u sa lity  to  ob jec ts o f  possible 
ex perience , a s  ap p ea ran ces , th e s e  ob jec ts h ave  a  “cau se” w h ich  m a y  n o t u lti­
m a te ly  b e  t h a t  o f an o th e r  a p p e a ra n c e ; a s  h e  says, a p p e a ra n c e s  “m u s t  have  
g ro u n d s  w h ich  a re  n o t a p p e a ra n c e s .” W e h av e  n o  id e a  how , u ltim a te ly , ap ­
p e a ra n c e s  com e to  be p e rce iv ed  b y  u s , fo r we c an  only ex p erien ce  a n y th in g
30 Beck’s Commentary, p. 185.
31 Cf. A476-85 = B504-13.
32 A536-7 = B564-5.
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th ro u g h  space a n d  tim e. T h u s , th e  an tin o m y  is  so lved  b e ca u se  m echan ica l 
c a u sa lity  is n e ce ssa ry  for ob jec ts of possib le  experience, w h ile  freedom  a s  an  
u n co n d itio n ed  cau se  is  p o ss ib le  fo r th in g s  in  th em se lv es; b o th  th e s is  a n d  a n ­
ti th e s is  a re  n e e d e d  fo r rea so n .
The so lu tio n  to  th is  a n tin o m y  c lears  th e  w ay  fo r h u m a n  freedom  as 
w ell. K a n t r ig h tly  n o tes  t h a t  a  w o rld  u n d ers to o d  a s  o p e ra tin g  com pletely  
u n d e r  th e  ru le s  o f m ec h an ica l c a u sa tio n  is  in co m p atib le  w ith  th e  possib ility  
o f h u m a n  freedom . B u t th e  d iv is io n  be tw een  n o u m e n a  a n d  p h e n o m e n a  also 
a p p lie s  to  th e  p e rso n . In  th i s  re sp ec t, w e m ay  r ig h tly  th in k  b o th  th a t  a n  ef­
fec t in  th e  w orld  w as s im p ly  o n e  cond itioned  am ong  a  ch a in  o f cond itions a n d  
t h a t  th e  effect w a s  b ro u g h t a b o u t a s  th e  re s u lt  o f a  co m p le te ly  sp o n tan eo u s 
a n d  u n co n d itio n ed  cause . T h u s , freedom  a n d  c a u sa lity  a re  n o t  con trad ic to ry  
no tions, for one h a s  to  do w ith  th e  s e lf  a s  a  n o n -em p irica l re a lity , w hile  th e  
o th e r  h a s  to do w ith  a p p e a ra n c e s  in  th e  world; th e  in te llig ib le  cau se  o f th e  
a p p ea ra n c e  m ay  b e  re g a rd e d  a s  free , w hile  th e  se rie s  o f  a p p e a ra n c e s  m ay  be 
c a u se d  according  to  th e  law s o f n a tu re .
IV.
H av ing  se en  how  th e  s e lf  a n d  freedom  a re  e x a m in e d  in  th e  f irs t  
Critique, we h a v e  fin a lly  to  d isc u ss  K a n t’s co n sid e ra tio n  o f  G od.33 K a n t gives 
on ly  tw o possib ilities  fo r know ledge  o f God, b o th  of w h ich  h e  re jec ts , n am ely  
know ledge b a sed  on  reaso n , a n d  know ledge b a se d  on  re v e la tio n .34 In  “T he  
Id e a l o f P u re  R eason ,” K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  th e re  a re  o n ly  th re e  possib le  
proofs fo r th e  ex is ten ce  o f G od,35 a ll  o f w hich  fa il. T h e  f i r s t  is  th e  “ontologi­
ca l” proof, w hich  h a s  i t  t h a t  G od  e x is ts  because  th e  co n cep t o f G od in c lu d es 
ev ery  possib le  perfec tion , o f w h ich  one  am ong th e m  is  “e x is ten ce .” K a n t
33 Kant maintains that “Metaphysics has as the proper object of its inquiries three ideas only: 
God, freedom, and immortality...” (B395 n.).
34 A631 =B659.
35 A590 = B618.
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c o u n te rs  th is  a rg u m e n t by c la im in g  th a t  th is  on ly  h o ld s tru e  i f  we excep t th e  
e x is ten ce  o f th e  object b e fo re h an d  as  i t  h a s  b e e n  defined; th is  is  lik e  o u r  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f a  tr ia n g le , fo r “to  p o s it  a  tr ia n g le , a n d  ye t to  re jec t i t s  th re e  
an g le s , is  se lf-con trad icto ry ; b u t  th e re  is  no  c o n tra d ic tio n  in  re je c tin g  th e  
t r ia n g le  to g e th e r w ith  i ts  th re e  ang les. T h e  sa m e  h o ld s  t ru e  o f th e  co n cep t of 
a n  a b so lu te ly  n e ce ssa ry  b e in g .”36 B ecause  w e define  th e  concept o f God, to  
p o s it  i t s  ex istence  b u t  to  th e n  re jec t one o f th e  c h a rac te ris tic s  w ould  be  
co n trad ic to ry ; b u t  re je c tin g  th e  ex istence  o f th e  ob ject o f th e  concept to g e th e r  
w ith  i ts  c h a rac te ris tic s  is  p e rm itte d . To do o th e rw ise  w ould  b e  to  a ssu m e  th e  
v e ry  object to  be p roved .37 T h e  o th e r  tw o p o ss ib le  proofs, K a n t c la im s, a re  th e  
“cosm ological” a n d  th e  “physico-theological”38 p roofs. H e a rg u e s  th a t  w h ile  
b o th  of th e m  begin  w ith  d iffe ren t p rem ise s , n a m e ly  som e type  o f experience  
o r o th e r , th e  key  to  th e i r  p ro o f a lw ays re d u c e s  to  th e  ontological a rg u m e n t 
above, a n d  a re  b o th  th e re fo re  in co n s is te n t.39 K a n t  c la im s th a t  a ll  o th e r  
a t te m p ts  a t  such  a  p ro o f a re  on ly  d iffe ren t v e rs io n s  o f th ese  th re e  m is ta k e n  
a rg u m e n ts .
G iven  th e  d iscussion  above, i t  sh o u ld  b e  c le a r  th a t  th e  on ly  p o ss ib le  
knowledge o f God h a v e  w ou ld  h av e  to  com e fro m  th e  experience  of G od a s  a n  
e m p iric a l object: w e c a n n o t know  G od from  th e  a n a ly s is  of concepts, a s  m a n y  
th in k e rs  h a v e  a tte m p te d , b ecau se  concep ts a re  e m p ty  a n d  w ith o u t c o n te n t 
u n t i l  t h a t  co n ten t is  su p p lie d  b y  th e  in tu it io n s . B u t  w h a t possib le  c o n te n t 
co u ld  be p rov ided  t h a t  cou ld  disclose a  t r a n s c e n d e n t  God? A ny experience  or 
“re v e la tio n ” w ould b e  su b jec t to  space, tim e , a n d  th e  categories, a n d  concern  
on ly  a p p ea ran ces . T h u s  K a n t concludes t h a t
36 A594-5 = B622-3.
37 A595 = 623.
38 We might call this the “teleological proof.”
39 On this reduction see: A590 = B618. A607 = B635. and A625 = B653.
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all a ttem p ts to employ reason in theology in any m erely speculative m anner 
are a ltogether fruitless and by the ir very nature  null and  void, and th a t the 
principles of its employment in the study  of nature do not lead to any theology 
whatsoever... All synthetic principles of reason allow only of an  im m anent 
employment; and  in order to have knowledge of a  suprem e being we should 
have to p u t them  to a transcendent use, for which ou r understanding is in no 
way fitted .40
W e c a n n o t d e riv e  know ledge  o f G od e i th e r  from  ra t io n a l  in q u iry  o r from  som e 
experience  o f  th e  d iv in e . T he c a teg o rie s  a re  th em se lv e s  em p ty , w h ile  re v e la ­
tio n  can  on ly  d isc lose  know ledge o f  th e  re a lm  o f a p p e a ra n c e s .
V.
W ere i t  n o t  fo r a  few  h in ts  a lo n g  th e  w ay, w e m ig h t  th in k  th a t  K a n t 
h a s  m ad e  i t  im p o ssib le  fo r u s  to  k n o w  a n y th in g  ab o u t G od, freedom , o r th e  
self. A nd, s tr ic t ly  sp e ak in g , th is  is  t ru e . B ecau se  k n o w led g e  m u s t d ea l w ith  
objects o f p o ss ib le  experience , w e c a n n o t h a v e  know ledge  o f  God, freedom , o r 
th e  self. B u t  a s  K a n t’s fam ous s ta te m e n t, “I  h a v e  th e re fo re  fo u n d  i t  n eces­
sa ry  to  d en y  knowledge, in  o rd er to  m a k e  room  for faith  (Glaube),”41 in d i­
ca tes , K a n t is  k e e n ly  a w a re  of th e  l im ita tio n s  h e  h a s  p la c e d  on  m etaphysics, 
a n d  looks fo r a  so u rce  o th e r  th a n  sp e c u la tiv e  rea so n  in  w h ic h  to  in v e s tig a te  
th e se  m e ta p h y s ic a l q u estio n s . T h is  sou rce , o f course, is  p ra c tic a l reaso n , a n d  
i t  is  w ith  p ra c tic a l  re a so n  th a t  K a n t  fee ls  w e c a n  h av e  a  r a t io n a l  b a s is  for 
b e lie f  re g a rd in g  God, freedom , a n d  th e  self, th o u g h  w e c a n n o t be  a s su re d  o f 
know ledge. A s K a n t’s  d iscussion  in  th e  “T h e  Id e a l o f P u re  R easo n ,” th e  
“A ppend ix  to  th e  T ra n sc e n d e n ta l D ia lec tic ,” a n d  th e  “T ra n sc e n d e n ta l  Doc­
tr in e  o f M eth o d ” in d ic a te s , h e  be lieves i t  is  o n ly  th ro u g h  a n  in v es tig a tio n  in to  
m o ra lity  t h a t  w e c a n  a sp ire  to a n sw e r  th e  m e ta p h y s ic a l q u estio n s;
But w hen all progress in the field of the  supersensible h as th u s been denied to 
speculative reason, it is still open to u s  to enquire w hether, in the practical 
knowledge of reason, da ta  m ay not be found sufficient to determ ine reason’s
40 A636 = B664.
41 Bxxx. See also A745 = B773.
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transcendent concept of the  unconditioned, and  so to enable us, in accordance 
w ith the wish of m etaphysics, and by m eans of knowledge th a t is possible a 
priori, though only from a  practical point of view, to pass beyond the lim its of 
all possible experience.42
T h o u g h  K a n t’s c ritica l p ro je c t h a s  p ro h ib ited  a n y  k n o w led g e  o f m etaphysics 
th ro u g h  specu la tive  re a so n , i t  a lso  h a s  th e  p o sitiv e  e ffec t o f n o t p lac ing  a n y  
d e fin ite  re s tric tio n s  u p o n  th e  possib le  n a tu re  o f G od, freedom , or th e  self. In  
o th e r  w ords, w hile  w e c a n n o t be  su re  th a t  th e se  th r e e  m e tap h y s ica l objects 
e x is t,43 n e ith e r  can  w e b e  c e r ta in  th a t  th e y  c an n o t. T h u s , K a n t  h a s  m ade  
room  fo r  fa ith .
Specifically, room  is  m ad e  av a ilab le  b y  th e  fa c t  th a t ,  w hile w e c a n ­
n o t  d ed u ce  a n y th in g  from  th e  m ere  form  o f th e  c o n cep ts  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d ­
in g , w e  c a n  u tilize  th em  i n  th in k in g . As K a n t e x p la in s , w h ile  I  can  only 
k n o w  a n  object th ro u g h  ex p erien ce  or a priori th ro u g h  rea so n , “though  w e 
c a n n o t  know  th ese  objects a s  th in g s  in  th em se lv es, w e  m u s t  y e t be in  a  p o si­
tio n  a t  le a s t  to  think th e m  a s  th in g s  in  them se lv es; o th e rw ise  w e shou ld  be  
la n d e d  in  th e  ab su rd  conclu sio n  th a t  th e re  c an  b e  a p p e a ra n c e  w ith o u t a n y ­
th in g  t h a t  a p p ea rs .”44 “I  c a n  think  w h a tev e r I  p le a se , p ro v id ed  only th a t  I  do 
n o t  c o n tra d ic t  m yself...”45 K a n t’s  th ree -fo ld  d iv is io n  o f  re a l ity  in to  re p re se n ­
ta t io n s , ap p ea ran ces , a n d  th in g s  in  them se lves, n e c e s s i ta te d  b y  th e  re s u lts  o f 
th e  Critique, allow s u s  to  th in k  abou t th e  n o u m e n a l re a lm , th o u g h  we c an n o t 
k n o w  a n y th in g  ab o u t it.
In  Section  Two o f “T h e  C anon  of P u re  R e a so n ,” K a n t  m akes h is  fa ­
m o u s s ta te m e n t  th a t , “a ll  th e  in te re s ts  of m y  re a so n , sp e cu la tiv e  as w ell a s  
p ra c tic a l, com bine in  th e  th r e e  follow ing q u estio n s: 1. W h a t c an  I  know?
42 Bxxi.
43 This is not an entirely accurate statement, since Kant believes freedom can indeed be known 
to be certain, as a necessary foundation for the known moral law, though he seems to refrain from calling 
this knowledge per se since it is not discovered through speculative reason.
44 Bxxvi-vii.
45 Bxxvi n. See also B146. A287-8 = B344. and A771-2 = B799-800.
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2. W h a t o u g h t I  to do? 3. W h a t m ay  I hope.”46 Above, w e h a v e  a lre ad y  seen  
K a n t’s a n sw e r to th e  f i r s t  q u estio n , a n d  seen  th a t  w e a re  q u ite  l im ite d  in  
w h a t w e c a n  ta k e  to  b e  know ledge  per se. T he  a n sw e r  to  th e  second question  
concerns th e  m o ra l la w  a s  sp e lle d  o u t in  th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e ; th is  
q u estio n  is  p a sse d  over fo r th e  m o st p a r t  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique, K a n t a ssu m in g  
h e re  t h a t  th e re  is  a  m o ra l law , th a t  w e h ave  access to  i t ,  a n d  th a t  i t  is  n o t in ­
c o n s is ten t w ith  sp e cu la tiv e  re a so n . I t  is to  th e  th ird  q u e s tio n  th a t  w e m u st 
now  tu rn .
As K a n t w ill e x p la in  in  g re a te r  d e ta il in  th e  Critique of Practical 
Reason, th o u g h  w e c a n n o t k n o w  God, freedom , a n d  a n  im m o rta l self, i f  th ese  
a re  n e ce ssa ry  c o rre la te s  to  th e  m o ra l law , w e m u s t postulate th e ir  existence. 
In  th e  f i r s t  Critique, K a n t  s im p ly  ta k e s  i t  for g ra n te d  t h a t  w e do h a v e  access 
to  th e  m o ra l law , th e  “ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e” o f th e  Grundlegung. F rom  th is  
po in t, h e  a rgues:
Now if it is indubitably certain  th a t something is or th a t  som ething ought to 
happen, bu t this certain ty  is a t  the same time only conditional, then  a certain 
determ inate condition of i t  can be absolutely necessary, or can be an optional 
and contingent presupposition... Now since there are  practical laws which are 
absolutely necessary, th a t  is, the moral laws, it m ust follow th a t if these nec­
essarily presuppose the existence of any being as the  condition of the possibil­
ity of their obligatory power, th is existence m ust be postulated... At some fu­
ture time we shall show th a t  the moral laws do not m erely presuppose the ex­
istence of a suprem e being, b u t also, as them selves in a different connection 
absolutely necessary, justify us in  postulating it, though, indeed, only from a 
practical point of view.47
T hus, K a n t in tro d u ces  th e  n e ce ss ity  o f p o s tu la te s  o f p u r e  p ra c tic a l reason . I f  
a  cond ition  is  n e c e ss ita te d  fo r obey ing  th e  m o ra l law , th e n  w e m u s t p o s tu la te  
th e  ex is tence  o f th is  cond ition , th o u g h  we can n o t k n o w  i t  to  ex is t. A s w e w ill 
see  in  g re a te r  d e ta il  below , freedom  is  necessita ted , b e c a u se  o th erw ise  we
46 A804-5 = B832-3.
47 A633-4 = B661-2. See also A818 = B846. and A823-29 = B851-57.
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w ould  be  su b je c t only  to th e  law s o f n a tu re , a n d  cou ld  n o t be p ra is e w o rth y  or 
b lam ew o rth y  fo r o u r actions. A n im m o rta l self, c o n ta in in g  a  c o n s is te n t 
p e rso n a lity , is  p o s tu la te d  so th a t  w e c a n  co n tin u e  th e  p ro jec t o f becom ing  
in c re a s in g ly  p e rfe c t m o ra l c re a tu re s , a s  th e  m o ra l la w  com m ands; o th e rw ise , 
ou r lives o n  e a r th  a lone  w ould  be too sh o rt, a n d  th e  m o ra l law  a b su rd . A nd, 
finally , w e m u s t  p o s tu la te  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  God, a  b e in g  w ho c a n  re w a rd  o r 
p u n ish  u s  in  accord  w ith  o u r leve l o f  m o ra l perfection  o r o u r good w ill. T hese  
p o s tu la te s  a re  th e  a n sw e r to  th e  th i r d  q u estio n , “W h a t m a y  I  hope?” a n d  a re  
m a tte rs  fo r  b e lie f  o r f a i th  (glaube), a n d  n o t know ledge.
W ith  th is  l a s t  q uestio n  in  m in d , a n d  h a v in g  e s ta b lish e d  som e c ru c ia l 
p a ra m e te rs  fo r o u r d iscussion  o f m o ra l p ro g ress , le t  u s  tu r n  now  to th e  n e x t 
c h a p te r  w h e re  w e w ill exam ine  K a n t’s u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f teleology, a n  im p o r­
ta n t  concep t fo r th e  in v es tig a tio n  o f  n a tu r e  a n d  h isto ry .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Teleology and the Highest Good in the First Critique
I.
W ith  o u r  la rg e r  in te r e s t  in  K a n t’s concep tion  o f  m o ra l  p ro g re ss  a n d  
th e  “Id e a  for a  U n iv e rsa l H is to ry  w ith  a  C osm opo litan  I n t e n t ” specifica lly  in  
m in d , th e re  a re  a  n u m b er of in te r e s t in g  p o in ts  to  b e  m a d e  re g a rd in g  th e  Cri­
tique o f Pure Reason a n d  K a n t’s  a n sw e r  to th e  q u e s tio n , “W h a t m ay  I  hope?” 
I n  th is  c h a p te r , th e re  a re  fo u r c e n tr a l  q u e s tio n s  w h ich  w ill  h e  ex am in ed : 1. 
W h a t is  th e  n a tu r e  of a n  “id ea ,” a n d  w h a t is th e  n a tu r e  o f  i t s  a p p lica tio n  to  
experience?  2. W h a t is  th e  n a tu r e  o f  K a n t’s con cep tio n  o f  teleology? 3. Is  
th e r e  a  conflict b e tw een  th e  a n sw e rs  to  th e  th r e e  q u e s tio n s  p o se d  b y  th e  i n ­
te r e s t  o f re a so n ? 1 4. W h a t is  th e  h ig h e s t  good a n d  w h e re  is  i t  located?  A ll 
fo u r  q u estio n s  a re  in te rre la te d . A s w e sh a ll see , i f  w e c a n  h a v e  som e in d ic a ­
t io n  a s  to  th e  a n sw e rs  to th e se  q u e s tio n s  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique, w e s h a l l  b e  in  a  
b e t te r  p o sitio n  to  assess  th e  c la im s K a n t  m ak e s  in  th e  “Id e a ,” a n d  in  h is  la te r  
w o rk s .
In  ad d itio n , i t  is  im p o r ta n t  fo r u s  to u n d e r s ta n d  h o w  K a n t  conceives 
o f  th e  a n sw e rs  to  th e se  fo u r q u e s tio n s  a t  th is  p o in t, m a n y  y e a rs  befo re  th e  
w r i t in g  o f th e  th i r d  Critique. T h is  o f  p a r t ic u la r  im p o r ta n c e  b e ca u se  m a n y  
co m m en ta to rs  th in k  th a t  K a n t’s  id e a s  o f teleo logy a re  v a s t ly  u n d e rd e v e lo p e d  
a t  th is  s tage , a n d  th a t  th ey  a re  n o t  so lid ified  u n t i l  th e  l a s t  Critique. I n  th e  
p re s e n ta tio n  o f  th e  above issu e s  in  th is  c h a p te r , e sp e c ia lly  th e  q u e s tio n  o f 
K a n t ’s  concep tion  o f teleology, i t  sh o u ld  becom e a p p a r e n t  t h a t  K a n t  h a d  a
1 What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? Discussed briefly in Chapter One
above.
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v ery  c le a r  no tion  o f th e  lim ita tio n s  of th e  u se  o f teleological id eas, a n d  t h a t  
h e  does n o t  dev ia te  from  th e  p a ra m e te rs  h e  h im sp lf recogn izes a n d  e s ta b ­
lish e s . H ence , i f  K a n t is  a w a re  o f th e  n e c e ssa ry  lim ita tio n s , w hich  I  t h in k  h e  
is, th e n  w e ough t n o t a t t r ib u te  a  "m ere o v e rs ig h t” to  h is  th in k in g  in  h is  s u b ­
s e q u e n t p o litica l w ritin g s  ( th e  “Id e a ” a n d  “T h eo ry  a n d  P rac tice ,” fo r e x am p le ) 
i f  w e f in d  a  claim  w hich  s tr ik e s  u s  a t  f i r s t  a s  possib ly  too s tro n g . I f  K a n t  is  
c le a r  in  h is  conception o f th e  co rrec t em p loym en t of teleo log ical id e a s  i n  th e  
f ir s t  Critique, th e n  w e o u g h t to  g ive h im  th e  b en efit o f th e  d o u b t w h en , in  
la te r  c h a p te rs , we an a ly ze  th e s e  a d d itio n a l w ritings . F o r now , le t  u s  a t ­
te m p t to  a n sw e r th e  fo u r q u e s tio n s  I  h a v e  ou tlined .
n .
Id e a s  a re  n ecessa ry , K a n t a rg u es , fo r th e  sy s tem iza tio n  of th e  u n d e r ­
s ta n d in g . J u s t  as th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  d e a lt on ly  w ith  th e  in fo rm a tio n  g iv en  to  
i t  by  th e  in tu itio n s , sy n th e s iz in g  a n d  o rg an iz in g  th is  in fo rm atio n , re a so n  
d ea ls  o n ly  w ith  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , o rg an iz in g  i t  a n d  g iv ing  i t  s tru c tu re ;
the  transcendental concept of reason is directed always solely towards absolute 
to ta lity  in the synthesis of conditions, and  never term inates save in w h a t is 
absolutely, th a t is, in all relations, unconditioned... Reason concerns itse lf  ex­
clusively with absolute to tality  in the employment of the concepts of th e  un ­
derstanding, and endeavours to carry the  synthetic unity, which is though t in 
the  category, up to the completely unconditioned.2
[Transcendental ideas] are concepts of pure reason, in th a t they view all 
knowledge gained in experience as being determined through an absolute to­
ta lity  of conditions.3
In  th e  “F i r s t  Book o f th e  T ra n sc e n d e n ta l D ia lec tic” a n d  in  “T h e  Id ea l o f  P u r e  
R easo n ,” K a n t  a rg u es for th e  ex is tence  o f th r e e  ideas, b a se d  u p o n  th e  th r e e  
c a teg o rie s  o f  R ela tion . E ac h  id e a  gives th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a  to ta lity  to w a rd s  
w h ich  i t  c a n  d irec t i ts  actions, th o u g h  su ch  a  to ta lity  cou ld  n e v e r be  th e
2 A326 = B382-3.
3 A327 = B384.
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object o f  a n  experience. T he f i r s t  is  th e  id e a  o f  t h a t  w h ich  is  a  su b je c t a n d  
n e v er a  p re d ic a te , th e  second is  t h a t  w hich  is  u n co n d itio n ed  in  th e  se r ie s  of 
cond itions o f  ap p ea ra n c e , a n d  th e  la s t  is  th e  id e a  o f th e  “ens realissimum ,” o r 
th a t  w h ich  is  th e  su m  o f a ll po ssib le  p red ic a te s . T h ese  th re e  id ea s  o f  rea so n  
p rov ide  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  w ith  to ta litie s , id e a s  of th e  uncond itioned , 
com pelling  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  to  m ove beyond  p a r t ic u la r  g e n e ra liza tio n s  to 
give to ta l i ty  to  experience.
B u t  th e s e  id ea s  m u s t be  ta k e n  a s  re g u la tiv e  only, a n d  n o t c o n s titu ­
tive, fo r th e y  a re  only gu ides t h a t  re a so n  a p p lie s  to  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n d  
do n o t c o n s titu te  an y  object of p o ss ib le  experience . T h e  (schem atized ) c a te ­
gories o f  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a llow  fo r ex p erien ce  o f objects in  th e  f i r s t  p lace, 
a n d  a re  th u s  c o n s titu tiv e  of experience. T he id e a s , w h ile  o rg an iz in g  th e  u n ­
d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  g iv ing  u s  a  b a s is  fo r th e  in v e s tig a tio n  o f n a tu ra l  sc iences, do 
n o t c o n s titu te  th e  objects of experience:
I accordingly m aintain  th a t transcendental ideas never allow of any constitu­
tive employment... On the o ther hand, they have an excellent, and  indeed in­
dispensably necessary, regulative employment, namely, th a t of directing the 
understanding  towards a certain  goal upon which the routes m arked out by all 
its rules converge, as upon the ir point of intersection. This point is indeed a 
m ere idea, a  focus imaginarius... This illusion... is indispensably necessary if 
we are  to direct the understanding beyond every given experience...4
W e c a n n o t m e e t th e  u n co n d itio n ed  o r to ta lity  i n  experience, y e t th e s e  id e a s  
a re  n e c e ssa ry  i f  u n d e rs ta n d in g  is  to  m ove b e y o n d  a  ran d o m  co n g lo m era te  of 
ru le s  in to  th e  fo rm u la tio n  of a  sy s te m a tic  sc ience. T h u s  K a n t say s  t h a t  th e  
id e a  is  b e s t  th o u g h t o f n o t as a n  object given, b u t  r a th e r  a s  a  p ro b lem  to be 
solved, fo r “a lth o u g h  w e can n o t h a v e  a n y  k now ledge  o f th e  object w h ich  
co rre sp o n d s to  a n  idea , w e y e t h a v e  a  p ro b lem atic  concep t of i t .”5 “I f  th e  
co n d itio n ed  is  given, a  reg ress  in  th e  se rie s  o f a ll  i ts  cond itions is  set u s  as a
4 A644-5 = B672-3.
5 A339 = B397.
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ta sk”6 R eason  g u id es  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  to  sy s te m a tize  i ts  know ledge 
th ro u g h  i ts  a p p lic a tio n  of th e  ca tego ries . I f  w e ta k e  th e m  to  be m ore th a n  
m ere ly  reg u la tiv e , w e e n d  up  w ith  th e  p a ra lo g ism s , th e  an tin o m ies, a n d  th e  
th re e  m is ta k e n  p roo fs fo r th e  ex is tence  o f  God.
B u t a lo n g  w ith  id eas  w hich  a llow  fo r th e  fu r th e r in g  o f th e  s tu d y  o f 
n a tu re ,  K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  th e re  e x is t id e a s  w hich  a llow  o f an  in flu e n ce  in  
th e  sp h e re  o f p ra c tic a l reason . T h ese  in c lu d e  th e  id e a  o f  God, freedom , a n d  
im m o rta lity  o f a  p e rm a n e n t  soul, i.e., th e  sa m e  th re e  ca teg o ries  o f R e la tio n  
a p p lie d  now  to  p ra c tic e , a s  w ell as, K a n t  m a in ta in s , th e  id e a  of th e  h ig h e s t  
good, a n d  o f a  p e rfe c tly  o rgan ized  a n d  e ffe c tu a l c o n s titu tio n . T he fu n c tio n  of 
re a so n  is  th e  o rd e r in g  o f ends, fo r b o th  th e  sp ecu la tiv e  a n d  th e  p rac tic a l 
sp h e re , "and  a s  su c h  [reason] is  n o t b o u n d  dow n to  n a tu r a l  conditions, i t  is  
ju s t if ie d  in  e x te n d in g  th e  o rd er o f en d s, a n d  th e re w ith  o u r  ow n ex istence , b e ­
y o n d  th e  lim its  o f  experience  a n d  of life .”7 A s w e saw  in  C h a p te r  O ne above 
a n d  w ill see a g a in  below , rea so n  m ay  e x te n d  i ts e lf  th u s  b ecau se  th e  n e ce s­
sa ry  cond itions fo r  a d h e rin g  to  th e  m o ra l la w  m u s t  be  p o s tu la te d  i f  th e  m o ra l 
la w  is  tru e . T h e se  id e a s  a re  n o t m a tte r s  fo r  know ledge, y e t  a re  n o t m ere  
op in ions or h y p o th es is . T hey  a re  p ro p e rly  te rm e d  “p o s tu la te s” of p u re  p r a c t i ­
c a l rea so n , o r “be lie fs .” R eason  gives ru le s  a s  id e a s  for th e  o rd erin g  o f th e  
u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n d
is here, indeed, exercising causality, as actually  bringing about th a t which its 
concept contains; and of such wisdom we cannot, therefore, say disparagingly 
it is only an idea. On the contrary, ju s t because it is the  idea of the necessary 
unity of all possible ends, it m ust as an  original, and a t  least restrictive condi­
tion, serve as s tandard  in  all th a t bears on the  practical.8
6 A497-8 = B526. See also A287 = B344, A328 = 384-5, and A499 = B527.
7 B425.
8 A328 = B385.
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J u s t  b ecau se  th e  id ea s  a re  n o t to  be  m e t  w ith  in  experience, t h a t  does no t 
m e a n  th e y  a re  “m ere” id eas , fo r K a n t  d eem s th em  n e ce ssa ry  fo r th e  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  fo r p ra c tic a l re a so n , fo r  “i t  is  only by  m e a n s  o f  th is  id e a  
t h a t  a n y  ju d g m e n t a s  to  m o ra l w o rth  o r i t s  opposite  is  p o ss ib le .”9 T h e  id e a s  
o f r e a s o n  a re  a  p ro ject. A s such , th e y  o rd e r  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  in  th e  
in v e s tig a tio n  of n a tu re , b u t  a lso  o rd e r  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  to w a rd s  th e  m o ra l 
e n d s  o f  rea so n . In  th is  w ay , re a so n  c a n  h e lp  to  b rin g  ab o u t i t s  ob ject, th o u g h  
o n ly  in  p a r t ,  a n d  only  a s  a  p ro jec t.10 T h e  id e a s  give u s  a  to ta lity , a  “u n ity  o f  
a ll  p o ss ib le  ends,” a n d  o rd e r  th o se  e n d s  a p p ro p ria te ly , th o u g h  w e c a n  n e v e r  
k n o w  th e  ex istence o f su ch  a  to ta lity . In  th is  w ay, id ea s  a id  p ra c t ic a l  re a so n  
in  th e  in s tru c tio n  o f th e  co rrec t e n d s  fo r m o ra lity .
G iven  our in te r e s t  in  th e  “I d e a  fo r  a  U n iv e rsa l H is to ry  w ith  a  Cosm o­
p o lita n  In te n t ,” i t  is  in te re s tin g  t h a t  th e  v e ry  f irs t  id ea  th a t  K a n t  p ro v id es  in  
th e  f i r s t  Critique a s  a n  ex am p le  is  t h e  id e a  o f a  perfec t c o n s titu tio n . In  r e ­
c o n s tru c tin g  P la to ’s  concep tion  o f a n  id e a , p a r tic u la r ly  a  p ra c tic a l  id e a  as 
p re s e n te d  in  th e  Republic, K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t
a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in  accordance w ith 
laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all oth­
ers — I do not speak of the g rea test happiness, for this will follow of itself — is 
a t  any ra te  a necessary idea, which m u st be taken as fundam ental not only in 
first projecting a  constitution b u t in  all its  law s.11
K a n t  goes on  to  c la im  in  th is  sec tion , m u c h  in  th e  sam e w ay  a s  in  th e  second  
book  o f th e  Metaphysics o f Morals, t h a t  th e  o rg an iza tio n  o f p o litic a l in s t i tu ­
t io n s  m u s t  be  e s tab lish ed  in  acco rdance  w ith  o u r  ideas, a n d  c a n n o t  b e  b a se d  
on ex p erien ce . T his w ou ld  be  m u ch  th e  sa m e  a s  th e  e rro r  of t r y in g  to  d isce rn  
th e  n o tio n  o f perfec t v ir tu e  from  e x a m p le s  o f experience. I t  i s  on ly  b ecau se
9 A315 = B372. See also A569 = B597.
10 A328 = B384-5.
11 A316 = B373.
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th e  id e a s  o f  re a so n  a re  n o t to be m e t w ith  in  experience  th a t  th ey  a re  ab le  to  
fu n c tio n  a s  g ro u n d s  fo r m ora l ju d g m e n t a n d  com parison . C o n stitu tio n s  m u s t  
be  c re a te d  w ith  th e  m o ra l law  a n d  th e  id e a  o f th e  g re a te s t  possib le  rec ip ro ca l 
freedom  a n d  n o t  c re a te d  from  “a d v e rse  experience. S u c h  experience  w o u ld  
n e v e r h a v e  e x is te d  a t  all, i f  a t  th e  p ro p e r  tim e  those  in s t itu tio n s  h a d  b e e n  e s ­
ta b lish e d  in  acco rdance  w ith  id e a s ...”12 K a n t  a rg u es  t h a t  we h a v e  id e a s  o f 
p e rfec t v i r tu e  a n d  a  perfec tly  fu n c tio n in g  society, a n d  i t  is  th ese  id e a s  w h ich  
allow  fo r p ra c tic a l  re a so n  to  h av e  c a u s a l  efficacy.
T h re e  p o in ts  a re  im p o r ta n t to  n o te  abou t K a n t’s  d iscussion  o f  th e  p e r ­
fec t c o n s titu tio n . F ir s t ,  th is  d iscu ssio n  occurs w ith in  a  d iscussion  o f th e  p o s­
sib le  m o ra l p e rfe c tio n  o f h u m a n  b e in g s , a n d  th u s  p ro v id es  u s  w ith  o u r  f i r s t  
c lue  th a t  m o ra l p e rfec tio n  is  som ehow  l in k e d  to  p o litica l in s titu tio n s . B efore  
th e  ex am p le , K a n t  ta lk s  a b o u t v ir tu e  a n d  th e  “ap p ro ach  to  m oral p e rfe c ­
tio n .”13 A fte r  th e  exam ple , he  m a in ta in s  th a t:
in a  perfect s ta te  no punishm ents w hatsoever would be required. This perfect 
s ta te  m ay never, indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect the 
rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organization of 
m ankind ever nearer to its g rea test possible perfection, advances th is  m axi­
mum as  an  archetype. For w hat th e  highest degree m ay be a t  which m a n k i n d 
may have to come to a stand, and how great a gulf m ay still have to be left be­
tween the  idea and  its realization, a re  questions which no one can, or ought to, 
answ er.14
In  su ch  a  s i tu a t io n , th e  po litica l a n d  le g a l  in s titu tio n s  w ou ld  be  so efficacious 
th a t  p e rso n s , w h ile  h a v in g  th e  g re a te s t  poss ib le  freedom , sim ply  w o u ld  n o t 
im p in g e  o n  th e  freed o m  of o th e rs . T h is  i s  re q u ire d  b y  th e  m o ra l la w  a t  i ts  
perfection , a t  le a s t  in  i t s  e x te rn a l a p p lica tio n , a n d  no  p u n ish m e n t w o u ld  be  
n e ce ssa ry  b e c a u se  no  one w ou ld  ac t (ex te rn a lly ) in  opposition  to  th e  m o ra l 
law . I t  s h o u ld  be  no ted , o f course, t h a t  in  su ch  a  S ta te , p e rso n s  w ou ld  n o t
12 A316-7 = B373.
13 A315 = B372, quoted above.
14 A317 = B373-4.
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n ecessa rily  be m orally  perfec t, for th ey  cou ld  in d ee d  b e  a c tin g  legally  w ith o u t 
h a v in g  a  good w ill o r a tte m p tin g  to ac t from  d u ty  a lo n e .15 H ence, K a n t is  n o t 
c la im in g  h e re  th a t  a  S ta te  o rgan ized  in  com plete  accordance  w ith  th e  id e a  o f 
freedom  w ould sim p ly  be a  s i tu a tio n  in  w h ich  in d iv id u a ls  a re  m orally  p e rfec t. 
B u t th e re  is a n  im p o r ta n t  lin k , th e  n a tu re  o f  w hich  w e c a n n o t d iscern  fo r c e r ­
ta in  in  th is  context a lone , be tw een  th e  p ro jec t o f m o ra l perfection , a n d  th e  
p ro jec t of political a n d  le g a l perfection .
T he second im p o r ta n t  p o in t can  on ly  b e  m en tio n ed  h e re , to  be  ex ­
p la in e d  la te r , b u t  is  in  a  s im ila r  vein  a s  th e  f i r s t  p o in t. In  th e  p a ra g ra p h  
follow ing th e  f irs t  ex am p le  o f a n  idea, K a n t w rites:
It is, however, in regard  to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, 
where the experience, in th is case of the good, is itself made possible only by 
the ideas -- incomplete as their empirical expression m ust always rem ain  -- 
th a t Plato’s teaching exhibits its quite peculiar m erits... For whereas, so fa r as 
na ture  is concerned, experience supplies the  rules and  is the source of tru th , in 
respect of the m oral laws it is, alas, the m other of illusion!16
W h a t is  of in te re s t h e re  is  th e  lin k in g  o f th e  m o ra l law  n o t on ly  w ith  m o ra lity  
a n d  relig ion, b u t ag a in  w ith  leg isla tion . W e can  sa y  l i t t le  h e re  ab o u t th e  n a ­
tu re  o f th is  link , b u t  i t  sh o u ld  be n o ted  t h a t  K a n t is  m a in ta in in g  th a t  i t  is  
on ly  w ith  th e  id eas of re a so n  th a t  th e re  c a n  be  som e ju d g m e n t re g a rd in g  
th e s e  th re e  a reas.
T he  th ird  im p o r ta n t  p o in t to  no te  is  th a t  K a n t i s  c lea rly  concerned  
w ith  th e  id ea  of po litica l, i f  n o t m oral, p ro g ress  from  th e  s ta n d p o in t of 
p ra c tic a l a n d  no t sp e cu la tiv e  reaso n . O ccu rrin g  a fte r  th e  f i r s t  exam ple  o f  a n  
id ea , w hich  we n o ted  above  concerned  a  p o litica l c o n s titu tio n , K a n t w rite s  a s  
a  tra n s itio n : “B u t i t  is  n o t  on ly  w here  h u m a n  rea so n  e x h ib its  gen u in e
15 See Kant’s Metaphysics o f Morals.
16 A318 = B37S, italics added for emphasis. “If we set aside the exaggerations in Plato's meth­
ods of expression, the philosopher’s spiritual flight from the ectypal mode of reflecting upon the physical 
world-order to the architectonic ordering of it according to ends, that is, according to ideas, is an enter­
prise which calls for respect and imitation.” (A318 = B375). See also A314 = B371 and A569 = B597.
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cau sa lity , a n d  w h ere  id ea s  a re  opera tive  c au ses  (o f ac tio n s  a n d  th e ir  objects), 
n am ely , in  th e  m o ra l sp h e re , b u t  a lso  in  re g a rd  to  n a tu r e  itse lf, th a t  P la to  
r ig h tly  d iscerns c le a r  p roofs o f a n  orig in  from  id e a s .”17 H ere  w e see  t h a t  th e  
p ro g ress  o f th e  h u m a n  species, p a r tic u la r ly  th e  c re a tio n  o f c o n tin u a lly  
im prov ing  p o litica l in s t i tu t io n s , is  a n  id ea  w h ich  K a n t  d iscusses in  
connection  w ith  “th e  m o ra l sp h e re ” before h e  p ro ceed s to  d iscuss th e  teleo logy  
o f  n a tu re . W h a t th is  show s i s  t h a t  th e  d iscussion  o f  po litica l p ro g ress  in  
h is to ry  o rig in a te s  w ith  p ra c tic a l  considera tions, a n d  n o t sp ecu la tiv e  ones. 
K a n t  considers n a tu r a l  te leo logy  a f te r  h is  d iscu ssio n  o f po litica l p ro g ress , 
show ing, a t  le a s t  in  th e  Critique o f Pure Reason, t h a t  p o litica l p ro g re ss  a n d  
th e  g re a te s t possib le  h u m a n  freedom  are  m a tte rs  o f  concern  fo r p ra c tic a l 
re a so n  an d  hence  fo r th e  in te re s ts  o f m o ra lity .18 T h is  top ic  is  n o t a  m a t te r  o f 
th e  specu la tive  concern  o f h o w  to  m ak e  a  science o f  “h is to ry ,” n o r w ith  h o w  to  
co m p reh en d  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f po litica l in s t i tu t io n s  a s  a  m a tte r  o f 
specu la tive  in te re s t. T h is  i s  c o n tra ry  to m an y  c o m m en ta to rs’ c la im s t h a t  
su c h  a  d iscussion  o f h u m a n  p ro g re s s  a n d  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f po litica l 
in s titu tio n s , bo th  h e re  a n d  in  th e  “Id ea ,” is  s im p ly  a  p rim itiv e  v ers io n  o f  
K a n t’s view  of teleo logy w h ich  w ill m a tu re  in  th e  Critique o f Judgment.
B efore we c an  say  m ore  a b o u t th is , w e n eed  to sa y  so m e th in g  f i r s t  a b o u t 
K a n t’s spe lling  o u t o f th e  n o tio n  o f teleology in  th e  f i r s t  Critique.
UL
K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  id e a  of teleology is  n e ce ssa ry  fo r u s  to  o rg a n ­
ize  th e  categories a n d  to  h a v e  a  science of n a tu re  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace. W hy  th is  
is  so m ay  be seen  w ith  a  re la tiv e ly  sim ple  exam ple . Im ag in e  d issec tin g  a  frog  
a n d  try in g  to  fig u re  o u t i ts  n a tu re ,  how  i t  fu n c tio n s. I f  w e ignore  th e  id e a s  o f 
rea so n , th e  only  (m en ta l) m a te r ia ls  w e h av e  to  w o rk  w ith  a re  space, tim e , 
a n d  th e  categories. S p ace  a n d  tim e  a re  n ecessa ry  fo r  u s  to  experience  th e
17 A317 = B374.
18 See also the ending transition of this paragraph. A318 = B375.
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fro g  a s  a n  a p p ea ra n c e . T h e  ca tegories le t  u s  t h in k  o f  su b s ta n c e , com m unity , 
a n d  o f  c a u se  a n d  effect. B u t  th e s e  a re  on ly  th o u g h ts  a b o u t “b lin d ” m a te r ia l  
c a u sa lity . T h is is  on ly  th e  concep t of “b ill ia rd  b a lls ” o f p h y s ic a l su b stan ce  
(co rpuscles, a tom s, q u a rk s , etc.) knock ing  in to  o ne  a n o th e r  a n d  effecting e ac h  
o th e r . T h e  q u estio n  is , h o w  co u ld  such  b lin d  m a t te r  se lf-o rgan ize?19 H ow  
c o u ld  a ll  th e  p a r ts  a n d  o rg a n s  o f a  frog w ork  to g e th e r  to  k eep  a  w hole frog  
a live?  M ore  p recisely , th e  q u e s tio n  is, how  co u ld  o u r  h u m a n  m e n ta l m a te r i­
a ls  o f in tu i t io n  a n d  th e  ca teg o rie s  alone le a d  u s  to  h a v e  a n  experience o f a  
se lf-o rg a n iz in g  o rgan ism ? T h is  is  th e  q u estio n  t h a t  co n ce rn s K an t, th o u g h  i t  
w ill co n ce rn  h im  a g a in  in  th e  Critique o f Judgment. H is  a n sw e r is  th a t ,  in  
o rd e r  to  h a v e  a  n a tu r a l  sc ience, p a r tic u la r ly  one co n ce rn e d  w ith  liv ing  o rg a n ­
ism s, w e m u s t  a t  l e a s t  th in k  o f  o rg an ism s a s  c re a te d  in  accord  w ith  a  concept. 
T h is  is  re a so n ’s id e a  o f teleology.
Teleology is  th e  id e a  t h a t  liv ing  b e in g s a re  o rg a n iz e d  according  to  a  
concep t, t h a t  th e  concept p la y s  a  c au sa l ro le  in  th e  com ing  to  b e  of th e  being . 
F o r  ex am p le , w hen  a  w a tc h m a k e r  m ak es a  w a tch , th e  concep ts s/he h a s  o f a  
w a tch , n a m e ly  th e  w ay  a ll th e  p a r t s  in te ra c t  in  o rd e r  fo r th e  w atch  to keep  
p ro p e r  tim e , is  p a r t  of th e  c a u se  in  e x p la in in g  h o w  th e  w a tch  cam e in to  ex is­
ten c e .20 T h e  sam e  is  t ru e  w h e n  w e th in k  a b o u t l iv in g  o rg an ism s. We m u s t 
e x a m in e  th e m  as i f  th e y  w ere  c re a te d  in  accord  w ith  a  concept. We m u st 
th in k  o f  th e m  as i f  a ll  th e  p a r t s  w ere  o rg an ized  fo r a  p a r t ic u la r  end, a n d  th u s  
th e  teleological a sp ec t of th e  id e a . T he  on ly  w ay  w e c a n  do th is , K a n t m a in ­
ta in s , is  to  th in k  o f th in g s  a s  h a v in g  been  c re a te d  b y  a n  in te llig e n t au th o r, 
m u c h  in  th e  sam e w ay  as w e m u s t  th in k  o f th e  w a tc h m a k e r  w h en  exa m in in g  
a  w a tc h . H ence , K a n t a rg u es:
The speculative in terest of reason makes it necessary to regard  all order in the 
world as if it had  originated in the purpose of a  suprem e reason. Such a
19 Cf. A625 = B653.
:o Cf. A626 = B654.
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principle opens out to our reason, as applied in the field of experience, 
altogether new views as to how the things of the world m ay be connected 
according to teleological laws, and  so enables it to arrive a t  the ir greatest 
system atic unity.21
T h e  id e a  of teleology, a n d  w ith  i t  th e  id e a  of a  su p rem e  in te llig en c e  a s  a u th o r  
o f  th e  w orld , e n a b le s  us to  b e g in  o u r  in v e s tig a tio n  o f n a tu re ,  a n d  to  b r in g  th e  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  in to  a  h ig h e r  le v e l o f  o rg an iza tio n . T h e  id e a  o f te leo logy  h e lp s  
u s  to  s tru c tu re  o u r s tu d y  o f n a tu r e ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  of th o se  o rg an ism s  w h ich  
e x h ib it  w h a t  w e ta k e  to be  a  se lf-o rg a n iz in g  s tru c tu re .
H ow ever, th is  is  n o t to  s a y  t h a t  w e a re  ju s tif ie d  in  s ta t in g  t h a t  th e  
o rg a n ism s  a c tu a lly  a re  o rg a n iz e d  acco rd in g  to a  concept. K a n t’s  p o in t  is  on ly  
to  m a in ta in  t h a t  w e m u st h a v e  th i s  id e a  o f teleology i f  w e a re  ev er to  b eg in  
su c h  a n  in v e s tig a tio n  in to  n a tu r e ,  fo r w e w ould  h av e  no o th e r  w ay  o f o rg an iz ­
in g  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o r th e  sc ien ce  p ro p erly .22 W ith o u t th e  id e a  o f te leo l­
ogy, i t  seem s u n lik e ly  th a t  w e c o u ld  h a v e  a n  experience o f  a n  o rg an ism  w h ich  
a p p e a rs  o rg an iz ed  for a  p a r t ic u la r  p u rp o se .
In  fac t, th e  a ssu m p tio n  t h a t  th in g s  ac tu a lly  h a v e  b e e n  o rg an iz ed  b y  
a n  a u th o r  o f th e  w orld  goes d ire c tly  a g a in s t  th e  pu rp o se  o f th e  teleo log ica l 
id e a , n am ely , to  sea rch  o u t th e  mechanical cau ses b e h in d  w h a t  looks lik e  a  
te leo log ica l o rgan ism . T he id e a  e x is ts  o n ly  so th a t  we c a n  b eg in  o u r 
in v e s tig a tio n  o f  n a tu re , a n d  to  p o s i t  th e  id e a  as be ing  m ore  th a n  m ere ly  
re g u la tiv e  is  to  e n d  th e  in v e s tig a tio n  befo re  i t  even  b eg in s .23 So w e c a n  see  
w h y  th is  n a tu ra l ly  leads to  w h a t  K a n t  th in k s  is  a n  in e v ita b le  “d ia lec tic” o f 
re a so n , fo r re a so n  needs to  p o s it  t h e  ex is ten ce  o f such  id ea s , th u s  le a d in g  th e  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  in to  th e  re a lm  o f th e  tra n sc e n d e n t, b u t  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  c an
21 A686 = B714. See also especially A623 = B652 and A651 = B679.
22 There is a fair amount of current writing on this subject of teleology. While writers differ as 
to the degree of r e a lity  which we must assign teleology to nature, many agree that we simply could not 
have an experience of a living organism if we did not have an idea of teleology. The notion of simple 
mechanical causation, while it may be adequate, finally, to explaining the actual operations of the organ­
ism, may not be sufficient for our experience of the organism as a self-organizing whole.
23 This is discussed again below and with further citations.
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leg itim ate ly  fu n c tio n  only w ith in  th e  re a lm  o f ap p ea ran ces. T h e re  is  a  
ten s io n  b e tw een  re a so n  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g , b u t  a  necessa ry  a n d  n a tu r a l  one.
I t  is  im p o r ta n t  to  be c e r ta in  t h a t  K a n t p ro h ib ited  a  co n s titu tiv e  u s e  o f 
teleology a n d  p e rm itte d  only a  re g u la tiv e  em ploym ent; m an y  co m m en ta to rs  
h a v e  a lleged  t h a t  th e  "Idea fo r a  U n iv e rsa l H isto ry” functions on ly  a s  a  
p rim itiv e  n o tio n  o f teleology, a n d  th a t  K a n t  is  con fused  abou t th e  reg u la tiv e  
em ploym ent o f  teleo logy in  th is  a rtic le . A llegedly, h e  th e n  co rrec ts th is  defec t 
in  th e  th ird  Critique. C e rta in ly  i t  is  t r u e  th a t  K a n t’s u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f te leo l­
ogy is n o t com plete  in  th e  f ir s t  Critique,24 b u t  n e ith e r  is  h e  u n c e r ta in  a b o u t 
th e  m erely  re g u la tiv e  n a tu re  o f teleo logy. T h e re  a re  a b u n d a n t c ita tio n s  in  
th e  f irs t  Critique to  show  th a t  K a n t w a s  q u ite  a w are  o f th e  n e ce ssa ry  l im ita ­
tio n s  of th e  teleo log ical idea.
Does K a n t  w a it  only u n t i l  th e  Critique of Judgment to  a rg u e  th a t  
p u rp o siv en ess  i s  n o t ac tu a lly  to  be  fo u n d  in  th e  organism s? I  th in k  th e  a n ­
sw er is  c learly  n e g a tiv e . K a n t m ak e s  m a n y  s ta te m e n ts  to th is  effect, m a n y  of 
w hich  a re  to  b e  fo u n d  in  th e  “A ppend ix  to  th e  T ran sc en d e n ta l D ia lectic .” B e­
c au se  th is  is  su c h  a n  im p o rta n t p o in t, I  w ill quo te  sev era l of th e se  p a ssa g e s  
h e re , a n d  c ite  th e  re s t:
Reason could never be justified in  abandoning the causality which it knows for 
grounds of explanation which are obscure, of which it does not have any 
knowledge, and  which are incapable of proof.25
Now since every principle which prescribes a priori to the understanding 
thoroughgoing unity  in its employment, also holds... of the object of experience, 
the principles of pure reason m ust also have objective reality in respect of th a t  
object, not, however, in order to determine anything in it, b u t only in order to
24 We see nothing in the first Critique like the antinomy of teleology, nothing like the attempt 
to unite the two faculties and “worlds” of reason and understanding, and Kant here seems confused as to 
how to judge the teleological notion where several different organisms may interact together to bring 
about some effect.
25 A626 = B654.
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indicate the procedure whereby the empirical and determ inate employment of 
the understanding can be brought into complete harm ony with itself.26
...if instead  of looking for causes in  the  universal laws of m ateria l mechanism, 
we appeal directly to the unsearchable decree of suprem e wisdom, all those 
ends which are exhibited in nature , together with the m any ends which are 
only ascribed by us to nature, m ake our investigation of the causes a very easy 
task, and  so enable us to regard the labour of reason as completed, when, as a 
m a tte r  of fact, we have merely dispensed w ith its employment... W hat we may 
presum e to do is to follow out the physico-mechanical connection in accordance 
w ith  universal laws, in the hope of discovering what the teleological connection 
actually is.27
Moreover, the principle of such an  hypothesis would a t  most serve only for the 
satisfaction of reason, not for the  furtherance of the employm ent of the under­
stand ing  in  respect of objects. O rder and purposiveness in na tu re  m ust them ­
selves be explained from n a tu ra l grounds and according to n a tu ra l laws.28
I t  seem s q u ite  d e a r  th a t  K a n t is  n o t  con fused  a s  to th e  p ro p e r  lim ita tio n s  for 
th e  em p lo y m en t of th e  teleological id ea . I ts  p u rp o se  is  to  o rg an ize  th e  u n d e r ­
s ta n d in g  a n d  th e  n a tu r a l  sciences, a n d  to  p o s it  th e  re a lity  of te leo logy  is  to 
b r in g  to  a  d o s e  a n  in v es tig a tio n  w h ich  h a s  y e t to  beg in . T he  f in d in g s  a n d  
logic o f th e  e n tire  Critique o f Pure Reason w ou ld  be v io la ted  i f  w e w ere  to  a s ­
su m e  t h a t  teleology could  be d iscovered  in  n a tu re .29 T he  sec tio n s w h e re  h e  
m ig h t appear to  ta k e  th e  id e a  o f teleo logy  to b e  co n s titu tiv e  occur in  K a n t’s 
d iscu ssio n  o f th e  h ig h e s t good, a n d  I  s h a l l  a rg u e  below  th a t  th is  is  p e rfec tly  
u n d e rs ta n d a b le .
B efore m oving  on, th e re  is  o ne  teleo log ical-type p r in d p le  o f K a n t’s 
w h ich  d eserv es  s p e d a l  considera tion . T h is  is  th e  p r in d p le  t h a t  no  fa c u lty  or 
o rg an  is  to  be  fo u n d  in  n a tu re  w h ich  does n o t h av e  i ts  u se . T h is  p r in d p le  is
26 A665-6 = B693-4.
27 A691-2 = B719-20. Italics added for emphasis.
28 A772 = B800.
29 For additional citations of Kant on teleology, see: A317-8 = B374-5, A626-9 = B654-7, 
A649-51 = B677-9, A663-5 = B691-3, A671 = B699, A687-8 = B715-6, A694 = B722, A698-701= B726- 
9, and A772-3 = B800-1.
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m en tio n ed  in  five d iffe ren t p laces in  th e  Critique.30 I ts  m o st p recise s ta te ­
m e n t is:
If  we judged according to analogy with the nature of living beings in  th is 
world,... reason m ust necessarily accept the  principle th a t no organ, no faculty, 
no impulse, indeed nothing w hatsoever is e ither superfluous or disproportioned 
to its use, and  th a t therefore nothing is purposeless, b u t everything exactly 
conformed to its destiny in life...31
S u ch  a  p rin c ip le  is  in c lu d ed  n o t on ly  in  th e  f i r s t  ed ition , b u t  a ll refe rences 
a re  k e p t in  th e  second  ed ition  a s  w ell. T h e  q u o te  above is  fo u n d  on ly  in  th e  
second  ed itio n .
T h e re  seem  to  b e  a t  le a s t  th re e  v e rs io n s  o f th is  p rin c ip le . I  w ill 
h en ce fo rth  c a ll th e m  th e  “s tro n g ,” “m ed iu m ,” a n d  “w eak ” vers io n s o f th e  
“p rin c ip le  o f p u rp o s iv e  m ech an ism s.” T h e  s tro n g  v e rs io n  m ig h t ta k e  i t  a s  a  
fac t o r la w  a b o u t n a tu r e  th a t  ev ery  m ec h an ism  h a s  som e p a r t ic u la r  p u rp o se . 
I t  s im p ly  w o u ld  be  a  fac t, like  th e  N e w to n ’s p rin c ip le s  o f m otion , w hich  w e 
cou ld  d iscover a n d  p ro v e  regard in g  n a tu re . T h is  seem s to  b e  th e  im p lied  
v e rs io n  o f th e  q uo te  above, w h ere  “e v e ry th in g  [is] ex ac tly  conform ed to  i ts  
d e s tin y  in  life ...” T h is  m ay  n o t be a  co m p le te  s u rp r is e  to  u s , for as A.C. E w ­
in g  p o s its , “K a n t, th o u g h  he  liv ed  befo re  th e  sc ien tific  e s ta b lish m e n t of th e  
doc trine  o f evo lu tion , w a s  very  in te re s te d  in  th e  n o tio n  of evo lu tion  a s  a  p o s­
sib ility ...”32
T he  m e d iu m  vers ion  o f th e  p r in c ip le  o f p u rp o siv e  m ech an ism s w ou ld  
ta k e  i t  to  b e  a  la w  o f  n a tu re  th a t  every  m e c h a n ism  c a n  h a v e  some purpose or 
other. T h is  v e rs io n  w o u ld  say  t h a t  w e c a n  d iscover in  n a tu r e  th e  fac t th a t  
e v e ry th in g  c a n  be  p u t  to  som e u se  o r o th e r . T h is  seem s to b e  im p lied  w h en  
K a n t w rite s  th a t :  “E v e ry th in g  w h ich  n a tu r e  h a s  i ts e l f  in s t i tu te d  is  good for
30 B425-6, A688 = B716, A743-4 = B771-2, A747-8 = B775-6, and A800-1 = B828-9.
31 B425.
32 A.C. Ewing. .4 Short Commentary. p. 258.
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some purpose. E ven p o iso n s h a v e  th e ir  u se . T h ey  se rv e  to  co u n te rac t o th e r  
p o iso n s  g e n e ra te d  in  o u r b o d ily  h u m o u rs , a n d  m u s t  h a v e  a  p lace in  every  
co m p le te  p h a rm aco p o e ia .”33 T h is  m ed ium  v e rs io n  w ou ld  m ere ly  ta k e  i t  to  be  
t ru e  t h a t  w e c an  fin d  a  u se  fo r  e v e ry th in g  in  n a tu r e .
T h e  w eak  version  w o u ld  h a v e  i t  th a t  s u c h  a  p rin c ip le  is  m ere ly  r e g u ­
la tiv e . T h is  version  com es to  th e  fore w h en  K a n t  w rite s :
m edical physiology... [resorts] to a principle for which pure reason has alone 
been  responsible: and i t  carries this principle so fa r as to assume confidently, 
an d  w ith  general approval, th a t  everything in  an  anim al has its use, and sub­
serves some good purpose. If  th is assum ption be trea ted  as constitutive it goes 
m uch fu rther than  observation has th us far been  able to justify; and we m u st 
therefore conclude th a t it  is nothing more th a n  a  regulative principle of rea ­
son...34
T h is  v e rs io n  a sse r ts  on ly  t h a t  th e  “p rin c ip le  o f p u rp o s iv e  m echan ism s” is  u s e ­
fu l fo r th e  o rd e rin g  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  th e  s tu d y  o f n a tu re . I t  a llow s 
u s  to  f in d  connec tions b e tw e e n  th e  m ech an ism s w ith in  o rgan ism s, a n d  p e r ­
h a p s  to  f in d  connections b e tw e e n  o rg an ism s th e m se lv e s .35
A re  w e ab le  to  decide  b e tw een  th e se  th r e e  v e rs io n s  of th e  p rinc ip le?  
B ased  o n  K a n t’s w ritin g s a lo n e , i t  w ould  be  d ifficu lt, p a r tic u la r ly  because  
K a n t k e e p s  th is  p rin c ip le  in  b o th  ed itions, even  in tro d u c in g  th e  s tro n g  v e r ­
sion  in  th e  second  ed ition  a lo n e . H ow ever, i t  se e m s w e m u s t  ru le  o u t a t  le a s t  
th e  s tro n g  v e rs io n  of th e  p rin c ip le , even i f  in  opp o sitio n  to  K an t, for i t  seem s 
too m u ch  to  c la im  th a t  ev e ry  o rg a n  or m ech an ism  is  d e s ig n ed  for a  specific 
u se . W e se em  to  be ab le  to  com e u p  w ith  ex am p les  w h e re  th is  sim ply  does 
n o t h o ld  t ru e .  T he w eak  v e rs io n , on  th e  o th e r  h a n d , sq u a re s  w ell w ith  th e  
r e s t  of K a n t’s  Critique, a n d  s e e m s  to  be b o m  o u t a s  a  re g u la tiv e  id e a  for th e  
s tu d y  o f  n a tu re .  B u t w h a t o f  th e  m ed ium  vers ion?  T h is  version  does no t
33 A743 = B771. Italics added for emphasis.
34 A688 = B716.
35 See: A Short Commentary, p. 258.
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seem  to b e  incompatible w ith  th e  w eak  version , for i t  could be th e  case  th a t  
th e  w e ak  v e rs io n  shou ld  be ta k e n  a s  a  reg u la tiv e  idea, w hile  th e  m ed iu m  
v e rs io n  ju s t  h a p p e n s  to be  a  fac t a b o u t n a tu re . In  fact, K a n t cou ld  sa y  th a t  
th e  s tro n g  v e rs io n  shou ld  be  ta k e n  a s  a  reg u la tiv e  idea, th u s  making  i t  th e  
w eak  v e rs io n , b u t  th a t  th e  m ed iu m  v e rs io n  is  a n  a  posteriori fac t a b o u t th e  
w orld  o f  a p p e a ra n c e . T he  su b se q u e n t q u estio n , how ever, w ould  b e  a s  to  how  
fa r  w e sh o u ld  ta k e  th is  no tion  o f "som e p u rp o se  or o ther” im p lied  in  th e  m e­
d ium  v e rs io n . C e rta in ly  w e cou ld  u se  o u r  sp leen  for a  p a p e rw e ig h t, b u t  
w ould  th is  q u a lify  as purposive? T h e  m ed iu m  version  m ay  sim p ly  tu r n  o u t to  
be r a th e r  tr iv ia l . W hile th e  w eak  v e rs io n  seem s to be acceptable, I  do n o t 
th in k  w e a re  y e t in  a  position  to  decide a b o u t th e  m edium  version . N o r does 
i t  seem  t h a t  K a n t  h a d  a  firm  g rasp  o f ex ac tly  how  to spell o u t th is  p rin c ip le .
S im ila rly , th e re  is  a n  a d d itio n a l p u zz le  reg a rd in g  how  th e  fa c u lty  of 
rea so n  i ts e l f  is  to  be th o u g h t o f u n d e r  th is  “p rin c ip le  of pu rposive  m e c h a ­
n ism s.” A ga in , K a n t gives u s  con flic ting  v ers ions. A t A800 =  B 828, K a n t 
w rites:
The whole equipm ent of reason... is in fact determined... yet further, namely, 
to the  problem of what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a  God and a 
fu ture world. As this concerns our a ttitude  to the supreme end, i t  is evident 
th a t the  ultim ate intention of n a tu re  in her wise provision for us has  indeed, in 
the constitution of our reason, been directed to moral interests alone.36
T h is p a s sa g e  a p p e a rs  to a rg u e  th a t ,  ta k in g  som e version o f th e  “p rin c ip le  of 
pu rp o siv e  m ech an ism s” as a  fac t, w e can  th e n  deduce th a t  th e  fa c u lty  of r e a ­
son m u s t b e  th o u g h t to h a v e  b een  g iven  to  u s  b y  n a tu re  in  o rd er to  p ro m o te  
m o ra l e n d s . H ow ever, a t  B 425 K a n t  w rites :
if we judged by such an analogy [of living beings] we should have to regard 
man, who alone can contain in him self the final end of all this order, as the 
only creatu re  th a t is excepted from it. M an’s natural endowm ents — not 
merely his ta len ts and the impulses to enjoy them, but above all else the moral
36 A800-1 = B828-9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
law w ithin him — go... far beyond all the utility and  advantage which he may 
derive from them in this p resen t life....37
T h is  too seem s to  ta k e  som e v e rs io n  o f th e  “p rin c ip le  o f  p u rp o siv e  m ech a­
n ism s” a s  tru e , b u t  seem s to  in d ic a te  th a t  h u m a n s  a r e  th e  excep tion  to  th e  
ru le  a n d  sh o u ld  b e  exem pted  fro m  th e  p rincip le . T h is  seem s to  be  because  
th e re  is  n o th in g  in  th e  w orld  w h ich  re a so n  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  s u ite d  for, a n d  is 
b e t te r  s u ite d  to  a n  en v iro n m en t o th e r  th a n  th is  world..38 A s th e s e  a re  th e  
on ly  tw o p a ssa g e s  w e h av e  to  w o rk  w ith , I  th in k  a  decision  b e tw ee n  th e m  is 
im possib le . T he  “Id ea” su p p o rts  th e  fo rm er s tance , b u t  th e  above second  edi­
t io n  v e rs io n  m u s t  h av e  been  w r i t te n  a f te r  th e  “Id ea .” W e m u s t p o stpone  ou r 
ju d g m e n t o f  th is  p rin c ip le  u n t i l  la te r .
B efore m oving  on, w h ile  som e o f th e  issu e s  in v o lv e d  in  teleology are  
le f t  u n reso lv ed  h e re , we h av e  a t  le a s t  e s ta b lish e d  som e im p o r ta n t  p o in ts . I 
h a v e  tr ie d  to  a rg u e  above th a t  K a n t  is  w ell aw are  o f th e  l im its  o f th e  notion  
o f teleo logy a s  ap p lied  to  n a tu re : h e  recognizes th a t  i t  is  a  re g u la tiv e  idea, 
a n d  also  recogn izes th e  d a n g e r in h e re n t  in  ta k in g  i t  to  be  a  c o n s titu tiv e  con­
cep t. As I  s h a l l  a rg u e  in  C h a p te r  S ix  below , th e re  a re  no  s ig n if ic a n t changes 
in  th is  lin e  o f th in k in g  b e tw een  w h a t  K a n t  a rg u es  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique a n d  
h is  conclusions in  th e  Critique o f Judgment. C e r ta in ly  th e re  is  a  d eep er ex­
p lo ra tio n  o f th e  concept o f teleology, a n d  m an y  im p o r ta n t  conclusions a re  
d ra w n  from  th is ,39 b u t  th e  c e n tra l  lim ita tio n s  re g a rd in g  te leo log ica l concepts 
fo u n d  in  th is  w ork  do n o t v a ry  fro m  th e  f ir s t  Critique.
I f  w e accep t th is  fact, th e n  I  th in k  we m u s t ta k e  K a n t’s e a r ly  (as w ell 
a s  la te r )  w ritin g s  re g a rd in g  th e  p ro g re ss  o f th e  h u m a n  rac e  se rio u sly . T h ere ­
fore, I  ta k e  i t  t h a t  th e re  is  no prim a facie reaso n  th a t  w e  sh o u ld  th in k  K a n t
37 B425-6.
38 This may well be some sort of leftover premise in an older argument for immortality. Such 
an argument is traced out by Rolf George in: “Immortality,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth International 
Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 669-677.
39 These conclusions will, however, only serve as further support for my thesis.
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sim ply  con fused  a b o u t h is  ow n concept o f te leo logy  a n d  how  i t  sh o u ld  be 
u tilized . I f  K a n t is  c le a r  in  h is  no tion  o f teleo logy , a s  I  h a v e  a rg u ed  h e  is, 
th e n  th e re  is  e v e ry  re a so n  to  th in k  th a t  h is  w r it in g s  concern ing  th e  p ro g re ss  
of p o litica l in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  of h u m a n  m o ra lity  sh o u ld  b e  ta k e n  a t  face  v a lu e  
a s  c o n s is ten t w ith  h is  u se  o f  teleology. I f  w e c a n  su g g e s t a n  in te rp re ta tio n  
for th e s e  w ritin g s  w h ich  leav es  K a n t c o n s is te n t, in s te a d  o f d ism issing  th e m  
o u trig h t, th e n  I  th in k  su c h  a n  in te rp re ta t io n  o u g h t to  be  favored . I  w ill s u g ­
gest su ch  a n  in te rp re ta t io n  in  th e  c h a p te rs  t h a t  follow.
IV.
In te re s tin g ly , n o t  on ly  can  w e now  se e  w h y  K a n t  c la im s th a t  th e re  is  
a  n a tu ra l  d ia lec tic  o f rea so n , b u t  w e c an  now  o b se rv e  th a t  th e re  is  a  con flic t  
betw een  th e  q u e s tio n s  o f “W h a t can  I  know ?” a n d  “W h a t m ay  I  hope?” T h e  
an sw e r to  th e  f i r s t  q u e s tio n  w as d iscussed  in  C h a p te r  O ne  above, n am e ly  
th a t  one can  k n o w  on ly  a b o u t objects o f p o ss ib le  ex p erien ce  a n d  th e  t r a n ­
scen d e n ta l s t ru c tu re  w h ich  m u s t m ak e  th e m  p o ss ib le . T h e  an sw er to  th e  
th ird  q u e s tio n  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique h a s  to  do ( a t  le a s t)  w ith  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f  
freedom , im m o rta lity , a n d  God.40 N otice, h o w ev er, t h a t  th e  p o sitin g  o f a n y  of 
th e se  n o tio n s  a s  ob jec ts  o f know ledge o r a s  c o n s titu tiv e  o f experience w ould  
d irec tly  in te rfe re  w ith  th e  p ro jec t o f th e  f i r s t  q u e s tio n . B y p re su m in g  k n o w l­
edge o f th e se  ob jects o f hope, a  p h y sico -m ech an ica l science is  te rm in a te d .41 
L et u s  look a t  e a c h  o f th e  th re e  id eas to  see  w h y  th is  m ig h t be.
I f  w e e x p la in  a  p e rso n ’s action  a s  s im p ly  a n  ex p ress io n  of freedom , w e 
stop try in g  to  d e te rm in e  th e  in f lu e n tia l m e c h a n ic a l a n d  psychological c a u se s  
o f action;
401 say “at least” here because it may also involve the postulating of the possibility of the high­
est good, both on earth and in another world.
41 This is a main point in each of Kant’s discussion in the “Antinomies,” “Paralogisms,” and 
“The Ideal of Pure Reason” respectively.
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if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances of m en’s wills, there 
would not be found a single hum an action which we could not predict w ith cer­
tain ty , and  recognize as proceeding necessarily from its antecedent conditions. 
So far, then, as regards th is  em pirical character there is no freedom; and yet it 
is only in the light of th is ch arac te r th a t  m an can be studied...42
T h is  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  im p o r ta n t  i f  w e rem em b er K a n t’s  d iscu ssio n  o f P la to ’s 
p e rfe c t S ta te .  W e see h e re  t h a t  th e  n o tio n  of freedom  w ou ld  e n d  a n  in v e s ti­
g a tio n  w h ich , a t  i ts  fu lle s t, c o u ld  r e n d e r  th e  ac tio n s o f p e rso n s  k n o w ab le  a n d  
p re d ic ta b le . P resu m ab ly , th e n ,  w ith  su c h  in fo rm ation , co m b in ed  w ith  th e  
id e a  o f  th e  p e rfe c t c o n s titu tio n  a n d  i ts  law s, th e  p e rfe c t S ta te  w o u ld  be  pos­
sib le , a t  le a s t  in  c o n tin u a l a p p ro x im a tio n .
Second , w hile  th e  p o s it in g  o f  a n  a fte rlife  w ou ld  n o t d irec tly  h in d e r  
sc ien tif ic  in v es tig a tio n , th e  p o s it in g  o f a  sim p le  su b s ta n c e  a s  so u l h a s  th e  
sa m e  p ro b lem s a s  th a t  o f freed o m . I f  w e m ak e  th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  th e re  is  a  
s in g le  sou l, a  know ab le  T  b e h in d  th e  “I  th in k ,” th e n  n o t o n ly  a re  w e m ak in g  
th e  m is ta k e  o f th e  p a ra lo g ism s, b u t  w e a lso  s h u t  ou rse lves o ff from  possib le  
a v e n u e s  o f  p h ysico -m echan ica l e x p la n a tio n s . T a k in g  th e  so u l fo r sim p le , or 
ta k in g  th e r e  to  be  som e C a r te s ia n  E go w hich  ex is ts  th ro u g h  w h ich  a l l  s e n sa ­
tio n s  o f  th e  b ra in  m u s t p a ss , th w a r ts  m a n y  possib le  in te rp re ta t io n s  o f  th e  ac­
tu a l  fu n c tio n in g  o f th e  b ra in  o r  o f psychology.43 Scien tific  s tu d y  w o u ld  be  
l im ite d  to  a  se a rc h  for th e  c e n te r  o f th e  m e n ta l u n iv erse , a n d  p h ilo so p h ic  a n d  
p sycho log ica l en d eav o rs  w o u ld  b e  l im ite d  in  a  s im ila r  fash io n .
F in a lly , a s  w e saw  in  se c tio n  th re e  above, th e  a ssu m p tio n  o f th e  
e x is te n ce  o f  G od a s  w ise a u th o r  o f th e  w orld  is  a n  id e a  w hich , i f  ta k e n  to  be 
c o n s titu t iv e  a n d  n o t m ere ly  re g u la tiv e , w ou ld  a lso  h in d e r  sc ien tific  
in v e s tig a tio n . I f  th is  id e a  is  ta k e n  a s  co n stitu tiv e , w e Mull n o  lo n g e r look  for
42 A550 = B578.
43 This can be seen especially with the question of personal identity. Explanations such as 
those given by Derik Parfit or Daniel Dennett which focus on the absence of any possible single center for 
experience would be eliminated.
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ex p la n a tio n s  o f n a tu r e  w h ich  a re  physico-m echan ica l, th e  only k in d  of 
ex p la n a tio n  w hich  is  ju s tif ie d  by  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  h u m a n  m ind .44
H ow ever, n o  su c h  conflict is  n ecessa ry  b e tw ee n  th e  an sw er to  th e  sec­
ond  q u estio n  a n d  th e  f i r s t  a n d  th ird  questions , b ecau se  w h a t I  o u g h t to  do is  
th e  co rrec t m o ra l a c tio n  re g a rd le ss  o f th e  cond itions o f experience. D esp ite  
lim its  o n  w h a t I  m a y  a c tu a lly  be  ab le  to  do in  a  g iven  s itu a tio n , a n d  desp ite  
th e  fa c t th a t  I  m ay  b e  g re a tly  ig n o ra n t a s  to  th e  possib le  effects, I  am  a lw ays 
com m anded  to  do w h a t  th e  m o ra l la w  req u ire s . A n d  th is  is  so despite th e  fac t 
t h a t  su c h  an  ac tion  m a y  w ell be  ex p la in ed  entirely by  em p irica l a n d  psycho­
logical m ean s . As th e  “A n tinom ies” h a v e  show n, th e re  is  no  conflict b e tw een  
th e  p o s tu la te  o f freed o m  a n d  a  com pletely  physico -m echan ica l ex p lan a tio n .45
T hese  p o in ts  a re  im p o rta n t to  keep  in  m in d  a s  w e m ove to th e  
d iscussion  of th e  h ig h e s t  good. We see  h e re  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique a  conflict in  
a d d itio n  to th e  n a tu r a l  d ialectic . I t  is  th e  conflict b e tw een  w h a t K a n t deem s 
to  be  n e ce ssa ry  for th e  p ro jec t o f th e  f ir s t  q u estio n  a n d  th e  an sw er to  th e  
th ird  q u estio n  a sk e d  b y  rea so n . T he  th in g s  t h a t  w e c a n  know  w ill a lw ays be 
lim ite d  to  physico -m echan ica l ex p lan a tio n s, d u e  to  th e  n a tu re  of in tu itio n  
a n d  th e  ca tego ries o f  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g . B u t th o se  th in g s  for w hich  w e m u s t 
n e ce ssa rily  hope46 w o u ld  g re a tly  h in d e r  o u r know ledge i f  th ey  w ere ta k e n  to 
be tru ly  descrip tive  o f  n a tu r e  a n d  th e  w orld  of a p p e a ra n c e . A nd vice versa , 
for ta k in g  th e  re a lm  o f a p p e a ra n c e  to  be  th e  on ly  possib le  re a lity  w ould
44 This might also have the unintended effect, spelled out in the Critique o f Practical Reason, 
of actually doing great harm to the moral law. Kant maintains that if we were to actually know of God 
and the inescapable necessity of rewards and punishments in proportion to our virtue, then we would no 
longer act out of duty, but out of fear, and thus “the conduct of man... would be changed into mere 
mechanism, where, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in 
the figures.” See Chapter Two, Section Two below.
45 Thus, freedom only enters into the explanation of how the carrying out of the moral law is 
possible, and is not the answer to the question of, “What ought I to doT  The answer to this question is, of 
course, “Do what the moral law commands.” Hence, I believe I am not contradicting myself when I say 
that though freedom is involved in the explanation of the answer to the second question, the second ques­
tion is not in conflict with the first or third question.
46 We shall see more precisely below why such hopes are actually, according to Kant, necessary.
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u n d e rm in e  th e  possib ility  o f hope . T h ere  is  a  d irec t conflict b ecau se  reaso n  is 
c o n s tra in e d  to  posit th e  n e ce ss ity  o f b o th  th e se  id eas . S u ch  a  conflict is  
b ro u g h t to  ex trem es in  p a ssa g e s  w h e re  K a n t cla im s t h a t  th e  objects o f hope 
m u s t  n e c e ssa rily  u n ite  w ith  sp e cu la tiv e  reason; th is  occurs in  K a n t’s 
d iscu ss io n  o f  th e  h ig h e s t good.
V.
K a n t  ex p la in s  th e  co n cep t o f th e  “h ig h e s t good” in  th e  “C anon  o f P u re  
R easo n ” in  th e  f ir s t  Critique in  th is  w ay:
Happiness, taken  by itself, is, for our reason, far from being the complete good. 
Reason does not approve happiness (however inclination m ay desire it) except 
in so far as it is united w ith  worthiness to be happy, th a t is, w ith moral con­
duct. Morality, taken  by itself, and  with it, the mere worthiness to be happy, is 
also far from being the complete good. To make the good complete, he who be­
haves in  such a m anner a s  not to be unworthy of happiness m ust be able to 
hope th a t he will participate  in  happiness.47
T h e  h ig h e s t  good, th e n , is  th e  com bina tion  o f th e se  tw o goods, th e  good of 
h a p p in e s s  a n d  th e  good o f m o ra lity . T h u s, h a p p in e ss  “in  e x a c t p ro p o rtio n  
w ith  th e  m o ra lity  o f th e  r a t io n a l  b e in g s who a re  th e re b y  re n d e re d  w orthy  of 
i t, a lo n e  c o n s titu te s  th e  su p re m e  good o f th a t  w orld  w h e re in , in  accordance 
w ith  th e  com m ands o f a  p u re  b u t  p ra c tic a l reason , w e a re  u n d e r  ob liga tion  to 
p lace  o u rse lv es .”48 K a n t c la im s t h a t  th is  is  a  n ecessa ry  p o s tu la te  o f reason , 
for “ev en  th e  rea so n  t h a t  is  f re e  from  a ll  p r iv a te  p u rp o ses, sh o u ld  i t  p u t  its e lf  
in  th e  p lace  o f a  b e in g  t h a t  h a d  to  d is tr ib u te  a ll  h a p p in e ss  to  o th e rs , can n o t 
ju d g e  o th e rw ise .”49 T h is  is  a  n e c e ssa ry  id ea  o f reason , a n d  a  n e c e ssa ry  p o s tu ­
la te  fo r p ra c tic a l reaso n . W h ile  th e  d e ta ils  of th e  h ig h e s t good w ill change  
so m e w h a t in  th e  course  o f K a n t’s  w ritin g s , th e  m a in  concep t o f  th e  p ro p o r­
tio n in g  o f h a p p in e ss  to  w o rth in e ss  re m a in s  th e  sam e.
47 A813 =B841.
48 A814 = B842.
49 A813 = B841.
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P rac tica l rea so n , K a n t c la im s, c a n n o t p o s tu la te  th e  h ig h es t good 
w ith o u t God;
I t  is necessary th a t the whole course of our life be subject to moral m axim s; 
b u t it is impossible th a t th is should happen unless reason connects w ith  the  
m oral law, which is a mere idea, an  operative cause which determines for such 
conduct as is in  accordance w ith the  moral law  an  outcome, either in th is or in 
another life, th a t  is in exact conformity w ith  o u r suprem e ends. Thus w ithout 
a  God and w ithout a  world invisible to us now b u t hoped for, the glorious ideas 
of m orality are indeed objects of approval an d  adm iration, bu t not springs of 
purpose and action.50
T h e  h ig h e s t  good is  a n  id e a  o f re a so n , g iv ing  u s  a n  “estimation of m o ra lity , in  
r e g a rd  to  i ts  p u r i ty  a n d  consequences,”51 b u t  w e c a n  see  no  n ecessa ry  c a u s a l  
m e c h a n ism  w hich  w ou ld  b r in g  su c h  a  s ta te  a b o u t. W e see  l i t t le  ev idence in  
th is  w o rld  t h a t  t ru ly  m o ra l a c ts  a re  re w a rd e d  b y  a p p ro p r ia te  h a p p in e ss . T h e  
p o s tu la te  o f G od is  n e ed e d  in  o rd e r  to  se cu re  su c h  a n  a p p ro p ria te  cause ;
the alleged necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the necessary 
endeavour to render the self worthy of happiness cannot therefore be known 
through reason. I t  can be counted upon only if a  Supreme Reason, th a t gov­
erns according to moral rules, be likewise posited as underlying natu re  as its 
cause.”52
T h e  on ly  th in g  th a t  c a n  b r in g  a b o u t th e  h ig h e s t  good i s  a  G od th a t  is  ra t io n a l  
a n d  m o ra l, om niscien t, a n d  po w erfu l e n o u g h  to  b r in g  a b o u t a  fu tu re  w o rld  in  
w h ic h  h a p p in e ss  is  p ro p o rtio n ed  to  m o ra lity .53 W e w ill h a v e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  
d iscu ss  th e  com ponen ts o f th e  h ig h e s t  good a n d  th e i r  com plete  ju s tif ic a tio n  in  
l a te r  c h a p te rs , b u t  fo r now  w e m u s t  m ove on.
50 A812-3 = B840-1.
51 A812 = B840.
52 A810 = B838.
53 For a more complete presentation of the nature of the Highest Good in the first Critique. see 
"The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.”
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I t  is  w ith in  th is  d iscussion  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good t h a t  K a n t ta lk s  a b o u t 
th e  objects o f h o p e  u n i t in g  w ith  th e  re g u la tiv e  id e a s  o f sp ecu la tiv e  rea so n . 
Im p o rta n tly , K a n t  m e n tio n s  th is  con junc tion  on ly  in  th e  section  on th e  h ig h ­
e s t  good. K a n t m a in ta in s  in  a  p a ra g ra p h  im m e d ia te ly  follow ing a  d iscu ss io n  
o f th e  th re e  q u e s tio n s  o f  re a so n  th a t  " the  th i r d  q u e s tio n ... is  a t  once p ra c tic a l 
a n d  th eo re tic a l, in  s u c h  fa sh io n  th a t  th e  p ra c tic a l  se rv es  only  a s  a  c lue  t h a t  
le a d s  u s  to  th e  a n s w e r  to  th e  th eo re tic a l q u e s tio n , a n d  w h e n  th is  is  fo llow ed 
ou t, to  th e  sp e c u la tiv e  q u estio n ,”54 a n d  la te r  w rite s :
I m ain tain  th a t  ju s t  as the m oral principles are  necessary according to reason 
in its practical em ploym ent, i t  is in  the  view of reason, in the field of its  theo­
retical em ploym ent, no less necessary to assum e th a t  everyone has ground to 
hope for happiness in  the  m easure in which he has rendered him self by his 
conduct w orthy o f it, and  th a t the system of m orality  is therefore inseparably -- 
though only in th e  idea of pure reason -- bound up w ith th a t  of happiness.55
K a n t  conceives o f m o ra lity  h e re  a s  w o rth in ess  to  b e  h a p p y ; “...th a t law , i f  
th e re  is  su c h  a  law , w h ic h  h a s  no o th e r  m o tive  t h a n  worthiness o f being 
happy, I  te rm  m o ra l (law  o f  m orality ).”56 T h u s  K a n t  conceives th a t  th e  sy s ­
tem  o f m o ra lity  m u s t  in e v ita b ly  be  in te r tw in e d  w ith  th e  sy stem  o f sp e c u la tiv e  
rea so n , w h ich  c la im s  to  d e te rm in e  th e  t r u th  a b o u t re a l i ty  a n d  th u s  a b o u t 
h a p p in e ss ; w e c a n n o t  k n o w  w h a t m ak e s  u s  h a p p y  o r th e  m ea n s  to  a n y  p a r ­
t ic u la r  p le a su re  w ith o u t  th e  know ledge w h ich  sp e c u la tiv e  rea so n  can  p ro ­
v ide. H ence , th e  p ra c t ic a l  a n d  specu la tive  s ta n d p o in ts  m u s t  bo th  be  b ro u g h t 
to  b e a r  on  th is  q u e s tio n  a b o u t th e  en d s o f h u m a n  b e in g s . B u t K a n t h e re  
seem s to  b e  s ta t in g  t h a t  th e  a n sw e r to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f hope , b ro u g h t on b y  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f w h a t  I  o u g h t to  do, m ig h t som ehow  h a v e  a  th eo re tic a l e m ­
p lo y m en t p e rh a p s  above  a n d  beyond  a  re g u la tiv e  id ea .
54 A807 = B833.
55 A809 = B837.
56 A806 = B834. See also the rest of this paragraph at A806 = B834. and the discussion at 
A809-15 = B837-43.
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K a n t g ives a  s im ila r  p ic tu re  a  few  p a g es  la te r . H ere  h e  w rites:
B ut th is system atic unity  of ends in this world of intelligences -- a  world which 
is indeed, as m ere nature, a sensible world only, b u t which, as a  system of 
freedom, can be en titled  an  intelligible, th a t is, a  m oral world... -- ... thus 
un ites the  practical w ith  the  speculative reason. The world m ust be repre­
sen ted  as having originated from an idea if  it  is to be in harm ony with th a t 
em ploym ent o f reason without which we should indeed hold ourselves to be 
unw orthy of reason, namely, with the m oral employm ent...57
K a n t c a lls  th is  u n i ty  a  “tra n s c e n d e n ta l  e n la rg e m e n t o f  o u r know ledge” an d  
c la im s t h a t  i t  “is  n o t  to  b e  reg a rd e d  a s  th e  cau se , b u t  m ere ly  a s  th e  effect of 
th e  p ra c tic a l p u rp o s iv e n e ss  w h ich  p u re  re a so n  im p o ses u p o n  u s .”58 K a n t 
h e re  se e m s to  be  m a in ta in in g  th a t ,  in  re g a rd  to  th e  th i r d  q u estio n  posed  by 
rea so n , th e re  is  a c tu a lly  a n  ex tension  o f o u r knowledge o f th e  w o rld  o f a p ­
p e a ra n c e s  b ecau se  o f  th e  c e r ta in ty  o f th e  m o ra l law . B ecause  m o ra lity  is 
h e re  conce ived  o f a s  w o rth in e ss  to  be h ap p y , th e  n o u m e n a l a n d  p h en o m en a l 
re a lm  a re  co m bined  a t  th is  p o in t, a n d  a re  b o th  u n d e r  co n sid era tio n  a s  possi­
b le  ob jec ts fo r h ope . W e c a n  know  th e  m o ra l law , a n d  i t  in d ic a te s  th a t  we a re  
p u rp o s iv e  b e ings , s tr iv in g  to  ach ieve m o ra l p e rfec tio n . I t  a lso  te lls  u s  th a t  
m o ra lity  is  co n n ec ted  w ith  h a p p in e ss , a n d  th e re fo re  w e a re  a t  l e a s t  p e rm itte d  
to  hope  fo r  a  w o rld  w h e re  m o ra lity  w ill be  re w a rd e d  b y  h a p p in e ss . B u t since 
h a p p in e s s  is  a  m a t te r  co n ce rn in g  specu la tive  rea so n , i t  seem s th a t  K a n t is 
h e re  c la im in g  t h a t  p ra c tic a l  rea so n  is  d ic ta tin g  so m e th in g  to  sp ecu la tiv e  re a ­
son  w h ic h  m u s t b e  a p p lie d  to  th e  rea lm  o f a p p e a ra n c e s  a n d  ta k e n  a s  know l­
edge.
W h a t a re  w e to  m a k e  o f th ese  s ta te m e n ts?  O n  th e  one h a n d , th ey  
m ay  s im p ly  b e  too s tro n g  to  b e  adm issib le . G iven  K a n t’s  p ro fessed  k now l­
edge a s  to  th e  p ro p e r  l im its  o f ap p ly in g  teleo log ical id e a s ,59 h e  m ay  sim ply  be
57 A815-6 = B843-4.
58 A817 = B845.
59 See section three above.
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o v e rs tep p in g  h is  bounds in  th is  ch ap te r, n o t k eep in g  to  th e  e s ta b lish e d  lim its  
h e  h im s e lf  se t. I  th in k  th e re  is  a  good a rg u m e n t th a t  K a n t  goes too fa r  in  
c a llin g  fo r  a  “tra n s c e n d e n ta l  e n la rg e m e n t o f o u r  know ledge,” th o u g h  p e rh a p s  
h e  h a s  n o th in g  m ore in  m in d  th a n  th e  s im p le  n e ed  to  s a y  so m e th in g  ab o u t 
objects w h ich  w ould  be n e c e ssa ry  or p e rm iss ib le  en d s o f  o u r  w illing .60 B u t 
w h ile  th is  m a y  b e  tru e , I  t h in k  th e re  is  so m e th in g  im p o r ta n t  h a p p e n in g  in  
th is  c h a p te r  o f th e  Critique. W h a t I  w a n t to  a rg u e  is  t h a t  i t  i s  no  su rp r ise  
th a t  th e  te n s io n  w hich  I  ta lk e d  ab o u t in  sec tio n  fo u r above com es to  i ts  g re a t­
e s t  s t r a in  in  th e  d iscussion  o f  th e  h ig h e s t good, a n d  t h a t  i t  i s  on ly  h e re  th a t  
K a n t m a k e s  s ta te m e n ts  a b o u t teleology w h ich  seem  to v io la te  h is  ow n p re ­
sc rib ed  lim ita tio n s . K a n t is  s tru g g lin g  w ith  a  question , consciously  o r no t, 
w hich  h e  w ill co n tin u e  to  t r y  to  spe ll o u t sa tis fac to rily  fo r  y e a rs  to  come. I f  
th e  h ig h e s t  good is  possib le  on this earth, i f  K a n t th in k s  t h a t  th e re  is  som e 
n e c e ssa ry  re a so n  to p o sit su c h  a  possib ility  a s  h a p p e n in g  in  th e  realm  of a p ­
p e a ra n c e s , th e n  th e  ten s io n s  b e tw een  w h a t I  c a n  know  a n d  w h a t  I  c an  hope 
becom e fo cu sed  on  th e  h ig h e s t  good. A ll d ie  conflicting  in te rp re ta t io n s  w hich 
I  d isc u sse d  above, from  th e  n a tu r e  of th e  ap p lica tio n  of te leo log ica l id eas , to 
th e  th re e  v e rs io n s  of th e  “p rin c ip le  of p u rp o s iv e  m ech an ism s,” to  th e  ro le  th e  
fac u ltie s  o f  re a so n  p lay  in  t h a t  p rinc ip le , to  th e  n a tu ra l  d ia lec tic  a n d  th e  
conflict b e tw e e n  th e  f ir s t  a n d  th ir d  q u estio n  o f reason , com e in to  p la y  a t  p re ­
cisely  th is  p o in t ab o u t th e  h ig h e s t  good. K a n t  w ill c o n tin u e  to  w rite  ab o u t 
th e  p ro g re s s  of th e  h u m a n  ra c e  u n til  h is  d e a th , a n d  th e s e  d iffe ren t s t ra in s  of 
h is  th o u g h t  w ill co n tin u e  to  f lu c tu a te . I t  w ill b e  one p u rp o se  o f th is  book to  
t ry  to  s o r t  o u t th e se  s tra in s , a n d  come to som e conclusion  ab o u t th em .
O n e  q u estio n  w e m ay  w ish  to a sk  a t  th is  p o in t is , w h e re  does K a n t 
th in k  th e  h ig h e s t  good w ill b e  located? Is  i t  to  ta k e  p lace  only  in  “H eav en ” 
a n d  h a v e  th e  n a tu re  o f b e in g  on ly  n o u m en a l o r  “o therw orld ly”? O r w ill i t  
ta k e  p lace  on  e a r th  in  th e  fu tu re ?  U n fo rtu n a te ly , th is  too  is  a  q u estio n
60 This may be true in this Critique especially, since at the time of its writing Kant still believed 
the study of morals to involve some empirical evidence, and thus not to be “purely” a priori.
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f ra u g h t  w ith  conflic t. K a n t m a k e s  m a n y  s ta te m e n ts  in  th e  f ir s t  Critique, 
m o st o f w h ich  a re  to  be  fo u n d  in  “T h e  C anon  o f P u re  R e aso n ,” to su p p o rt bo th  
in te rp re ta t io n s ;  a g a in , th is  m a y  n o t su rp r ise  u s  g iven  K a n t’s  seem ing  
u n c e r ta in tie s  d isc u sse d  above. S u p p o rtin g  th e  “o therw orld ly*  in te rp re ta tio n , 
K a n t  w rites:
Now since we are necessarily constrained by reason to  represent ourselves as 
belonging to such a[n intelligible] world, while the  senses present to us nothing 
bu t a world o f appearances, we m ust assume th a t  m oral world to be a conse­
quence of o u r conduct in the  world of sense (in which no such connection be­
tween w orthiness and happiness is exhibited), and  therefore to be for us a fu­
ture world. T hus God and a  fu ture life are two [necessary] postulates...61
This world [of happiness in exact proportion to morality] is indeed an intelligi­
ble world only, since the sensible world holds out no promise th a t any such 
system atic un ity  of ends can  arise from the na tu re  of th ings.62
T h is  la s t  s ta te m e n t  is  q u ite  d e fin ite  ab o u t th e  p o ss ib ilitie s  o f a  h ig h es t good 
on  e a r th , th o u g h  th e  f ir s t  s ta te m e n t  is  am biguous. K a n t  m a in ta in s  th ro u g h ­
o u t a ll  h is  w r it in g s  t h a t  m o ra lity  is  n o t  n a tu ra lly  re w a rd e d  b y  h ap p in ess , 
a n d  often  th e  re v e rs e  occurs. N a tu re  does n o t seem  to  c a re  ab o u t m orality , 
a n d  th e re  is  n o th in g  w e can  do to  ch an g e  th e  law s o f n a tu r e  to  m ake  i t  o th ­
e rw ise .63 K a n t  a lso  co n tin u es  to  be lieve  th a t  m o ra lity  i s  n o t i ts  own rew ard , 
i t  is  a  duty ; h a p p in e s s  is  th e  p ro p e r  re w a rd  fo r m o ra lity , b u t  th is  is  only  to  be 
fo u n d  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t  good.
S u p p o r tin g  th e  h ig h e s t good on  e a r th  in te rp re ta t io n , K a n t w rites:
Pure reason, then, contains... in th a t practical em ploym ent which is also 
moral, principles of the possibility of experience, nam ely, of such actions as, in 
accordance w ith  m oral precepts, might be m et with in  th e  history of m ankind... 
Consequently, a  special kind of system atic unity, nam ely the moral, m ust 
likewise be possible.64
61 A811 = B839.
62 A814 = B842.
63 Cf. A810 = B838.
64 A807 = B835.
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...[the idea of a moral world] really can have... an influence upon the sensible 
world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the 
idea. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality... as referring 
to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its 
practiced employment... so far as the free will of each being is, under moral 
laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every 
other.65
But this systematic unity of ends [the highest good] in this world of intelli­
gences — a world which is indeed, as mere nature, a sensible world only, but 
which, as a system of freedom, can be entitled an intelligible, that is, a moral 
world... -- leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things...66
W hile  th e s e  s ta te m e n ts  se em  to  su p p o r t su c h  a n  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  th e  h ig h e s t  
good on  e a r th ,  p e rh a p s  th e  s tro n g e s t a rg u m e n t w e h av e  fo r su ch  a n  in te rp r e ­
ta t io n  is  K a n t’s  w r it in g s  on  P la to ’s id e a  o f th e  p e rfe c t S ta te . R ecall, a s  d is ­
c u sse d  above, K a n t  c la im s t h a t  th e  id e a  o f “a  c o n s titu tio n  a llow ing  the great­
est possible human freedom in  accordance  w ith  law s by w h ich  the freedom o f 
each is made to be consistent with that o f all others — I  do n o t sp e a k  o f th e  
g re a te s t  h a p p in e ss , fo r  th is  w ill follow  o f i t s e l f  — is  a t  an y  ra te  a  n e c e ssa ry  
id ea ...”67 T h is  is  a  s i tu a t io n  w h ich  is  v e ry  c lose  to  th e  h ig h e s t good, th o u g h  i t  
c a n n o t be  th e  h ig h e s t  good itse lf , since  w e a r e  on ly  concerned  w ith  e x te rn a l  
a c tio n s h e re , a n d  th e  effect o f n a tu r a l  e v e n ts  on h u m a n  h a p p in e ss  is  le f t  o u t 
o f co n s id e ra tio n . S u c h  a  S ta te  w ould  be, how ever, a  v a s t im p ro v e m e n t over 
th e  c u r r e n t  s ta te  o f society , a n d  le t  u s  n o t fo rg e t t h a t  th o u g h  th is  co n ce rn s  
leg a lity , su c h  q u e s tio n s  a re  moral q u e s tio n s  fo r  K a n t, since th ey  h a v e  to  do 
w ith  freedom . I f  w e h a v e  a  s i tu a tio n  w h e re  th e  freedom  o f each  is  m ax im iz e d  
w h ile  s t i l l  n o t in te r fe r in g  w ith  th e  freedom  o f  o th e rs , a n d  K a n t is  r ig h t  to  a s ­
su m e  t h a t  th e  g re a te s t  h a p p in e s s  “w ill fo llow  o f itse lf ,”68 th e n  th is  is  a  g re a t  
s tep  to w a rd  th e  h ig h e s t  good on  e a r th .
65 A808 = B836.
66 A815 = B843.
67 A316 = B373.
68 In fact I do not think that this is a warranted assumption, particularly given Kant’s defini­
tion of happiness in the first Critique as: "the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively. in respect of their
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W e sh o u ld  a lso  n o te  t h a t  th e s e  two possib le  p o s itio n s  of K a n t’s  a re  
n o t  n ecessa rily  in co n g ru o u s . I f  w e h o ld  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good on e a r th  is  im ­
p o ss ib le  in  its  complete p e rfec tio n , th e n  th e re  is  no necessary conflict. In  th is  
case , w e h av e  th e  id e a  o f a  p e rfe c t S ta te  a n d  o f p e rfe c t in d iv id u a l m o ra lity , 
b o th  o f w hich  c a n  a n d  do se rv e  a s  id e a s  for m o ra l co m p ariso n , as w ell a s  
h a v in g  a  cau sa l in flu en ce  o n  o u r  ac tio n s . N e ith e r  a re , s tr ic t ly  speak ing , 
p o ss ib le  goals to  achieve, th o u g h  th e y  m ay  b o th  be c o n tin u a lly  ap p ro x im ated . 
H ence , K a n t  is  co rrec t to  c la im  th a t ,  s tr ic tly  sp eak in g , " th e  sensib le  w orld  
h o ld s  o u t no  p rom ise  t h a t  a n y  su c h  sy s te m atic  u n ity  o f e n d s  c a n  a rise  from  
th e  n a tu r e  of th in g s ,” y e t a lso  c la im  t h a t  we h a v e  a  d u ty  to  ap p ro x im ate  th e  
id e a  a s  b e s t  we c an .69 W e w ill h a v e  o p p o rtu n ity  to sp e ll o u t  th is  possib ility  in  
m ore  d e ta il  below, b u t  i t  s h o u ld  b e  k e p t  in  m ind .
VL
A  few  su m m ary  r e m a rk s  a re  in  o rder. Above, w e  h a v e  exam ined  
se v e ra l d iffe ren t ten s io n s  ru n n in g  th ro u g h  th e  f ir s t  Critique, m ost o f th e m  
h a v in g  to  do w ith  th e  id e a  o f  te leo logy  a n d  how  to  a n sw e r  th e  th re e  q u e s tio n s  
n e c e ssa r ily  posed  a s  th e  in te r e s ts  o f rea so n . T hese  te n s io n s  a re  re la ted , a n d  
th e y  a p p e a r  to b e  m ost a m p lifie d  in  th e  d iscussion  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good. W hile  
th e s e  ten s io n s  w ill n o t b e  re so lv ed  sa tis fac to rily  in  th e  " Id ea ,” i t  is 
n o n e th e le s s  no t su rp r is in g  t h a t  K a n t  a tte m p te d  to w o rk  o u t som e of th e se  
p ro b lem s in  th is  essay ; th e  “Id e a ” does n o t sim ply  ”com e o u t  o f now here ,” b u t  
is  a  n a tu r a l  ou tg row th  o f th e  te n s io n s  fo u n d  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique. We sh o u ld  
a n tic ip a te  th a t  a n y  a tte m p t to  sp e ll o u t  a  version  of th e  h ig h e s t  good
manifoldness, intensively, in respect of their degree, and protensively, in respect of their duration,” A806 
= B834.
69 If we further maintain that we ourselves have no control over the outcome of our attempt to 
approximate the idea, so that we must hope that God will be able to make it real, then this seemingly 
strong statement of Kant’s as to the impossibility of the highest good on earth no longer forbids the im­
possibility, but only points to the fact that we need a God to bring about the hoped for result. See below 
Section Two, chapters One and Six.
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occu rring  o n  e a r th  w ould ru n  in to  se rio u s  d ifficu lties  a n d  lim ita tio n s . W hy 
K a n t s h o u ld  w a n t  to do th is , a n d  how  i t  m ig h t be  possib le , a re  q u estio n s  for 
la te r  c h a p te rs . F o r now, le t  u s  p ro ceed  to  th e  “Id e a ” in  o rd er to  ge t a  
ru d im e n ta ry  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th is  e ssay .
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Chapter Three
A First Look at the “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent”
L
I n  th is  c h a p te r  w e w ill ta k e  a n  in tro d u c to ry  look a t  K a n t’s  “Id e a  fo r  a  
U n iv e rsa l H is to ry  w ith  a  C osm opo litan  In te n t ,” w r it te n  th re e  y e a rs  a f te r  th e  
f i r s t  e d itio n  o f th e  Critique o f Pure Reason a n d  th e  sam e  y e a r  a s  “W h a t is  
E n lig h te n m e n t? ” H e re  I  w ish  on ly  to  o u tlin e  th e  m a in  p rem ises  o f th e  “Id e a ;” 
la te r  w e w ill h a v e  occasion to  ex am in e  i t  in  m o re  d e ta il, a n d  I  w ill a rg u e  t h a t  
th is  p iece  is  c ru c ia l to  K a n t’s ph ilo sophy .
n.
K a n t’s in tro d u c tio n  a n d  n in e  “th e s e s” in  th e  “Id e a  for a  U n iv e rsa l 
H isto ry ” a t te m p t n o t only  to  show  t h a t  th e  h u m a n  species is  p ro g ress in g  to ­
w a rd s  a n  e n d  w h ere  a ll o f i ts  r a t io n a l  c ap ac itie s  w ill be p e rfec ted  a n d  h u ­
m an s  w ill u n ite  in to  a  m o ra l w hole, b u t  a lso  en d ea v o rs  to  show  how  th is  
te leo log ica l p rocess m ig h t o p era te . K a n t  m a in ta in s  th a t  h is to ry  o p e ra te s  ac ­
co rd ing  to  la w s  w hich , concern ing  th e  “freedom o f the wilF a s  i t  is  m a n ife s te d  
in  th e  “appearances” of h u m a n  ac tion , a llow  one
to hope that if we examine the play of the human will’s freedom in the large, 
we can discover its course to conform to rules as well as to hope that what 
strikes us as complicated and unpredictable in the single individual may in the 
history of the entire species be discovered to be the steady progress and slow 
development of its original capacities.
C e rta in ly  h is to ry  c an n o t be  co n cern ed  in  an y  w ay  w ith  th e  s tu d y  of 
n o u m e n a l “freedom of the will in  a  m e ta p h y s ic a l co n tex t,”1 fo r obviously i t  is
1 Ak. 17.




im possib le  to  k n o w  a n y  em p irica l t r u th s  a b o u t p e rso n s  in  th e i r  in te llig ib le , 
tra n s c e n d e n t re a l ity . N o r is  K a n t’s  “h is to ry ” th e  s tu d y  o f th e  liv e s  a n d  w ills 
o f one o r se v e ra l im p o r ta n t  p e rso n s  o r e v e n ts  a n d  th e ir  im p a c t o n  o th e rs .
N o te  th a t ,  from  th e  v e ry  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  “Id e a ,” K a n t i s  co n ce rn ed  w ith  ru le s  
a n d  law s of th e  h u m a n  w ill’s  ac tion  w h ich  w o u ld  d e te rm in e  th e  “s te a d y  
p rog ress... o f i ts  o r ig in a l  c ap ac itie s ,” a n d  i s  n o t co n ce rn ed  w ith  d isco v erin g  
ru le s  a n d  law s w h ic h  w o u ld  allow  one to  g ive  a  h is to ry  o f p e rso n s , is su e s , or 
even ts; th is  is  a n  im p o r ta n t  p o in t to  c o n s id e r  w h e n  e v a lu a tin g  th o se  
c o m m en ta to rs  w ho  m a in ta in  th a t  th e  “Id e a ” is  a n  in i t ia l  a t te m p t a t  a  
reg u la tiv e  co n cep t to  b e  a p p lied  to  h is to r ic a l  s tu d y . R a th e r , w h a t  is  of 
concern  in  th e  e x a m in a tio n  o f  h is to ry  a s  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f th e  h um an 
species is  th e  in te ra c t io n  o f h u m a n  w ills i n  g e n e ra l, en masse. N a tu re , K a n t 
a sse r ts , h a s  a  p la n  o f  i t s  ow n for th e  h um an species, a n d  th is  p la n  c a n  be  
seen  in  h isto ry .
W h a t is  n a tu r e ’s p la n  a n d  how  does i t  o p e ra te?  K a n t  m a in ta in s  th a t  
n a tu re  m oves p e rs o n s  to  in te ra c t  w ith  e a c h  o th e r, w h ile  s im u lta n e o u s ly  im ­
p e llin g  th em  to s e e k  so litu d e . K a n t e x p la in s  th a t ,
I understand antagonism  to m ean m en’s unsocial sociability (ungesellige Gesel- 
ligkeit), i.e., th e ir  tendency to en te r into society, combined, however, w ith a 
thoroughgoing resistance th a t constantly  th rea tens to sunder th is  society... 
M an has a propensity  for living in society... [H]e also has, however, a  great 
tendency to isolate himself, for he finds in  him self the unsociable characteristic 
of w anting every th ing  to go according to his own desires, and he therefore an­
ticipates resistance everywhere...2
In d iv id u a ls  w a n t  to  e n te r  in to  social re la tio n s  w ith  one a n o th e r  fo r  i t  is  n a tu ­
r a l  fo r th em  to  be  w ith  one  a n o th e r . H ow ever, by  ob se rv in g  th e ir  ow n d es ire  
for h a v in g  th in g s  go th e  w ay  th e y  w a n t, a n d  re a liz in g  th a t  o th e rs  w ill h a v e  
in te n tio n s  a n d  d e s ire s  d iffe re n t from  th e i r  ow n, in d iv id u a ls  a re  a lso  d isposed
2 Ak. 20-1.
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to  m ove aw ay  from  one a n o th e r  fo r fe a r  of opposition . T h is  is  th e  unsocial 
so c iab ility  o f persons.
K a n t  cla im s th a t  th is  d u a lis tic  m ovem ent, how ever, is  n a tu re ’s w ay  o f 
a llo w in g  th e  h u m a n  species to  develop, reg a rd le ss  o f  th e  in te n tio n s  of in d i­
v id u a l w ills . K a n t w rites:
while each according to his own ways pursues his own end -  often at cross 
purposes with each other — they unconsciously proceed toward an unknown 
natural end, as if following a guiding thread (Leitfaden); and they work to 
promote an end they would set little store by, even if they were aware of it.3
In d iv id u a ls  a re  involved  w ith  th e  p u r s u i t  a n d  a t ta in m e n t  o f th e ir  ow n goals, 
re g a rd le s s  o f w h e th e r  th e se  goa ls a re  opposed to  th o se  o f o th ers . In  th e  face 
o f  su ch  opposition , one is  fo rced  to  im prove a n d  a d v an c e  th e  sk ills  a n d  ta l ­
e n ts  one h a s  in  o rder to  ach ieve  one’s  goals. B y le a d in g  m a n  in to  a  re la tio n ­
sh ip  o f te n s io n  a n d  opposition  w ith  o thers , " th is  re s is ta n c e  a w ak e n s  a ll o f 
m a n ’s pow ers, [and] b rin g s  h im  to  overcom e h is  te n d e n c y  to w ard s  laz in ess ...”4 
B u t  b e ca u se  th e  in d iv id u a l is  a lso  sociable, su c h  s tru g g le s  w ill a lw ays ta k e  
p la c e  w ith in  a  society, a  co llection  o f in d iv id u a ls  w ho fee l a  n e e d  to  s ta y  to ­
g e th e r . T h is  re su lts  in  th e  c o n s ta n t  im p ro v em en t o f th e  ta le n ts  o f in d iv id u ­
a ls  in  a  society .5
3 Ak. 17.
4 Ak. 21.
5 Here, I think, Kant has in mind those capabilities which would contribute to culture, though it 
is difficult to spell out explicitly what Kant understood both of these terms to entail. Given that, as shall 
be shown below, Kant thought the use of reason to be something which could be perfected only over time 
and with practice, it seems that “talents” may refer firstly to those capacities which aid reason, and which 
might help everyone in their improvement o f their use of reason. Secondly, Kant also speaks of talents in 
a moral sense, such as improving the ability and desire to will in accordance with the categorical impera­
tive. These two ways of thinking about talents seem to be borne out in Kant’s discussion of culture in 
section 83 of the Critique o f Judgment. Lastly, however, “talents” may refer to any type of ability which 
might somehow move a person in any way to strive toward morality and toward creating a moral whole. 
Painting, for example, might be a talent which should be improved, for a nation may be motivated towards 
peace if only, in part, to protect the work of this admired artist, or an individual may be influenced enough 
by a painting to change, even if slightly, his/her moral disposition towards the better.
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T he goal o f th is  c o n tin u a l p ro g ressio n , th e  e n d  to  w hich  th e  spec ies  is  
m ov ing  w ith  th e  im p ro v e m e n t of i ts  ta le n ts ,  is  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f a  com ­
m u n ity  in  w hich each  p e rso n ’s ra tio n a l c ap a c itie s  a re  perfected . K a n t w rite s :
all man’s talents are gradually developed... and through progressive enlight­
enment he begins to establish a way of thinking tha t can in time transform the 
crude natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical princi­
ples and thus transform a pathologically enforced agreement (pathologische- 
abgedrungene Zusammenstimmung) into a society and, finally, into a moral 
whole (moralisches Ganz).s
I n  h is  “First Thesis,” K a n t a s se r ts  th a t ,  uall o f a creature’s natural capacities 
are destined to develop completely and in conformity with their en d ”7 T h e  
n a tu r a l  e n d  of p e rso n s  a s  in te llig ib le , n o u m e n a l b e in g s , th o u g h  e x is tin g  in  
th e  n a tu r a l  w orld, is  re a so n , a n d  i t  is  re a so n  a n d  th e  cap ac ity  for p e rfe c t m o­
r a l i ty  w hich  is  to develop  com pletely. H ow ever, K a n t  c la im s in  th e  “Second 
Thesis” th a t  uin man (as  th e  sole ra t io n a l  c re a tu re  on  e a r th )  those natural 
capacities directed toward the use of his reason are to he completely developed 
only in the species, not in the individual.”8 T h e  ju s tif ic a tio n  for su ch  a n  a s ­
se r tio n  is  th a t ,  “re a so n  i ts e l f  does n o t o p e ra te  on in s tin c t, b u t  re q u ire s  t r ia l.. .  
in  o rd e r  g rad u a lly  to  p ro g ress ... T herefo re , e ac h  in d iv id u a l m a n  w ou ld  h a v e  
to  liv e  excessively lo n g  i f  h e  w ere  to  m ak e  com plete  u se  o f a ll h is  n a tu r a l  c a ­
p a c itie s .”9 T he d ev e lo p m en t o f th e  cap ac ity  fo r re a so n  a n d  m o ra lity  ta k e s  
tim e , p e rh a p s  “co u n tle ss  g en era tio n s .”10 E a c h  in d iv id u a l m u s t s tru g g le  w ith  
h im  o r h e rs e lf  a n d  w ith  o th e rs  in  society i f  s /h e  is  to m ove beyond  a n im a l i n ­
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In  ad d itio n , i t  is  th e  e n d  o f n a tu r e  to  m ove th e  h u m a n  species to w ard  
a  society  “in  w h ich  one w ill f in d  th e  h ig h e s t  possib le  d eg ree  o f freedom under 
external laws...”11 B ecause a n ta g o n ism  i s  n e ce ssa ry  fo r th e  d ev e lo p m en t of 
h u m a n  re a so n , n a tu re  m u s t h a v e  a s  i ts  e n d  a  society  in  w h ich  th e re  m ig h t 
re m a in  a n ta g o n ism  b u t  n o t w ar, a  c o m m u n ity  i n  w hich  each  p e rso n  w ou ld  
h a v e  th e  freed o m  to p u rsu e  one’s  ow n e n d s  a n d  com pete w ith  one a n o th e r  as 
long  a s  s u c h  com petition  d id  n o t d irec tly  in te r fe re  w ith  th e  freedom  o f a n ­
o th er. T h is  w o u ld  be a  n a tio n  w ith  a  p e rfe c t c o n s titu tio n  t h a t  w o u ld  allow  
people  to  b e  free  th ro u g h  coercion, a llo w in g  a n ta g o n ism  to  develop ta le n ts  
w ith o u t in v a l id a t in g  th e  freedom  o f a n o th e r . S u ch  a n  “in te rn a l” c o n s titu tio n  
o f a  n a tio n  w o u ld  be  inefficacious, how ever, i f  th e re  w ere  no  “e x te rn a l” consti­
tu tio n  b e tw e e n  n a tio n s  to  re g u la te  su c h  freed o m . H ence, K a n t  m ain tains 
th a t  th e  g o a l o f m a n k in d  is, “an internally, and fo r  th is  purpose, also an ex­
ternally perfect national constitution, as the sole state in which all o f human­
ity’s natural capacities can be developed.”** N a tio n s  a t  w a r  becom e econom i­
cally  d ra in e d  a n d  physica lly  d ev as ta te d , p la c in g  a t  r is k  th e ir  a b ility  to  func­
tion  in te rn a l ly . B o th  th e  in te rn a l  a n d  e x te rn a l  c o n s titu tio n s , th e n , a re  d es ir­
ab le  in  o rd e r  to  p e rfec t th e  ta le n ts  o f th e  sp e c ie s ,13 a n d  a re  b o th  b ro u g h t 
ab o u t in  th e  sa m e  w ay  as above, n a m e ly  th ro u g h  a n tag o n ism  o r u n so c ia l so­
ciab ility . T h e  c o n s ta n t f ig h tin g  o f m a n  a g a in s t  m a n  a n d  n a tio n  a g a in s t  n a ­
tion , K a n t  m a in ta in s , w ill ev en tu a lly  le a d  to  a  s ta te  o f peace, a  cosm opolitan  
w orld  in  w h ic h  p e rso n s  w ill b e  ab le  to  p u r s u e  th e i r  ow n h a p p in e ss  w ith o u t 
in fr in g in g  u p o n  th e  freedom  o f a n o th e r . T h e  e n d  of th e  h u m a n  be ing , th e n , 
is  th e  ex erc ise  o f p e rfec t reason , a n d  th is  e n d  c a n  only be  ach iev ed  in  a  cos­




13 We shall see in our discussion of “To[ward] Perpetual Peace” the more exact nature of such 
an external constitution.
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m .
As th is  c h a p te r  is  m e re ly  a n  overv iew  o f th e  a rtic le , le t  m e  p ro v id e  
h e re  on ly  a  few  su m m ary  re m a rk s . T he  f i r s t  r e m a rk  is  to  no tice  t h a t  K a n t  
a g a in  a s se r ts  t h a t  e v e ry th in g  in  n a tu r e  h a s  a  p u rp o se , a n o th e r  re c u rre n c e  o f 
th e  “p rin c ip le  o f p u rp o siv e  m e c h a n ism ” a s  I  h a v e  te rm e d  i t .  To quo te  in  fu ll:
All of a creature’s natural capacities are destined to develop completely and in 
conformity with their end. This is confirmed in all animals, both by external 
and internal, analytical observation. In the teleological theory of nature, an 
organ that is not intended to be used, an organization tha t does not achieve its 
end, is a contradiction. If we stray from tha t fundamental principle, we no 
longer have a lawful but an aimlessly playing nature and hopeless chance 
takes the place of reason’s guiding thread.14
T h is  is  a  p a rtic u la rly  s tro n g , a n d  so m e w h a t n e w  th e s is , a t  le a s t  th e  a s s e r tio n  
t h a t  ev ery  capac ity  is  to  develop  completely. H ow  a re  w e to  ta k e  th is?  F o r  
e x am p le , ta k e  th e  frog’s in s t in c tu a l  a b ility  to  sh o o t o u t i ts  to n g u e  in  o rd e r  to  
c a tc h  flies. A re w e to  su p p o se  th a t ,  over tim e , fro g s ev ery w h ere  w ill g e t p ro ­
g ress iv e ly  b e tte r  a t  th is , to  th e  p o in t  w h e re  th e y  w ill  n e v e r  m iss  w h e n  th e y  
t r y  to  ca tch  fiies? P e rh a p s  w e a re  on ly  to  ta k e  th is  to  m e a n  th a t  s ince  th e  
n a tu r a l  e n d  o f a  frog is  to  k eep  i ts e l f  a live  b y  c a tc h in g  flie s  i t s  n a tu r a l  i n ­
s t in c t  w ill be d irec ted  on ly  to  t h a t  en d , a n d  n o t to  som e o th e r  e n d .15 O r  p e r ­
h a p s  w e sh o u ld  ta k e  th is  to  m e a n  t h a t  th is  is  h o w  w e  a re  to  s tu d y  a ll  th e  o r ­
g a n s  a n d  in s tin c ts  w hich  w e f in d  in  a  frog, n a m e ly  w ith  i ts  n a tu r a l  e n d  o f  
s u rv iv a l  th ro u g h  e a tin g  flies . T h is  w o u ld  m a k e  se n se , b u t  i t  seem s d ifficu lt 
to  ju s t ify  K a n t’s a sse rtio n  t h a t  a n y  in s t in c t  o r o rg a n  w ill develop completely.
14 Ak. 18. Also: “Nature does nothing unnecessary and is not prodigal in the use of means of 
her ends” (Ak. 19).
15 Though it is hard to imagine what this other end might be; catching rides on airplanes or 
licking postage stamps?
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T he  only  in te rp re ta t io n  w h ich  m igh t save  K a n t o n  th is  score is  to 
su g g e s t so m eth in g  lik e  th e  “s u rv iv a l  o f th e  f i tte s t” ev en  o f  in d iv id u a l in ­
s t in c ts  a n d  o rgans. O n  th is  in te rp re ta t io n , K a n t m ig h t b e  th o u g h t  to  be 
s a y in g  th a t  i t  is  sim ply  a  fa c t o f  n a tu r e  th a t  in s tin c ts  o r o rg a n s  w h ich  do n o t 
c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  en d  o f a n  o rg a n ism  a re  w eeded o u t o v er tim e . T h u s, i f  w e 
e n c o u n te re d  a  frog w h ich  a tte m p te d  to  k ill flies by  h o p p in g  on  to p  o f them , 
w e m ig h t w ell observe t h a t  th i s  p a r t ic u la r  b ehav io r is  ineffec tive , a n d  such  
frogs w ill n o t live  long  e n o u g h  to  rep roduce, th u s  th e  t r a i t  w ill n o t  be  p a sse d  
dow n  a s  such . In  th is  w ay , o v e r tim e , a ll such  o rg an s  a n d  in s t in c ts  w ould  
c o n tin u e  to  develop toward p e rfe c tio n , since th e  m ore e ffe c tu a l su c h  a n  o rgan  
o r  in s ta n c e  w ould  be in  p re s e rv in g  th e  species, th e  m ore  t h a t  ty p e  o f an im a l 
w o u ld  co n tin u e  to  exist. H ow ever, ev en  th is  w e ak e r th e s is  seem s too strong , 
fo r w e seem  to h av e  ex am p les  w h e re in  a n  o rg an  sim p ly  h a s  no  u se  w hich  w e 
c a n  find , exam p les of o rg an s  o r  in s t in c ts  w hich, w hile  n o t  h in d e r in g  th e  o r­
g an ism , seem  to  h av e  evolved  on  th e  “coa tta ils” of o th e r  t r a i ts .  A nd, in  a d d i­
tio n , i t  is  d ifficu lt to see  how  th e s e  m ig h t develop completely.
T h is  p a r tic u la r  is su e  o f  com plete  developm ent a s id e , th e  r e s t  of 
K a n t’s q u o ta tio n  is q u ite  te l l in g  o f  a n  im p o rta n t p o in t, n a m e ly  t h a t  such  a  
p rin c ip le  is  n ecessa ry  to em ploy, a t  le a s t  as a  reg u la tiv e  p rin c ip le , i f  we a re  to 
conceive o f som e o rder in  n a tu r e .  T h is  is  a  th e s is  w h ich  w e s h a l l  see  m uch  
m o re  fu lly  developed in  th e  t h i r d  Critique, b u t w h ich  seem s a t  l e a s t  to  be 
su g g e s te d  h e re . We sa w  above t h a t  th e  id ea  of teleology m a y  b e  n ecessa ry  
e v en  to  conceive of a n  o rg a n ism  to  b eg in  w ith . B u t in  a d d itio n  to  th is , w h a t 
po ssib le  science could develop i f  o rg a n s  h a d  no co m p reh en s ib le  p u rp o se , o r i f  
o rg an ism s d id  n o t h av e  “goals”? H ow  cou ld  w e conceive o f a  n a tu r e  w hich  
e x h ib ite d  no  o rderly  dev e lo p m en t, b u t  only p roduced  o rg a n s  w h ich  h a d  p u r ­
po ses  fo re ign  o r co n tra ry  to  th e  e n d s  o f th e  organism ? A  ra n d o m  o r p lay fu l 
n a tu r e  w ou ld  be  one w h ich  w o u ld  b e  im possib le  to  su b jec t to  r e g u la r  law s of 
science.
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H ence, again , a  s tro n g  th e s is  re g a rd in g  th e  “p rin c ip le  o f p u rp o siv e  
m ech an ism s” seem s to  be  ex trem e ly  d ifficu lt to defend, th o u g h  i t  seem s n ec ­
e s sa ry  a s  a  reg u la tiv e  id ea . A n d  w e see  h e re  fu r th e r  su g g e s tio n s  a s  to w hy 
su ch  a  reg u la tiv e  id ea  w ou ld  b e  n ecessa ry .
N otice also th a t  a  non-te leo log ica l n a tu re  w ould  be  opposed  to  o u r  in ­
te re s ts  in  m orality , p a r t ic u la r ly  w ith  r e g a rd  to  th e  h u m a n  species. K a n t h e re  
is  co n ce rn ed  w ith  th e  a p p a re n t  p ro b lem  t h a t  th e  h is to ry  of th e  h u m a n  race  
seem s c o n tin u a lly  f ra u g h t w ith  p e ril, a n d  seem s to be  p u rp o se le ss . K a n t also  
n o tes  t h a t  w e do have  th e  fac u lty  o f  rea so n , a n d  th e re b y  access to  m o ra lity .16 
T he  q u e s tio n  th e n  n a tu ra lly  a rise s , W h a t good is th e  fa c u lty  o f re a so n  i f  i ts  
effects in  th e  h is to ry  o f h u m a n ity  seem  to  be  negligible?
One cannot resist a certain [feeling of] indignation when one sees men’s ac­
tions placed on the great stage of the world and finds that, despite some indi­
viduals’ seeming wisdom, in the large everything is finally woven together 
from folly and childish vanity and often even childish malice and destructive­
ness.17
S uch  a  h is to ry  devoid o f a  p u rp o se  w o u ld  be  a  “sense less co u rse  o f h u m a n  a f­
fa irs .”18
T h is  is  p a rtic u la rly  a  p ro b lem  since  n a tu re  seem s to  h a v e  g iven  u s  
th e  fa c u lty  o f reason  for no p u rp o se . R easo n  seem s so m u ch  m o re  in e ffec tu a l 
th a n  in s t in c t  a t  p rov id ing  u s  w ith  h a p p in e ss ; “n a tu re  seem s h e re  to  h a v e  
ta k e n  d e lig h t in  th e  g re a te s t  fru g a lity ... [and] i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  n a tu r e  is  u t ­
te r ly  u n co n ce rn ed  th a t  m a n  live  w ell...”19 W ell m ig h t w e d e sp a ir  a n d  th in k  
th a t  th e  w o rld  is  only a  p lace  fo r m ise ry  i f  o u r  facu lty  o f re a so n  is  in e ffec tu a l
16 Of course, the moral law is not yet conceived of as it will be in the Grundlegung or the sec­
ond Critique.
17 Ak. 17-8.
18 Ak. 18. Also see Kant’s comments at Ak. 30.
19 Ak. 19-20.
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bo th  in  th e  p u r s u i t  o f h a p p in e ss  a n d  in  a  w orld  w h ich  o p e ra te s  unconcerned  
w ith  m o ra l en d s .
T h e  seco n d  re m a rk  w hich  sh o u ld  be  m ade  is  to  ex am in e  how  K a n t 
in te n d s  su c h  a  h is to ry  to be  conceived; does th is  id e a  o f  a  cosm opolitan  h is ­
to ry  se rv e  ch ie fly  fo r a  sp ecu la tiv e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  h u m a n  h isto ry , a s  m an y  
c o m m en ta to rs  h a v e  asserted?  I  th in k  t h a t  th e  a n sw e r  to  th is  is  negative . 
C e rta in ly  K a n t  does claim  t h a t  “w e w ill leav e  i t  to  n a tu r e  to  p roduce  th e  m an  
who is  in  a  p o s itio n  to  w rite  [a h is to ry ]. In  th is  w ay  s h e  p ro d u ced  a  K epler, 
w ho in  a n  u n e x p e c te d  w ay su b jec ted  th e  eccen tric  p a th s  o f th e  p la n e ts  to  
d e fin ite  law s, a n d  a  N ew ton...”20 K a n t  hopes to sk e tch  a  “a  g u id ing  th re a d  for 
such a  h is to ry ,”21 w hich  w ould  be  sp e lle d  o u t by som e o th e r  p e rso n  in  g re a te r  
d e ta il  a n d  in  accordance w ith  law s. B u t  w h a t k in d  o f  h is to ry  is  th is  “su ch  a  
h is to ry ”? K a n t’s “gu id ing  th re a d ” fo r  th is  h is to ry  seem s to  h a v e  l it tle  to  do 
w ith  e v e n ts  a n d  in v en tio n s  of th e  p a s t ,  b u t  r a th e r  h a s  to  do from  th e  s ta r t  
w ith  “th e  s te a d y  p rog ress a n d  slow  developm en t of i t s  [ th e  h u m a n  species] 
o rig in a l c a p a c itie s ,”22 in  o th e r  w ords, to  do w ith  a  m o ra l h is to ry . T h is is  th e  
h is to ry  o f n a tu r e ’s  p la n  to b r in g  a b o u t a n  in te rn a l  a n d  e x te rn a l  co n stitu tio n  
exclusively  fo r th e  reason  th a t  i t  is  “the sole state in which all o f humanity’s 
natural capacities can be developed.”23 T h is  is  h is to ry  fro m  p rac tic a l p o in t of 
view .
W e se e  reco n firm atio n  o f th is  in  K a n t’s c losing  p a ra g ra p h s  (“N in th  
T hesis”). T h e  m o st decisive s ta te m e n t  o f  th is  is:
I t  would be a  m isunderstanding of my point of view to [believe] th a t I w ant 
th is idea of a  world history th a t  is to a  certain ex ten t led by an  a  priori guiding 
th read  to take the place of history as such, whose composition is wholly
20 Ak. 18.
21 Ak. 18. Italics added for emphasis.
22 Ak. 17.
23 Ak. 27.
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empirical. This idea is only a reflection of w hat a philosophical mind... could 
a ttem pt to do from another perspective.24
K a n t  a p p e a rs  to  be in d ic a tin g  t h a t  h is  conception o f h is to ry  a s  d isc u sse d  in  
th e  “Id e a ” is  n o t one concerned , a t  l e a s t  in  th e  m a in , w ith  e m p iric a l in fo rm a ­
tio n  o f th e  p a s t  b e in g  u n if ie d  in to  a  th eo re tica l science. K a n t  is  co n ce rn ed  
w ith  th e s e  ev en ts  on ly  in so fa r  a s  th e y  show  “w h a t p eo p les  a n d  g o v e rn m e n ts  
h a v e  done  to c o n tr ib u te  to  o r  im p a ir  th e  objective o f co sm o p o litan ism .”25 In  
fac t, i f  w e ta k e  K a n t’s  rec o m m e n d a tio n s  seriously  a b o u t h o w  to  c o n s tru c t a  
th e o ry  o f em p irica l ev en ts , th is  w o u ld  seem  to  b e  a  r a th e r  im p o v e rish e d  h is ­
to ry  in d eed ; K a n t’s  ex am p le s  h a v e  on ly  to  do w ith  “fo cu sin g  e v e ry w h e re  only  
o n  c iv il c o n s titu tio n s  a n d  th e i r  la w s  a n d  on th e  re la tio n s  a m o n g  n a tio n s .”26 
T h is  is  a  h is to ry  w ith o u t sc ience, w ith o u t in v en tio n s, w ith o u t l i te ra tu re ,  
w ith o u t a r t ,  a n d  p re su m a b ly  ev en  w ith o u t g re a t in d iv id u a ls .27 I t  is  a  h is to ry  
o f  p o litic s  a n d  g eo g rap h ica l e x p lo ra tio n , a n d  only  th e s e  b e c a u se  th e y  a re  th e  
d r iv in g  fac to rs b e h in d  th e  p ro g re ss  o f th e  h u m a n  ra c e  to w a rd  m o ra l p e rfec ­
tio n . A gain , th is  is  a n  im p o r ta n t  p o in t to  m ake  a g a in s t  th o se  c o m m en ta to rs  
w ho  ta k e  th e  “Id e a ” to  be  p r im a r ily  concerned  w ith  th e  a t te m p t  to  g ive n eces­
s a ry  concep ts fo r th e  s tu d y  o f  e m p iric a l h is to ry .28 I  th in k  t h a t  w e m ay  con­
c lu d e , th e n , th a t  K a n t h a s  a  d iffe re n t p u rp o se  in  m in d  th a n  th e  s tu d y  o f em ­
p ir ic a l  h is to ry .
T he  th ird  r e m a rk  to  be  m a d e  is  to  sim ply  b r in g  to  o u r  a t te n t io n  th e  
n e c e ssa ry  connection  b e tw e e n  m o ra lity  a n d  po litica l sy s te m s. A fte r h a v in g
24 Ak. 30. Incidentally, I take this other perspective to be a practical one.
25 Ak.31.
26 Ak. 30.
271 include the last because Kant’s focus is on “the play o f the human will's freedom in the 
large” (17), and thus seems to exclude important individuals. However, it is possible that they would 
have to be included in descriptions of wars, politics, and constitutions; it is likely, for instance, that Kant 
would want to include King Frederick William n  as an important instigator of enlightened reforms.
28 Friedrich Kaulbach. for example.
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c la im ed  in  th e  “F o u r th  T hesis” th a t  th e  n a tu r a l  en d  fo r h u m a n s  is  to  form  
“in to  a  moral w hole ,” in  th e  “F if th  T h es is ,” K a n t  m a in ta in s  th a t
thus must there be a society in which one will find the highest possible degree 
of freedom under external laws combined with irresistible power, i.e., a per­
fectly rightful civil consitution,29 whose a t t a in m ent-, is the supreme task nature 
has set for the human species; for only by solving and completing it can nature 
fulfill her other objectives with our species.30
W e c a n  see  th is  e sp ec ia lly  in  th e  s e v e n th  a n d  e ig h th  “T h eses .” K a n t c la im s 
t h a t  n a tu r e ’s  “su p re m e  objective” is  “a  u n iv e rs a l  cosmopolitan state, th e  
wom b in  w h ich  a ll  o f th e  h u m a n  species’ orig in al cap ac itie s  w ill be  devel­
oped.”31 K a n t  c le a r ly  s ta te s  th a t  m o ra lity  c a n  only  occur w ith in  a  p o litica l 
sy s tem  in  w h ic h  th e re  is  bo th  a n  in te r n a l  c o n s titu tio n  a n d  a  “cosm opolitan  
s ta te  in  w h ich  th e  se c u rity  of n a tio n s  is  p u b lic ly  acknow ledged .”32 In d eed , in  
th e  s ta te m e n t  o f  th e  “F if th  T hesis” itse lf , im m e d ia te ly  a f te r  a rg u in g  th a t  th e  
n a tu r a l  e n d  o f  h u m a n  b e ings is  th e  p e rfe c t deve lopm en t o f th e ir  rea so n , a n d  
th e re b y  th e i r  m o ra lity , K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  “the greatest problem” fo r u s  is  
th e  uachievefment of] a universal civil society j”33 th is  is  a  s tro n g  th e s is  g iven  
th a t  m o ra lity  i s  s ta te d  a s  our f in a l end . K a n t  m ig h t h a v e  sa id  th a t  a  good 
will w as o u r n e c e ssa ry  end , b u t h e  specifica lly  s ta te s  t h a t  i t  is  a  cosm opolitan  
s ta te  o p e ra tin g  u n d e r  th e  law s of R igh t, a n d  th a t  th is  is  th e  “hardest and the 
last [problem] to be solved.”** T his in d ic a te s  n o t only t h a t  th e re  is  a  d e fin ite  
l in k  b e tw een  p o litic s  a n d  m orality  fo r K a n t, b u t  also t h a t  th e  ach iev em en t of





34 “Sixth Thesis.” Ak. 23.
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a  u n iv e rs a l civil society is  ou r n e c e ssa ry  object of w illing  a s  m o ra l (sensuous) 
c re a tu re s .35
A  n e ce ssa ry  co rre la te  to  th is  d iscussion  m u s t be  th e  fa c t t h a t  th e  w ill 
can  b e  in flu e n ce d  by  su rro u n d in g  co n d itio n s. T his c o rre la te  is  b o rn e  o u t in  
a ll  o f  K a n t’s w ritin g s , a n d  we w ill h a v e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  e x am in e  i t  in  m ore de­
ta i l  below . B u t fo r now  we c a n  a t  l e a s t  n o te  th a t  th e  w ill i s  in d e e d  in flu en ced  
by  e x te rn a l  c ircum stances. A n d  c le a rly  K a n t  is  concerned  w ith  su c h  in f lu ­
ence; o therw ise , h e  w ould  s im p ly  h a v e  w r it te n  th a t  a  good w ill is  th e  f in a l 
object o f a l l  o u r w illing , a n d  h is  w ritin g s  a b o u t perfec t c o n s titu tio n s  w ould  
h a v e  b e e n  r a th e r  in c id e n ta l d e ta ils , d e a lin g  only w ith  R ig h t o r p e rh a p s  w r i t­
te n  only  w ith  a n  eye to w ard  h a p p in e ss .
T h e  q u estio n  n a tu ra lly  a r is e s  a s  to  w hy th e  fu ll p e rfec tio n  o f m o ra lity  
sh o u ld  be  lin k e d  w ith  a  p erfec t c o n s titu tio n  a n d  a  cosm opo litan  w orld? To 
beg in  w ith , w e m u s t n o te  th a t  K a n t, l ik e  H obbes, be lieves t h a t  th e  s ta te  of 
n a tu re  is  n o t  conducive to  th e  b e tte rm e n t  o f persons, a n d  t h a t  peop le  n eed ed  
to e n te r  in to  a  civ il society before th e y  c o u ld  have  h a d  th e  sa fe ty  to  in v e s t 
th e ir  tim e  a n d  im prove  th e ir  ta le n ts . K a n t  ap p ea rs  to  ta k e  su c h  a  c la im  fu r ­
th e r , in d ic a tin g  t h a t  i t  is  only w ith in  su c h  a  society th a t  one  h a s  th e  ab ility  to 
becom e m o ra lly  b e tte r . We w ill see  th e  n a tu r e  of th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  
R ig h t a n d  m o ra lity  a g a in  in  h is  Metaphysics of Morals, b u t  w e c a n  a t  le a s t 
m a k e  som e in tu it iv e  sen se  of th is  belief: in  a  S ta te  w h e re  one’s  p e rso n  a n d  
one’s w ell b e in g  is  co n tin u a lly  u n d e r  d ire c t th re a t  of a tta c k , i t  is  d ifficu lt i f  
n o t im possib le  to  ac t in  accordance w ith  th e  categorical im p e ra tiv e . H ow
35 We will have to wait to say more about why Kant thinks that this is our necessary end, but let 
me give a brief indication of why I think this is. The main reason is that Kant takes the highest good to be 
necessary object of all our (rational) willing. The highest good concerns not one individual, but all indi­
viduals. And it concerns both morality and happiness. So, if our goal is to achieve the highest good on 
earth, we want to maximize morality, and (Kant believes) reward that morality with happiness. While we 
cannot directly make others more virtuous, we can attempt to bring about those conditions under which 
the cultivation of their rational nature can begin in earnest. And, for Kant, such cultivation occurs only 
with a perfect internal constitution and a cosmopolitan world.
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cou ld  one beh av e  p e rfec tly  m orally  a n d  y e t su rv ive?  W h a t d em an d  o f  R ig h t 
cou ld  be  a d h e re d  to in  su c h  a  s ta te  o f law lessn ess?
K a n t d raw s a n  a n a lo g y  b e tw een  th e  s ta te  of n a tu r e  p rio r to  e n te r in g  
in to  a n y  civil society  a n d  a  s ta te  of n a tu re  p r io r  to e n te r in g  in to  a  c iv il r e la ­
tio n sh ip  am ong  n a tio n s :
What the lawless state did to savages -- namely, hold back all of our species’ 
natural capacities until the evil that this placed them under compelled them to 
leave this state and enter into a civil constituion,36 in which all those seeds can 
be developed -- barbarous freedom will also do to already established nations.37
T h is  in d ica te s  t h a t  K a n t  be lieves a  s im ila r  s ta te  o f n a tu r e  to  ex is t b e tw ee n  
n a tio n s  w hich, lik e  th e  o r ig in a l s ta te  o f n a tu re ,  h a m p e rs  th e  deve lopm en t o f 
m o ra lity . H e m a in ta in s  t h a t  w e m u st “lea v e  th e  law le ss  s ta te  of sa v a g e ry  
a n d  e n te r  in to  a  fe d e ra tio n  o f peoples,”38 “m u s t  force n a tio n s  to  ju s t  th e  sam e  
decision ... to  w hich  sa v a g e  m e n  w ere so u n h a p p ily  forced, nam ely , to  give u p  
th e i r  b ru ta l  freedom  a n d  to  se ek  calm  a n d  s e c u rity  in  a  law -governed  co n sti­
tu tio n .”39 A gain , su ch  a  s i tu a tio n  of law le ss  sa v ag e ry  b e tw een  n a tio n s  is  a n  
e x te rn a l  s itu a tio n  w h ich  o b s tru c ts  th e  deve lopm en t o f m ora lity .
K a n t’s re a so n in g  concern ing  th e  so u rce  of su ch  o b stru c tio n s i s  t h a t  h e  
be lieves th a t  h u m a n s  c o n tin u a lly  w a n t to  h a v e  th in g s  th e i r  own w ay, re g a rd ­
le ss  of w h a t h a rm  i t  m ig h t c a u se  o thers, a n d  i t  is  only  th ro u g h  th e  coercion  of 
a  S ta te  th a t  p e rso n s  w ill b e h av e  in  accord w ith  R igh t. E a c h  in d iv id u a l n eed s  
to  b e  coerced, since
although as a rational creature he desires a law that establishes boundaries 
for everyone’s freedom, his selfish animal propensities induce him to except
36 Again, this misprint occurs in the translation.
37 Ak. 25-6.
38 Ak.24.
39 Ak. 24. We will encounter a fuller discussion of the requirement of nations to move out of a 
“state of international nature” in Section One, Chapter Nine and Section Two, Chapter Four below.
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himself from them wherever he can. He thus requires a master who will break 
his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will...40
As se n su o u s  c re a tu re s , p e rso n s  h a v e  a  n a tu r a l  in te r e s t  in  h ap p in ess , a n d  
h e n ce  m a n y  tim es th e y  w ill to  h a v e  th e i r  dow er)41 d e s ire s  sa tis fied  re g a rd le s s  
o f o th e rs ’ w ish es to  do th e  sam e. B e ca u se  o f th is  fac t, p e rso n s  behave  b e t te r  
w h e n  coerced  in  acco rd  w ith  R ig h t,42 a n d  since s u c h  R ig h t is  sim ply  th e  
g re a te s t  freedom  o f e a c h  in d iv id u a l w ith o u t t r a n s g re s s in g  th e  freedom  o f  a n ­
o th e r , i t  is  le g is la te d  from  th e  m o ra l la w .43 A s K a n t  su m m arize s  in  a  foo tno te  
in  “T o[w ard ] P e rp e tu a l  Peace:”
a man (or a people) who is merely in a state of nature denies me... security and 
injures me merely by being in this state. For although he does not actively 
(facto) injure me, he does so by virtue of the lawlessness of his state (statu  
iniusto), by which he constantly threatens me, and I can require him... to enter 
with me into a state of civil law...44
A gain , fo llow ing  th e  analogy , w e c an  in tu it iv e ly  conceive o f w hy i t  is  n e ce s­
s a ry  fo r n a tio n s  to  e n te r  in to  a  cosm opo litan  w ho le , n a m e ly  b ecause  c o n s ta n t  
w a r, th e  th r e a t  o f w a r, a n d  p re p a ra tio n  fo r w a r  le a v e  n a tio n s  econom ically  
d e v a s ta te d , t ra d e  d is ru p te d , a n d  p eo p le  fe a r in g  fo r  th e i r  w ell being . K a n t  
s im p ly  ta k e s  i t  a s  fa c t t h a t  w a r a n d  th e  th r e a t  o f w a r  is  a  s itu a tio n  w h ich  is
40 Ak. 23. Herder in his Ideas on the Philosophy o f the History o f Mankind rebukes Kant for 
his assertion that humans require a master. Kant attempts to reply to this charge in: Immanuel Kant, 
“Reviews of Herder’s Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind,” in Kant: Political Writings, ed. 
Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 201-220.
41 Cf. Kant's distinction between the “lower” and “higher” faculty of desire in the second Cri­
tique.
42 And, of course, this is not some completely foreign and arbitrary constraint, because Kant 
claims that Right is simply what we do will as rational creatures. When we put the moral law above self- 
love in the formulation of the categorical imperative, we rationally will for such a society to be formed. In 
addition, such a society is one of our Ideas of reason.
43 See the Metaphysics o f Morals for a more detailed discussion of this.
44 Ak. 350. Immanuel Kant, “To[ward] Perpetual Peace: A philosophical Sketch,” in Perpet­
ual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral Practice, trans. Ted Humphrey 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983), 107-143. All citations refer to Akademie page 
numbers.
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in co m p a tib le , n o t w ith  th e  d ev e lo p m en t of a ll  c u ltu re , b u t  w ith  th e  develop­
m e n t o f so m e  asp ec ts  o f c u ltu re  w h ich  allow  fo r th e  p ro m o tio n  of a  m o ra l 
ed u ca tio n .
O n e  re a so n  w hy  su c h  a  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  b e tw ee n  n a tio n s  is  co n trad ic ­
to ry  to  m o ra lity  is  b ecau se  i t  is  co n trad ic to ry  to  th e  f in a l  e n d  o f h u m an ity . As 
K a n t  e x p la in s  in , “T o[w ard] P e rp e tu a l  Peace:”
Just as we view with deep disdain the attachment of savages to their lawless 
freedom — preferring to scuffle without end  rather than to place themselves 
under lawful restraints..., consequently preferring a mad freedom to a rational 
one —... so also should we think [this of] civilized peoples (each one united into 
a nation).45
W hile w e w ill see  such  e n d s  d isc u sse d  a g a in  w ith  th e  th i r d  Critique, w h a t w e 
see w ith  th is  q u o ta tio n  is  t h a t  w a r  does n o th in g  (d irec tly ) to  p rom ote  m ora l 
en d s. W a r a n d  th e  p re p a ra t io n  fo r w a r  do n o t te a c h  p e rs o n s  ab o u t how  to be  
m oral; a t  m o st, w a r  a n d  th e  th r e a t  o f  w a r  a re  “th e  g re a te s t  obstacle  to  
m o ra lity ... w h ic h  c o n s ta n tly  r e ta r d s  th is  a d v an c em en t”46 ev en  a t  best, w a r 
does n o t c u lt iv a te  p e rso n s’ w illin g n e ss  to  ad h e re  to  th e  com m ands o f th e  
m o ra l law , te a c h in g  th e m  th e  a r t  o f  k illin g  in s te a d  o f a r t  itse lf . T he f in a l e n d  
o f h u m a n  b e in g s  a s  r a t io n a l  c re a tu re s  is  a  S ta te  in  w h ic h  everyone h a s  th e  
m ax im u m  a m o u n t o f freed o m  w h ile  n o t  im p ed in g  on  th e  freedom  of o th e rs .47 
T h is  f in a l  e n d  a lso  e n ta ils  th e  m o ra l perfec tion  o f a ll  p e rso n s , above a n d  
beyond  a  p e a c e fu l cosm opo litan  w hole. A  s ta te  o f w a r  v io la te s  th e  f in a l en d  
o f h u m a n k in d . K a n t  is  d e a r  in  a ll  h is  w ritin g s  t h a t  w a r  is  th e  sing le  m ost
45 Ak. 354. Italics added for emphasis.
46 Conflict o f  the Faculties, p. 169.
41 Incidentally, we can also see that war does little to improve the happiness of persons. And, 
of course, there is nothing like the proportionality of happiness to morality in the spoils of the victor, since 
“the concept of the right of nations as a right to go to war is meaningless (for it would then be the right to 
determine the right not by independent, universally valid laws that restrict the freedom of everyone, but by 
one-sided maxims backed by force)” (“To[ward] Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 357). And, finally, this is recon­
firmation that the question about a cosmopolitan whole is a question asked with moral considerations in 
mind, not simply a concern for happiness.
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th re a te n in g  obstacle  in  th e  w ay  of p eace , a n d  b ecause  such  peace  is  n ecessa ry  
for th e  im p ro v em en t o f o u r  c ap ab ilitie s , i t  is  a  th r e a t  to m ora lity  itse lf .
N one the less , K a n t  is  also d e a r  t h a t  a n tag o n ism  is  a  n e c e ssa ry  e le­
m en t in  th e  cu ltiv a tio n  o f  m orality . P e rh a p s  th e  b e s t ind ica tion  o f  th is  com es 
from  K a n t’s  d iscussion  o f  w h a t  w ould  h a p p e n  i f  no  an tagon ism  e x is te d  
am ong persons. In  th is  case , “m an  w o u ld  liv e  a s  a n  A rcad ian  sh e p h e rd , in  
perfec t concord, co n te n tm e n t, a n d  m u tu a l  love...”48 T h is sounds l ik e  a  w on­
d erfu l id ea l, b u t  K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  in  th is  s itu a tio n , “a ll ta le n ts  w ou ld  He 
e te rn a lly  d o rm a n t in  th e i r  seed; m en  docile  a s  th e  sheep  th ey  te n d  w ould  
h a rd ly  in v e s t th e ir  ex is ten ce  w ith  a n y  w o rth  g re a te r  th a n  th a t  o f c a ttle ; a n d  
as  th e  p u rp o se  b e h in d  m a n ’s  c rea tio n , h is  r a t io n a l  n a tu re , th e re  w o u ld  r e ­
m ain  a  void .”49 H ere  w e m u s t  a n tic ip a te  K a n t’s a sse rtio n  in  th e  seco n d  a n d  
th ird  Critique, th o u g h  th is  is  easily  e n o u g h  done, th a t  w h a t m a k e s  p e rso n s  
v a lu ab le  is  th e ir  ra tio n a l n a tu re ; i t  is  b e c a u se  in d iv id u a ls  a re  m em b ers  o f th e  
in te llig ib le , m o ra l rea lm , a n d  n o t m e re ly  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  th e  n a tu r a l  rea lm , 
th a t  th e y  a re  “en d s in  th em se lv es.” A n  e x ce llen t su m m ary  of th is  p o in t  oc­
cu rs in  K a n t’s “R eview s o f H e rd e r’s Id e a s  on  th e  Philosophy  of th e  H is to ry  of 
M an k in d ” w h ere  h e  re b u k e s  H erder, say in g :
Does the author really mean that, if the happy inhabitants of Tahiti, never 
visited by more civilized nations, were destined to live in their peaceful indo­
lence for thousands of centuries, it would be possible to give a satisfactory an­
swer to the question of why they should exist at all, and of whether it would 
not have been just as good if this island had been occupied by happy sheep and 
cattle as by happy human beings who merely enjoy themselves?50
T hus, w hile  p e rso n s m ig h t be  h ap p y  w ith o u t an tag o n ism ,51 th ey  w o u ld  n o t 
h ave  an y  m ore  v a lu e  th a n  a n y  o th er c re a tu re  on  E a r th , for th e y  w o u ld  n o t be
48 Ak. 21.
49 Ak. 21.
50 “Reviews o f Herder’s Ideas,” p. 219-20.
51 This is different than Kant’s other claim that persons would have been happier without the 
interference of reason (see especially the “Speculative Beginning of Human History .” Ak. 111 and Ak.
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c u ltiv a tin g  th e  u se  of th e i r  reaso n , a n d  th e re fo re  w ould  n o t  be  p ro g re ss in g  
to w a rd  th e ir  n a tu r a l ,  m o ra l end .52 O ne  n e e d s  an tag o n ism , b u t  n o t w a r ,53 a  
s i tu a tio n  o ccu rrin g  “on ly  in  society — a n d , indeed , only  in  one  th a t  com bines 
th e  g re a te s t  freedom , a n d  th u s  a  th o ro u g h g o in g  a n ta g o n ism  am ong i t s  m em ­
b e rs , w ith  a  p rec ise  d e te rm in a tio n  a n d  p ro tec tio n  o f th e  b o u n d a rie s  o f  th is  
freedom , so t h a t  i t  c a n  coex ist w ith  th e  freedom  of o th e rs .”54
O ne im p o r ta n t  p o in t w e n e ed  to  m a k e  h e re  is  to  n o te  th e  e x ac t n a tu r e  
o f th is  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw ee n  a  po litica l w ho le  a n d  m o ra lity . P u t  s im p ly  
enough , m o ra lity  d e p en d s  on  a  cosm opolitan  w orld, b u t  a  cosm opolitan  w o rld  
does n o t d e p e n d  on  m o ra lity . A  cosm opolitan  w orld  is  a  n e ce ssa ry  b u t  n o t  a  
su ffic ien t con d itio n  fo r th e  ach iev em en t o f  m orality . T h is  is  a  p o in t w h ic h  
w ill le a d  to  confusion , a s  i t  h a s  led  m a n y  com m en ta to rs , i f  n o t p ro p erly  u n ­
ders to o d  a n d  s tr ic tly  a d h e re d  to.55 W e w ill h a v e  m ore to  s a y  ab o u t th is  in  
S ec tion  Two, C h a p te r  T h re e  below, b u t  i t  is  d e a r  t h a t  K a n t  s ta te s  th is  r e la ­
tio n sh ip , i f  n o t d e a r ly , th e n  a t  le a s t co n sis ten tly . T he  cosm opolitan  w h o le  is  
th e  “wom b” from  w h ich  o u r  c a p a d tie s  c a n  b e  perfected . I t  i s  th e  fo rm a tio n  of
115); it is a claim that individuals would not have any value if they did not cultivate their rational abili­
ties.
52 Heinz Wichmann maintains that this indicates “daB Kant keinen anderen Weg aus der rein 
tierischen Existenz des Menschen hin zu hOheren Existenz sieht als den des gegenseitigen Kampfes der 
Menschen untereinander. Nur der soli Progression and positive Entwicklung garantieren,” (873-4). See: 
Heinz Wichmann, “Zum Problem des ewigen Friedens bei Kant,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth Interna­
tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, p t 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 873-9.
53 Thus, I think that Laberge goes too far in his analysis on the need for “external war,” for it 
does not seem necessary that there always be the threat of war in order 1) to continually motivate persons 
to develop culture and not be lulled into the life of an Arkadian shepherd, and 2) to secure the threat of a 
world despotism. As Schuler says, “because unsocial sociability is the source of creativity as well as de­
struction, its presence must somehow be felt within a state of perpetual peace,” (p. 903); Jeanne Schuler, 
“Reasonable Hope: Kant as Critical Theorist,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, 
ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 901-7. See also: Pierre La­
berge, “Von der Garantie des ewigen Friedens,” trans. Michael Walz, (French to German], in Immanuel 
Kant: Zum ewigen Frieden, ed. Otfried HflfFe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag GmbH, 1995), 149-70.
54 Ak. 22.
55 It is perhaps this lack of differentiation which leads Laberge to attempt to make a rather 
strange and unconvincing split between ends which “nature sets for herself’ and the more rational ends 
that humans set for themselves of which “nature has no knowledge.”
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a  S ta te  w h ich  c an  th e n  be tran sfo rm e d  “in to  a  moral w hole .” I t  is  th e  “sole 
state in which all o f humanity’s natural capacities can be developed.” K a n t’s 
d iscussion  o f  th e  A rcad ian  sh ep h erd , n o te d  above, a lso  show s a  s ta te  in  
w hich  th e re  i s  peace  a n d  even love, b u t  n o t  a  m o ra l w ho le , n o t a  s i tu a t io n  in  
conform ity  w ith  th e  f in a l e n d  of h u m a n  b e in g s . W e h a v e  la te r  co n firm atio n  
o f th is  in  “T o [w ard ] P e rp e tu a l P eace” w h e re  K a n t s ta te s  p la in ly :
One can see that although the inner core of morality is certainly not its cause, 
presently existing but still very imperfectly organized nations have in their 
foreign relations already approached what the idea of right prescribes (so that 
a good national consitution56 cannot be expected to arise from morality, but, 
rather, quite the opposite, a people’s good moral condition is to be expected 
only under a good constitution).57
K a n t be liev es t h a t  th e  developm ent o f m o ra lity , th e  c u ltiv a tio n  of o u r  r a ­
tio n a l n a tu re ,  c a n n o t develop p ro p erly  u n d e r  th e  th r e a t  o f w ar. W hile  i t  does 
seem  to r e q u ire  a n ta g o n ism , i t  a lso  re q u ire s  a  la s tin g  p eace , so th a t  c itiz e n s  
can  devote th e m se lv e s  to developing  th e s e  ta le n ts  in s te a d  o f develop ing  th e  
sk ills  o f w ar.
T h is  fa c t  sa v e s  K a n t from  a n  o th e rw ise  s ig n if ic a n t problem . W e sh a ll  
see  th is  p ro b lem  m o re  c learly  below, b u t  w e c a n  see  i t  h e re  a lread y  a n d  offer 
a  so lu tion . I f  a  p e rfec tly  cosm opolitan  w o rld  sim p ly  was th e  m oral p e rfec tio n  
o f th e  h u m a n  rac e , a n d  i f  such  a  w orld  w a s  b ro u g h t a b o u t b y  n a tu re  despite 
th e  ac tions o f  th e  h u m a n  race, th e n  p e rso n s  w ou ld  a t t a in  m o ra lity  w ith o u t 
h a v in g  w illed  i n  accordance  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , n am e ly , t h a t  w illing  w h ich  
gives th e m  m o ra l w o rth  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace. I n  fact, th e  ty p e  o f actions u su a lly  
invo lved  in  b r in g in g  ab o u t th e  cosm opo litan  w hole K a n t  u n d e rs ta n d s  to  be  
u su a lly  d ia m e tr ic a lly  opposed  to  th e  m o ra l law . B u t th is  p rob lem  is  so lved  i f  
th e  cosm opo litan  w o rld  is  m erely  th e  “w om b” o f m o ra lity , i f  i t  is  a  n e c e ssa ry  
b u t  n o t su ffic ie n t cond ition  of tru e  m o ra l ach iev em en t. I f  w e h ave
56 Again, misprint occurs in the original translation.
57 Ak. 366.
iI
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u n d e rs to o d  K a n t correctly , h e  a p p e a rs  to  in d ic a te  th a t  a  cond ition  o f  la s t in g  
p e ac e  is  a  cond ition  w h ich  w e m u s t h a v e  in  o rd e r  to  u n d e r ta k e  in  e a rn e s t  th e  
p ro jec t o f u n iv e rsa l m o ra l s tr iv in g . W a r  a n d  th e  th r e a t  of w a r  p lace  th e  
in d iv id u a ls  o f d iffe ren t n a tio n s  in  a  co n d itio n  s im ila r  to  th e  s ta te  o f n a tu r e  
o u t o f  w h ich  th e y  o rig ina lly  m oved, a n d  su c h  a  cond ition  K a n t be lieves to  be 
a d v e rse  to  th e  cu ltiv a tio n  o f m o ra lity . T h u s , w e m u s t hope t h a t  th is  
co n d itio n  c a n  b e  overcom e, a n d  t h a t  w e  c a n  m ove to w ard  a  cosm opo litan  
w o rld  in  o rd e r  to  su b seq u e n tly  m ove to w a rd  a  m o ra l w hole.
T h is  a lso  solves a  r e la te d  p ro b lem . I f  i t  is  o u r  d u ty  a s  m em b ers  o f  th e  
h u m a n  rac e  to  m ove to w a rd  a  m o ra l w hole , a n d  i f  i t  is  t ru e  t h a t  su c h  m ove­
m e n t  c a n  on ly  occur w ith in  th e  sp ace  o f  cosm opo litan ism , th e n  i t  is  o u r  d u ty  
to  s tr iv e  to w a rd  th is  cosm opo litan ism . B u t  does th is  give u s  a  carte blanche 
for v io lence? D oes K a n t’s p ic tu re  o f a n  a n ta g o n is tic  w orld  le a d  u s  to  th e  j u s ­
tif ic a tio n  o f w a r  a n d  v io lence in  th e  n a m e  o f  m ov ing  th e  h u m a n  rac e  fo rw ard ?  
I  th in k  su c h  a n  in te rp re ta tio n  w ou ld  b e  a  se rio u s  m isco n s tru a l of K a n t’s  p o ­
sitio n , a n d  p ro b ab ly  one on ly  p oss ib le  th ro u g h  d e lib e ra te  ex ag g e ra tio n . T h e  
e n d  o f  th e  h u m a n  race, a s  K a n t  sees i t ,  is  th e  fo rm a tio n  of a  m o ra l w hole , n o t 
s im p ly  a  p eacefu l w orld. A n d  w h a t h in d e r s  th e  developm en t o f  o u r r a t io n a l  
c a p a c itie s  to  beg in  w ith  a re  co n d itio n s o f v io lence, b o th  be tw een  p e rso n s  a n d  
b e tw e e n  n a tio n s . C e rta in ly  K a n t’s  w e ll-k n o w n  s ta n c e  a g a in s t rev o lu tio n  
(“Argue a s  m u ch  as  you w a n t a n d  a b o u t w h a t  you w an t, but obey/”)58 a n d  
ev en  a g a in s t  m a n y  form s o f p ro te s t, s p e a k s  to w a rd  th e  p ro h ib itio n  b o th  o f  d i­
re c t v io lence  a s  w ell a s  a n y  ac tio n  w h ic h  m ig h t jeo p ard ize  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f 
th e  S ta te .  W e m u s t a lw ays w ill in  acco rd  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , a lw ay s t r e a t  
o th e r  peop le  a s  en d s in  th em se lv es; th is  is  th e  on ly  w ay  in  w h ich  w e h a v e  
t r u e  au to n o m y .59
58 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,” Ak. 37. In: Per­
petual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral Practice, trans. Ted Humphrey 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983), 41-8. All citations refer to Akademie page 
numbers.
59 See the following chapter for more on this.
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C o m m en ta to rs  a re  r ig h t to  p o in t ou t th a t  K a n t  does n o t h a v e  th e  
sam e  fra m e w o rk  in  p lace a s  H eg e l does for th e  p u rp o se  of d escrib in g  how  the  
species m ig h t p rog ress  to w a rd  ra tio n a lity . B u t th is  i s  good. H egel’s descrip ­
tio n  o f th e  w o rld  a s  be ing  c o n s titu tiv e ly  (i.e., n o t m ere ly  reg u la tiv e ly ) d ialec­
tic  le a d s  to  p h ilo soph ica l p ro b lem s (n o t be ing  ab le  to  su rv iv e  a  c r itiq u e  o f 
“M o d ern ity ”), p rac tic a l a tro c itie s  ( th e  v io len t a c tio n s  o f p e rso n s a g a in s t  one 
a n o th e r  in  th e  hopes th a t  th e ir  “th e s is  a n d  a n ti th e s is ” w ould  le a d  to  som e 
“sy n th e s is”), a s  w ell as a b su rd itie s  (S ta lin ’s a tte m p t, I  h av e  h e a rd , to  p la n t  
rice  in  th e  n o r th e rn  reg ions o f th e  Sov ie t U nion  in  th e  hope  th a t  i t  w ou ld  
p ro d u ce  a  su p e r io r  s tra n d ). F o r K a n t, w e a re  n e v e r c e r ta in  t h a t  th e  h ig h e s t 
good c a n  be  ach ieved , fo r i ts  p o ss ib ility  is  n ev er so m e th in g  w hich  cou ld  be 
ta k e n  a s  k n o w n . In  add ition , th o u g h  w a r m ay le a d  h u m a n  b e in g s  to  th o se  
p o litica l s t ru c tu re s  n ecessa ry  fo r th e  b eg in n in g  o f a  m o ra l com m unity , th e  
en d  o f h u m a n k in d  is  th is  moral com m un ity  itse lf, a n d  actions w h ich  d e tra c t 
from  i ts  c re a tio n  a re  decidedly  v io la tio n s  of th e  m o ra l law . T he e n d s  n ev er 
ju s tify  th e  m e a n s , th o u g h  p rov idence  m ay  help  u s  to  ach ieve  d e s irab le  en d s 
even  th o u g h  w e do n o t seem  to d e s ire  th em  o u rse lves.60 H ence, w e c an n o t
60 While Susanne Weiper is certainly right to argue, as I do, that war can never be utilized as a 
means to peace (p. 915), I think she read too great a conflict between the ends of nature and the ends of 
human beings. In this regard, she argues that this conflict “should be interpreted as an antinomy,” (p.
915, all translations mine), particularly that there is an antinomy between the positions of the “teleological 
historian” and the “philosopher of Right,” (p. 915). But this hardly seems like a real thesis and antithesis. 
There is nothing incompatible between the facts that Providence will lead us to a condition of perpetual 
peace and either 1) that we can ourselves contribute to this process, or 2) that moral progress must come 
from our own endeavors. See: Susanne Weiper, “Eine Idee zwischen Politik and Moral: Der 
Friedensgedanke bei Kant and Scheler,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. 
Hoke Robinson, 2, p t 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 909-918. Similarly, Eckart von 
Sydow writes: “The difficulty [namely, an “Antinomie der Geschichtskonstrucdon”] concerning the 
meaning of history can be stated through the contradictory sentences: 1. History promotes morality and 
hence weakens natural capacities; 2. history promotes natural capacities and hence weakens morality,” (p. 
380). Obviously, if what I have argued is correct, von Sydow is simply wrong. To begin with, though we 
might be able to conclude that history does help develop natural abilities, we can never know, as a fact, 
that history promotes morality. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, natural capacities are in no way 
ipso facto in conflict with morality; this not only goes against Kant’s writings on moral progress and cul­
ture, where the skills of individuals aid morality, but also against his moral writings and his belief in the 
free choice to be evil. All these points will be discussed further below, though I shall not bring up Eckart 
von Sydow specifically again. See: Eckart von Sydow, “Der Gedanke des Edeal-Rechts bei Kant,” in 
Materialien zu Kants Rehctsphilosophie, ed. Zwi Batscha (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1976). 379-389.
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choose “a n y  m ean s n ecessa ry ” to re a c h  th e  goal of th e  cosm opolitan  w orld. 
T h e  in te rp re ta t io n  I  h a v e  given w ould , o f  course, allow  a n d  even  n e c e ss ita te  
a n ta g o n ism , b u t  a s  I  h a v e  tr ie d  to  a rg u e  above, su ch  a n ta g o n ism  is  s im p ly  
th e  n a tu r a l  a n tag o n ism  w hich  occurs w h e n  h u m a n  be ings h av e  d iffe ren t 
e n d s  re g a rd in g  h a p p in e ss , a n d  i t  sh o u ld  occur w ith in  a  society  w ith  a  p e rfec t 
c o n s titu tio n  a n d  can  occur w ith o u t v io la tin g  th e  m oral law . W e s h a l l  see  th is  
in  f u r th e r  d e ta il below.
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Chapter Four 
Kant’s Moral Philosophy and the Highest Good
L
I n  th is  c h a p te r  I  w ill p re s e n t  a  b r ie f  accoun t o f K a n t’s  m o ra l th eo ry , 
focusing  m a in ly  on th e  Critique o f Practical Reason. O f c h ie f  in te r e s t  h e re  is 
K a n t’s a rg u m e n t for th e  h ig h e s t  good a n d  h is  d iscussion  o f how  so m e th in g  
becom es a  p o s tu la te  o f p u re  p ra c tic a l  rea so n . In  th e  f i r s t  sec tion  I  w ill give a  
b r ie f  overv iew  o f K a n t’s m o ra l ph ilo sophy , in  th e  second  I  w ill give K a n t’s  a r ­
g u m en t fo r  th e  h ig h e s t good, in  th e  th i r d  I  w ill d iscuss  th e  n e c e ssa ry  p o s tu ­
la te s  o f G od  a n d  im m o rta lity , in  th e  fo u r th  I  w ill d iscuss th e  lo ca tio n  o f  th e  
h ig h e s t good, a n d  in  th e  l a s t  I  w ill b rie fly  p o in t ou t K a n t’s s tru g g le  w ith  th e  
q u estio n  o f  th e  “expansion” o f  p ra c tic a l reaso n .
n.
I n  th e  Grundlegung, K a n t  is  in te re s te d  in  th e  n a tu r e  o f m o ra l com ­
m an d s. Specifically , K a n t w a n ts  to  k now  i f  w e can  f in d  a  s in g le  p r in c ip le  for 
m orality . H e u tilize s  w h a t h e  te rm s  th e  “an a ly tica l” m e th o d  in  w h ich  h e  
s ta r ts  w ith  e th ic a l p rin c ip le s  w h ic h  everyone  w ill ag ree  a re  t r u e  a n d  th e n  a t ­
tem p ts  to  a rg u e  from  th e se  acc ep ted  p rin c ip le s  to  th e  n e c e ssa ry  g ro u n d  fo r 
th e ir  t r u th .  T h e  Prolegomena is  a n o th e r  exam p le  of K a n t’s  a n a ly tic a l 
m ethod , s in ce  i t  b eg in s w ith  th e  accep ted  law s o f geom etry  a n d  p h y sic s  a n d  
a rg u e s  to  w h a t  m u s t be  a priori n e ce ssa ry  i f  th e se  la w s  a re  to  h a v e  a  fo u n d a ­
tion , n a m e ly  in tu it io n s  a n d  th e  ca tego ries . In  th e  Grundlegung, K a n t  m oves 
from  a ccep ted  te n e ts  o f e th ic s  a n d  m o ra lity  in  a n  a tte m p t to  f in d  a  s in g le  u n i­
fy ing  p r in c ip le  fo r m orality .





K a n t re a so n s  t h a t  th e  b a s is  fo r e th ic a l a c tio n  c a n n o t be g ro u n d e d  in  
th e  d e s ire  fo r h a p p in e s s . T h is is  fo r ( a t  le a s t)  th r e e  re la tiv e ly  sim p le  re a so n s . 
T h e  f i r s t  is  t h a t  w e  a ll  a g re e  (K an t p resu m es) t h a t  ta le n ts ,  benefits , w e a lth , 
pow er, in te llig en ce , e tc ., a re  only good i f  th e y  a re  co m b in ed  w ith  a  good w ill; 
su c h  b e n e fits  c a n  “becom e ex trem ely  b a d  a n d  h a rm fu l  i f  th e  will... is  n o t 
good.”1 H ence, a  “good w ill seem s to  c o n s titu te  th e  in d isp e n sa b le  co n d itio n  o f 
b e in g  even  w o rth y  o f h a p p in e ss .”2 T h e  second  re a s o n  is  t h a t  h a p p in e ss  i s  n o t  
a n  e n d  o f w hich  w e  c a n  co n sis ten tly  conceive: “m e n  c a n n o t form  a n y  d e fin ite  
a n d  c e r ta in  co n cep t o f th e  su m  of sa tis fac tio n  o f a l l  in c lin a tio n s  th a t  is  c a lle d  
h a p p in e ss .”3 H a p p in e s s  is  a  co n tin u a lly  f lu c tu a tin g  concep t, an d  even  i f  w e 
ach iev e  m o m e n ta ry  h a p p in e ss , a  d iffe re n t d e s ire  soon  a r is e s .4 T he th i r d  r e a ­
son , a n d  p e rh a p s  th e  m o st im p o rtan t, is  t h a t  K a n t  n o te s  t h a t  an  ac tio n  do n e  
in  acco rd  w ith  m o ra lity  is  a n  action  th a t  w e sa y  “o u g h t” to  h av e  b een  done. 
T h e  p rin c ip le  a cco rd in g  to  w hich th e  ac tion  w as d e te rm in e d  is  th e re fo re  u n i ­
v e rs a l  a n d  n e c e ssa ry . W e do no t s a y  th a t  th e  a c tio n  sh o u ld  be done i f  the  
p e rso n  w a n te d  so m e  e n d  o r o ther, b u t  t h a t  th e  a c tio n  sh o u ld  be done in d e ­
p e n d e n tly  of th e  e n d  a n d  th e  outcom e. T h u s, K a n t  re a so n s  th a t  s ince  th e  
w illin g  o f h a p p in e s s  d e a ls  w ith  specific a n d  c o n tin g e n t e n d s , th ese  e n d s  c a n ­
n o t possib ly  se rv e  a s  g ro u n d s  for m o ra lity .
S uch  co n clu sio n s le a d  K a n t to  th re e  p ro p o sitio n s , w hich  th e n  le a d  
h im  to  th e  fo rm u la  o f th e  m o ra l law . T h e  th re e  p ro p o s itio n s  are: a n  ac tio n  
m u s t  b e  done from  d u ty  a n d  d u ty  a lo n e  to  h a v e  m o ra l w o rth ,5 “an  ac tio n  done
1 Ak. 393. All quotations come from: Immanuel Kant, Grounding fo r  the Metaphysics o f  
Morals, in Ethical Philosophy, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
Third Printing, 1988), 1-69. All citations refer to the Akademie page numbers.
2 Ibid., Ak. 393-4.
3 Ibid., Ak. 399.
4 With the (hypothetical) imperative of skills, once one has chosen the end, the means follow 
necessarily, so that it is in the form of an imperative. But there can be not even a corresponding 
(hypothetical) imperative for prudence, since “the concept of happiness is such an indeterminate one that 
even though everyone wishes to attain happiness, yet he can never say definitely and consistently what it 
is that he really wishes and wills,” {Grundlegung, Ak. 418). See also: Ak. 417-8.
s As the translator notes, this proposition is "implicit” in the discussion found at Ak. 397-9.
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from  d u ty  h a s  i ts  m o ra l w o rth , n o t in  th e  p u rp o se  th a t  is  to  be a tta in e d  by  it, 
b u t  in  th e  m ax im  accord ing  to  w h ich  th e  ac tion  is  de te rm in ed ,”6 a n d  “du ty  is  
th e  n ecessity  o f  a n  ac tio n  done o u t of re sp ec t fo r th e  law . I  can  in d ee d  hav e  
a n  in c lin a tio n  fo r a n  ob ject a s  th e  effect o f m y  p ro p o sed  action; b u t  I  can  
n e v e r  h av e  re sp e c t fo r su c h  a n  object, j u s t  b ecau se  i t  is  m erely  a n  effect a n d  
is  n o t  a n  ac tiv ity  o f th e  w ill.”7 T hese  p ropositions le a d  K a n t to th e  conclusion 
th a t  i t  m u s t be  th e  fo rm  o f la w  i ts e l f  w h ich  can  g ive u s  th e  n ecessa ry  condi­
t io n s  for a n  e th ic a l action ; th e  fo rm  a b s tra c ts  from  a ll em p irica l in te n tio n s , 
g rounds, a n d  en d s. B u t w h a t  so r t  of e th ica l p r in c ip le  cou ld  give u s  such  a  
form ?
K a n t’s d iscovered  p rin c ip le  is, o f course, th e  m o ra l law  g iven  in  th e  
fo rm  o f a  “ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e .” K a n t gives u s  th re e  fo rm u la tio n s of i t  in  
th is  w ork:
Hence there is only one categorical imperative and it is this: Act only accord­
ing to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should be­
come a universal law.8
Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a univer­
sal law of nature.9
Act in such a way tha t you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as 
a means.10
In  th is  respec t, th e  object w h ich  w e w ill is  th e  on ly  object w hich is  good in  
a n d  o f itse lf, a n d  is  n o t em p irica l, n am e ly  a  good w ill. B u t  K a n t concludes 
t h a t  su ch  w illin g  is  s im p ly  th e  w illingness to  w ill in  accord  w ith  th e  m oral 
law . T h u s  i t  is  th e  form  o f  th e  law , a n d  n o t i ts  m a te r ia l, w hich  p rov ides a n
6 Grundlegung, Ak. 399.
7 Ibid., Ak. 400.
8 Ibid., Ak. 421.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., Ak. 429.




ac tio n  w ith  w orth . A nd, o f course , su ch  a n  action is  s im p ly  w illin g  in  accord 
w ith  d u ty . The w ay  in  w h ich  w e check  t h a t  any  p a r t ic u la r  m ax im  conform s 
w ith  th e  m oral la w  is  to  see  i f  w e cou ld  u n iv ersa lize  i t .  I f  w e c a n  co n sis ten tly  
w ill t h a t  th e  m ax im  be  u n iv e rsa liz e d , th e n  i t  is in  accord  w ith  th e  m o ra l law .
T he m a te r ia l  o f  th e  Grundlegung is  w ell w orn , a s  i s  m o st o f th e  Cri­
tique o f Practical Reason. A s such , le t  m e  now  m ove on  to  th e  second  Cri­
tique in  o rder to  give a  b r ie f  sk e tch  o f i t s  backg round  com ponen ts .
T he  Critique o f Practical Reason, p robab ly  w ritte n  w ith in  th e  course  
o f  one  c a len d a r y e a r  a n d  p u b lis h e d  on  th e  heels o f th e  second  e d itio n  of th e  
Critique of Pure Reason, u tiliz e s  th e  “sy n th e tic” m ethod . T h is  m e th o d  is  
p ro p e r  fo r a  “c ritiq u e ,” a n d  a rg u e s  fo r th e  v a lid ity  o f a priori p rin c ip le s  w ith  
a s  l i t t le  reference  to  ex p erien ce  a s  possib le . As th e  f ir s t  Critique a tte m p te d  
to  d iscover those p r in c ip le s  a n d  law s n ecessa ry  fo r th e  k now ledge  o f n a tu re , 
th e  second  Critique a tte m p ts  to  d iscover th o se  p rin c ip les  a n d  la w s  necessa ry  
fo r  m o ra l action  a n d  ju d g m e n t.
T he  m a in  th r u s t  o f  th e  Critique o f Practical Reason i s  “m ere ly  to 
show  t h a t  th e re  is  a  p u re  p ra c tic a l re a so n ,”11 in  o th e r  w ords, t h a t  p u re  rea so n  
c a n  be  p rac tica l. W e sa w  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique th a t  rea so n  h a s  a  specu la tive  
fu n c tio n , b u t  K a n t a rg u e s  h e re  th a t  i t  h a s  a  p rac tica l fu n c tio n  a s  w ell.
A gain  in  th e  second  Critique, K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  no  p rin c ip le  th a t  
c o n ta in s  em p irica l c o n te n t c a n  ta k e  th e  fo rm  of a  law , t h a t  is , i t  c an n o t 
c o m m an d  from  u n iv e rs a lity  a n d  n ecessity . T h is is  because , f irs t , w e c an n o t 
k n o w  a priori w h a t ob jects w ou ld  give u s  p lea su re , a n d  th u s  (even  i f  
h a p p in e s s  w ere c o n sis ten t)  i t  w ou ld  b e  a  m erely  c o n tin g en t fa c t a n d  n o t ab le  
to  p rov ide  u s  w ith  a  u n iv e rs a l  a n d  n e c e ssa ry  object fo r w illin g ,12 a n d  second, 
su c h  m a tte r s  of p le a su re  a re  d iffe ren t fo r each  person , a n d  th u s  c an n o t be
11 Ak. 3. All references come from: Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Practical Reason, trans. 
Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1956).
12 Ibid., Ak. 21.
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u n iv e rs a l .13 H ow ever, even  i f  ob jects o f p le a su re  w ere  k n o w n  a priori a n d  
even  i f  a ll  p e rso n s  ag reed  on th em , "even th e n  th e y  cou ld  n o t  se t up  th e  
p rin c ip le  o f  self-love a s  a  p ra c tic a l law , fo r th e  u n a n im ity  i t s e l f  w ould be 
m ere ly  c o n tin g e n t,”14 a n d  th u s  be  on ly  sub jec tive ly  n e ce ssa ry .
T h u s  K a n t  a g a in  a rg u e s  t h a t  i f  th e re  is  a  m o ra l law , th e n  i t  m u s t 
co m m an d  d u e  on ly  to  i ts  form , b e ca u se  no  m a te r ia l  is  a llo w ed  in  a  u n iv e rs a l 
a n d  n e c e ssa ry  im p e ra tiv e ; " th e  so le  p rin c ip le  of m o ra lity  c o n sis ts  in  in d e ­
p en d en ce  from  a ll  m a te r ia l  o f  th e  la w  (i.e., a  d e s ired  object) a n d  in  th e  ac­
co m p an y in g  d e te rm in a tio n  o f choice by  th e  m ere  fo rm  o f  g iv in g  u n iv e rsa l law  
w hich  a  m ax im  m u s t  be  cap ab le  o f h a v in g .”15 T h is le a d s  K a n t  back  to  th e  
fo rm u la tio n  o f th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e , th e  co m m an d  to  a c t so " th a t th e  
m ax im  o f y o u r w ill cou ld  a lw ay s h o ld  a t  th e  sam e tim e  a s  a  p rin c ip le  e s ta b ­
lish in g  u n iv e rs a l  law .”16
N ow  K a n t  h a s  a rg u e d  th a t  w e c a n  th in k  o f su c h  a  law , a n d  w e c an  
fo rm u la te  i t  a p p ro p ria te ly . T h u s  h e  concludes t h a t  w e h a v e  consciousness of 
th e  m o ra l law . B u t  since th e  m o ra l la w  exp resses n o th in g  b u t  th e  freedom  of 
th e  w ill to  give la w s  to  i ts e lf  a p a r t  from  em p irica l in flu en ce , th e  m oral law  
im p lies  th e  n e c e ss ity  of a  free  w ill:
I t  is therefore the moral law, of which we become im m ediately conscious as 
soon as we construct maxim s for the will, which first p resen ts itself to us; and 
since reason exhibits it as a ground of determ ination which is completely inde­
pendent of and  not to be outweighed by any sensuous condition, it is the m oral 
law  which leads directly to the concept of freedom.17
13 Ibid., Ak. 25 and 36.
14 Ibid., Ak. 26. We can also always ask, given that one person likes such a thing, or that eve­
ryone likes such a thing, why should this thing be a necessary possession? And should it be necessary for 
everyone to desire it?
15 Ibid., Ak. 33.
16 Ibid., Ak. 30.
17 Ibid.. Ak. 29-30.
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T he  m o ra l law , of w hich  w e c a n  b e  conscious, com m ands th a t  w e w ill on ly  
th o se  e n d s  w h ich  can  be n e c e ssa ry  a n d  u n iv e rsa l, a n d  th u s  w ill f re e ly  a n d  
w ith o u t r e g a r d  to  se n su o u s  n a tu r e .  B u t  su c h  w illing  is  free  w illin g , th e  le g is ­
la tio n  o f  r e a s o n  to  itse lf.
R e c a ll t h a t  th e  w ill, a s  K a n t  d e fin es  i t ,  is  "a  facu lty  e i th e r  o f  b r in g in g  
fo r th  o b jec ts  c o rre sp o n d in g  to  co n cep tio n s o r  o f d e te rm in in g  itse lf , i.e ., i t s  
c a u s a lity  to  effect su ch  objects...”18 S u ch  b r in g in g  fo r th  o f ob jects is  a  la w ­
lik e  b e h a v io r ; "ev e ry th in g  in  n a tu r e  w o rk s  accord ing  to  law s. O n ly  a  r a t io n a l  
b e in g  h a s  th e  pow er to  a c t a cco rd in g  to  h is  conception  o f law s, i.e ., acco rd ing  
to p r in c ip le s , a n d  th e re b y  h a s  h e  a  w ill.”19 B u t  w h a t fac u lty  co n tro ls  th e  fo r­
m a tio n  o f  law s?  R eason , a s  w e l e a r n e d  fo rm  th e  f ir s t  Critique, is  t h a t  fa c u lty  
w h ich  is  a b le  to  d ra w  conclusions i n  a  law -lik e  fash ion , a s  w ell a s  s e t  i t s  ow n 
en d s. A n im a ls  p re su m ab ly  do n o t  h a v e  freedom , do n o t h a v e  th e  a b ility  to  
s e t  e n d s  fo r  th em se lv es  a n d  th e n  to  p u rs u e  th o se  p u rp o ses  in  a  law -lik e  
fa sh io n . T h u s  a n im a ls  c a n n o t b e  m o ra l. Im p o rta n tly , K ant, concludes
though  freedom is certainly the  ratio essendi of the m oral law, th e  la tte r  is the 
ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For had  not the m oral law already been dis­
tinctly  thought in our reason, we would never have been justified in a s s u m in g  
any th ing  like freedom... B ut if  there  were no freedom, the m oral law would 
never have been encountered in  us.20
K a n t d ra w s  th e  im p o rta n t co n clu sio n  th a t  w e w ould  n o t even  be conscious o f 
th e  m o ra l  la w  i f  i t  w ere  n o t fo r th e  p o ss ib ility  o f freedom . F reed o m  a s  th e  
a b ility  o f  r e a s o n  to give law s to  i ts e lf , in d e p e n d e n t o f sen su o u s n a tu r e ,  is  e x ­
a c tly  w h a t  th e  m o ra l law  ex p resses , a n d  to  h a v e  consciousness o f  th e  m o ra l 
la w  is  to  h a v e  a n  e n co u n te r w ith  o u r  ow n freedom .21
18 Ibid., Ak. 15.
19 Grundlegung, Ak. 412.
20 Second Critique, Ak. 4, n.
21 Though, o f course, freedom is something “we can neither know immediately, since our first 
concept o f it is negative, nor infer from experience, since experience reveals us only the law o f appear­
ances and consequently the mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of freedom.” (Ibid.. Ak. 29).
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T h u s, K an t co n c lu d es t h a t  th e  poss ib ility  w h ich  th e  Critique o f Pure 
Reason o p en ed  up fo r freed o m , is  now  filled  in  a n d  co n firm ed  by  th e  Critique 
of Practical Reason. F reed o m , w h ile  i t  c an n o t b e  m e t w ith  a s  a n  in tu itio n , is  
n e c e ss ita te d  by  th e  m o ra l la w , a  la w  of w hich  w e w o u ld  n o t be  conscious in  
th e  f i r s t  p lace  i f  freedom  w e re  n o t  possible. B u t  th is  freedom  is  n o t m ere ly  
th e  n e g a tiv e  freedom  w h ich  w a s  exp ressed  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique, i.e., s im ply  
th e  a b ility  to  beg in  a  co m p le te ly  n ew  c a u sa l c h a in  from  a n  uncond itioned .
W e now  h a v e  a  positive  freedom :
The sole principle of m orality  consists in independence from all m aterial of the 
law... T hat independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, while 
th is intrinsic legislation o f pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the 
positive sense. Therefore, the  moral law expresses nothing else th an  the 
autonom y of the pure practical reason, i.e., [positive] freedom.22
T h e  p o ss ib ility  of freedom  is  no w  given a s  a  n ecessity , th o u g h  on ly  from  a  
p ra c tic a l p o in t o f view , so t h a t  w e a re  led  to  m ove b ey o n d  a  n eg a tiv e  freedom  
to  p o s it a  positive  freedom .23 W ith  th e  m oral law , re a so n  g ives a  law  to itse lf, 
s e ts  i t s  ow n p u rposes, a n d  i s  th u s  au tonom ous.
As K a n t says, in c lu d in g  a n y  (em pirical) m a te r ia l  w ith in  a  law  re su lts  
in  h e te ro n o m y , a n d  “heteronomy o f  choice... n o t o n ly  does n o t  e s tab lish  an y  
o b lig a tio n  b u t  is  opposed to  th e  p rincip le  o f d u ty  a n d  to  th e  m o ra lity  o f th e  
w ill.”24 N o t m ere  n eg a tiv e  free d o m  is  ex p ressed  b y  th e  m o ra l law , b u t posi­
tiv e  freedom , freedom  o f th e  w ill from  sen su o u s in c lin a tio n s . T h rough  th is , 
w e m u s t  u n d e rs ta n d  t h a t  i f  w e  a re  no t w illing  in  acco rd  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , 
a n d  th u s  n o t g iv ing  th e  la w  to  ourse lves, th e n  w e a re  w illin g  in  accord w ith
22 Ibid., Ak. 33.
23 “[EJven in that [first] Critique it was emphasized that the supersensible was not mere fancy 
and that its concepts were not empty. Now practical reason itself... provides reality to a supersensible ob­
ject of the category of causality, i.e., to freedom. This is a practical concept and as such is subject only to 
practical use; but what in the speculative critique could be thought is now confirmed by fact,” (Ibid., Ak. 
6).
24 Ibid.. Ak. 33.
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self-love, a n d  su c h  w illing  is  n o t on ly  h e te ronom ous, i t  is  w illin g  to  give up 
one’s freedom ; “w h e n  one’s ow n h a p p in e s s  is  m ad e  th e  d e te rm in in g  g ro u n d  of 
th e  w ill, th e  r e s u l t  is  th e  d irec t o p p o site  o f th e  p rin c ip le  o f m o ra lity .”25 “[T|t is  
h e te ro n o m y  b e ca u se  th e  w ill does n o t g ive i ts e l f  th e  law  b u t  on ly  d irec tions 
fo r a  re a so n a b le  obedience to  p a th o lo g ica l law s.”26 B y p u tt in g  m a te r ia l  in to  
th e  fo rm  o f th e  m o ra l law , b y  h a v in g  self-love as th e  g u id in g  p r in c ip le  (even 
i f  th e  r e s u l t  o f  su c h  a  p rin c ip le  con fo rm s to  lega lity ), h u m a n  b e in g s  fo rfe it 
th e ir  freedom , a n d  th u s  forfe it a n y  c la im  to  w o rth  th e y  m ig h t h a v e ;27 K a n t 
a s s e r ts  t h a t  th e  fa c t one “h a s  re a so n  does n o t in  th e  le a s t  ra is e  b im  in  w orth  
above m e re  a n im a lity  i f  rea so n  o n ly  se rv es  th e  p u rp o ses  w hich , am o n g  a n i­
m a ls , a re  ta k e n  c a re  of b y  in s t in c t .”28
F in a lly , th e n , because  m o ra l w illin g , freedom , a n d  (non-em pirically  
d e te rm in e d ) re a so n  a ll ex p ress  e x ac tly  th e  sam e  th in g , K a n t m a y  conclude 
t h a t  p u re  re a so n  is  p rac tic a l a s  w ell; “p ra c tic a l rea so n  h a s  th e  sa m e  cognitive 
fac u lty  fo r  i ts  fo u n d a tio n  a s  th e  sp e cu la tiv e , so f a r  a s  th ey  a re  b o th  p u re  re a ­
son .”29 W ill a n d  rea so n  a re  n o t tw o  d iffe re n t th in g s , fo r “th e  w ill is  th o u g h t of
25 Ibid., Ak. 35.
26 Ibid., Ak. 33.
27 As an aside, this should help us to understand why, in Kant’s political writings, he insists 
that, even in matters of Right, we must give the law to ourselves. It is not enough to follow the dictates of 
the State; we must be co-legislators of the State. If we are not, then we are not free, not autonomous, and 
thus not of worth.
28 Second Critique, Ak. 61. Kant changes his opinion on this matter of the forfeiture of free­
dom somewhat in his Religion. By that time, Kant realizes that if natural inclinations are to blame for 
immorality, then humans are not really responsible for such actions. Hence, Kant introduces the impor­
tant concept of “disposition” (Gesinnung), and maintains that the propensity one has toward evil results 
from the freely chosen disposition in which the moral law is subjugated to the desire for happiness. Thus, 
as Silber summarizes on page cxiv of his “Introduction,” “the evil man is one who freely decides to sub­
ordinate the demands of the law to the demands of his sensible nature. By expressing no more of his per­
sonality than is expressed in its abnegation, he foils as a free person and is evil.” John R. Silber, “The 
Ethical Significance of Kant’s Religion,” in Religion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone, by Im m anuel 
Kant, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), lxxix - 
cxxxiv. Thus, one freely abnegates one’s freedom, and freely wills heteronomy. Thus, one is free, but one 
still abnegates one’s freedom Silber seems to think that this is quite a different position than the second 
Critique, while Lewis White Beck seems to think that Kant’s conclusions are essentially the same. Cf. 
Silber, pp. lxxx-xcvi, ciii-cxvii and Beck’s A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 
117-125.
29 Ibid.. Ak. 89.
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a s  a  fac u lty  o f d e te rm in in g  i ts e l f  to  ac tio n  in  acco rdance  w ith  th e  r e p re s e n ta ­
tio n  o f c e r ta in  law s, a n d  su c h  a  fa c u lty  c an  be fo u n d  only  in  r a t io n a l  b e ­
in g s .”30 E v en  w h en  th e  se e k in g  o f o n e’s  ow n h a p p in e s s  is  th e  p ra c tic a l  p r in ­
c ip le  o f th e  w ill, re a so n  s t i l l  g e n e ra te s  m ax im s fo r th e  object o f  s u c h  w illing ; 
“th e  w ill is  n e v e r  d e te rm in e d  d ire c tly  b y  th e  ob ject a n d  our concep tion  o f it; 
r a th e r ,  th e  w ill i s  a  facu lty  w h ich  c a n  m ak e  a n  ob ject re a l.”31 B u t  re a so n  can  
give law s  to  itse lf, a n d  th u s  i t  c a n  b e  au to n o m o u s. T h u s, p u re  re a s o n  in  i ts  
la w  g iv ing  c ap a c ity  can  a lso  b e  p ra c tic a l, g iv ing  th e  m o ra l la w  to  i ts e l f  a n d  
th u s  ex em p tin g  i ts e l f  from  se n su o u s  d e te rm in a tio n  w hich  w ou ld  o th e rw ise  
e lim in a te  freedom .
L e t m e qu ick ly  add , h e re , t h a t  w e now  see  th e  im p o rtan ce  o f  K a n t’s 
(a n d  m y) d iscu ssio n  o f th e  “Id e a s  o f re a so n ” from  th e  Critique o f Pure Reason. 
A s K a n t p o in ts  o u t in  th e  second  Critique:
Thus reason [itself], which w ith its  ideas alw ays became transcenden t when 
proceeding in a  speculative m anner, can be given for the first tim e an  objec­
tive, although still only practical, reality; its transcendent use is changed into 
an  im m anent use, whereby reason becomes, in the field of experience, an  effi­
cient cause through ideas.32
R eca ll th a t ,  a s  seen  in  C h a p te r  Two above, re a so n  possesses se v e ra l Id e a s  
w h ich , w h ile  n o t co n s titu tiv e  fo r experience , a re  n e ce ssa ry  for tw o  re a so n s . 
T h e  f i r s t  is  fo r th e  o rg an iz a tio n  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g . B u t second, reca ll,
reason is here, indeed, exercising causality, as actually bringing about th a t 
which its  concept contains; and  of such wisdom we cannot, therefore, say dis­
paragingly it is only an idea. On the  contrary, ju s t  because it  is the idea of the 
necessary unity  of all possible ends, it m ust as an  original, and  a t  least re­
strictive condition, serve as s tan d ard  in all th a t bears on the practical.33
30 Grundlegung, Ak. 427.
31 Second Critique, Ak. 60.
32 Ibid., Ak. 48.
33 A328 = B385.
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IW e sa w  a lso  th a t  th e  a t te m p t  to  f in d  ev e ry  “u n co n d itio n ed ” in  a  se rie s  of 
co n d itio n s  o f  a p p e a ra n c e  w a s  “set u s  as a task”34 a s  a n  “id e a  o f  re a so n ” a n d  
t h a t  th e s e  “id e a s” a re  “th e  in d is p e n s a b le  cond ition  o f  a l l  p ra c tic a l em ploy­
m e n t  o f re a so n .”35
N ow , p e rh a p s , w e c a n  se e  th e  fu ll  force o f  th is  p o sitio n . I f  re a so n  is  
b o th  sp e c u la tiv e  a s  w ell a s  p ra c tic a l, th e n  i t  is  a  fa c u lty  o f  b r in g in g  objects 
in to  e x is te n ce . T he  id e a s  o f sp e c u la tiv e  rea so n  w h ich  se rv e  to  g u id e  th e  u n ­
d e rs ta n d in g  in  i ts  q u e s t  fo r sp e c u la tiv e  know ledge w ill a lso  g u id e  re a so n  i t ­
s e lf  i n  i t s  p ra c tic a l ap p lica tio n ; th e  “tw o” rea so n s  a re  th e  sam e , a n d  K a n t h a s  
t r ie d  to  sh o w  th a t  p u re  re a so n  c a n  in d e e d  be p rac tic a l. T h is , o f  course , is  th e  
o th e r  w a y  o f conceiv ing  o f K a n t’s  “C o p e m ica n  R ev o lu tio n ,” n a m e ly  th a t  r e a ­
son , once th o u g h t to  b e  b e s t s u i te d  fo r  d iscoveries o f  sc ience  a n d  
( tra n sc e n d e n t)  m e tap h y s ic s  h a s  no w  b e e n  ju d g ed  r a th e r  in a d e q u a te  fo r such  
a n  e n d e a v o r, a n d  K a n t  now  c la im s  t h a t  re a so n ’s  p ro p e r  fu n c tio n  is  p rac tica l, 
i.e ., m o ra l; “ev ery  in te r e s t  is  u l t im a te ly  p rac tica l, e v en  t h a t  o f sp ecu la tiv e  
re a so n  b e in g  only  co n d itio n a l a n d  re a c h in g  p e rfec tio n  o n ly  in  p ra c tic a l u se .”36 
H en ce  w e k n o w  th a t  th e  id e a s  o f  re a so n  a re  to se rv e  a s  s ta n d a rd s  fo r m o ra l 
a c tio n  a n d  ju d g m e n t, in c lu d in g  th e  id e a ls  o f th e  p e rfe c tly  m o ra l p e rso n  a n d  
of th e  p e rfe c tly  fu n c tio n in g  S ta te .  W e c a n  see, th e n , t h a t  w h a t  K a n t  c lea red  
th e  w ay  fo r in  th e  f i r s t  Critique h a s  b e e n  confirm ed  b y  th e  second, a n d  K a n t 
h a s , i n  p a r t ,  k e p t  h is  e a r l ie r  p ro m ise  t h a t  th e  “concep ts o f  re a so n  m ay  p e r ­
h a p s  m a k e  p o ss ib le  a  t r a n s i t io n  fro m  th e  concepts o f n a tu r e  to  th e  p rac tic a l 
concep ts ... A s to  a ll  th is , w e m u s t  a w a it  e x p la n a tio n  in  th e  seq u e l.”37
34 A498 = B526.
35 A328 = B385.
36 Second Critique, Ak. 125.
37 A329 = B386. I say, of course, “in part” because we have no real mention in the Critique o f 
Practical Reason o f a perfect constitution. Presumably this is because the “sequel” of which Kant spoke 
was probably intended to be the Metaphysics o f Morals, published much later in Kant’s career. On this 
see Lewis White Beck’s discussion in his. Commentary.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
L e t m e also quick ly  p o in t  o u t h e re  so m e th in g  w h ich  sh o u ld  be uncon- 
tro v e rs ia l  a n d  read ily  a p p a re n t , b u t  p e rh a p s  is  n o t. T h is  is  th e  fac t t h a t  th e  
se n su o u s  w orld  a n d  one’s  co n d itio n  in  i t  c an  in flu en ce  th e  w ill. P u t  sim ply, 
since  K a n t  h a s  a rg u e d  th a t  p u re  rea so n  is  p rac tic a l, a n d  t h a t  p ra c tic a l re a so n  
is  th e  sa m e  a s  th e  w ill, i t  se e m s  t h a t  we w ould  a lw ay s a c t in  accord  w ith  th e  
m o ra l la w  w ere  i t  n o t for th e  fa c t t h a t  o th e r  in ce n tiv e s  in flu e n ce  ou r w ill, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  ou r desire  fo r h a p p in e s s .38 T he  m o ra l la w  offers i ts  own in ce n ­
tive , i t s  ow n com m and, b u t  n a tu r e  also offers in c e n tiv e s  to w a rd  p lea su re . 
C e r ta in ly  w e can n o t be  completely overw helm ed  b y  th e  in ce n tiv e s , for w e a re  
a lw ay s com m anded  to  be  f re e  no  m a tte r  w h a t th e  s itu a tio n . B u t K a n t is  also 
c e r ta in ly  concerned  ab o u t s u c h  in flu en ces  a n d  s itu a tio n s ; th e  v e ry  fac t th a t  
th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e  n e e d s  to  command in d ic a te s  th is  fac t.
W e f in d  th e  fo llow ing  a s  a  c o n s ta n t th e m e  in  K a n t’s  w ritin g : “To se ­
c u re  o n e’s  ow n h a p p in e ss  is  a  d u ty  (a t le a s t  in d irec tly ); fo r d isco n ten t w ith  
o n e’s  co n d itio n  u n d e r  m an y  p re s s in g  cares a n d  a m id  u n sa tis f ie d  w an ts  m ig h t 
ea s ily  becom e a  g re a t te m p ta tio n  to  tra n sg re s s  one’s  d u tie s .”39 P u t  an o th e r  
w ay , “m a n  fee ls w ith in  h im s e lf  a  pow erfu l c o u n te rw e ig h t to  a l l  th e  com­
m a n d s  o f  du ty ...; th is  c o u n te rw e ig h t consists o f h is  n e ed s  a n d  in c lin a tio n s , 
w hose  to ta l  sa tis fac tio n  is  su m m e d  up  u n d e r  th e  n a m e  o f h a p p in e ss .”40 K a n t 
k e e p s  to  th is  p rem ise , from  th e  second  Critique to  th e  Metaphysics of Morals:
[the conflict between happiness and  morality is] a  practical conflict, and, were 
the  voice of reason with respect to the will not so distinct, so irrepressible, and 
so clearly audible to even the commonest m an, it would drive morality to 
ru in .41
38 Hemy E. Allison, in fact, takes this to be the condition which explains the possibility of 
“radical evil.” See: Henry E. Allison, “Kant’s Doctrine of Radical Evil,” in Akten des Sibenten Intema- 
tionaler Kant-Kongresses, ed. Gerhard Funke, Band I (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), 51-72.
39 Grundlegung, Ak. 399.
40 Ibid., Ak. 404.
41 Second Critique, Ak. 35.
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It can even be a duty in certain  respects to provide for one’s happiness, in part 
because... it contains means to the  fulfillment of one’s duty and in p a rt because 
the lack of it (e.g., poverty) contains tem ptations to transgress against duty.42
the cu ltu re  of discipline... is negative and  consists in the  liberation of the  will 
from the despotism of desires, a  despotism th a t rivets us to certa in  natu ra l 
things and  renders us unable to do our own selecting...43
Adversity, pain, and want are g rea t tem ptations to violate one’s duty... [T]he 
end [of prom oting the happiness o f another] is not the subject’s happiness but 
his m orality, and happiness is m erely a  m eans for removing obstacles to his 
m orality...44
T hese  a re  o n ly  a  few  o f m an y  p o ss ib le  q u o ta tio n s. S u ch  q u o ta tio n s , a s  w ell 
a s  th e  n a tu r e  o f  K a n t’s en tire  d iscu ssio n  o f th e  “incen tives” o f n a tu r e ,  sh o u ld  
suffice to  m a k e  th e  p o in t th a t  p e rso n s  a re  in flu en ced  b y  n a tu re .45
m.
All th r e e  Critiques h a v e  a t  le a s t  one an tinom y . K a n t c la im s th a t  th e  
an tinom y  to  b e  so lved  in  th e  second  Critique is  th a t  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good.
K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  w e hav e  tw o n a tu r a l  c an d id a te s  fo r “good,” n a m e ly  
h a p p in e ss , b y  v ir tu e  of ou r c re a tu re ly  n a tu re , a n d  pe rfec t m o ra lity , b y  v ir tu e  
of o u r  in te llig ib le  n a tu re . W hile  K a n t  h a s  a rg u e d  before th a t  v i r tu e  is  th e  
on ly  good in  itse lf , h e  also  c o n s is ten tly  s ta te s  th a t  i t  does n o t i ts e l f  p ro v id e  
h a p p in e ss . W hile  h e  explicitly  s ta te s  t h a t  w e receive som e “se lf-c o n ten t­
m e n t”46 w h e n  w e w ill in  accord w ith  th e  m o ra l law , “th is  com fort i s  n o t  h a p p i­
n ess , n o t ev en  th e  sm a lle s t p a r t  o f h a p p in e ss ... T his in n e r  sa tis fa c tio n  is
42 Ibid., Ak. 93.
43 Ak. 432. Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1987).
44 Ak. 388. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
45 See also Wike’s discussion of this in chapter four of her book: Victoria S. Wike, Kant on 
Happiness in Ethics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
46 Second Critique. Ak. 117.
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3th e re fo re  m erely  n e g a tiv e  w ith  reference  to  e v e ry th in g  w h ich  m ig h t m a k e  life  
p le a s a n t .”47 K a n t s ta te s  t h a t  “h a p p in e ss  a n d  m o ra lity  a re  tw o specifically  
d if fe re n t e lem en ts  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good a n d  th e re fo re  th e i r  com bination  c a n n o t 
be  k n o w n  ana ly tica lly ... T h e  h ig h e s t good is  a  synthesis o f concepts.”48 T h is  
is  re a ff irm e d  in  K a n t’s d isc u ss io n  o f th e  S toics, w ho  w ere  w rong  to  th in k  t h a t  
p e rfe c t m o ra lity  sim ply  b ro u g h t ab o u t h a p p in e s s  o f  i ts  ow n accord.
N ow  K a n t h a s  a lre a d y  a rg u e d  (in  th e  “A n a ly tic ”) th a t  v ir tu e  is  th e  
“su p re m e ” a n d  u n co n d itio n ed  good. B u t h e  a rg u e s  (in  th e  “D ialectic”) th a t ,
these tru ths do not imply th a t  virtue is the en tire  and  perfect good as the  ob­
ject of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings. For this, happiness is also 
required, and indeed not m erely in the partia l eyes of a  person... bu t even in 
the judgm ent of an im partia l reason... for to be in  need of happiness and  also 
worthy of it [i.e., to be virtuous] and yet not to p a rtak e  of it could not be in  ac­
cordance with the complete volition of an  om nipotent rational being...49
W hile  m o ra lity  a n d  h a p p in e ss  a re  no t th e  sa m e  th in g , K a n t  c la im s th a t  a  
h ig h e s t  good w ould  u n ite  th e  tw o, an d  th a t  “th is  c o m b in a tio n  is  know n  a s  a  
p r io r i  a n d  th u s  as p ra c tic a lly  necessa ry ... I t  is  a  p r io r i  (m orally) n e ce ssa ry  to  
b r in g  fo r th  th e  h ig h e s t good...”50 T hus, th e re  m u s t  b e  som e connection  b e ­
tw e e n  th e s e  tw o e lem en ts , som e connection  of “g ro u n d  a n d  consequence.”51 
T h is , th e n , is  th e  an tin o m y  o f p rac tic a l rea so n , n a m e ly  to  f in d  a  n e ce ssa ry  
connec tion  be tw een  tw o goods w h ich  a re  th em se lv e s  w holly  h e te ro g en eo u s 
a n d  show  no (ap p a ren t)  co n n ec tio n  in  th e  w orld  o f  n a tu r e .52
47 Ibid., Ak. 88. For more on the exact nature of “happiness” as Kant conceives it, see Section 
Two, Chapter Two below.
48 Ibid., Ak. 112.
49 Ibid., Ak. 110.
50 Ibid., Ak. 113.
51 Ibid., Ak. 110.
52 Beck is right to claim that “it should be obvious that we do not have here an antinomy in any 
strict sense,” (Commentary, p. 247). This is because, one of the theses is simply false, and, subsequently, 
rejected. Compare this with the third antinomy where both thesis were necessary and both affirmed. See 
Beck’s discussion, pp. 247-8.
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B ecau se  h ap p in ess  c a n n o t b e  a  c o n d itio n  o f v irtu e , a n d  b ecau se  th e  
h ig h e s t good is  a  necessary  ob ject o f  m o ra l  vo lition , K a n t concludes t h a t  v i r ­
tu e  m u s t  b e  th e  condition  for h a p p in e s s . T h e  f i r s t  is  ru le d  o u t b y  b o th  th e  
“A n a ly tic” a s  w ell a s  th e  Grundlegung, s in c e  h a p p in e ss  a s  th e  b a s is  fo r w ill­
in g  a n  ac tio n  p roduces h e te ro n o m y  a n d  c a n n o t  p roduce  t ru ly  m o ra l com ­
m an d s . B u t  th e  second, w hile  a p p a re n t ly  n o t  ev idenced  in  n a tu re , is  “fa lse  
on ly  i f  I  a s su m e  ex istence  in  th is  w o r ld  to  b e  th e  only  m ode o f ex is ten ce ...”53 
K a n t’s  so lu tio n , th e n , is  to r e a s s e r t  t h a t  h u m a n  b e ings a re  m em b ers  o f tw o  
“w orlds” a n d  to  conclude th a t  “i t  is  n o t  im p o ss ib le  th a t  th e  m o ra lity  o f  in te n ­
tio n  sh o u ld  h a v e  a  n ecessa ry  re la tio n  a s  c a u s e  to  h a p p in e ss  a s  a n  effect in  
th e  se n su o u s  w orld ; b u t  th is  r e la t io n  i s  in d ire c t , m e d ia te d  by  a n  in te llig ib le  
A u th o r o f  n a tu r e .”54 T hus,55 i t  is  a n  in te llig ib le  A u th o r o f n a tu re , n a m e ly  th e  
m o ra l God, w h ich  m u s t be a ssu m e d  to  p ro v id e  th e  connection  b e tw ee n  v ir tu e  
a n d  h a p p in e ss , th u s  u n itin g  th e  tw o  in to  a  h ig h e s t  good,
happiness in exact proportion to m orality  (as the worth of a person and his 
w orthiness to be happy)... w herein... happiness, though som ething alw ays 
p leasan t to him  who possesses it, is not of itse lf absolutely good... b u t alw ays 
presupposes conduct in accordance w ith  the  m oral law as its condition.56
U n fo rtu n a te ly , th is  is  ab o u t th e  e x te n t  o f  K a n t’s  a rg u m e n ts  fo r w hy  th e  
h ig h e s t good is  a  necessa ry  object o f  o u r  w ill i n  th e  f ir s t  p lace; to  t ry  to  ju s tify  
th is  c la im , w e s h a l l  have  to  f u r th e r  a n a ly z e  i t  below . In  la te r  c h a p te rs  I  w ill 
a rg u e  t h a t  th e  h ig h e s t good m u s t in d e e d  b e  th e  p ro p e r object o f o u r w illing , 
b u t  I  w ill a lso  a rg u e  th a t  th e re  a re  se r io u s  f law s in  K a n t’s  concep tion  o f th e
S3 Second Critique, Ak. 114.
"Ib id ., Ak. 114.
55 As an aside, I think we can already see a  possible inconsistency here, of the kind Andrews 
Reath talks about in: “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Journal o f the History ofPhiloso­
phy 26, no. 4 (October 1988): 593-619. The “antinomy” of the highest good does not seem to be solved by 
this solution, for Kant himself maintains that this world does not reward morality with happiness. We 
would have to have a future life or a future world.
56 Second Critique. Ak. 110-11.
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h ig h e s t good a n d  i ts  co rresp o n d in g  an tin o m y . F o r now , le t u s  ta k e  th is  c la im  
a s  given, a n d  m ove on to  K a n t’s  d iscussion  o f th e  n ecessa ry  p o s tu la te s  w h ich  
a re  needed  to su p p o rt i t.
IV.
I f  th e  h ig h e s t good is  th e  n e ce ssa ry  ob ject o f m o ra l w illing , w e m u s t  
a lso  n ecessa rily  p re su p p o se  th o se  cond itions w h ich  w ou ld  m ak e  i t  p ossib le . 
K a n t  calls su ch  p re su p p o s itio n s  "p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l  reaso n .” T h ese  p o s ­
tu la te s , as n o ted  in  “C h a p te r  Two” above, a re  freed o m  (b u t h e re  in  th e  p o s i­
tiv e  sense), im m o rta lity , a n d  God, i.e., th e  p o s itiv e  a sse rtio n s  from  p ra c tic a l 
re a so n  of id eas  o f p u re  re a so n . N ow  K a n t is  c le a r  to  in s is t  th a t  su ch  p o s tu ­
la te s  a re  n e ith e r  “know n” in  a n y  s tr ic t se n se  n o r  a re  th e y  “objectively” n e ce s­
sa ry . T hey a re  n o t  th e  fo rm er b ecau se  n o n e  o f th e m  c a n  be g iven  to  u s  in  a n  
in tu itio n , a n d  th u s  a re  n o t ob jec ts of know ledge  a s  d efin ed  in  th e  f i r s t  Cri­
tique. K a n t a rg u e s  th a t  th e y  a re  n o t th e  l a t t e r  b e c a u se  th ey  a re  n o t g ro u n d s  
fo r th e  possib ility  o f th e  m o ra l la w  itse lf, on ly  fo r  i ts  h o p ed  outcom e; i t  is  “n o t 
a  n ecessity  k n o w n  b y  th e  re fe ren c e  to a n  object. I n  o th e r  w ords, i t  is  a  n e ce s­
s a ry  assu m p tio n , ra th e r ,  w ith  refe rence  to  th e  su b je c t a s  conform ing to  th e  
objective p rac tic a l law s o f re a so n .”57 In  sh o rt, i t  is  n ecessa ry  for th e  m o ra lly  
w illin g  ag en t to p o s tu la te  th e s e  objects in  o rd e r  to  be  co n s is ten t in  th e ir  
w illing ,58 “a  th eo re tic a l p ro p o sitio n  w hich  is  n o t a s  su c h  dem onstrab le , b u t  
w h ich  is  an  in se p a ra b le  co ro lla ry  of a n  a  p r io r i  u n co n d itio n a lly  v a lid  p ra c t i ­
c a l law .”59 B efore w e a tte m p t a  fu lle r  e x p la n a tio n  o f th is , le t  u s  ex am in e  e ac h  
o f th e se  p o s tu la te s  in d iv id u a lly .
O f th e  th re e  p o s tu la te s , K a n t th in k s  “freedom ” to  be th e  only  one 
w h ich  is  in d eed  a  “fac t” a n d  is  n o t  in  q u estio n  a s  to  i t s  necessity , even  th o u g h  
w e c an n o t experience  i t  a s  a n  in tu itio n . T h is  i s  b eca u se , a s  w e n o te d  above,
57 Ibid., Ak. 12.
58 We shall analyze this claim in detail below. Section Two, Chapter Five.
59 Second Critique. Ak. 122.
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K a n t th in k s  t h a t  we w ould n o t h a v e  consciousness o f th e  m o ra l law  i f  w e d id  
n o t h av e  p o sitiv e  freedom , h e n ce  “w ith  th e  p u re  p ra c tic a l facu lty  o f reaso n , 
th e  re a lity  of tra n s c e n d e n ta l freedom  is  a lso  con firm ed ,”60 tho u g h  w e c an n o t 
h av e  a n  in tu i t io n  o f i t  a s  su ch . F reedom  i s  a  “fa c t  o f  rea so n , since one c a n n o t 
fe r re t  i t  o u t fro m  an teced en t d a ta  o f rea so n , su c h  a s  th e  consciousness o f 
freedom  (for th is  is  n o t a n te c e d e n tly  given), a n d  s in ce  i t  forces i ts e lf  u p o n  u s  
a s  a  sy n th e tic  p roposition  a  p r io r i...”61 D esp ite  th is , K a n t  som etim es re fe rs  to  
freedom  a s  one  o f  th e  th re e  p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c t ic a l  re a so n , “freedom  a ffirm a ­
tive ly  re g a rd e d  (as  th e  c a u sa lity  o f  a  b e in g  so f a r  a s  h e  be longs to th e  in te l li­
gible w orld)...”62 T h is seem s accep tab le  e n o u g h , fo r th o u g h  freedom  is  a  
“fact,” i t  is a  v e ry  d ifferen t so r t o f  fac t th a n  th a t  w h ich  w e n o rm ally  th in k , 
n am ely  a n  in tu it io n  su b su m e d  u n d e r  space , tim e , a n d  th e  categories. F re e ­
dom  in  th e  n e g a tiv e  sense  h a s  a lre a d y  b e e n  n e c e ss ita te d  b y  th e  so lu tion  to  
th e  “th ird  an tin o m y ,” b u t freed o m  in  th e  p o s itiv e  se n se  is  n ece ss ita ted  by  th e  
m oral law . F reed o m  is th e re fo re  a  n e ce ssa ry  p o s tu la te  b ecau se  i t  is  a  s tra n g e  
type  o f fac t, a n d  a  fac t w hich  is  n e e d e d  i f  th e re  is  to  b e  m o ra lity  a t  a ll.63
T h e  n e x t n ecessa ry  p o s tu la te  is  im m o rta li ty  o f th e  soul. K a n t 
exp la in s th a t  th e  m oral law  co m m an d s “co m p le te  f itn e ss  o f  in te n tio n s  to  th e  
m oral law ,”64 b u t  such  fitn e ss  is  “h o lin e ss”65 w h ich  is  n o t possib le  for 
c re a tu re s  w ith  f in ite  in te llig en ces in  th e  w o rld  o f  sen se . Y et such  com plete 
f itn e ss  is  com m anded , for th e  m o ra l law  s im p ly  s ta te s  t h a t  every  action  m u s t  
be m ora l, m u s t  b e  such  th a t  i t  co u ld  be w illed  b y  ev ery  p e rso n  a n d  in c lu d ed  
in  th e  law s o f n a tu re . T hus, w h ile  com plete  p e rfec tio n  is  n o t possible, “an
60 Ibid., Ak. 3.
61 Ibid., Ak. 31.
62 Ibid., Ak. 132.
63 See also Beck’s discussion in the Commentary, pp. 207-8 and 251-5.
64 Second Critique, Ak. 122.
65 Ibid.





e n d le ss  p ro g ress  to  t h a t  com plete f i tn e s s”66 is possible, a n d  i t  is  th is  t h a t  we 
m u s t ta k e  to  be t r u e .  K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  th is  solves th e  p ro b lem  b e ca u se
the Infinite Being, to whom the tem poral condition is nothing, sees in this se­
ries, which is for us without end, a whole conformable to th e  m oral law; holi­
ness... is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of th e  existence of ra ­
tional beings.67
S u ch  perfection  is  “a  p rac tic a l id e a l  w h ich  m u st n ecessa rily  s e rv e  a s  a  m odel 
w h ich  a ll  f in ite  r a t io n a l  be ings m u s t  s tr iv e  to w ard  even  th o u g h  th e y  c a n n o t 
re a c h  i t .”68 B u t s u c h  a n  en d less  p ro g re ss  is  im possib le  i f  w e u n d e r s ta n d  o u r­
se lv es to  be  l im ite d  in  ou r life  sp a n , th u s  "in fin ite  p ro g ress  is  p o ss ib le ... only  
u n d e r  th e  p resu p p o sitio n  o f a n  in f in ite ly  e n d u rin g  ex istence  a n d  p e rso n a lity  
o f th e  sa m e  ra t io n a l  being; th is  is  c a lle d  th e  im m o rta lity  o f th e  sou l.”69 T h u s  
im m o rta lity  of th e  so u l is a  n e ce ssa ry  p o s tu la te  to  e n su re  th e  p o ss ib il i ty  of 
“u n e n d in g  p ro g ress” to w a rd  m o ra l pe rfec tion .
T h e  f in a l p o s tu la te  th a t  K a n t  a s s e r ts  is  th e  ex is tence  o f  G od a s  th e  
(m oral) a u th o r  o f th e  w orld. T he h ig h e s t  good is  th e  sy n th e s is  o f m o ra lity  
w ith  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss . H ow ever, “th e  poss ib ility  o f su c h  a  connec tion  
o f th e  cond itioned  w ith  its  cond ition  be longs w holly to th e  s u p e rse n su o u s  re ­
la tio n s  of th in g s  a n d  c an n o t b e  g iven  u n d e r  the  law s of th e  w o rld  o f se n se .”70 
K eep in g  th e  f irs t  Critique in  m ind , K a n t  is  in d ic a tin g  h e re  t h a t  th e  la w s  of 
n a tu re , a s  u n d e rs to o d  th o u g h  th e  c a teg o rie s  of th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , h a v e  
n o th in g  to  do w ith  m o ra lity , a n d  w e o ften  w itn ess  n a tu re ’s  a p p a re n t  ob liv i­
o u sn e ss  to  th e  consequences of m o ra l ac tions . H ow  can  m o ra lity  b e  r e ­
w ard ed , th e n ?  S u ch  a  so lu tion  “c a n  occur only c o n tin g en tly  in  a  sy s te m  o f
“ Ibid.
67 Ibid., Ak. 123.
68 Ibid., Ak. 32.
69 Ibid., Ak. 122.
0 Ibid.. Ak. 119.
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n a tu r e ,”71 a n d  c a n n o t b e  b ro u g h t ab o u t b y  p e rso n s, s in ce  “n o t b e in g  n a tu r e ’s  
cau se , h is  w ill c a n n o t b y  i ts  ow n s tre n g th  b r in g  n a tu r e ,  a s  i t  to u ch e s  on  h is  
h a p p in e ss , in to  com plete  h a rm o n y  w ith  h is  p ra c tic a l p rin c ip le s .”72 T h e  so lu ­
tio n  is  on ly  to be  h a d  th ro u g h  “th e  su p p o s itio n  of a  su p re m e  cau se  o f  n a tu r e  
w h ich  h a s  a  c a u sa lity  co rresp o n d in g  to  th e  m o ra l in te n tio n .”73 As su c h , th e  
h ig h e s t  good “is  th e  K ingdom  o f God, in  w h ic h  n a tu r e  a n d  m o ra lity  com e in to  
a  h a rm o n y , w hich  i f  fo re ig n  to  each  a s  su c h , th ro u g h  a  h o ly  A u th o r o f  th e  
w orld , w ho m ak e s  p o ss ib le  th e  de riv ed  h ig h e s t  good. T h e  h ig h e s t good is  th e  
n e c e ssa ry  object o f  th e  m o ra l law , a n d  a s  su c h  i t  m u s t  be  possib le ; th e re fo re , 
w e m u s t  a ssu m e  th e  ex is ten ce  o f a  G od w h o  w ou ld  co n n ec t m o ra lity  w ith  
p ro p o r tio n a te  h a p p in e ss .
V.
A gain , i t  is  im p o r ta n t  to  ask: W h ere  is  th e  h ig h e s t  good th o u g h t  to  be 
loca ted?  I  th in k  i t  is  v e ry  c le a r  in  th e  Critique o f Practical Reason t h a t  K a n t  
w as r a th e r  d iv ided  on  th e  is su e , w ith  th e  r e s u l t  b o th  t h a t  th e re  a re  te n s io n s , 
i f  n o t  in co n s is ten c ie s , b e tw e e n  h is  s ta te m e n ts , a n d  t h a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good 
se em s to  h a v e  tw o lo ca tio n s. W hile  I  w ill s a v e  a  d iscu ssio n  o f p o ss ib le  in c o n ­
s is te n c ie s  u n t i l  la te r , l e t  m e a d d re ss  th e  q u e s tio n s  o f  loca tion , a n d  s ta te  
a g a in  m y  b e lie f  t h a t  th e re  ex is ts  for K a n t  b o th  a n  “o th erw o rld ly ” a n d  a n  
“e a r th ly ” h ig h e s t good.
K a n t’s ta lk  o f im m o rta lity  of th e  s o u l c e r ta in ly  seem s to  p la c e  a n  e m ­
p h a s is  o n  a n  “o th erw o rld ly ” in te rp re ta t io n  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good. I f  th e  so u l 
m u s t  p ro g re ss  en d le ss ly  to w a rd  p erfec t m o ra lity , th is  m u s t  ta k e  p la c e  in  
som e re a lm  beyond  th is  w orld .74 A nd i f  su c h  a  p e rso n  is  to  be  re w a rd e d , th e n
71 Ibid., Ak. 115.
72 Ibid., Ak. 124.
73 Ibid., Ak. 125.
74 I think Kant’s clearly Christian approach to questions of morality would rule out an interpre­
tation of reincarnation, though whether such an interpretation could remain consistent itself is another 
question.
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i t  seem s th is  m u s t also ta k e  p lac e  in  th e  n ex t w orld . H en ce  w e e n d  up w ith  
s ta te m e n ts  su ch  as:
The holiness of morals is prescribed to them  even in th is life as a guide to con­
duct, bu t the  well-being proportionate to this, which is bliss, is thought of as 
attainable only in eternity. This is due to the fact th a t... the latter, under the 
nam e of happiness, cannot... be reached in this life and  therefore is made only 
an  object of hope.75
[RJeason certainly has an inescapable responsibility from the side of his sensu­
ous nature  to attend  to its in te res t and to form practical maxim s with a  view 
to the happiness of th is and, where possible, of a  fu ture life.76
[A person who strives for m orality] may very well have the  comforting hope... 
th a t he will be steadfast in  these principles in an  existence continuing beyond 
th is life... [H]e can have prospect of a  blessed future. For “blessed” is the word 
which reason uses to designate a perfect well-being independent of all contin­
gent causes in the world.77
I  th in k  th e se  s ta te m e n ts  a re  su ff ic ie n t to  e s ta b lish  K a n t’s p o sitio n  of an  
“o therw orld ly” h ig h e s t good.
H ow ever, su rp ris in g ly , th e  m ajo rity  of th e  s ta te m e n ts  fo u n d  in  th e  
seco n d  Critique su p p o rt a n  “e a r th ly ” in te rp re ta tio n . In d ee d , th e  e n tire  q u e s­
tio n  o f  G od a ris e s  because  n a tu r e  in  th is  w orld  is  n o t re sp o n s iv e  to  m orality , 
a n d  w e m u s t p o s tu la te  a n  in te l l ig e n t  a u th o r  of n a tu re ;  th e  d iscussion  con­
c e rn s  p ro p o rtio n a lity  “in  th is  w o rld ” a n d  “in  th e  w o rld  o f  se n se .” T hus:
[I]t is not impossible th a t th e  m orality of intention would have a  necessary re­
lation as cause to happiness as an  effect in the sensuous world...78
In  fact, the impossibility m entioned is merely subjective, i.e., our reason finds 
it impossible to conceive, in  th e  m ere course of na tu re , a  connection so exactly 
proportioned and so thoroughly adapted to an  end  betw een natu ra l events 
which occur according to law s so heterogeneous. But, as w ith  every other pu r­
posive th ing  in nature, it still cannot prove th a t it is impossible according to
75 Second Critique, Ak. 129.
Ibid., Ak. 61.
Ibid., Ak. 123 n.
Ibid.. Ak. 115.
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universal laws of na ture  [only], i.e., show this by objectively sufficient reasons. 
But now a determ ining factor of another kind [namely practical reason] comes 
into play to  tu rn  the scale in this indecision of speculative reason.79
[T]he existence is postulated of a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct 
from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness 
with morality... Therefore, the highest good is possible in the world only on 
the supposition [which we do make] of a  suprem e cause of nature which has a 
causality corresponding to the m oral in tention [of hum an beings].80
All th a t here belongs to duty is the endeavor to produce and to fu rther the 
highest good in the world, the existence of which m ay thus be postulated 
though our reason cannot conceive it except by presupposing a highest intelli­
gence.81
[T]he Kingdom of God... [is th a t  hoped for condition] in  which na tu re  and mo­
rality  come into a  harmony... through a  holy A uthor of the world...82
[I]f we inquire into God’s final end in creating the world, we m ust name not 
the happiness of rational beings in the world b u t the highest good...83
T hus, aga in , I  b e liev e  th a t  K a n t a s se r ts  th e  n ecessity  o f a  h ig h e s t good on  
e a r th .
Now, p re su m a b ly  K a n t cou ld  v e ry  w ell h a v e  sa id  th a t  th e  so lu tio n  to 
th e  an tin o m y  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good is  to  a ssu m e  t h a t  a ll  ac tio n s w ill be  su ita b ly  
re w a rd e d  or p u n is h e d  in the next life. S in ce  one of th e  tw o m ain  p ro b lem s of 
th e  h ig h e s t good in  th e  f ir s t  p lace is  th e  u n re sp o n s iv e n e ss  o f n a tu re  in  th is  
w orld, th e  r a th e r  obvious so lu tion  fo r K a n t w ou ld  h av e  b e en  to sa y  th a t  p ro ­
p o rtio n a lity  ta k e s  p lace  in  a  d iffe ren t w orld . K a n t cou ld  h a v e  e as ily  w ed th e  
no tion  o f p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss  s tr ic tly  to  th e  no tion  o f  a n  en d le ss  p ro g ress  
in  th e  n e x t life. B u t  K a n t  does no t, a n d  h e  em p h asize s  th a t  such  p ro p o r­
tio n a lity  m u s t b e  conceivable in  th is  w orld . I  ta k e  th is  to  be  p a rtic u la rly  
te lling . I  sh a ll a t te m p t  to  show  in  la te r  c h a p te rs  w hy, exactly , K a n t m ig h t
79 Ibid.,, Ak. 145.
80 Ibid., Ak. 124-5.
81 Ibid., Ak. 126.
82 Ibid., Ak. 128.
83 Ibid., Ak. 130.
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th in k  th a t  th is  is  n ecessa ry , b u t  fo r now  le t  m e only  in d ic a te  th a t  i t  seem s 
th a t  K a n t th o u g h t a  w o rld  w h ich  w as com pletely  im p e rv io u s  to  m orality  
w ould  m ak e  th is  w o rld  a  fa rce , a  pu rpose less  w orld  w h ic h  in  w h ich  n a tu re  
seem s to  he lp  every  o th e r  c re a tu re  except h u m a n  b e ings . I  th in k  K a n t h a s  
c le a r  m otives fo r th e  n e c e ss ita tio n  o f two locations fo r th e  h ig h e s t good.
VL
H ere  I  w a n t on ly  to  m e n tio n  briefly  th a t  w e f in d  a g a in  in  th e  second 
Critique K a n t’s  concern  a b o u t th e  n a tu re  of a  possib le  "ex p an sio n ” o f know l­
edge w hich  p ra c tic a l re a so n  h a s  ta k e n  from  sp ecu la tiv e  rea so n . T h is  is a  
concern  m uch  lik e  th e  o ne  w e n o te d  above re g a rd in g  th e  f i r s t  Critique. W hile 
K a n t in s is ts  th a t  “re a so n  is  n o t h e re b y  ex tended , how ever, in  i ts  th eo re tica l 
know ledge” by  th e  ob jects g iven  in  p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l re a so n ,84 “th e  th eo ­
re tic a l know ledge o f p u re  re a so n  does ob ta in  a n  accession ... [and] th eo re tica l 
rea so n  is, th ere fo re , ju s t if ie d  in  a ssu m in g  [these  objects].”85 K a n t su m m a­
rizes:
Theoretical knowledge not of these objects b u t of reason in general was ex­
tended so far that, by the practical postulates, object were given to those ideas 
[of reason], and a m erely problematical thought thereby obtained objective 
reality. I t  was therefore no extension of knowledge of given supersensuous 
objects, b u t still an  extension of theoretical reason and  of its knowledge with 
respect to the supersensuous in  general, inasmuch as knowledge is compelled 
to concede th a t there are such objects without more exactly defining them...86
K a n t th e re fo re  rea ch e s  th e  im p o r ta n t  conclusion th a t:
Now no object in in tu ition  can be given to the categories so far as they are 
applied to these ideas; b u t th a t such an object really exists and  th a t here the 
category as a mere form of thought is not em pty bu t has significance -- this is
84 Ibid., Ak. 4-5.
85 Ibid., Ak. 134.
86 Ibid., Ak. 135.
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sufficiently dem onstrated by an  object which practical reason indubitably pre­
sents in the concept of the highest good...87
N ow  K a n t in  th e se  sections w h e re  h e  i s  concerned  w ith  th e  possib le  e x p a n ­
sio n  o f  th e o re tic a l know ledge seem s to  be  m ostly  concerned  w ith  su ch  k n o w l­
edge  a s  i t  concerns freedom , th e  sou l, a n d  God, a n d  n o t a s  m u ch  w ith  th e  
w o rld  a s  such . B u t  w h a t is  im p o r ta n t  to  n o te  is  th a t  i f  w e m u s t  a ssu m e  a  
h ig h e s t  good on  e a r th , th e n  w e w ill h a v e  th e  fu r th e r  ten s io n  b e tw een  w h a t  
re a so n  can  p o s it re g a rd in g  n a tu r e  a s  m ere ly  m echan ica l, a n d  n a tu re  a s  pur­
posive, a s  teleo logical. T hus, w h ile  w e m u s t  w a it a  few  c h a p te rs  to  an a ly ze  
th is , i t  sh o u ld  be no  w onder to  u s  t h a t  K a n t  fe lt  th e  n e ed  fo r a n o th e r  m a jo r 
w o rk  d evo ted  p rec ise ly  to  th is  is su e ; th u s  th e  re su ltin g  Critique of Judgment.
87 Ibid., Ak. 136. Italics added for emphasis.
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Chapter Five 
An Overview to the Critique o f Judgment
L
O n th e  one h a n d , th e  Critique o f Judgment goes a  lo n g  w ay  tow ard  
e lu c id a tin g  som e o f th e  con flic ts  t h a t  we observed  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique a n d  in  
th e  “Id e a .” T h is Critique co n ce rn s  a  very  d e ta ile d  e x a m in a tio n  o f th e  facu lty  
o r pow er o f ju d g m e n t itse lf , w h ich  is  v irtu a lly  a b se n t from  th e  o th e r  Cri­
tiques. H ere , K a n t g ives m u c h  a tte n tio n  to  th e  concep t a n d  possib ility  of 
teleo logy  in  n a tu re  w ith  h is  a n a ly s is  of “p u rp o ses .” H e  d irec tly  ad d resses  th e  
q u e s tio n  o f w h a t w e a re  to  s a y  a b o u t n a tu re  a c tin g  in  acco rdance  w ith  p u r ­
po ses, a n d  w h a t conclusions w e c a n  d raw  from  th is , e sp ec ia lly  reg a rd in g  God 
a n d  th e  “f in a l  p u rp o se” o f th e  h u m a n  species. I t  w ill t u r n  o u t t h a t  an  an a ly ­
s is  o f p u rp o ses  can  give u s  som e p a r t ia l  con firm ation  o f th e  p o ss ib ility  of 
a ch iev in g  th e  h ig h e s t good. W e a lso  get a  fa ir ly  good in d ic a tio n  o f how to 
so lve  th e  q uestion  o f th e  “p rin c ip le  o f pu rposive  m ec h an ism s .”1
O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , K a n t  a d h e re s  to th e  g e n e ra l g u id e lin e s  se t ou t in  
th e  f i r s t  Critique in  h is  d iscu ss io n  o f th e  “id ea s” o f re a so n  a n d  o f teleology,2 
a n d  w e receive no n ew  ra d ic a l  d e p a r tu re s  h o rn  th e se  g u id e lin es . K a n t a d ­
h e re s  to  h is  m ain  p rem ise  t h a t  th e  no tion  of teleology is  n e c e ssa ry  for u s  to 
u n d e rs ta n d  a n d  in v e s tig a te  n a tu re .  T hough h e  sp e lls  o u t th is  necessity  a n d  
th e  ex ac t n a tu re  o f te leo logy  i n  f a r  g rea te r  d e ta il  h e re  th a n  in  th e  f irs t Cri­
tique, h e  s ti ll  a rg u es  t h a t  i t  is  on ly  a  necessa ry  id e a  fo r o u r  cogn ition  a n d  ex­
a m in a tio n  o f c e r ta in  a sp ec ts  o f  n a tu re , a n d  n o t a  fac t a b o u t n a tu r e  itself. In
1 See Chapter Two and Four above.
2 See Chapter Two above.




o th e r  w ords, i t  rem a in s  on ly  a  reg u la tiv e  a n d  n o t a  c o n s titu tiv e  concept. 
T herefo re , w e re m a in  sa fe  to  a d h e re  to th e  conclusions w hich  w e d rew  abou t 
teleo logy  in  “C h a p te r  Two” above, a n d  we re m a in  s a fe  to  a ssu m e  th a t  K a n t 
w a s  n o t sim p ly  confused  a s  to  h is  ow n stance  on teleo logy  w h en  h e  w ro te  th e  
“Id e a .” T h is is  ex trem ely  im p o r ta n t  because, a s  w e s h a l l  see  in  la te r  c h ap ­
te rs , i f  teleology is  only a  re g u la tiv e  p rincip le , i t  m e a n s  th a t  m o ra l p rog ress 
m u s t  be, for K a n t, a  p o s tu la te  o f p rac tic a l reaso n .
In  th is  ch ap te r, I  s h a l l  b eg in  w ith  a  b r ie f  o v e ra ll su m m a ry  o f th e  Cri­
tique o f Judgment, w hich  i s  a  n ecessa ry  b a ck g ro u n d  to  m ore  specific po in ts . 
I n  so doing, i t  w ill becom e c lea r, a s  W ern er S. P lu h a r  a rg u e s  in  h is  
“In tro d u c tio n ” to  h is  re c e n t tra n s la tio n  o f th is  Critique, w hy  w e ca n n ot, sim ­
p ly  th in k  of m ech an ica l c a u sa lity  a s  a  m erely  re g u la tiv e  id ea , a s  so m an y  
c o m m en ta to rs  on  K a n t h a v e  c la im ed . T h is is  th e  on ly  possib ly  c on troversia l 
c la im  I  in te n d  to  m ake  in  th is  section , b u t  i t  is  im p o r ta n t, a s  w e sh a ll  see 
la te r .  T hose re a d e rs  w ho a re  m o re  fa m ilia r  w ith  th e  co n te n ts  o f th e  th ird  
Critique, a n d  w ho a re  w illin g  to  accep t th a t  m e c h an ica l c a u sa lity  rem a in s  a  
c o n s titu tiv e  p rin c ip le  a t  th e  e n d  o f th e  th ird  Critique, m ay  w ish  to  sk ip  th is  
r a th e r  laborious chap ter.
In  th e  n e x t th re e  c h a p te rs , I  w ill a d d re ss  m o re  specific concerns a n d  
p ro b lem s, m an y  of w hich  h a v e  b e en  in tro d u c ed  in  th e  p rev io u s  fo u r c h a p te rs  
o f  th is  p ap er. I n  th e  n e x t c h a p te r , I w ill a d d re ss  th e  g e n e ra l concern  re g a rd ­
in g  j u s t  w h a t to  sa y  ab o u t th e  n a tu r e  of teleology a n d  how  m uch  i t  is  sa id  to 
a c tu a lly  ex is t in  n a tu re . I  s h a l l  a rg u e  th a t  K a n t s ta y s  w ith  th e  conclusions of 
th e  Critique o f Pure Reason in  m a in ta in in g  th a t  te leo logy  is  a  reg u la tiv e  
p rin c ip le  only. T h is  is  im p o r ta n t  i f  w e a re  to  a d h e re  to  th e  d ic ta te s  o f th e  
f i r s t  Critique, i f  w e a re  to  k e ep  w ith  a  conception o f n a tu r e  w hich  is  s tric tly  
physio -m echan ica l, a n d  i f  w e  a re  to  u n d e rs ta n d  w h y  th e  ex istence  o f po litica l 
o rg an iz a tio n s  a re  so im p o rta n t. N ext, I  w ill a g a in  d isc u ss  th e  q u estio n  of, 
W h ere  is  th e  h ig h e s t good th o u g h t  to be located? I w ill a rg u e  th a t  we h av e
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ab so lu te ly  conclusive evidence in  th e  th ird  Critique t h a t  K a n t  conceives of a  
h ig h e s t  good on e a r th , a n d  th a t  h e  ta k e s  such  a  b e lie f  to  b e  in  som e sense  
n e ce ssa ry . I  w ill d iscuss how  i t  is  t h a t  th e  th ird  Critique g ives u s  ad d itio n a l 
h o p e  fo r th e  p o ssib ility  of ach iev in g  th is  h ig h es t good on  e a r th .  In  th e  la s t  
c h a p te r  o f th is  se t, I  sh a ll a g a in  a d d re s s  th e  question  o f  th e  “p rin c ip le  o f p u r ­
p o siv e  m ech an ism s,” show ing  h o w  K a n t  in te n d s  th is  to  b e  a  n e ce ssa ry  p r in ­
cip le , b u t  only  a  reg u la tiv e  one. L e t  u s  beg in , how ever, w ith  a n  overview  of 
K a n t’s  th ird  Critique.
IL
T he  m a in  concern  of th e  Critique o f Judgment m ig h t be  s ta te d  as 
follow s: K a n t concluded  in  th e  Critique of Pure Reason t h a t  th e  ca tegories 
p ro v id e  th e  law s to  w hich  n a tu re  m u s t  conform  to  be ex p erien ced , a n d  th u s  
w e c a n  know  th e se  law s (cau sa lity , fo r in stance) a priori. H ow ever, w hile  
th e s e  law s a re  n ecessa ry  fo r n a tu r e  in  genera l, e.g., th e re  m u s t  b e  a  
(m echan ica l) cau se  a n d  effect fo r n a tu r e  a s  ap p ea ran ce , th e r e  is  n o th in g  to 
in d ic a te  th a t  su ch  law -like  b e h a v io r  m ig h t be  expected  in  th e  p a r tic u la r . In  
o th e r  w ords, n a tu re  in  i ts  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f p a r tic u la r  p re s e n ta tio n s  o r objects 
is  contingent a s  f a r  a s  we c an  see. W hile  n a tu re  in  g e n e ra l m u s t  be  ab le  to  be  
cogn ized  accord ing  to  basic  u n iv e rs a l  law s, th e re  is  no g u a ra n te e  t h a t  n a tu re  
w ill ex h ib it co n sis ten t, re liab le , a n d  u n d e rs ta n d a b le  la w s  w ith  re g a rd  to 
specific  in s tan c es :
the universal supplied by our (hum an) understanding does not determ ine the 
particular; therefore even if different things agree in a common characteristic, 
the variety of ways in which they  m ay come before our perception is contin­
gent. For our understanding is a  power of concepts... so th a t  it m ust indeed be 
contingent for it as to w hat th e  character and all the varie ty  of the particular 
m ay be th a t can be given to it in  na tu re  and th a t can be brought under its con­
cepts.3
3 p. 290 = Ak. 406. All quotations come from: Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Judgment, trans. 
Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). I will cite both the translation's 
page number and the Akademie page number, respectively. "The point is this: Our understanding has the 
peculiarity that when it cognizes, e.g.. the cause of a product, it must proceed from the analytically




W hy s h o u ld  th e  m otion of ev ery  p la n e t, fo r exam ple, be  ab le  to  be ex p la in ed  
w ith  a  few  sim p le  m a th e m a tic a l eq u a tio n s?  W hy sh o u ld  chem ica l reac tio n s 
re m a in  a lw ay s  th e  sam e  a n d  b e  ab le  to  b e  ex p la in e d  m a th e m a tic a lly ?  As fa r  
a s  w e h u m a n  be ings w ith  o u r  p a r t ic u la r  cognitive a b ilitie s  c a n  see, th e re  is  
no re a s o n  w h y  n a tu re  sh o u ld  b e  re g u la r  w ith  re g a rd  to  i t s  m ore  specific 
c h a ra c te r is tic s .4
A s th e  tw o Critiques b efo re  i t ,  th is  Critique a lso  d e a ls  w ith  a n  a n tin ­
omy5 w h ic h  c a n  only b e  so lved  b y  re fe ren ce  to  th e  “su p e rse n s ib le .” T h e  a n ­
tin o m y  b e g in s  w ith  th e  ju d g m e n t t h a t  a n  object (of n a tu re )6 is  b e a u tifu l. O f­
ten , w e b e h o ld  a n  object or scen e  w hich , u p o n  reflection , w e co n sid er to  be 
b e a u tifu l. T h is  occurs w hen  w e h a v e  a  fee lin g  o f p le a s u re  w h ile  beho ld ing  
so m e th in g  o f n a tu re , a n d  w e w a n t  to  m a k e  a  ju d g m e n t a b o u t t h a t  feeling .
B u t K a n t  c la im s th a t  a  ju d g m e n t o f b e a u ty  c an n o t be  m a d e  th ro u g h  re fe r­
ence to  a  concep t. T he  ju d g m e n t t h a t  so m e th in g  is  b e a u tifu l  m u s t n o t only be 
d is in te re s te d , b u t  m u s t be free  o f  concep ts. T h is  is  b e ca u se  “from  concepts 
th e re  is  n o  tra n s it io n  to  th e  fe e lin g  o f p le a su re  o r d isp le a su re  (except in  p u re
universal to the particular (i.e., from concepts to the empirical intuition that is given); consequently, in 
this process our understanding determines nothing regarding the diversity of the particular” (p. 291 = Ak. 
407).
4 This should hearken us back to the writings of David Hume. How could we possibly know a 
priori that the flame of the candle will bum us? How could we know the way a certain product of nature 
operates without an experience of it? Thus, while Kant argues against Hume that there must be some laws 
of nature which we can know a priori to be valid and universal, namely the ones we give nature through 
the categories, he agrees with Hume that the particular rules of nature must be utterly contingent as far as 
we can judge.
5 While Kant presents an “aesthetic” and a “teleological” antinomy, Pluhar argues that there is 
really only one antinomy of the third Critique, much in the same way as there is only one antinomy of the 
first Critique though it has four aspects. I am inclined to agree with him. See: Pluhar, pp. xciii-xciv in 
the “Translator’s Introduction” to Critique o f  Judgment, by Immanuel Kant, trans. Werner S. Pluhar 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987).
6 The more traditional interpretation of Kant is that he indicates that an object must be found in 
nature for it to be truly judged beautiful; but this may not be an accurate assessment. See: Theodore Gra- 
cyk, “Art, Nature, and Purposiveness in Kant’s Aesthetic Theory,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth Interna­
tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995). 499- 
507.




p ra c tic a l law s; b u t  th e s e  c a rry  a n  in te re s t  w ith  th e m , w h ile  none is  co n n ec ted  
w ith  p u re  ju d g m e n ts  o f  ta s te ) .”7 K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e re  is  no concept 
a v a ila b le  to u se  fo r th e  ju d g m e n t t h a t  so m eth in g  is  b e a u tifu l.
H ow ever, th o u g h  th is  is  a  ju d g m e n t o f ta s te , K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  i t  
is  e sse n tia l to  th e  ju d g m e n t t h a t  so m e th in g  is  b e a u tifu l to  say  n o t only  t h a t  
w e, ourselves, f in d  th e  object b e a u tifu l, b u t th a t  everyone  e lse  sh o u ld  ju d g e  
th e  sam e  w ay. W e w a n t  to  sa y  t h a t  everyone sh o u ld  f in d  th is  object b e a u t i ­
fu l, “for he  m u s t  n o t c a ll i t  beautiful i f  [he m eans] o n ly  [th a t]  he lik es  it.
M a n y  th in g s  m ay  be  c h a rm in g  a n d  ag reeab le  to  h im ; no  one cares ab o u t th a t .  
B u t  i f  h e  p rocla im s so m e th in g  to  b e  b e au tifu l, th e n  h e  req u ire s  th e  sam e  
l ik in g  from  o th e rs ...”8 T h u s , K a n t  say s , such  a  ju d g m e n t resem bles a  log ical 
ju d g m e n t of a t t r ib u t in g  th e  p re d ic a te  o f “b eau tifu l” to  a n  object. B u t th is  
c a n n o t be  w h a t w e a re  doing, s in ce  w e w ould  h av e  to  u se  a  concept fo r su c h  
p red ica tio n , a n d  no  co n cep t is  av a ila b le . T h is ra is e s  th e  problem , th en , o f 
ju s t  how  i t  is  t h a t  w e c a n  m a k e  su c h  a  u n iv e rsa l ju d g m e n t w ith o u t a p p e a lin g  
to  a  concept.
W h at is  th e  n a tu r e  o f th is  p le a su re  th a t  g ives r ise  to  th e  (u n iv ersa l) 
ju d g m e n t of ta s te ?  K a n t  e x p la in s  i t  a s  follows: i f  w e c a n n o t appea l to  con­
cep ts , th e n  th e  b a s is  o f  su c h  a  ju d g m e n t
can be nothing o ther th an  the m ental sta te  th a t we find in the relation be­
tween the p resentational powers [imagination and understanding] insofar as 
they refer a given presentation  to cognition in general. When this happens, 
the  cognitive powers brought into play by this p resentation  are in free play, 
because no determ inate concept restricts them  to a particu lar rule of cognition. 
Hence the m ental s ta te  in this presentation m ust be a feeling, accompanying 
the given presentation, of a  fine play of the presentational powers directed to 
cognition in general.9
7 p. 54 = Ak. 211-2.
8 pp. 55-6 = Ak. 212-3.
9 pp. 61-2 = Ak. 217.
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T h is  free  p la y  o f th e  facu lties  is  a  “q u ick en in g  of th e  tw o p o w ers  (im ag in a tio n  
a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g )  to a n  ac tiv ity  t h a t  is  in d e te rm in a te  b u t, a s  a  r e s u l t  o f th e  
p ro m p tin g  o f th e  given p re se n ta tio n , n o n e th e le ss  accordan t: th e  ac tiv ity  re ­
q u ire d  fo r cognition  in  g en era l.”10 W e c a n n o t de te rm ine  a h e a d  o f  tim e  th a t  
a n y  p a r t ic u la r  object m ig h t c a u se  su c h  a  free  p lay  o r q u ick e n in g  w h ich  th e n  
w ould  c a u se  a  fee ling  o f p le a su re  in  u s . T h is  free  p lay  is  th e  p le a s u re  w e feel 
w h e n  o u r  tw o  facu ltie s  of im a g in a tio n  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a re  in  h a rm o n y .
H ence, w h a t we receive a  fee lin g  o f p lea su re  from  a re  th e  cond itions 
w h ich  m a k e  possib le  th e  ab ility  to  m a k e  ju d g m en ts  at all. W ith  th e  b e a u ti­
fu l, w e a re  m a k in g  a  ju d g m e n t a b o u t o u r  ab ility  to  ju d g e . R eca ll th a t ,  accord­
in g  to  K a n t, a  ju d g m e n t is a  su b su m p tio n  o f a  p a rtic u la r  u n d e r  a  u n iv e rsa l. 
T he  u n d e rs ta n d in g  prov ides th e  u n iv e rsa l, in  te rm s of th e  ca teg o rie s , ju d g ­
m e n t su b su m e s  a  p a rtic u la r  u n d e r  th e  u n iv e rsa l, a n d  th e n  re a s o n  d raw s th e  
log ical co n c lu sio n s.11 B u t in  o rd e r  to  m a k e  su ch  ju d g m en ts  a t  a ll, th e re  m u s t 
be  th e  a b ility  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  to  g ive law s to th e  in tu i te d  m an ifo ld , a n d  
th u s  a  h a rm o n y  betw een  th e  p o w ers  o f im ag in a tio n  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  is  
n eeded . A  b e a u tifu l th in g  is  so m e th in g  w h ich  is  p a rtic u la rly  good a t  a llow ­
in g  fo r th e  h a rm o n y  of th ese  tw o p ow ers. T h u s  we ju d g e  n o t t h a t  th e  object is 
b e a u tifu l, a s  i f  b e a u ty  w ere  a  p re d ic a te , b u t  w e judge  th a t  th is  p a r t ic u la r  ob­
jec t g ives r is e  to  th e  free  p lay  o f th e  cogn itive  facu lties, a n d  s in c e  a ll  su ch  
fa c u ltie s  o f h u m a n  beings m u s t  n e c e ssa rily  b e  th e  sa m e ,12 w e a lso  ju d g e  th a t  
th e  object m u s t  be  ju d g ed  a s  b e a u tifu l  b y  a ll  people. T h is is  a  u n iv e rs a l  
ju d g m e n t, b u t  on ly  a  sub jective  one, a n d  n o t a n  objective one.
10 p. 63 = Ak. 219.
11 This may be a quite general judgment about cause and effect, in accordance with the a priori 
categories of the understanding, or an even more specific judgment, using empirical concepts of the un­
derstanding, such as, ‘This is a dog.” In this case, the judgment subsumes a particular manifestation of 
the manifold (taken up through intuition and schematized by the imagination) under the empirical con­
cept of “dog,” given by the understanding. Reason then draws the necessary conclusion.
12 This is argued for in the first Critique.




T h is  is  how  th e  an tin o m y  sh a p e s  up  in  “P a r t  O ne” o f th e  th ird  
Critique, n a m e ly  th e  q u estio n  o f ho w  i t  is  t h a t  w e c a n  reconcile  th e  d isp a ra te  
c la im s th a t  a  ju d g m e n t of b e a u ty  is  a  ju d g m e n t o f  ta s te  m ad e  w ith o u t 
concep ts  a n d  y e t t h a t  i t  is  a  ju d g m e n t t h a t  is  u n iv e rsa l. B u t th is  so lu tio n  is  
n o t y e t a d e q u a te , fo r in  o rd e r to  p ro p e rly  solve th is  an tin o m y , K a n t b rin g s  in  
th e  concep t o f “p u rp o s iv e n ess ,” a n d  th is  e v e n tu a lly  le a d s  h im  to h is  
d iscu ss io n s  o f o rg an ism s in  “P a r t  Tw o.” In  m a k in g  a  ju d g m e n t th a t  
so m e th in g  is  b e a u tifu l, we ju d g e  t h a t  th e  th in g  h a s  “p u rp o siv en ess ,” n a m e ly  
th e  p u rp o s iv e n ess  o f b e in g  ab le  to be  in tu i te d  a n d  th e n  ta k e n  up  by th e  
im a g in a tio n , a n d  a lso  to  be  o rg an iz ed  acco rd ing  to  th e  concepts o f th e  
u n d e rs ta n d in g . T h is  is  n o t a  p u rp o s iv e n ess  t h a t  is  for so m e th in g  p a r tic u la r , 
no t, say , fo r th e  p u rp o se  o f p ro v id in g  n o u r ish m e n t fo r a n im a ls  or for th e  
p u rp o se  o f fly ing . I t  is  w h a t K a n t c a lls  “p u rp o siv e n ess  w ith o u t a p u rp o se .”
B u t  th e  q u es tio n  a rise s  a g a in , “W hy sh o u ld  th is  be?” W hy sh o u ld  
th e re  be  objects in  n a tu re  w h ich  a re  p a r t ic u la r ly  w ell s u ite d  for h u m a n  cog­
n itio n ?  T h e  on ly  w ay  th a t  w e can  ju d g e  th e se  ob jects is  to  judge  th a t  th e y  
h a v e  th e  p u rp o s iv e n ess  of being able to be judged by human cognition,13 W e 
ju d g e  th a t  a n  object is  b e a u tifu l b ecau se  of i ts  su b jec tiv e  pu rposiveness, a n d  
ju d g e  th a t  o th e rs  sh o u ld  ju d g e  th e  sa m e  w ay  b ecau se  o f th e  u n iv e rsa lity  o f 
h u m a n  cognition .
W e sh o u ld  be  qu ick  to  add , how ever, th a t  K a n t  in te n d s  th is  to  be  a  
re g u la tiv e  a n d  reflec tive  p rin c ip le  o f ju d g m e n t a n d  n o t a  co n stitu tiv e  o r d e ­
te rm in a te  one. K a n t  concludes th a t  th e re  is, f in a lly , no  w ay  th a t  we cou ld  
p o ss ib ly  k now  w h e th e r  so m eth in g  in  n a tu re  cou ld  b e  c a u se d  a n d  e x p la in ed  
th ro u g h  a n  e n tire ly  p h y sio -m ech an ica l account:
13 As Pluhar summarizes: “the principle of judgment is the assumption that nature manifests a 
cognizable order not only in its (transcendental and metaphysical) universal laws (which are based on the 
categories) but in terms of its particular (and contingent) laws as well: Nature makes its universal laws 
specific (Ak. 186) in such a way that the particular laws will not be too ‘heterogeneous’ (Ak. 180) for us 
to have coherent experience even in terms of them (Ak. 180)” (p. Mi).
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natu re  shows in all of its free formations a g rea t mechanical tendency to pro­
duce forms th a t seem made, as it were, for the  aesthetic employment of our 
power of judgment; and  na tu re  gives us no grounds whatever for supposing 
th a t  [the production of such forms] requires anyth ing  more th an  n a tu re ’s 
m echanism ...14
In  th e  f in a l  a n a ly s is , i t  is  n o t  p o ss ib le  for u s  a s  h u m a n  b e in g s  w ith  on ly  o u r 
l im ite d  ca teg o ries  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  to  ev er conc lude  w h e th e r  so m e th in g  
is  p o ss ib le  on ly  th ro u g h  m e c h a n ic a l law s, o r w h e th e r  a  concept is  n e ed e d  fo r 
i ts  fo rm a tio n .15 We a re  n o t a llo w ed  to sa y  t h a t  n a tu r e ’s  p u rp o siv en ess  w ith ­
o u t a  p u rp o se  h a s  b een  g iven  to  u s  a s  specifically  d e s ig n ed  fo r ou r possib le  
cogn ition , o r w h e th e r  th is  is  a  h a p p y  coincidence. W e c a n n o t say  th a t  b e a u ti­
fu l ob jec ts  h a v e  been  p re s e n te d  to  h u m a n  b e in g s fo r  th e  p u rp o se  o f c a u s in g  
th e  fre e  p la y  o f th e  fac u ltie s . W e c a n  only  ju d g e  t h a t  su c h  objects a p p e a r  to  
u s  as i f  they  w ere  so d e s ig n e d ,16 b u t  th is  is  on ly  a  p r in c ip le  w hich  w e n e e d  fo r 
th e  c o rre c t ju d g in g  o f objects o f b e au ty , for a  u n iv e rs a l  b u t  sub jective  ju d g ­
m e n t.
T h e  a n tin o m y  of th e  f i r s t  p a r t  of th e  Critique is  s t i ll  n o t q u ite  a d e ­
q u a te ly  solved, how ever, w ith o u t th e  fu ll e x p la n a tio n  g iven  in  “P a r t  Two.” 
T h is  is  b e ca u se  th e  so lu tio n  to  th e  an tin o m y  o f “P a r t  O n e” involved  th e  in d e ­
te rm in a te  concept o f n a tu re ’s  p u rp o siv en ess  w ith o u t a  p u rp o se . B u t w e see 
ev en  h e re  t h a t  w e a re  n o t a b le  to  sa y  w h e th e r  n a tu r e  is  ab le  to  cau se  su ch  
p u rp o s iv e n e ss  th ro u g h  m ec h an ism  only, o r w h e th e r  a  concept is tru ly  in ­
volved. In  fac t, w e w ill n e v e r be  a b le  to  m ak e  su c h  a  ju d g m e n t, for w e w ill 
n e v e r  g e t b eyond  th e  cogn itive  l im its  se t by  th e  f i r s t  Critique. B u t th is  s till
14 p. 222 = Ak. 348.
15 “It is however quite undetermined, and for our reason forever indeterminable, how much the 
mechanism of nature does as a means toward each final intention in nature” (p. 300 = Ak. 414-5). More 
on this below.
16 “The diverse rules whose unity... arouses this admiration are one and all synthetic and do not 
follow from a concept of the object, e.g., that of a circle, but these rules require that this object is given in 
intuition. But that makes it seem as if the rule of this unity had an empirical basis outside us and distinct 
from our presentational power... and hence possible only through a purpose that aimed expressly at this 
harmony [of imagination and understanding]” (p. 242 = Ak. 364-5).
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leaves u s  th e  a n tin o m y  th a t  w e a re  n o t  ab le  to  t h in k  of such  a  p u rp o s iv e n e ss  
in  n a tu re , b ecau se , a s  fa r  a s  w e c a n  see , su c h  a  o rd e rin g  o f th e  p a r t ic u la r  is  
com plete ly  c o n tin g e n t. We a re  sa y in g  both t h a t  th e  p a r t ic u la r  is  co n tin g en t, 
a n d  th a t  i t  is  n ecessa ry ; i t  is  c o n tin g e n t b e ca u se  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  c a n n o t 
conceive o f th e  p a r t ic u la r  a s  b e in g  n e c e ss ita te d , a n d  n ecessa ry  b ecau se  o f  th e  
sub jec tive  b u t  u n iv e rs a l  ju d g m e n t t h a t  is  m a d e  a b o u t th e  b e au tifu l. C o n tin ­
gency o f th e  p a r t ic u la r  im p lies p h y sio -m ec h an ica l c au sa lity , w hile  n e c e ss ity  
o f th e  p a r t ic u la r  im p lie s  p u rp o siv e  c a u sa lity . T h is  is  th e  re a l  a n tin o m y  o f  th e  
th ird  Critique.
S u c h  a n  an tin o m y  is  n o t s im p ly  so lvab le  b y  ch an g in g  th e  once c o n s ti­
tu tiv e  p rin c ip le  o f (m echan ica l) c a u s a lity  in to  a  reg u la tiv e  p rin c ip le , a n d  th u s  
c a llin g  teleo logy  a n d  m ech an ica l c a u s a lity  m ere ly  reg u la tiv e , fo r w e a re  s t i l l  
le f t w ith  com ple te ly  a n ti th e tic a l  a s se r tio n s  a b o u t one a n d  th e  sa m e  p re s e n ­
ta tio n  a s  re g a rd s  i ts  c a u sa lity .17 “C o n tingency” i ts e l f  im p lies th e  fa c t t h a t  w e 
a re  forced to conceive o f  n a tu re  in  te rm s  o f p h y sio -m ech an ica l law s, w h ile  
“p u rp o s iv e n ess” im p lie s  th a t  w e m u s t  th in k  in  te rm s  o f p u rposive  c a u sa lity . 
T h u s  w e n e e d  a  so lu tio n  w hich  a llow s u s  to  cognize th e  p oss ib ility  o f su c h  a  
n e c e ss ita te d  con tingency , m u ch  in  th e  sa m e  w ay  t h a t  we n eed ed  a  so lu tio n  to 
th e  a n tin o m y  o f freed o m  a n d  c a u sa lity  w h ich  a llow ed  u s  to  u n d e rs ta n d  how  
b o th  cou ld  b e  a s s e r te d  to  coexist.
T h is  p ro b lem  is  b ro u g h t to  th e  fo re  in  “P a r t  Two” o f th e  book, w h e re  
K a n t m oves from  p re s e n ta tio n s  w h ich  a re  b e a u tifu l, to  th e  p re s e n ta tio n  o f 
o rg an ism s. O rg a n ism s  a re  th o se  ob jec ts in  n a tu r e  w hich  a re  “self­
o rg a n iz in g ” ob jects w h ich  h a v e  th e  p e c u lia r ity  o f h a v in g  each  of th e  p a r t s  
se rv in g  fo r th e  p u rp o se  of th e  w hole, i.e ., w h e re  th e  concept o f th e  w hole  d ic­
ta te s  w h a t th e  d es ig n  o f each  o f th e  p a r t s  m u s t  be. K a n t ca lls  th is  a  “n a tu r a l  
pu rp o se :” “a  th in g  e x is ts  as a  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se  i f  i t  is  both cause and effect o f
1 This point will become clearer below.
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itself...”18 H e re  w e en co u n te r n a tu re  a s  n o t on ly  o rganized , b u t self­
o rg an ized . H e re  w e seem  to  ju d g e  c e r ta in  ob jec ts a s  h a v in g  pu rp o siv en ess 
w ith  specific  p u rp o ses , a n d  h ence  w e e n c o u n te r  “n a tu r a l  p u rposes” o v er a n d  
above th e  “sub jec tive  pu rp o siv en ess .” W hen  re a so n  en co u n ters  such  a n  ob­
ject, i t  a tte m p ts  to  com prehend  th e  fo rm atio n  o f  th is  object, a n d  i ts  n ecessity . 
B u t w h a t  i t  concludes is  th a t ,  in  th e  case  o f o rg an ism s, th e ir  fo rm ation  is  so 
u t te r ly  co n tin g en t, t h a t  “th a t  v e ry  con tingency  o f th e  th in g ’s  form  is  a  b a s is  
for r e g a rd in g  th e  p ro d u c t a s  i f  i t  h a d  com e a b o u t th ro u g h  a  c au sa lity  t h a t  
only  re a s o n  c a n  h a v e .”19 Yet, fo r su ch  a  th in g  to  be  a  natural pu rpose , a  se lf­
o rg a n iz in g  o rg an ism  fo u n d  in  n a tu re , w e m u s t  a lso  ju d g e  th a t  “i t  is  to  be  
p o ss ib le  on ly  a s  a  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se  [per se], w ith o u t th e  cau sa lity  of concep ts, 
w h ich  ra t io n a l  b e in g s ou tside  i t  h a v e .”20 In  c a llin g  so m eth ing  a  n a tu r a l  p u r ­
pose, w e  m u s t  sa y  th a t  w hile  i t  a p p e a rs  to  h a v e  b een  cau sed  according  to  a 
concep t, w e know  th a t  n a tu re  i ts e lf  c a n  only o p e ra te  by  m echan ica l c au sa lity , 
a n d  th u s  w e m u s t  ju d g e  th a t ,  th o u g h  i t  is  u t te r ly  co n tingen t, som ehow  th e  
p a r ts  a l l  a c t to g e th e r  th ro u g h  m ech an ica l c a u sa lity  in  o rder to form  th e  
w hole.21 O th e rw ise  i t  w ould  be a n  u n -n a tu ra l  p u rp o se , a n  object o rg an ized  
acco rd ing  to  a  concept. T hus, w e see how  th e  an tin o m y  w hich developed  in  
th e  e n c o u n te r  w ith  b e a u ty  (subjective p u rp o siv en ess) is  in ten sified  in  th e  e n ­
c o u n te r  w ith  o rg an ism s (n a tu ra l  pu rposes).
A ga in , th e  prob lem  is  th a t  w e a re  u n a b le  to  ju d g e  w h e th e r or n o t  i t  is  
possib le  fo r th e  o rg an ism s to h av e  com e a b o u t by  m ere  m echanism . O n  th e  
one h a n d , “i t  is  q u ite  c e r ta in  th a t  in  te rm s  o f m ere ly  m echan ica l p rin c ip le s  of 
n a tu re  w e c a n n o t even  a d eq u a te ly  becom e fa m ilia r  w ith , m uch less ex p la in , 
o rg an iz ed  b e in g s  a n d  how  th ey  a re  in te rn a lly  possib le .”22 Indeed, K a n t o ften
18 p. 249 = Ak. 371.
19 p. 248 = Ak. 370.
20 p. 252 = Ak. 373.
21 p. 252 = Ak. 373 and p. 254 = Ak. 374-5.
22 p. 282 = Ak. 400.
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sp e ak s  a s  th o u g h  w e n eed  a  te leo log ica l p rin c ip le  even  fo r th e  very  cognition  
o f such  o rg an ism s .23 O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , g iven th e  n a tu r e  o f  o u r  d iscursive  
u n d e rs ta n d in g , n e ith e r  can  w e sa y  t h a t  i t  w ould be  im p o ssib le  for n a tu re  to 
se lf-o rgan ize  u s in g  o n ly  m ech an ica l c au sa lity :
it would also be too presum ptuous for us to judge tha t, supposing we could 
penetra te  to the  principle in term s of which natu re  m ade the  fam iliar univer­
sal laws of na tu re  specific, there simply could not be in n a tu re  a  hidden basis 
adequate to m ake organized beings possible w ithout an  underlying intention 
(but through the mere m echanism  of nature).24
In  effect, w e s im p ly  c an n o t ju d g e  w h e th e r  such  c a u sa tio n  m ig h t be  possib le  
w ith o u t a n  accom pany ing  concept.
T h e  on ly  w ay  o u t of th is  a n tin o m y  is  to a p p e a l to  th e  su p e rsen s ib le  
in  o rd er to  th in k  o f n a tu re  i ts e l f  a s  b e in g  created by  som e a u th o r . B u t we 
m u s t th in k  o f th is  in te llig en ce  a s  o rg a n iz in g  n a tu re  u s in g  o n ly  m echan ica l 
c a u sa lity  to  ach ieve  th e  p u rp o ses w h ich  w e encoun ter; h en ce , “how ever ra s h  
a n d  im p ro v ab le  i t  w o u ld  be for determinative judgment,” in  o rd e r  to  reso lve 
th e  an tin o m y , w e m u s t  n o n e th e le ss  “th in k  a  c a u sa lity  d is tin c t from  m echa­
n ism  — viz., th e  c a u sa lity  of a n  (in te llig en t)  w orld  cau se  t h a t  a c ts  according  
to  p u rp o ses .”25 T h u s , th e  an tin o m y  is  reso lved  b ecau se  w e ju d g e  b o th  th a t  
n a tu re  i ts e l f  a c ts  on ly  m echan ica lly , a n d  t h a t  n a tu re  h a s  b e e n  c re a te d  w ith  
p u rp o se s  in  m in d . L e t u s  exam ine  th is  m ore  thorough ly .
To b e g in  w ith , reason , by  n a tu r e  o f i ts  desire  a lw ay s to  f in d  th e  u n ­
cond itioned , is  n a tu ra l ly  m oved to  th o u g h ts  of th e  su p e rse n s ib le  in  th e  hopes 
of f in d in g  a  su ffic ien t cause  fo r n a tu r e  lo ca ted  in  th is  s u b s tr a te  o f n a tu re .
23 See: p. 254 = Ak. 375, 263 = Ak. 383, 266 = Ak. 385, 266-7 = Ak. 386, 281 = Ak. 398, 
297-8 = Ak. 412-3, 308 = Ak. 421-2, and 313 = Ak. 426.
24 p. 283 = Ak. 400.
25 p. 269 = Ak. 389. “[T\he peculiar character o f my cognitive powers is such that the only 
way I can judge [how] those things are possible and produced is by conceiving, [to account] for this pro­
duction, a cause that acts according to intentions, and hence a being that produces [things] in a way 
analogous to the causality of an understanding" (p. 280 = Ak. 397-8).
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R easo n  f in d s  a  n a tu r a l  analogy  b e tw ee n  th e  o rg a n is m s  in  n a tu r e  a n d  th e  
ob jects t h a t  i t  i ts e lf  p roduces: b o th  g e o m e trica l objects, w h ic h  i t  p ro d u ces  ab ­
s tra c tly  in  accordance  w ith  a  concept, a n d  w ith  m ore te c h n ic a l ob jects su ch  as 
w a tch es , w h e re  th e  p a r t s  m u s t a ll w o rk  to g e th e r  fo r th e  w hole , a  w hole  w hich  
com es a b o u t on ly  b e ca u se  of a n  a n te c e d e n t concept. R easo n  h a s  a  w ill, a n d  
can  (a t  l e a s t  a tte m p t to) cau se  n a tu r e  to  coincide w ith  i ts  w ill. H en ce  th e re  is  
a  n a tu r a l  an a lo g y  b e tw een  su ch  p ro d u c in g  a n d  w illing  on  o ne  s id e  a n d  th e  
concep t o f a n  in te llig e n t  a u th o r  of th e  w o rld  on  th e  o th e r. R e aso n  c a n  th in k  
of th e  in te llig e n c e  b e h in d  n a tu re  a s  b e in g  lik e  itself, w illin g  n a tu r e  to  a c t in  
acco rdance  w ith  concepts, a n d  u til iz in g  n a tu r e  th ro u g h  m e c h a n ic a l law s.
T h is  is , o f  co u rse , on ly  a  reg u la tiv e  p r in c ip le .26
T h o u g h  such  a n  id e a  is  n a tu r a l  fo r reaso n , i t  does n o t  y e t p rec ise ly  
solve th e  an tin o m y , fo r  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  s t i l l  sees p a r t ic u la r  em p iric a l law s 
a n d  o rg a n ism s  a s  co n tin g en t. T he  u n d e rs ta n d in g , g iven  o n ly  th e  ca tego ries 
fo r th e  co g n itio n  o f n a tu re ,  c an n o t cogn ize  a  n a tu re  t h a t  c o u ld  o rg an ize  i ts e lf  
by  a n y  o th e r  m ea n s  th a n  p h y sio -m ech an ica l c au sa tio n . A  f in a l  co m p o n en t is  
n eeded , n a m e ly  th e  n o tio n  th a t  th e  in te l l ig e n t  a u th o r  o f th e  w o rld  m a k e s  or 
in tu i t s  su c h  co n tin g en c ies  a s  necessities. K a n t  a rg u es  t h a t  “th e  d is tin g u ish ­
in g  f e a tu re  o f  th e  id e a  o f a  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se  concerns a  p e c u lia r i ty  o f our 
(h u m an ) u n d e rs ta n d in g  in  re la tio n  to  th e  p o w er of ju d g m e n t a n d  i ts  reflec­
tio n  on  th in g s  in  n a tu re .”27 T h is is  a n  e x tre m e ly  im p o rta n t p o in t. W h a t i t  
in d ic a te s  is  th a t ,  for K a n t, th e  p ro b lem  o f “n a tu r a l  p u rp o se s” only arises in 
the first place fo r a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  w h ic h  is  lik e  ours, b e c a u se  on ly  w ith  th is  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  is  th e re  th e  p rob lem  o f  a n  em p irica l o rg a n iz a tio n  w h ich  is  u t ­
te r ly  c o n tin g e n t a s  f a r  a s  w e c a n  te ll. W e h a v e  only th e  c a teg o rie s  o f th e  u n ­
d e rs ta n d in g  to  c o n s titu te  n a tu re , a n d , in  fac t, th is  is  w h a t n a tu r e  is for u s, 
n a tu r e  a s  a p p e a ra n c e  b ecau se  i t  h a s  a lre a d y  b een  in tu i te d  a n d  le g is la te d  to
26 See Section Two below.
27 p. 289 = Ak. 405.
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by th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g . A nd th is  u n d e rs ta n d in g  c a n n o t give a n y  re a so n  w hy  
c o n tin g en c ies  sh o u ld  be o rgan ized , or, p a rtic u la rly , be  se lf-o rg an iz in g .28
B u t w h a t  th is  also show s, K a n t  a rg u e s , is  t h a t  th is  co n cep tio n  o f  o u r 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  a lre a d y  in d ic a te s  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f a  d iffe ren t u n d e rs ta n d in g :
But if  th a t  is so, [namely, the peculiarity  of our understanding,] th en  we m ust 
here be presupposing the idea o f some possible understanding  different from 
the hum an  one... Only by presupposing th is idea can we say th a t  because of 
the special character of our understand ing  must we consider certa in  n a tu ra l 
products, as to [how] they are possible, as having been produced intentionally 
and as purposes.29
T h is  is  th e  id e a  of a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  w h ich  is  d iffe ren t from  o u rs , th e  id e a  of 
a  n o n -d isc u rs iv e  in te lligence . W h e re a s  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  is  o n ly  rec ep tiv e  
to  in tu it io n s , th is  o th e r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  w o u ld  a c tu a lly  be sp o n ta n e o u s , n o t 
w o rk in g  from  on ly  u n iv e rsa l a priori ca teg o ries . W e can  th in k  o f  a n  in te l l i ­
gence fo r w h ic h  i t  w ou ld  be n e c e ssa ry  fo r th e  p a r t ic u la r  law s  o f n a tu r e  to  be  
o rg a n iz e d  su c h  th a t  w e can  c o m p re h en d  th e m  th ro u g h  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n  
e v e n t w h ich  w ill a lw ay s rem ain c o n tin g e n t fo r us, a n d  w h ich  w e  c a n  
“conceive of... on ly  a s  m ed ia te d  b y  p u rp o se s .”30 S uch  a n  in te llig e n c e  is
not discursive b u t intuitive, and hence proceeds from the synthetically univer­
sal (the intuition  of a whole as a  whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole 
to the  parts . Hence such an  understand ing  as well as its  p resen ta tion  of the 
whole has no contingency in the com bination of the parts in order to m ake a 
determ inate form of the whole possible.31
O u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  c a n  only p reced e  from  th e  p a r ts  to  th e  w hole , v iew in g  
su c h  w ho les a s  “consequences.”32
28 “So what matters here is how our understanding relates to judgment: we must find in this 
relation a certain contingency in the character of our understanding, so that we can take note of this pecu­
liarity as what distinguishes our understanding from other possible ones” (p. 290 = Ak. 406).
29 p. 289 = Ak. 405.
30 p. 291 = Ak. 407.
31 p. 291= Ak. 407.
32 p. 292 = Ak. 407.




B u t a  non -d iscu rsive  in te llig en ce  w ou ld  th in k  th e  w hole a s  a  whole, 
a n d  th u s  e lim in a te  th e  con tingenc ies o f th e  p a rtic u la r , th o u g h  th e  on ly  w ay 
we c a n  possib ly  ju d g e  su c h  a n  o rg an ized  object in  n a tu re  is  th ro u g h  ju d g ­
m e n t’s  concept o f p u rp o siv en ess , on ly  th ro u g h  th e  id ea  of a  b e in g  u tiliz in g  
concepts. In  o th e r  w ords, w h ile  w e c a n  th in k  of a n  in te lligence  d iffe re n t th a n  
ou rs , w e c a n n o t a c tu a lly  co n cep tu a lize  i t, a n d  th u s  we m u s t s t i l l  th in k  a n d  
ju d g e  in d iv id u a l p re se n ta tio n s  o f n a tu re  a s  i f  th e y  h a d  b een  c a u se d  according  
to  a  p u rp o se ; i t  is  on ly  by  th e  p rin c ip le  o f a  p u rp o se  th a t  w e a re  a b le  to  con­
ceive a n d  ju d g e  such  objects.
T h is , th en , is  th e  f in a l so lu tio n  to  th e  an tinom y. I t  is  n o t  po ssib le  to 
so lve i t  m ere ly  by  re le g a tin g  b o th  ty p es  o f c a u sa lity  (m echan ica l a n d  p u r ­
posive) to  re g u la tiv e  id eas , fo r w e w o u ld  s t i l l  b e  ju d g in g  one a n d  th e  sam e  
object a s  possib le  accord ing  to  e n tire ly  co n trad ic to ry  e x p la n a tio n s . P lu h a r  
e x p la in s  th is  well, so I  w ill quo te  h im  a t  le n g th :
[we judge an object] in term s of m echanism  insofar as the object is a  product of 
nature , in term s of final causes insofar as it  is a  purpose. Now m echanism  in­
volves the necessity implicit in the principle of causality which is based  on the 
categories; on the other hand, we cannot th ink  of an object as a  purpose with­
out thinking of it as contingent, viz., contingent in term s of the universal na tu ­
ra l laws (Ak. 39S).33 Hence it seem s th a t we are judging as both necessary and 
contingent “one and the sam e product” (Ak. 413), indeed, even th e  sam e causal 
connections within th a t product (Ak. 373, and  cf. 372-73). Hence we are con­
tradicting ourselves (Ak. 396) unless we can reconcile the two principles... The 
fact th a t we are using these principles as m ere maxims, as m erely regulative, 
does not resolve the conflict as all: if the concepts th a t the  two m axim s use 
contradict each other, then  we have not even a concept of a  n a tu ra l purpose; 
for the concepts and m axim s will cancel each other, so th a t we shall not be 
“judging” a t all.34
M ere ly  p o s itin g  th e  two concep tions o f c a u sa lity  a s  be ing  re g u la tiv e  does no t 
solve th e  an tinom y . C e rta in ly  th e y  re m a in  re g u la tiv e  for a n y  p o ss ib le  f in a l
33 This is Kant's point, discussed above, that it is only for our peculiar understanding that con­
tingencies of nature are a problem in the first place.
34 p. xc. For Pluhar’s complete discussion, see: pp. lxxxvi-cix. See also especially: pp. 297-8 
= Ak 412-3.
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judgment a s  to  w h e th e r  a  p a r tic u la r  object is  f in a lly  p o ssib le  according  to 
p h y sio -m ech an ica l c au sa tio n , b u t  th is  n e ith e r  reso lv es  th e  an tinom y, n o r 
does i t  change  th e  conclusions o f th e  Critique o f Pure Reason; m ech an ica l 
c a u sa lity  is  s t i l l  c o n stitu tiv e  fo r th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , th o u g h  i t  is re g u la tiv e  for 
ju d g m e n t.
N or is  i t  en o u g h  to th in k  o f a n  in te llig e n t a u th o r  o f th e  w orld  in  a n a l­
ogy w ith  th e  h u m a n  w ill, for w e a re  s ti l l  le f t w ith  th e  p ro b lem  of th e  c o n tin ­
gency  of n a tu re ,  a n d  o f how  to  ju d g e  su ch  o rg an iz ed  objects: a re  th e y  c re a te d  
by  a n  in te llig en ce  a s  a r t ,  th a t  is  to  say , by  a  m e re ly  p u rp o s iv e  cause, o r can  
th e y  be e x p la in e d  th ro u g h  m echan ism ? In  th e  e n d , K a n t  argues, w e m u s t 
conceive o f  n a tu r a l  p u rp o ses  a s  th e  p ro d u c t o f a  n o n -d iscu rs iv e  in te lligence , 
in  w hich  case  w h a t  seem s to u s  as c o n tin g en t is  a c tu a lly  n e c e ss ita te d  by  th e  
w hole , a  w hole o f  w h ich  th is  in te llig en ce  can  conceive w ith o u t b u ild in g  i t  up  
from  th e  p a r ts . W e s t i l l  req u ire  th e  concept o f p u rp o s iv e n ess , how ever, in  o r­
d e r  to  judge, a n d , to  som e ex ten t, even  cognize o rg a n iz e d  a n d  se lf-o rgan ized  
p re se n ta tio n s  o f  n a tu re :
[T]he fact th a t  we present [certain] products of na tu re  as possible only in term s 
of a kind of causality  th a t differs from the causality  of the  natural laws per­
taining to m atte r, namely, the causality of purposes and  final causes, is merely 
a  consequence of the special character of our understanding. Therefore, this 
principle does not pertain  to [how] such things them selves are possible through 
this kind o f production..., bu t pertains only to the way our understanding is 
able to judge them .35
T h is  is  a n  im p o r ta n t  s ta te m e n t. H ere , K a n t is  p o in tin g  to  th e  fac t th a t  th e  
so lu tio n  to  th e  a n tin o m y  is  ac tu a lly  com plete ly  in d e te rm in a te  w hen  w e t ry  to 
conceive o f i t  concre te ly . We c a n  h av e  a b so lu te ly  n o  co n cre te  conception of 
su c h  a  n o n -d iscu rs iv e  in te lligence  excep t to  sa y  h o w  i t  w o u ld  be d iffe ren t a n d  
u n lik e  ours. H ence , w e still n e e d  th e  concept o f p u rp o s iv e n ess , su p p lied  by
35 p. 292 = Ak. 408.
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ju d g m e n t, to ju d g e  o rg an iz ed  p re s e n ta tio n s  o f n a tu re 36. T h is  is  th e  sp e c ia l 
fu n c tio n  o f th e  p o w er o f  ju d g m en t, a n d  w hy  K a n t  th o u g h t a  Critique w as  
n e e d e d  to  beg in  w ith . T h e  only w a y  w e c a n  cognize such  objects is  b y  th in k ­
in g  o f th e m  as c a u se d  fo r  a  p u rp o se .37 T h is  is  how  we m u s t ju d g e  th e m , b u t  
th is  c a n n o t be th e  so lu tio n  to  th e  a n tin o m y  per se.
m.
T h is  su m m a ry  is  im p o r ta n t p r im a r ily  because  i t  p rov ides a  n e c e s sa ry  
b a c k g ro u n d  for th e  n e x t  sev era l c h a p te rs . H ow ever, le t  m e h e re  a n tic ip a te  
th e  a rg u m e n ts  o f  th e se  c h a p te rs , a n d  b rie fly  l is t  som e im p o rta n t p o in ts  to  
k eep  in  m ind . F irs t ,  th e  Critique o f Judgment show s th a t  w e c a n n o t k n o w  
w h e th e r  n a tu re  a c tu a lly  b eh av es te leo log ica lly . T hus, th e  id e a  o f  te leo logy  
re m a in s  reg u la tiv e  w h ile  th e  ca tego ries , in c lu d in g  (physio -m echan ica l) 
c a u sa lity , re m a in  c o n s titu tiv e  o f ex p erien ce . Second, th e  conclusion  t h a t  w e 
m u s t  n e ce ssa rily  ju d g e  in  accord w ith  teleo logy , i.e., we m u s t conceive of 
n a tu r e  as i f  i t  w ere  c re a te d  for a  p u rp o se , a llow s K a n t to  m ak e  a  v e ry  
po w erfu l a rg u m e n t l a t e r  in  th e  th i r d  Critique t h a t  i f  n a tu re  h a s  a  p u rp o se , 
i ts  u l t im a te  p u rp o se  is  to  p rom ote  th e  f le e  (m oral) w illing  of h u m a n  b e in g s . 
T h is , in  tu rn , su p p o rts  th e  no tion  o f  th e  h ig h e s t  good on e a r th . T h ird , K a n t’s 
d iscu ssio n  of b e a u ty  g ives u s  a n  in d ic a tio n , th o u g h  in d ire c t a n d  n e v e r  
c e r ta in , t h a t  n a tu re  w a s  in d ee d  c re a te d  fo r u s . T h a t  is, b ecau se  th e  
c o n tin g e n t often  e x h ib its  law -like  b e h a v io r  a n d  w e experience fee lin g s  o f 
p le a su re , i t  w ou ld  seem  a s  i f  n a tu re  w a s  c re a te d  w ith  th e  specific fa c u ltie s  o f 
h u m a n  b e in g s in  m in d . T hese  im p o r ta n t  p o in ts  w ill allow  fo r th e  p o ss ib ility
36 When we try to reconcile the two types of causality, “since the basis for this reconcilability 
lies in what is neither the one nor the other (neither mechanism nor connection in terms of purposes), but 
is nature’s supersensible substrate that we cannot cognize at all, [it follows that] our (human) reason can­
not fuse these two ways of conceiving how such objects are possible. We can only judge them as based... 
on a supreme understanding...” (pp. 299-300 = Ak. 414).
37 “[W]e must. .. conceive of a different understanding: without as yet attributing any [concept 
of a] purpose to this understanding, we can then present this harmony between the [particular] natural 
laws and our judgment as necessary relative to that understanding, [even though] our own understanding 
can conceive of this harmony only as mediated by purposes” (p. 291 = Ak. 407).
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of m o ra l p ro g ress  a n d  th e  h ig h e s t good on  e a r th , show  w h y  th e  h ig h e s t good 
can  on ly  be  a  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l reaso n , in d ic a te  w hy  p o litica l in s t i tu t io n s  
a re  l in k e d  to  m o ra l p ro g re ss , a n d  show  w hy  a  b e lie f  in  G od is  rationed . W ith  
th is  in  m in d , le t  u s  m ove on  to  th e  n e x t c h a p te r .
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Chapter Six
Limits of Teleology and the First Link between the Natural and Moral World
L
I  th in k  th a t  i t  is  a b so lu te ly  d e a r  in  th e  Critique o f Judgment th a t  th e  
te leo log ica l p rin c ip le  w h ich  w e n eed  fo r th e  ju d g m e n t o f c e r ta in  p re se n ta tio n s  
o f n a tu r e  is  n o t  in  a n y  w ay  th o u g h t by  K a n t  to  be  co n stitu tiv e . K a n t m ak es  
a b u n d a n t  s ta te m e n ts  to th is  fac t. To ex am in e  th is , w e m u s t se p a ra te  t h i s  
c h a p te r  in to  tw o sections. T h e  f irs t  sec tion  w ill d ea l w ith  in tr in s ic  teleology 
a n d  th e  p ro b lem  o f how  to ju d g e  a n  o rg an ism  w hich  is  a  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se .
T h e  te leo log ica l ju d g m e n t a llow s u s to  conceive of th e  p a r ts  o f th e  o rg a n i s m  
a s  o rg a n iz e d  by  th e  w hole. T h e  second sec tion  w ill d ea l w ith  ex trin s ic  o r 
“re la tiv e ” teleology, a n d  th e  p rob lem  o f how  to  ju d g e  th e  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  
d iffe re n t a sp e c ts  o f n a tu re ; “b y  ex trin sic  p u rp o siv en ess  I  m ean  a  p u rp o siv e ­
n e ss  w h e re  one  th in g  o f n a tu re  se rves a n o th e r  a s  a  m e a n s  to a  p u rp o se .”1 
W hile  i t  is  d e a r  t h a t  K a n t in te n d s  such  teleology to fu n c tio n  m ere ly  a s  a  
re g u la tiv e  id ea , K a n t a lso  th in k s  th a t  i t  is  a n  id e a  w hich  is  n o n e th e le ss  to  be 
u sed , a n d  m u s t  b e  ex am in ed  carefu lly , a s  i t  le a d s  u s  to  th in k  of n a tu re  a s  a  
sy s te m  o f p u rp o se s , a n d  to  th in k  of h u m a n  b e in g s  a s  th e  f in a l p u rp o se  o f n a ­
tu re . K a n t’s  d iscussion  o f th e  “u ltim a te ” a n d  “fin a l” p u rp o ses  o f n a tu re  a re  
so m etim es confusing . I  sh a ll  t ry  to  spell o u t th is  a rg u m e n t m ore  d e a r ly , a n  
a rg u m e n t w h ich  seem s to h a v e  been  overlooked in  th e  secondary  m a te r ia l.2 
T he  d iscu ss io n  in  th is  c h a p te r  w ill give u s  th e  n e ce ssa ry  m a te r ia ls  to  solve 
m a n y  o f th e  p ro b lem s w h ich  h a v e  a lre ad y  b e en  in tro d u c ed  in  th is  p a p e r, a s
1 p. 312 = Ak. 425.
2 With the notable exception of: Yirmiahu Yovel. Kant and the Philosophy o f History. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1980).
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w ell as sh e d d in g  lig h t on how  to re a d  K a n t concern ing  teleo logy  a s  a  re g u la ­
tiv e  id ea  a n d  h u m a n  b e in g s  a s  th e  f in a l p u rp o se  of n a tu re . I n  a d d itio n , th e  
d iscussion  o f th e  u ltim a te  a n d  f in a l p u rp o ses o f n a tu re  w ill g ive u s  one of 
th re e  a rg u m e n ts  l in k in g  te leo logy  a n d  m orality , to be  f u r th e r  d isc u sse d  in  
th e  n ex t c h a p te r .
IL
O nly  a  few  sec tions in  th e  Critique m ay  give r is e  to  u n c e r ta in ty  a s  to 
h o w  we a re  to  th in k  o f th e  p u rp o s iv e n ess  o f in d iv id u a l o rg an ism s , th e re b y  
c au s in g  u s  to  q u estio n  th e  s ta tu s  o f physio -m echan ica l e x p la n a tio n s  a s  con­
s ti tu tiv e . T h ese  sec tions occu r w h e re  K a n t sp e ak s  of th e  “su b o rd in a tio n ” of 
m ech an ica l c a u sa lity  to  p u rp o s iv e  cau sa lity . In  section  78, K a n t  w rite s  th a t ,  
concern ing  th e  in a b ility  o f h u m a n  be ings to  reconcile th e  tw o  ty p e s  o f c a u sa l­
ity , “a ll  we c an  do is  su b o rd in a te  th e  one type  of p ro d u c tio n  (m ech an ism ) to 
th e  o th e r (an  in te n tio n a l  techn ic ); th e  tra n sc e n d e n ta l p rin c ip le  o f  th e  p u r ­
posiveness o f n a tu re  c e r ta in ly  p e rm its  th a t .”3 Section  80 i t s e l f  is  tit le d , “O n 
th e  N ecessary  S u b o rd in a tio n  o f th e  P rin c ip le  of M ec h a n ism to  th e  T eleologi­
c a l P rinc ip le  in  E x p la in in g  a  T h in g  [C onsidered] a s  a  N a tu ra l  P u rp o se ,” a n d  
K a n t  w rites th a t ,
in  ju d g in g  th in g s  w h ose  con cep t a s  n atu ra l purposes does u n d ou b ted ly  h ave a 
b a sis  (i.e., in  ju d g in g  o rg a n ized  beings), w e m u st a lw a y s p resu p p ose  som e  
original organ iza tion  th a t  it s e l f  uses m echanism , e ith er  to produce o th er  or­
gan ized  form s or to  develop  th e  th in g ’s  ow n organ ized  form  in to  n ew  sh apes  
(though th ese  sh a p e s  too a lw a y s  resu lt from th e purpose an d  conform  to  it).4
T h ese  s ta te m e n ts  a n d  o th e rs  lik e  i t  seem  to  in d ica te  th e  p o ss ib ility  b o th  th a t  
m ech an ica l c a u sa lity  is  to  b e  re le g a te d  to th e  position  o f on ly  a  re g u la tiv e  
p rin c ip le , a n d  t h a t  i t  is  a lso  n o t  even  th e  p re fe rre d  reg u la tiv e  p rin c ip le  of 
ex p lan a tio n , b e in g  in fe rio r  to  a  pu rposive  ex p lan a tio n .
3 p. 299 = Ak. 414.
4 p. 304 = Ak. 418. Italics added for emphasis.
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W hy sh o u ld  i t  seem  th is  w ay? To p u t  i t  b riefly , th e  re a so n  fo r th e  
su b o rd in a tio n  h a s  to do w ith  th e  a n sw e r  to th e  a n tin o m y  o f te leo log ica l 
ju d g m e n t, d isc u sse d  in  th e  c h a p te r  above. G iven  t h a t  th e  a n tin o m y  c a n  on ly  
be  so lved  by  a p p e a lin g  to  th e  su p e rse n s ib le  in  o rd e r  to  reconcile  th e  tw o ty p es  
o f c a u sa lity , a n d  g iven  t h a t  h u m a n  b e in g s  c an n o t conceive of th e  su p e rs e n ­
sib le  ex cep t to  th in k  o f a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  w hich  is  n o n -d iscu rs iv e  a n d  w h ich  
w e c a n  on ly  ju d g e  by  th in k in g  o f i t  a s  u s in g  m ec h an ism  fo r i ts  p u rp o se s , th e n  
p u rp o s iv e  c a u sa lity  becom es m ore  im p o rta n t th a n  m ech an is tic  c a u s a lity  for 
judgment.5 P u rp o s iv e  c a u sa lity  is  im p o rta n t becau se , a s  w e sa w  above, d u e  
to  th e  p e c u lia r ity  o f h u m a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  w e m u s t ju d g e  o rg an ism s  as i f  
th e y  w ere  c re a te d  in  acco rd  w ith  a  concept, fo r w e c a n  conceive o f  b o th  s u b ­
jec tive  p u rp o s iv e n ess  a n d  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se s  in  no  o th e r  w ay. In  o th e r  w ords,
we m ust keep to the  above principle of teleology — viz., the principle th a t, in 
view of the  character of hum an understanding, the only cause th a t  can be as­
sum ed [in order to account] for the possibility of organic beings in n a tu re  is a 
cause th a t  acts intentionally, and  th a t the m ere mechanism of n a tu re  cannot 
a t  all suffice to explain these products of nature. B ut we are no t try ing to use 
th is principle to decide any th ing  about how such things them selves are possi­
ble.6
W h a t K a n t  concludes a b o u t th e  su b o rd in a tio n  o f m ech an ica l to  te leo log ica l 
c a u sa lity  is  t h a t  i t  is  n e c e ssa ry  in  o rd e r  to  m ak e  a  ju d g m e n t a b o u t n a tu r a l  
p u rp o ses .
W hen  i t  com es to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f w h a t ro le  th is  p rin c ip le  sh o u ld  p la y  
in  th e  in v e s tig a tio n  of n a tu r e  a s  a  science, K a n t’s a n sw e r does n o t  s t r a y  from  
th e  f i r s t  Critique. T h u s , K a n t  w rite s , “w ith o u t m ec h an ism  w e c a n n o t g a in  
in s ig h t  in to  th e  n a tu re  o f  th in g s . E v en  i f  i t  w ere  g ra n te d  th a t  a  su p re m e  a r ­
ch itec t d irec tly  c re a te d  th e  fo rm s o f n a tu re  as th e y  h a v e  a lw ays b een ... s t i l l
5 Specifically, for the judgment about how the existence of an organism is possible.
6 p. 298 = Ak. 413.
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n o n e  o f th is  ad v an c es  ou r cogn ition  o f n a tu r e  in  th e  le a s t . . .”7 In  sec tion  79, 
K a n t  a d d re s s e s  th e  q u estio n  specifica lly , a n d  s ta te s  q u ite  d e fin itiv e ly  th a t ,
n a tu ra l science requires determ inative and  not m erely reflective principles in 
o rder to indicate objective bases for n a tu ra l effects. Indeed, since the  theory of 
n a tu re  explains na tu ra l phenom ena in  m echanical term s, through their effi­
cient causes, there would be no advan tage  for it if we considered them  accord­
ing to... purposes... [Purposive explanations give] us no inform ation w hatever 
about the  origin and  inner possibility o f these forms, while th a t  is exactly w hat 
theoretical n a tu ra l science is concerned w ith.8
K a n t  m a k e s  th e  d is tin c tio n  b e tw e e n  th e  p rin c ip le  o f teleo logy  a s  i t  is  n eed ed  
fo r ju d g m e n t, a n d  a s  i t  is  n e e d e d  fo r  sp e c u la tiv e  science a n d  ph ilo sophy . T he  
p r in c ip le  o f  te leo logy  is  n e ce ssa ry  fo r  th e  so lu tio n  o f th e  an tin o m y , b u t  th is  
p r in c ip le  s a y s  on ly  th a t  reco n c ilia tio n  is  p o ss ib le  w ith  th e  su p e rse n s ib le . 
W hen  i t  com es to  a n  a c tu a l e x p la n a tio n  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  w ork ings 
o f n a tu re ,  a ll  w e h a v e  a re  in tu it io n  a n d  th e  ca teg o ries  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g . 
H ence , w e a re  le f t  w ith  a  s im ila r  s i tu a t io n  as  a t  th e  e n d  o f  th e  Critique of 
Pure Reason.
A s in  th e  f i r s t  Critique, K a n t  h e re  s tre s se s  th e  n e e d  fo r teleo logy as  
a n  a id  to  n a tu r a l  in v es tig a tio n . A g a in , h ow ever, K a n t c la im s t h a t  i f  teleology 
is  a s su m e d  fro m  th e  b e g in n in g  to  b e  c o n s titu tiv e  in s te a d  o f re g u la tiv e , su ch  a  
p rin c ip le  w o u ld  d e fe a t i ts  ow n p u rp o se , a n d  th e  in v e s tig a tio n  o f n a tu r e  in  ac­
co rd  w ith  sc ience  w ou ld  n e v e r b eg in . T h u s  K a n t  a rg u e s  w e m u s t  u ltim a te ly  
u se  e m p ir ic a l la w s , fo r i t  is  “in  te rm s  o f  th e s e  law s th a t  n a tu r a l  sc ience m u s t  
ju d g e  i ts  ob jec ts ... H ence  n a tu r a l  sc ien ce  m u s t  n o t le a p  o v er i ts  b o u n d a ry  in  
o rd e r  to  ab so rb ... so m e th in g  to  w h o se  co n cep t no  ex p erien ce  w h a te v e r  can  be 
a d e q u a te ...”9 K a n t  concludes d e fin itiv e ly :
7 p. 295 = Ak. 410.
8 p. 302 = Ak. 417.
9 p. 262 = Ak. 382.
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[W]e are not try ing  to introduce [into physics] a  special causal basis, bu t are 
trying to introduce only another method for our use of reason in investigation - 
- a m ethod different from the one in term s of mechanical laws -- in order to 
compensate for the  inadequacy we find in  the la tte r method when we search 
even em pirically for all the particular law s of nature... But in speaking this 
way we do no t tu rn  nature into an in telligent being (since th a t would be ab­
surd), nor a re  we so bold as to posit a different, intelligent being above nature 
as its architect, since th a t would be presum ptuous.10
hl
K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  in tr in s ic  te leo logy  n a tu ra lly  le a d s  u s  to  q u e s­
tions ab o u t e x tr in s ic , re la tiv e  teleology. W h en  w e exam ine  a n  o rg an ism , we 
try  to  u n d e rs ta n d  h o w  each  p a r t  o r o rg an  w o rk s  fo r th e  sak e  o f th e  w hole. 
W hy does th is  o rg a n  ex ist?  W h a t does i t  do? W e c a n  th e n  ta k e  th is  q u estio n  
one step  fu r th e r , a s k in g  ab o u t th e  o rg an ism  itse lf . W hy is  i t  h e re?  W h a t 
does i t  do? T h is  l in e  o f in q u iry  c a n  be  e x te n d e d  indefin ite ly , th u s  “th is  con­
cep t o f a  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se  lea d s  u s  n e c e ssa rily  to  th e  id ea  of a ll o f n a tu r e  a s  a  
system  in  te rm s  o f  th e  ru le  o f p u rp o se s .”11 H e re  w e exam ine  a ll  o f n a tu r e  as 
i f  i t  w ere  a  sy s tem , a n d  we in q u ire  a s  to w h a t  good each  of th e  p a r t s  m ig h t be 
to  th e  o th ers , a  p a r t  b e in g  “c a lled  e ith e r  u se fu ln e s s  (for h u m a n  b e in g s) or 
benefit (for a n y  o th e r  c re a tu re ) .”12 K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  reco g n itio n  of 
n a tu ra l  p u rp o se s  au to m a tica lly  ra is e s  q u e s tio n s  a b o u t how  to  ju d g e  n a tu re  
as a  sy s te m .13 K a n t  sp en d s  th e  second  h a l f  o f ‘T a r t  I F  w ondering  w h a t  w e 
m ig h t be ab le  to  conclude  i f  w e a ssu m e  th a t  n a tu r e  o p era tes  a s  a  sy s tem .
B u t how  v a lid  is  s u c h  a n  assu m p tio n ?  O n  w h a t  g ro u n d s sh o u ld  w e m a k e  it?
U ltim a te ly , K a n t’s a n sw e r ab o u t e x tr in s ic  teleology is  close to  h is  
conclusions a b o u t in tr in s ic  teleology: i t  is  a  u se fu l tool, a  re g u la tiv e  p r in c i­
ple, a n d  n o th in g  m ore . In  fact, ex trin s ic  te leo logy  is  even  m ore d isp e n sa b le  
th a n  in tr in s ic , fo r
10 pp. 263-4 = Ak. 383.
11 p. 258 = Ak. 379.
12 p. 245 = Ak. 367. See also: p. 314 = Ak. 427.
13 See also: p. 322 = Ak. 434.
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extrinsic p u rposiveness o f n a tu r a l  th in g s  does n o t give u s  a d e q u a te  ju s tifica ­
tio n  for also  considering  th e m  to  be  p u rp o ses  o f n a tu re  so a s  to  ex p la in  th e ir  
e x is ten ce , a n d  for tre a t in g  -  in  th o u g h t -- th e ir  co n tin g en tly  purposive  effects 
a s  th e  b a se s  [responsible] for th e ir  ex istence  in  te rm s  o f  th e  p rincip le  o f  final 
c a u s e s .14
In  o th e r  w ords, w hile  w e n e e d  th e  concept o f p u rposive  c a u s a lity  in  o rd e r to 
conceive o f  th e  u tte r ly  c o n tin g en t a n d  to  th in k  o f n a tu r a l  p u rp o se s  to  begin  
w ith , w e  n e e d  n o t th in k  th a t  one th in g  w a s  c re a te d  fo r th e  s a k e  o f an o th e r. 
W h ereas  w e c a n n o t u n d e rs ta n d  h o w  a  sin g le  o rg an ism  c o u ld  b e  self- 
o rg an iz in g  w ith o u t th e  concept o f  teleology, fo r th e  re la tio n s  b e tw een  o rg an ­
ism s, w e  "fin d  th a t  n a tu ra l  c a u se s  a re  fu lly  a d e q u a te  to  m a k e  [th ings] come 
o u t th is  w ay ...”15 W e c an  ex p la in  th e  r ise  a n d  fa ll o f c e r ta in  o rg an ism s a n d  
e n v iro n m e n ts  w holly  w ith in  m ech an ica l c au sa lity , a n d  w ith o u t a p p e a lin g  to 
a n y  p u rp o se  w h ich  m ig h t ex is t b e tw ee n  o rg a n ism s .16 T h u s, K a n t  concludes 
defin itive ly , " th e  u n iv e rsa l id e a  o f n a tu re  a s  th e  su m  to ta l o f s e n se  objects 
gives u s  no  b a s is  w h a tev e r [for assu m in g ] t h a t  th in g s  o f n a tu r e  se rv e  one a n ­
o th e r  a s  m e a n s  to  pu rp o ses...”17 a n d  th a t  “i t  goes w ith o u t s a y in g  th a t  th is  
p r in c ip le  h o ld s  on ly  for reflective  b u t  n o t fo r d e te rm in a tiv e  ju d g m e n t, th a t  i t  
is  re g u la tiv e  a n d  n o t co n stitu tiv e . I t  se rv es  on ly  as a  g u id e ...”18
G iven  th a t  such  teleo log ical ju d g in g  is  only re g u la tiv e , w hy  p u rsu e  
su ch  in q u iry  in to  a  possib le  sy s tem  o f n a tu re ?  K a n t an sw ers :
once w e h av e  d iscovered th a t  n a tu re  is  ab le  to m ak e  p ro d u c ts  th a t  can  be 
th o u g h t o f  on ly  in  te rm s  o f th e  concept o f  fin a l causes, w e a re  th e n  e n title d  to 
go fu r th e r ; w e m ay th e re u p o n  ju d g e  p ro d u c ts  a s  b e lo n g in g  to  a  sy stem  of
14 p. 257 = Ak. 377.
15 p. 247 = Ak. 369.
16 p. 315 = Ak. 428.
17 p. 235 = Ak. 359. See also: pp. 246-7 = Ak. 368-9.
18 p. 259 = Ak. 379. Also: “while that maxim of [teleological] judgment is useful when ap­
plied to the whole of nature, it is not indispensable there, since the whole of nature is not given us as or­
ganized (in the strictest sense of organized as given above).” (pp. 280-1 = Ak. 398).
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purposes even if they... do not require us, for the ir possibility, to look for a 
different principle beyond the mechanism of blind efficient causes. For the 
idea of nature as a system  of n a tu re  already leads us, as concerns its basis, 
beyond the world of sense, so th a t  the unity of the supersensible principle m ust 
be considered valid no t m erely for certain  species o f n a tu ra l beings, bu t ju s t as 
m uch for the whole of na tu re  as a  system .19
In  th is  im p o r ta n t p a ssa g e , a n d  a s  e lsew h ere  in  sec tio n  67 , K a n t’s p o in t seem s 
to  b e  th is : we h av e  a lre a d y  se e n  t h a t  i t  is  n ecessa ry  to  a p p e a l to  th e  su p e r­
se n s ib le  in  o rd er to  so lve  th e  a n tin o m y  o f  ju d g m e n t. T h is  so lu tio n  forces u s  
to  th in k  o f  n a tu ra l  p u rp o se s  a s  b e in g  cau se d  by  a  d iv in e  a u th o r  in  accord 
w ith  a  concept. B u t i f  a  s in g le  o rg a n ism  is  c au se d  in  th is  w ay , a n d  n a tu re  is  
com posed  o f su ch  o rg an ism s, th e n  w e seem  e n tit le d  to  v iew  n a tu re  its e lf  a s  a  
sy s tem . A n d  i f  we a re  e n ti t le d  to  v iew  i t  a s  such , th e n  w e a re  e n tit le d  to a s k  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f w h a t th is  sy s tem  is  for. W hy w as i t  c re a te d  a t  all? B ecause  o f 
th e  p e c u lia r ity  o f h u m a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g , i t  is  n e c e ssa ry  to  v iew  th e  w orld  in  
te rm s  o f pu rp o ses, a n d  in  so d o ing  w e h a v e  already s u b o rd in a te d  m echan ica l 
to  p u rp o s iv e  cau sa tio n . In  th is  w ay , w e a re  e n tit le d  to  w o n d e r w h a t possib le  
f in a l  p u rp o se  th e re  m ig h t be  in  h a v in g  c re a te d  n a tu re .  T h is , th e n , is  th e  
q u e s tio n  K a n t is  co n cern ed  h e re  to  a n sw e r.
I f  w e a re  n o t c a re fu l in  o u r  re a d in g , K a n t’s d isc u ss io n  o f n a tu ra l, u l ­
t im a te , a n d  fin a l p u rp o se s  in  sec tio n s 82 th ro u g h  84  o f  th e  Critique o f Judg­
ment m ay  seem  a  s im p le  re s ta te m e n t  o f h is  p a s t  a rg u m e n ts  fo r th e  m oral 
w o r th  o f h u m a n s  a n d  th e i r  goal o f th e  h ig h e s t good. B u t  u p o n  closer ex am i­
n a tio n , w e see th a t  th is  i s  a  n ew  ty p e  o f a rg u m e n t.20 K a n t  seem s to be  try in g  
to  s a y  th a t ,  g iven  th e  so lu tio n  to  th e  a n tin o m y  o f ju d g m e n t, h e  c an  now  a rg u e  
fro m  n a tu r a l  p u rp o ses  in  n a tu re  to  th e  u ltim a te  a n d  th e n  th e  f in a l p u rp o se  o f 
n a tu re .  In  o th e r  w ords, h e  a tte m p ts  to  m ove from th e  ex is ten ce  o f o rgan ism s, 
w h ic h  w e m u s t conceive o f  a s  b e in g  c re a te d , to th e  n e ce ss ity  o f c u ltu re  as
19 pp. 260-1 = Ak. 380-1.
20 Also. cf.. Kant’s Lectures on Philosophical Theology. pp. 139-141.
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promoting th e  f in a l  pu rpose , to h u m a n s  a s  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se , a n d  th e n  to 
h u m a n  b e in g s  (as  free ly  w illin g  a g e n ts )  a s  th e  f in a l p u rp o se . T h is  is  a  v e ry  
d iffe ren t ty p e  o f  p ro o f th a n  K a n t p r e s e n ts  e i th e r  in  th e  f i r s t  o r  seco n d  Cri­
tique, a n d  i s  d iffe ren t from  th e  ty p ic a l  p ro o f  K a n t u ses in  a rg u in g  fro m  th e  
ex is tence  o f  freedom  a n d  th e  m o ra l la w  to  h u m a n s  a s  a n  e n d  in  th em se lv es . 
T h is  a rg u m e n t is  n o t p a r tic u la r ly  c le a r , n o r  is  K a n t’s  u se  o f  th e  te rm s  
“u ltim a te ’’ a n d  “f in a l,” a n d  I  h a v e  fo u n d  n o th in g  p a r tic u la r ly  h e lp fu l  in  th e  
seco n d ary  l i te ra tu re .  H ence, 1 w ill t r y  to  sp e ll o u t th is  a rg u m e n t a s  c lea rly  
as possib le , a n d  I  w ill a rg u e  th a t ,  a s  i t  s ta n d s , su ch  a  p ro o f does n o t  accom ­
p lish  w h a t i t  in te n d s , b u t  w ith  a  few  m in o r  changes, i t  m ay  su cceed . S u c h  a  
rec o n stru c tio n  is  ex trem ely  im p o r ta n t  fo r th re e  reasons: th is  “u p w a rd ” p roo f 
is  u n iq u e  to  th is  Critique, i t  is  v i r tu a l ly  ig n o re d  in  th e  se co n d a ry  l i te ra tu re ,  
a n d  i t  g ives K a n t  a  s tro n g  re a so n  to  p o s tu la te  th e  n ecessity  o f m o ra l p ro g ress  
of th e  h u m a n  species.
I t  m a y  seem  s tra n g e  t h a t  K a n t  b e g in s  w ith  th e  e x a m in a tio n  o f sp e ­
cific n a tu r a l  p u rp o se s  a n d  th e n  a t te m p ts  to  a rg u e  h is  w ay  “u p ” to  a  f in a l  
p u rp o se . P e rh a p s  h e  believes t h a t  th i s  is  a  n a tu r a l  w ay  fo r h u m a n  b e in g s  to  
th in k  ab o u t th e  issu e , n am e ly  t h a t  e n c o u n te rs  w ith  o rg an ism s e v e n tu a lly  
le a d  u s  to  th in k  a b o u t f in a l p u rp o se s , a n d  fee ls  h e  needs to  m a k e  a n  a rg u ­
m e n t w h ich  w o u ld  also  p roceed  a lo n g  th e s e  lin e s . A  m ore  l ik e ly  re a s o n  m ay  
be K a n t’s a t te m p t  to  un ify  th e  th r e e  Critiques in  th e  Critique o f Judgment, 
a n d  h e  m ay  th in k  t h a t  th is  a t te m p t w ill  b e  s tre n g th e n e d  if, b e g in n in g  m ere ly  
w ith  th e  re a lm  o f  n a tu re , h e  cou ld  m ove  in to  th e  rea lm  o f th e  s u p e rse n s ib le  
a sp ec t o f h u m a n  b e in g s (h u m a n s  a s  n o u m en o n ); in  o th e r  w ords, i t  m a y  b e  a n  
a tte m p t to  re a s o n  from  th e  co n c lu sio n s  o f  th e  f i r s t  to  th e  co n c lu sio n s  o f  th e  
second  Critique v ia  th e  conclusions o f  th e  th ird . H ence, in  t ry in g  to  sp e ll  o u t 
th is  proof, w e  sh o u ld  try  to  accep t a s  v a lid  on ly  th o se  p re m ise s  w h ic h  h a v e  
been  a rg u e d  fo r  in  th e  f irs t  o r th i r d  Critique, a n d  see how  f a r  in to  th e  second  
Critique K a n t  c a n  get. A p ro o f o f th is  ty p e  cou ld  only be a t te m p te d  in  th e




th i r d  Critique, th ro u g h  th e  in i t ia l  a ssu m p tio n  t h a t  w e h a v e  a  leg itim a te  r e a ­
son  fo r v iew ing  th e  w o rld  in  a  teleological m a n n e r .21
K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  q u estio n s ab o u t th e  c re a tio n  o f n a tu re  le a d  to  
th e  q u estio n  o f th e  “u l t im a te ” a n d  “fin a l” p u rp o se s  (letzter Zweck a n d  Endz- 
weck) o f n a tu re . W h en  w e e n c o u n te r  a  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se , K a n t c la im s th a t  w e 
w a n t to  know  w h e th e r  i t  is  a n  e n d  in  itse lf, o r w h e th e r  i t  is  only a  m ea n s  to  
a n o th e r  end . N ow  K a n t’s d e fin itio n  of a n  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  is  r a th e r  v ag u e . 
B ecau se  K a n t w ill f in a lly  p lace  lim ita tio n s  on  th e  u l t im a te  pu rpose  in  te rm s  
o f  a n  ad d itio n a l p u rp o se , n a m e ly  th e  “fin a l” p u rp o se  (a s  w e sh a ll see below ), 
w e m u s t  consider th e  u l t im a te  pu rp o se  a s  i ts e lf  b e in g  a n o th e r  m ean s to  a n  
end , a n d  c an n o t s im p ly  b e  th e  la s t  step  in  a  c h a in  o f  p u rp o ses: “we c a n  ev en  
p rove  a  p rio ri t h a t  w h a t  m ig h t p e rh a p s  be  a n  ultimate purpose for n a tu re  c a n  
s till, in so fa r  a s  i t  is  a  n a tu r a l  th in g , n ev er be  a  final purposef22
K a n t’s  n e x t m ove in  th is  p roo f seem s to  occu r in  section  82, w h ere  
K a n t a tte m p ts  to  ru le  o u t  th e  poss ib ility  t h a t  th e  q u e s tio n  o f th e  u ltim a te  
p u rp o se  cou ld  be a n sw e re d  b y  m ere ly  looking  a t  n a tu r e  itse lf . K a n t seem s to  
m ak e  th e  follow ing a rg u m e n t: le t  u s  assu m e  t h a t  th e r e  is  a n  objective 
p u rp o siv en ess  in  n a tu r e .  Now , w hen  we ex am in e  n a tu re ,  w e find  th a t  
h u m a n ity , w hich  w e m ig h t th in k  a s  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu re , is  “one o f 
th e  m a n y  a n im a l species, a n d  n a tu re  h a s  in  no  w ay  e x em p te d  [it] from  i ts  
d e s tru c tiv e  forces a n y  m o re  th a n  from  its  p ro d u c tiv e  fo rces, b u t  h a s  su b je c ted  
e v e ry th in g  to a  n a tu r a l  m ech an ism  w ith o u t a  p u rp o se .”23 K a n t m a in ta in s  
t h a t  w e see  n o t on ly  th e  ra n d o m  d estru c tio n  o f a ll  ty p e s  o f o rgan ism s, 
in c lu d in g  h u m a n s , b u t  a lso  t h a t  th e  e n v iro n m en t w h ich  h u m a n s  n e ed  in  
o rd e r  to  su rv ive , “th e  h a b i ta t  o f  a ll  th ese  c re a tu re s , th e  n a tiv e  soil... an d ... 
th e  sea ... p rov ides no  in d ic a tio n  o f h av in g  b e en  p ro d u c e d  by  any  b u t  a  w holly
21 But of course, as always, only regulatively and not constitutively.
22 p. 313 = Ak. 426. While it is hard to see how this might be done a priori, it may be possible 
to make this point at least a posteriori. See below.
23 pp. 314-5 = Ak. 427.




u n in te n t io n a l  m echan ism .”24 N a tu re , K a n t  concludes, seem s to be in d iffe ren t 
to  th o se  p la n t  a n d  a n im a l o rg a n ism s  w h ich  h u m an  b e in g s n e e d  to  su rv ive , 
d e s tru c tiv e  o f m any  now  e x tin c t species, a n d  also seem s to  in d ic a te  th e  
p o ss ib ility  o f ex p la in in g  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f h u m a n  b e ings a n d  th e ir  
n e c e ssa ry  h a b ita t  th ro u g h  b lin d  m ech an ism .
B u t  h av in g  re a c h e d  th is  conclusion , K a n t th in k s  w e h a v e  com e to a n  
a b su rd ity . H e  argues:
This argum ent, however, seem s to prove more than  it was intended to prove: 
not merely tha t m an cannot be an  u ltim ate purpose of nature , and  th a t  by the 
sam e token the aggregate of organized natu ra l things on e a rth  cannot be a 
system  of purposes, bu t even th a t  the na tu ra l products we earlier considered 
n a tu ra l purposes originate from nothing bu t the m echanism of na tu re .25
I f  w e re a so n  in  line  w ith  th e  o r ig in a l a ssu m p tio n , n am e ly  t h a t  objective 
e x te rn a l  p u rp o siv en ess  ex ists , w e re a c h  th e  conclusion th a t  n o  n a tu r a l  
p ro d u c t c a n  be th o u g h t of a s  h a v in g  a  p u rp o se . B u t th is  is  im p o ssib le  to  
p rove, s in ce  w e a lread y  saw  in  th e  a n tin o m y  o f ju d g m e n t t h a t  w e a re  n e v e r  
ab le  to  p ro v e  w h e th e r a n  o rg an ism  h a s  b e e n  cau sed  b y  m ec h an ica l c a u sa lity  
a lone . H en ce  w e h ave  a  reductio ad absurdum, a n d  w e m u s t re je c t th e  
o r ig in a l a ssu m p tio n . A nd  th is  is  w h a t  K a n t  a rg u es fo r in  th e  n e x t 
p a ra g ra p h .26 H e  a rg u es th a t  w h ile  w e a re  “ce rta in ly  p e rm itte d  to  s tr iv e  a s  
h a r d  a n d  ev en  a s  boldly a s  p o ss ib le  to  e x p la in  such  b e in g s m ech an ica lly ,”27 
th e  so lu tio n  to  th e  an tin o m y  (w h ich  i ts e l f  a rise s  because  of th e  p e c u lia r  
n a tu r e  o f  o u r  u n d e rs tan d in g ) d ic ta te s  t h a t  w e m u st th in k  o f o rg an ism s a s  
n a tu r a l  p u rp o ses. T he conclusion  o f  th is  sec tion  is to  show  t h a t  th e  q u estio n  
o f th e  u l t im a te  pu rpose  of n a tu r e  c a n n o t b e  solved by  look ing  a t  n a tu r e  a s
24 p. 315 = Ak. 428.
“ p. 316 = Ak. 428.
26 p. 316 = Ak. 428.
27 p. 316 = Ak. 428.
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h a v in g  objective e x te rn a l p u rp o siv en ess , b u t  also rem in d s  u s  t h a t  we are  s till  
c o n s tra in e d  to  exam ine  n a tu r e  w ith  a  b e n t  to w ard s  teleology.
T h is  does n o t seem  to  be  a  p a r t ic u la r ly  conv incing  a rg u m e n t. W hy 
a re  w e c o n s tra in e d  to  d ra w  th e  conclusion  th a t  th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f  som e spe­
c ies a n d  o f  som e h u m a n  b e in g s  m a k e s  i t  im possib le  fo r h u m a n  b e in g s  to be 
th e  u lt im a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu re ,  le t  a lone  m a k e  i t  im possib le  fo r  u s  to  conceive 
o f a n y th in g  a s  be in g  a  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se?  M an y  th in k e rs  h a v e  u s e d  a  s im ila r  
a rg u m e n t a b o u t th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f e a r l ie r  species a n d  th e  f ra g il i ty  o f th e  nec­
e s sa ry  h a b i ta t  of h u m a n  b e in g s  to  a rg u e  fo r p rec ise ly  th e  o p p o sin g  conclu­
sion . A nd, m ore  im p o rtan tly , w hy, i f  w e a ssu m e  a n  objective e x tr in s ic  p u r ­
p o siv en ess , a re  we fo rced  to  d ra w  th e  conclusion  th a t  th e  o rig in  o f  o rgan ism s 
c a n  be  e x p la in e d  th ro u g h  m ec h an ica l c au sa lity ?  K a n t sa y s  t h a t  th is  is  be­
c au se  w e c a n  exp la in  th e  o rig in  o f th e  habitat of orga n ism s  acco rd in g  to m e­
c h a n ic a l c au sa lity , th u s , “i f  t h a t  is  so, how  c a n  we, a n d  w h a t r ig h t  do we 
h av e , to  d e m a n d  a n d  a s s e r t  t h a t  th o se  c re a tu re s  [w hich n e e d  th e  h a b ita t  to  
su rv ive] h a v e  a  d iffe ren t o rig in?”28 W hile  i t  m ay  be t r u e  t h a t  w e c an n o t say  
for c e r ta in  t h a t  o rg an ism s c o u ld  n o t b e  e x p la in e d  by  p u rp o s iv e  c au sa lity , th is  
d e fin ite ly  does n o t le a d  u s  to  th e  opposite  conclusion , n a m e ly  t h a t  su ch  or­
g a n ism s m u s t  be  e x p la in e d  th ro u g h  m ech an ica l c au sa lity . I f  th is  w ere  tru e , 
K a n t  w ou ld  n o t h av e  a  Critique of Judgment to  beg in  w ith .
H ow ever, w hile  i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  su c h  a  s tro n g  c la im  c a n n o t  b e  m ade, 
i t  does n o t a p p e a r  th a t  K a n t n e e d s  to  m a k e  th is  p o in t w ith  a  reductio ad ab- 
surdum. K a n t  seem s in te re s te d  in , a n d  on ly  to  need , th e  fo llow ing  tw o 
p o in ts : f irs t , t h a t  we c a n n o t a ssu m e  objective ex trin sic  te leo logy  to  ex ist, a n d  
second, t h a t  w e can n o t re a c h  a n y  conclusions ab o u t th e  u l t im a te  p u rp o se  of 
n a tu r e  th ro u g h  a  m ere  e x am in a tio n  o f n a tu re ,  i.e., com plete ly  w ith o u t re fe r­
ence  to  som e ad d itio n a l fac ts  o r  p rin c ip le s . P o in t one, I  th in k , is  p ro v ed  ade­
q u a te ly  e lsew h ere  in  th e  th i r d  Critique, e spec ia lly  w ith  th e  d iscu ssio n  a t  th e
28 pp. 315-6 = Ak. 428.
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b e g in n in g  o f section  82 a n d  in  sec tio n s 63  a n d  67, d iscussed  above. K a n t 
n e e d  o n ly  p ro v e  th a t  th e re  e x is ts  n o  n e e d  fo r h u m a n s  to conceive o f  n a tu r e  as 
a c tin g  in  accord  w ith  th is  c o n s titu tiv e  p r in c ip le  o f re la tiv e  te leo logy .29 P o in t 
tw o is  s im ila r ly  p ro v ed  in  th e s e  sec tio n s , b u t  p e rh a p s  is  b e s t  s e t  o u t  i n  K a n t’s 
p re s e n ta tio n  o f L in n a e u s ’ p osition . W h ile  w e  m a y  th in k  t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  th e  
n a tu r a l  c a n d id a te  fo r be ing  th e  u l t im a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu re , L in n a e u s ’ p o s i­
t io n  is  t h a t  h u m a n s  ex is t on ly  to  h e lp  r e g u la te  th e  a n im a l k in g d o m , w h ich , in  
tu rn , r e g u la te s  th e  vegetab le  k ingdom . T h is  seem s a  p erfec tly  a ccep tab le  
p o sitio n , a n d  th e re  seem s to  b e  no  w a y  to  choose  b e tw een  a  sy s te m  o f n a tu r e  
w h ich  su p p o r ts  on ly  h u m a n s  a n d  one  w h ic h  su p p o r ts  th e  c o n tin u e d  ex is ten ce  
o f th e  v e g e ta b le  k ingdom . In  th is  re sp e c t, K a n t  seem s to b e  ab le  to  p ro v e  
w h a t h e  n eed s .
Y et, w h ile  th is  line  o f a rg u m e n ta t io n  m a y  ru le  o u t a n  ob jective  so lu ­
tio n  from  th e  m ere  ex am in a tio n  o f n a tu r e ,  i t  s t i l l  h a s  n o t so lved  th e  o r ig in a l 
p ro b lem  o f d iscovering  an  u ltim a te  p u rp o se . N ow  K a n t does h a v e  a  v e ry  le ­
g itim a te  a rg u m e n t to  m ake  in  fav o r o f m a n  a s  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se , n a m e ly  
one w h ich  w o u ld  beg in  w ith  th e  m o ra l la w . C o m m en ta to rs  seem  to  ta k e  th is  
m ore s ta n d a r d  lin e  o f th o u g h t a s  K a n t’s  a rg u m e n t  in  th is  sec tion .30 Y e t th is  
is  n o t th e  a rg u m e n t K a n t m ak e s  h e re . I n  th e  f i r s t  sen ten ce  o f sec tio n  83,
K a n t c la im s t h a t  h e  h a s  “show n in  th e  preceding  sec tion  th a t  [ce rta in ] p r in ­
cip les o f re a so n  give u s  su ffic ien t g ro u n d s  fo r  ju d g in g  m a n  — th o u g h  re flec ­
tive ly  r a th e r  th a n  d e te rm in a tiv e ly  —... to  b e  th e  ultimate p u rp o se  o f  n a tu r e  
h e re  on  e a r th .”31 H ow  does h e  th in k  h e  h a s  o b ta in e d  th is  conclusion?
I f  th e re  is  su ch  an  a rg u m e n t in  se c tio n  82, p e rh a p s  i t  is  th is :  i t  is  
only  h u m a n  b e in g s  w ho can  th in k  o r m a k e  n a tu r e  in to  a  system in  th e  f i r s t  
p lace, a n d  th u s  h u m a n  beings m u s t  b e  th e  u l t im a te  p u rp o se  o f  n a tu r e
29 Of course, the need does exist for it as a regulative principle.
30 This includes Pluhar. See his “Translator’s Introduction” to the Critique o f Judgment: p.
lxxxiv.
31 p. 317 = Ak. 429. First italics added for emphasis.
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b e c a u se  th e re  w ould  be no  n a tu r e  as a  sy s tem  w ith o u t th e m . K a n t s ta te s  
t h a t  “m a n ” is  th e  u lt im a te  p u rp o se  “because  h e  is  th e  on ly  be in g  on  e a r th  
w ho  c a n  form  a concept o f  p u rp o se s  a n d  u se  h is  re a so n  to  tu r n  a n  a g g re g a te  
o f p u rp o s iv e ly  s tru c tu re d  th in g s  in to  a  sy s tem  o f p u rp o se s .”32 L a te r  h e  m a k e s  
a  s im ila r  s ta te m e n t, q u o te d  above, th a t  i f  h um an b e in g s  a re  n o t th e  u l tim a te  
p u rp o se  o f n a tu re , th e n  “by  th e  sam e  to k en  th e  a g g re g a te  of o rg an ized  
n a tu r a l  th in g s  on e a r th  c a n n o t b e  a  system  o f p u rp o se s .”33 A nd  in  th is  f i r s t  
se n te n c e  o f section  83, K a n t  d e fin es  h u m a n  b e in g s a s  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  
as, “th e  p u rpose  by  re fe ren c e  to  w hich  a ll  o th e r  n a tu r a l  th in g s  c o n s titu te  a  
sy s te m  o f pu rp o ses.”34
T h is  a rg u m en t, ho w ev er, s till  seem s u n co n v in c in g  a s  i t  s ta n d s . H ow  
is  i t  t h a t  h u m a n  be ings c a n  tu r n  n a tu re  from  a n  a g g re g a te  in to  a  system ? Is  
i t  th ro u g h  cognition? B u t  w h y  sh o u ld  n a tu re  h a v e  to  b e  cognized (by h u m a n  
b e in g s) a s  h a v in g  a  p u rp o se  in  o rd e r  for th e re  to  be  a  p u rp o se?  M an y  o rg a n s  
o f o rg a n ism s  a re  ju d g ed  b y  u s  to  ex is t fo r th e  sa k e  o f  th e  w hole o rgan ism , b u t  
c e r ta in ly  n e ith e r  a re  th e y  cogn ized  by  th a t  o rg an ism , n o r  do th ey  fu n c tio n  
ju s t  b ecau se  h u m a n  b e in g s  c a n  cognize th em . I t  seem s p o ss ib le  for n a tu r e  to  
be  a  sy s te m  w ith o u t a n y o n e  b e in g  able  to  cognize i t ,  e sp ec ia lly  g iven K a n t’s 
a rg u m e n ts  th a t  th e  u l t im a te  p u rp o se  c an n o t s im p ly  b e  d e te rm in e d  from  ex ­
a m in in g  n a tu re . M aybe H e id eg g e r is  ab le  to  m ak e  a  p o in t lik e  th is , b u t  n o t 
K a n t. A nd, indeed , K a n t h im s e lf  re jects th is  p o ss ib ility  in  section  86: “i t  is  
n o t b y  reference  to  m a n ’s  cogn itive  pow er ( th eo re tica l rea so n ) th a t  th e  ex is­
te n c e  o f e v ery th in g  e lse  in  th e  w o rld  f ir s t  ge ts i ts  v a lu e , i.e ., i t  is  n o t 
[because] (say) th e re  is  so m eo n e  to contemplate th e  w o rld .”35
32 p. 314 = Ak. 426-7. More on this below.
33 p. 316 = Ak.429.
34 p. 317 = Ak. 429.
35 p. 331 = Ak. 442. Kant’s claim in section 82 that “man” is the ultimate purpose because of 
the “diverse uses to which his understanding teaches him to put all those creatures” may also be telling, 
p. 314 = Ak. 426. Italics added for emphasis.
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P e rh a p s  K a n t is  in d ic a tin g  th a t  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  is  a  q uestion  of 
w hich  species in  a  sy s te m  is  th e  m ost im p o rta n t, th e  l a s t  “fo r th e  sa k e  of 
w hich .” In itia lly , K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  m a n  is  th e  u l t im a te  p u rp o se . B ut, 
f irs t, w hy sh o u ld  th is  sp ec ie s  be  h u m a n  beings?36 In d eed , K a n t  recognizes in  
section  82 th a t  a  c o u n te r  a rg u m e n t is  possib le , n a m e ly  L in n a e u s ’ position  
th a t  th e  vegetab le  k in g d o m  is  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu r e .  Second, w hy 
sh o u ld  th is  p u rp o se  be  a s s u m e d  to be  a  sin g le  species a t  a ll?  I f  w e m ak e  th e  
analogy  be tw een  a n  o rg a n ism  a n d  n a tu re  a s  a  w hole, w h y  sh o u ld  w e t h in k  
th a t  n a tu re  ex is ts  fo r th e  s a k e  of one p a r t ic u la r  species?  W hy sh o u ld  n a tu re  
n o t ex is t for n a tu re  itse lf , in  th e  sam e w ay  t h a t  one p a r t  o f a n  o rg an ism  ex­
is ts  n o t sim ply  fo r a n o th e r  p a r t ic u la r  p a r t , b u t  ex is ts  fo r  th e  sa k e  o f th e  
w hole? W hy n o t n a tu r e  a s  a  se lf-o rgan iz ing  w hole  itse lf?  F ro m  w h a t  we can  
te ll  in  section 82, i t  does n o t  seem  th a t  K a n t c a n  conclude  t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  
th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu r e .  H ence, w hile  w e now  h a v e  a  c lue  t h a t  th e  
u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu r e  h a s  so m eth in g  to  do w ith  th e  a b ility  to  o rgan ize  
o th e r  pu rposes in to  a  sy s tem , w e do n o t y e t h a v e  a n  a rg u m e n t.
B u t p e rh a p s  h e  does n o t h a v e  to m ak e  th e  a rg u m e n t in  th is  w ay. A t 
th is  stage, K a n t is  try in g  to  m a k e  th e  p o in t th a t  h u m a n s  a re  th e  u ltim a te  
p u rp o se  of n a tu re . S u c h  a  s tro n g  position  does n o t seem  n e ce ssa ry , how ever. 
A s w ill m ake m ore  se n se  below , th e  p o in t t h a t  K a n t seem s to  n e e d  to  m ak e  in  
th is  s tep  of th e  p ro o f is  so m e th in g  like: m an  is  th e  on ly  p o ss ib le  candidate 
fo r a n  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f  n a tu re .  Now, cou ld  K a n t m a k e  th is  p o in t?  T his 
a p p e a rs  to be  possib le  a lo n g  th e  follow ing lin e s . F irs t , K a n t  h a s  a rg u e d  th a t, 
“w e can  even p rove a  p r io r i  t h a t  w h a t m ig h t p e rh a p s  be  a n  ultimate purpose 
fo r n a tu re  can  s till, in so fa r  a s  i t  is  a  n a tu ra l  th in g , n e v e r  b e  a  final pur­
pose.”37 W hile th is  seem s u n lik e ly  a s  a n  a  priori proof, th i s  r a th e r  s tro n g  
p o in t h a s  a lre ad y  b een  m a d e  w ith  K a n t’s d iscussion  o f e x tr in s ic  teleology a n d
36 Recall that, in accord with this “upward” proof, we are not allowed to cite the noumenal na­
ture of persons as a premise of the proof.
37 p. 313 = Ak. 426.
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h is  de fin itio n  o f a  f in a l pu rpose . W hen  o b se rv in g  an y  o rgan ism  (or species), 
K a n t c la im s th a t  th e re  ex is t tw o options:
We can say th a t  the purpose of the existence of such a n a tu ra l being is in th a t  
th ing itself, i.e., the thing is not m erely a purpose bu t also a  final purpose. Or 
we can say th a t  the final purpose is outside the thing and in other n a tu ra l be­
ings, i.e., th a t  although the thing exists purposively it is not a final purpose: 
rather, it  is necessarily a m eans as well.38
So, i f  K a n t is  co rrec t to  a rg u e  th a t  w e c an  a lw ay s conceive o f an y  o rg a n ism  o r 
species o f n a tu r e  a s  e x is tin g  for th e  sa k e  o f  a n o th e r , a n d  i f  w e accep t h is  
d e fin itio n  o f a  f in a l  p u rp o se , i t  seem s to  follow  t h a t  n o th in g  w e cou ld  f in d  
which exists entirely in nature cou ld  b e  s a id  to  e x is t a s a  f in a l p u rp o se .
Second, g iven  th is , K a n t seem s ju s t if ie d  in  h is  s ta te m e n t t h a t  “w e 
can ... p rove... t h a t  w h a t  m ig h t p e rh a p s  be  a n  ultimate purpose for n a tu r e  c an  
s till, insofar as it is a natural thing, n e v e r  be  a  final purpose.”39 W h en  w e 
d iscover so m e th in g  in  n a tu re , w e a lw ays a p p e a r  to  be in  a  p osition  to  con ­
ceive o f i t  a s  a  m e a n s  to  som e o th e r  end . H ence , “in so fa r a s  i t  is  a  n a tu r a l  
th in g '’ w e c a n  n e v e r  s a y  decisively t h a t  i t  i s  a n  e n d  in  itse lf. A  r e s ta te m e n t  o f 
th is  is: “th e  f in a l p u rp o se  is  uncond itioned , an d ... n a tu re  w ould  th e re fo re  be 
in ca p ab le  o f ach iev in g  i t  a n d  p roducing  i t  in  accordance  w ith  th e  id e a  o f th is  
p u rp o se . F o r  n o th in g  in  n a tu re  (considered  a s  a  b e in g  o f sense) h a s , w ith in  
n a tu re  itse lf, a  b a s is  d e te rm in in g  i t  t h a t  is  n o t a lw ay s cond itioned  in  tu r n .”40 
L e t u s  ca ll th is  th e  “p rin c ip le  o f n a tu re ’s ex c lu sio n .”41
T h ird , th is  le a d s  to  th e  conclusion  t h a t  i f  n a tu re  is  to  h a v e  a n  
u ltim a te  pu rp o se , th is  p u rp o se  cou ld  o n ly  b e  fo u n d  in reference to a  f in a l  
p u rp o se . I f  a  f in a l  p u rp o se  of n a tu re  c a n n o t be  fo u n d  s im p ly  b y  look ing  a t
“ p. 313 = Ak. 426.
39 p. 313 = Ak. 426. Italics added for emphasis.
40 p. 322 = Ak. 435.
41 “The final purpose, [that is, an unconditioned purpose] however, we must not seek within 
nature at all,” p. 318 = Ak. 431. See also: p. 329 = Ak. 440-1.
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n a tu re ,  th e n  i f  th e re  is  to  b e  a n  u ltim a te  p u rp o se , i t  m u s t be d isco v ered  on ly  
in  re fe ren ce  to  so m eth in g  “o u ts id e ” o f n a tu re . T h is  m ay  n a tu ra l ly  le a d  u s  to  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f w h e th e r  th e re  e x is ts  so m e th in g  w h ich  is  not e n tire ly  a  
n a tu r a l  th in g  w hich  m ig h t th e n  b e  a  f in a l p u rp o se . O f course, fo u r th , K a n t  
h a s  a lre a d y  a rg u e d  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique t h a t  a  h u m a n  b e in g  is  th is  ty p e  o f 
th in g , n a m e ly  a  c re a tu re  w h ic h  is  p a r t  n a tu re  a n d  p a r t  noum enon ; th e  
so lu tio n  to  th e  th ird  a n tin o m y  a llow s th a t  h u m a n s  cou ld  be e n tire ly  su b je c t 
to  m e c h a n is tic  cau sa lity , y e t  s t i l l  r e ta in  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f g e n e ra tin g  a  p u re ly  
sp o n ta n e o u s  a n d  u n c o n d itio n e d  seq u en ce  of e v e n ts . H ence, K a n t  se em s to  be  
a b le  to  d ra w  th e  conclusion  t h a t  i f  th e re  is  to  b e  a n  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f 
n a tu re ,  th e n  h u m a n s  a re  a t  le a s t  a c a n d id a te  fo r  b e in g  th a t  p u rp o se .
T h is  conclusion a llow s u s  to  a n sw e r tw o p ro b lem s p osed  above. T h e  
f i r s t  is  th e  p rob lem  o f th e  c lu e  t h a t  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  of n a tu r e  h a s  som e­
th in g  to  do w ith  th e  a b ility  to  o rg an iz e  o th e r  p u rp o se s  in to  a  sy s te m . W e 
c a n n o t see  w h y  an y  p a r t  o f n a tu r e  sh o u ld  be a n  e n d  in  itse lf. T h u s  w e c a n n o t 
see  w h y  n a tu r e  sh o u ld  be  a  sy s te m  w ith o u t re fe ren c e  to  so m e th in g  e lse . B u t 
i f  w e cou ld  d iscover a  f in a l p u rp o se , then n a tu re  cou ld  b e  fo rm ed  in to  a  sy s­
tem . A n d  i f  t h a t  f in a l p u rp o se  h a s  so m e th in g  to  do w ith  h u m a n  b e in g s , th e n  
i t  is  h u m a n  be ings w hich  fo rm  n a tu r e  from  a  co llection  o f m ere  a g g re g a te s  
in to  a  sy s tem . T h u s K a n t w rite s  (w ith  a n  eye to  th e  f in a l pu rpose):
if  we regard  nature as a  teleological system, th en  it is m an's vocation to be the 
u ltim ate  purpose of na tu re , b u t always subject to a condition: he m ust have 
the  understanding and the  will to give both n a tu re  and  him self reference to a 
purpose th a t can be independent of nature, self-sufficient, and  a  final p u r­
pose.42
K a n t  th in k s  th a t  we now  h a v e  th e  le g itim a te  conclu sion  th a t  h u m a n s  a re  th e  
u l t im a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu re , as long as a t  som e p o in t  l a te r  in  th e  proof, w e can  
d ed u ce  th e  f in a l p u rp o se  to  w h ich  w e can  re fe r th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se .
42 p. 318 = Ak. 431. Italics added for emphasis.
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T h e  second  problem  from  above is  th e  defin ition  o f a n  u ltim a te  p u r ­
pose. W hile  K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  c an n o t b e  fo u n d  in  n a ­
tu re , i t  se em s t h a t  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  m u s t  be. I f  th e  f in a l p u rp o se  is  o u t­
side  o f n a tu r e ,  b u t  we a re  in te re s te d  to  know  w h y  n a tu re  w as c re a te d , th e n  
th e  u l t im a te  p u rp o se  of n a tu re  w o u ld  b e  th e  la s t  th in g  in  n a tu r e  w h ich  p ro ­
m otes th e  f in a l  pu rpose . A  w o rk in g  d e fin itio n  o f u ltim a te  p u rp o se  m ig h t be: 
th e  la s t  “fo r  th e  s a k e  o f w h ich” o r m e a n s  to  th e  e n d  o f th e  f in a l p u rp o se  w hich 
is  a  p a r t  o f  n a tu r e .  We w ill h a v e  o p p o rtu n ity  below  to confirm  th is  d e fin i­
tion .
B u t  w h ile  K a n t m ay  h a v e  re a so n  to  be lieve  th a t  h u m a n s  a re  a  c an d i­
d a te  for th e  u l t im a te  pu rp o se  o f n a tu re , a re  h u m a n s  th e  only c an d id a te?  T he 
concern  se em s to  re m a in  th a t  w h ile  w e cou ld  n o t n ecessa rily  p o in t to  a  c e r­
ta in  species o f p u re  n a tu re  a s  a  c a n d id a te  fo r th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se , w h a t 
ab o u t th e  p o ss ib ility  of n a tu re  i ts e l f  a s  th is  p u rpose?  T h is seem s to  d e p en d  
on  w h e th e r  w e co u ld  fin d  a  f in a l p u rp o se  in  re fe ren ce  to  w h ich  n a tu r e  a s  a  
w hole w o u ld  b e  th e  n ecessa ry  u ltim a te  p u rp o se . B u t th e n  w e w ou ld  h a v e  to 
re fe r to  so m e th in g  like  “th e  p le a su re  w h ich  G od ta k e s  in  h is /h e r  c re a tio n ,” or 
“n a tu re  a s  a  m a n ife s ta tio n  of th e  A bso lu te  in  th e  w orld.” H ow ever, i t  is  d iffi­
c u lt to  see  w h y  w e w ould n e e d  to  be lieve  in  a  f in a l p u rp o se  su ch  a s  th is . I f  
w e could  a rg u e  co h eren tly  a n d  decisively  for a  f in a l pu rp o se  lik e  th is , th e n  
K a n t m ig h t h a v e  to  concede th e  u lt im a te  p u rp o se  of n a tu re , b u t  su c h  a n  a r ­
g u m en t w o u ld  h a v e  to be  m ade.
In  sec tio n  83, w ith  h u m a n s  a s  th e  se lec ted  c a n d id a te  fo r th e  u ltim a te  
pu rpose , p e n d in g  th e  deduction  o f  th e  f in a l  pu rp o se , K a n t a sk s  th e  follow ing 
question : “w h a t  is  i t ,  w ith in  m a n  h im se lf, t h a t  is  a  p u rp o se  a n d  t h a t  h e  is  to 
fu r th e r  th ro u g h  h is  connection  w ith  n a tu re ? ”43 H e re  i t  m ig h t seem  as  i f  K a n t 
is  look ing  fo r  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  a g a in . B u t, d esp ite  K a n t’s  r a th e r  sloppy  
w ord ing  in  th e s e  sections, I  th in k  h e  h a s  a lre ad y  decided on  h u m a n  b e in g s  to
43 p. 317 = Ak. 429.
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fu lfill th is  ro le, since in  th e  sen ten ce  p re c e d in g  th is  question  h e  n a m e s  h u ­
m a n s  a s  th e  u ltim a te  purpose. N or does i t  seem  from  the  w ay  th a t  h e  a n ­
sw ers  th is  q u estio n  th a t  h e  cou ld  be  a s k in g  h e re  on ly  a fte r th e  f in a l p u r ­
pose .44 I t  seem s as i f  he  is  a sk in g  a f te r  th e  f in a l  pu rp o se  by way o f som e 
“p e n u lt im a te ”45 pu rpose  o f n a tu re . H en ce , th is  q u estio n  m u s t be  p o s in g  
so m e th in g  like : “W h at is  th e  f in a l p u rp o se  o f h u m a n  beings, a s  th e  u ltim a te  
p u rp o se , which is to be assisted by som e a sp e c t o f n a tu re  a s  a  sy s tem ?”
A gain , K a n t’s  w ord ing  is  con fusing  a t  b e s t, b u t  l e t  u s  accept m y w o rd in g  o f 
th e  q u e s tio n  fo r now. K an t is  n o t sa tis f ie d  w ith  “m a n ” h im se lf  b e in g  th e  f in a l  
p u rp o se , b u t  on ly  som eth ing  w ith in  h u m a n  b e in g s . T his is  lik e ly  to  be  d u e  to  
th e  fac t t h a t  p a r t  o f th e  h u m a n  c o n s titu tio n  is  m a d e  up  of n a tu re , a n d  p a r t  is  
n o t, a n d  h e  is  concerned  to  exclude th e  n a tu r a l  p a r t  from  th e  f in a l p u rp o se . 
T h e  la rg e r  q u estio n  to keep in  m ind , th e n , is  ho w  c a n  K a n t m ove from  h u ­
m a n ity 46 a s  a  possib le  c an d id a te  for th e  u l t im a te  p u rpose  to  th e  d ed u c tio n  of 
th is  f in a l  p u rpose?
T h e  qu estio n  K a n t seem s to w a n t  to  a sk , th e n , m igh t be  r e s ta te d  as, 
“H ow  does n a tu re  become a  sy stem  in  o rd e r  to  p rom o te  som e asp ec t ( th e  
“p e n u lt im a te ” purpose) in  h u m a n  b e in g s  ( th e  u lt im a te  purpose) w h ich , in  
tu rn , a s s is ts  som e aspect (fo rthcom ing  a n sw e r: freedom ) w h ich  is  th e  f in a l 
p u rp o se?” T h u s , th is  is  n o t a  q u estio n  a b o u t th e  “u ltim a te ” p u rpose , b u t  
r a th e r  w h a t  w e m ig h t call e ith e r  s im p ly  th e  “p u rp o se  of n a tu re ” or, th e  te rm  I 
w ill u se , th e  “p e n u ltim a te ” p u rp o se  o f  n a tu re .  I t  is  a  question  o f w h a t  
p u rp o se  n a tu r e  p u rsu e s  in  o rd e r to  fa c il i ta te  th e  f in a l p u rpose  o f th e  u lt im a te  
p u rp o se . To a n sw e r th is  question , K a n t  o u tlin e s  tw o possib ilities re g a rd in g  
th is  p e n u lt im a te  purpose: e ith e r  i t  “c a n  b e  fu lfilled  by  n a tu re  i ts e lf  in  i ts
44 Kant's answer to his question is “culture.” Hence, because this is a part of nature, it Mis un­
der the “principle of nature’s exclusion,” and simply cannot be a final purpose. Nor, despite his calling it 
“nature’s ultimate purpose” can it be the “ultimate purpose” since he has already concluded this is human 
beings.
45 See the following paragraph.
46 Kant, of course, does not use the term "humanity.” but "man.”
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beneficence, or e lse  [m ust] be m a n ’s a p ti tu d e  a n d  sk ill for [pursu ing] v a rio u s  
p u rp o ses  fo r w h ich  h e  c an  u se  n a tu re .”47 In  o th e r  w ords, i t  m u s t e ith e r  be  
so m e th in g  w h ich  n a tu r e  can  accom plish  e n tire ly  b y  itse lf, or so m e th in g  
w h ich  n a tu re  c a n  p ro m o te . T h is  m ay  seem  lik e  a  fa lse  a lte rn a tiv e . P e rh a p s  
w h a t K a n t i s  in d ic a tin g  is  th a t  i f  n a tu re  is  to  b e  th o u g h t o f a s  a  system , 
n a tu re  m u s t  e i th e r  b e  ab le  to ach ieve  th e  p e n u lt im a te  “fo r th e  sa k e  o f w h ich ” 
by  i ts e lf18 o r n a tu r e  m u s t  a t  le a s t  be  a  n e c e ssa ry  lin k  in  th is  c h a in  to  a  
p u rp o se  w h ich  w o u ld  b e  ach ieved  in  som e o th e r  w ay. In  th e  f i r s t  o f th e se  tw o 
a lte rn a tiv e s , K a n t d e s ig n a te s  th e  p u rp o se  a s  h a p p in e ss , a n d  in  th e  la t te r ,  a s  
cu ltu re .
K a n t, o f co u rse , re jec ts  h a p p in e ss  a s  th e  p e n u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f n a ­
tu re , ju s t  a s  in  th e  second  Critique a n d  in  th e  “Id e a  fo r a  U n iv e rsa l H is to ry  
w ith  a  C osm opo litan  In te n t .” H ere , K a n t a rg u e s  t h a t  h a p p in e ss  is  only  a n  
idea , a n d  “since  [a h u m a n ’s] u n d e rs ta n d in g  is  t ie d  to  im ag in a tio n  a n d  th e  
senses, h e  fo rm u la te s  th e  id ea  so d iversely ..., ev en  i f  [natu re] w ere  su b jec ted  
com plete ly  to  m a n ’s  choice, s ti ll  [m an] cou ld  n o t  p ossib ly  adop t a  d e fin ite  a n d  
fixed  u n iv e rs a l la w  t h a t  w ou ld  [keep] i t  i n  h a rm o n y  w ith  th a t  w av erin g  con­
cep t...”49 K a n t a g a in  m a k e s  th e  p o in t t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  sim ply  n o t desig n ed  
to receive la s tin g  h a p p in e s s  from  n a tu re , fo r n o t  on ly  a re  th e ir  conceptions o f 
h a p p in e ss  c o n s ta n tly  ch an g in g , n o t only does n a tu r e  o ften  tu r n  h o stile  on 
h u m a n s , b u t  h u m a n s  a re  also c o n s ta n tly  f ig h tin g  w ith  one an o th e r. N ow  b e ­
cau se  K a n t c la im s t h a t  h a p p in e ss  is  n e v e r v e ry  fo rthcom ing  to  h u m a n  b e ­
ings, and , fu r th e r , b e ca u se  h u m a n s  w ou ld  n e v e r  be  ab le  to  leg is la te  a  sy s tem  
w hich  w ould  le a d  to  su c h  h a p p in e ss  (due to  th e  fa c t th a t  h u m a n s  c an  n e v e r 
conceive o f a  p o ss ib le  s ta te  of h a p p in e ss ), th e  p e n u lt im a te  pu rp o se  of n a tu re  
c a n n o t be  to  m ak e  h u m a n s  hap p y ; i t  w ou ld  s im p ly  n e v e r be  successful.
47 p. 317 = Ak. 430.
48 It cannot be the ultimate “for the sake of which” for this would be the last purpose in the 
chain, and we have already seen that this purpose must be outside of nature.
49 p. 317 = Ak. 430.
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T h is  a lso  le a d s  to  th e  conclusion  th a t  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  can n o t be e i­
th e r  th e  h a p p in e s s  o f h u m a n s  o r th e  w illin g  o f h u m a n s  to  be  h a p p y  u n d e r  
a n y  c irc u m s ta n c e s  (i.e., ig n o rin g  m o ra l c o n sid e ra tio n s). O f course, th is  is  n o t 
to  sa y  t h a t  h u m a n s  c a n n o t w ill to  be h ap p y , s in c e  w e k n o w  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t 
good c a lls  fo r  h a p p in e s s  in  p ropo rtion  to  m o ra lity , b u t  on ly  to  say  t h a t  h u ­
m a n s  c a n n o t  w ill fo r h a p p in e ss  w ith o u t cond itions; h a p p in e s s  “is  th e  m a tte r  
o f a ll  h is  p u rp o se s  on  e a r th , a n d  i f  h e  m a k e s  i t  h i s  w ho le  p u rp o se  i t  m ak e s  
h im  u n a b le  to  s e t  a  f in a l p u rp o se  for h is  ow n e x is te n ce  a n d  to  h arm o n ize  
w ith  th is  f in a l  p u rp o se .”50 T his c a n n o t b e  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  because  i t  c an n o t 
be  c o h e re n tly  w illed ,51 s ince  K a n t be lieves t h a t  i t  s im p ly  is  n o t achievable, 
n o t ev en  in  p rin c ip le .
A p p a re n tly , th e re  is  a n  a d d itio n a l re a so n  to  re je c t th e  w illing  o f 
h a p p in e s s  a s  th e  f in a l  pu rpose . H a v in g  a lre a d y  re je c te d  h a p p in e ss , K a n t 
w rite s  t h a t  “w e  m u s t  f in d  ou t w h a t n a tu re  c a n  accom plish  in  o rder to  p re p a re  
m a n  fo r w h a t  h e  h im s e lf  m u s t do in  o rd e r  to  be a  f in a l  p u rp o se , a n d  [then] 
s e p a ra te  t h a t  fro m  a ll  th o se  p u rp o ses w hose a c h ie v a b ility  r e s ts  on cond itions 
t h a t  w e c a n  ex p ec t n a tu r e  to  fu lfill a lone .”52 K a n t  seem s to  be  w ritin g  th is  
w ith  th e  “p r in c ip le  o f n a tu r e ’s exclusion” in  m in d . I f  th o se  th in g s  w hich  a re  
c o n s titu te d  b y  n a tu r e  a lo n e  c an n o t be  a  f in a l p u rp o se , a n d  i f  h a p p in e ss  could  
be  a ch iev e d  b y  n a tu r e  a lone ,53 th e n  w e m u s t  e lim in a te  th is  a s  a  f in a l p u rp o se  
to  b eg in  w ith . I f  h u m a n s  a re  ju s t  a n o th e r  p a r t  o f  n a tu re ,  th e n  th ey  cou ld  n o t 
be  a  f in a l  p u rp o se  o f n a tu re . K a n t w a n ts  to  ta k e  m a n  o u t o f  th e  ch a in  of 
p u rp o ses .
W ith  th is  a im  in  m ind , K a n t c la im s th a t  w e a re  le f t  w ith  c u ltu re  as 
th e  on ly  p o ss ib ility  fo r th e  p e n u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f  n a tu re .  I f  n a tu re  is  a
50 p. 319 = Ak. 431.
51 This may give us another clue to the reason why Kant thinks the highest good must be pos­
sible to be achieved, and why God and immortality are necessary postulates of practical reason.
52 pp. 318-9 = Ak. 431.
53 In theory, for we have already seen Kant’s argument that this is not. in fact possible.
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system , i f  so m e th in g  in  h u m a n s  ( th em se lv es  b e in g  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se ) is  to 
be  th e  f in a l p u rp o se , a n d  i f  n a tu re  c a n n o t p rov ide  h a p p in e ss , th e n  th e  on ly  
p o ss ib ility  le f t  fo r th e  p e n u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu r e  is  som eth ing  w h ich  
n a tu re  cou ld  p ro m o te  fo r h u m a n s . N ow  K a n t  h a s  e lim in a te d  th e  p o ss ib ility  
th a t  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  is  th e  w illin g  o f h u m a n  h a p p in e ss , w ith  h a p p in e ss  
defined  a s  “s u m  to ta l  o f a ll  th o se  o f h is  p u rp o se s  th a t  can  [be achieved] 
th ro u g h  n a tu r e  o u ts id e  a n d  w ith in  h im .”54 K a n t  th u s  a rg u e s  th a t  culture is  
th e  p e n u lt im a te  p u rp o se  of n a tu re . T h is  is  b ecau se  i t  is  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
a n d  th e  a b ility  to  s e t  one’s ow n goals w h ic h  s e ts  h u m a n s  a p a r t  from  th e  r e s t  
o f n a tu re , t h a t  is , th e  a b ility  to  w ill f ree ly .55 H u m a n s , a s  spe lled  o u t c lea rly  
in  th e  th ir d  a n tin o m y  o f th e  Critique o f Pure Reason, a re  n o t n ecessa rily  
com plete ly  su b je c t to  m ech an ica l c a u sa lity , b u t  h a v e  th e  freedom  to  s e t  th e ir  
ow n p u rp o se s . A ga in , K a n t seem s co n ce rn e d  to  ta k e  h u m a n s  ou t o f th e  ohain  
o f p u rp o ses . T h u s , h u m a n s  a re  th e  u l t im a te  p u rp o se  on th e  condition  t h a t  
“h e  m u s t  h a v e  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  th e  w ill to  give b o th  n a tu re  a n d  
h im se lf  re fe ren c e  to  a  p u rp o se  t h a t  c an  b e  in d e p e n d e n t o f n a tu re , self- 
su ffic ien t, a n d  a  f in a l p u rp o se .”56 W h a t K a n t  concludes is  th a t  th e  
p e n u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f n a tu re  is  n o t to  m a k e  h u m a n s  happy , b u t to m a k e  
th e m  ab le  to  p ro d u ce  a n d  p u rsu e  th e ir  ow n  p u rp o ses; c u ltu re
is a  form al and subjective condition, namely, m an’s aptitude in general for
setting him self purposes, and  for using na tu re  (independently of [the elem ent
54 p. 319 = Ak. 431.
55 This is a rather strange move again. We might have expected something along these lines: if 
Kant has eliminated the things which humans can will with the intent that nature fulfill them, then we are 
still left with those things which humans can will freely, i.e., in complete unconcern for the outcome. Do 
humans have this ability to will without concern for the compliance of nature? Certainly they do; they can 
will to will in accord with the categorical imperative. While this seems to be a strong move here, it also 
seems to take more for granted that Kant apparently desires, namely several of the conclusions of the Cri­
tique o f Practical Reason. Kant makes a different move, and this supports the original premise here that 
Kant is attempting to reach many conclusions of the second Critique through the first and third.
56 p. 318 = Ak. 431. Indeed, as we learn in the Religion, a person who subjugates the moral 
law to the principle of happiness voluntarily chooses to abdicate his/her freedom, and act as if they were 
merely an animal, merely subject to natural laws.
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of] nature in m an’s determ ination of purposes) as a m eans [for achieving them] 
in conformity w ith the m axim s of his free purposes generally.57
T h is  accords w ell w ith  K a n t’s  s ta te m e n ts  in  sec tio n  82 b o th  th a t  th e  f in a l 
p u rp o se  canno t be  fo u n d  in  n a tu re ,  a n d  th a t  th e  u ltim a te  pu rpose  c a n n o t be  
g iven  w ith o u t re fe rence  to  th e  f in a l  purpose .58
N a tu re , i t  seem s, h a s  tw o  p a r ts  w hich m a k e  u p  th e  p e n u ltim a te  p u r ­
pose. T he f ir s t  is  th e  c u ltu re  o f sk ill. T his is  “a n  a p titu d e  to p rom o te  p u r ­
poses generally .”59 T h is  seem s to  be  n o t so m u ch  th e  ab ility  to  ach ieve  p u r ­
p oses once th ey  h a v e  b een  se t, b u t  r a th e r  w h a t m ig h t  be  ca lled  th e  
“m otiva tion” to s e t  p u rp o se s  to  b eg in  w ith . T h is  is  b e s t  accom plished  by n a ­
tu r e  th ro u g h  th e  un so c iab le  so c iab ility  of h u m a n s  w h ich  lea d  to  a n  in te rn a l  
a n d  e x te rn a l c o n s titu tio n .60 U n d e r  th e  co n stan t co nd ition  of an tag o n ism , 
q u ite  v io len t a t  f i r s t  b u t  re se m b lin g  som eth ing  l ik e  fr ien d ly  com petition  in  
th e  la s t  stages, h u m a n s  a re  m o tiv a te d  to se t th em se lv e s  pu rposes; h u m a n s  
a re  n o t designed  fo r h a p p in e ss , b u t  r a th e r  for th e  developm en t o f u n d e r­
s ta n d in g . T he second  e le m e n t o f  th e  p e n u ltim a te  p u rp o se  is  th e  c u ltu re  o f 
d isc ip line . T h is is  th e  a s s is t in g  o f “th e  will in  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  a n d  se lec­
tio n  o f i ts  p u rposes,”61 in  o th e r  w ords, “th e  p u rp o se  o f m ak in g  room  for th e  
developm ent o f o u r h u m a n ity , n am ely , by m a k in g  ev er m ore h e ad w a y  
a g a in s t  the  c ru d en ess  a n d  v ehem ence  of those in c lin a tio n s  th a t  be long  to  u s  
p r im a rily  as a n im a ls  a n d  th a t  in te r fe re  m ost w ith  o u r  ed u ca tio n  for o u r
57 p. 319 = Ak. 431. Also: “Hence the only [thing] which can give man’s existence an absolute 
value, and by reference to which the existence of the world can have a final purpose, is... the value that he 
can only give himself, and that consists in what he does, how and on what principles he acts, not as a link 
in nature, but in the freedom of his power of desire...” (p. 332 = Ak. 443).
58 Also: “But suppose even there were rational beings [in the world], but that their reason were 
able only to posit the value of the existence of things in nature’s relation to these beings (their well-being), 
but not able to procure that value originally on its own (in its freedom): then there would indeed be pur­
poses in the world (relative ones), but no final (i.e., absolute) purpose...” (p. 339 = Ak. 449).
59 p. 319 = Ak. 431-2.
60 p. 320 = Ak. 432-3. See also: “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent.”
61 p. 319 = Ak. 432.
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h ig h e r  vocation ...”62 W h a t seem s to be th e  p a r t ic u la r ly  im p o r ta n t  ro le  of th e  
c u ltu re  o f d isc ip line  is  once ag a in  p u llin g  h u m a n s  o u t o f  th e  c h a in  o f n a tu re , 
m a k in g  “g re a t h e a d w a y  a g a in s t  th e  ty ra n n y  of m a n ’s  p ro p e n s ity  to  th e  
se n se s , a n d  so p re p a r[ in g ]  h im  for a  sovere ign ty  in  w h ich  re a so n  a lone  is to 
d o m in a te ,”63 i.e., a s s is t in g  th e ir  ab ility  to  w ill free ly .64 T h ese  a re  th e  two 
p a r t s  o f n a tu re  w h ich  p ro m o te  h u m a n s’ ab ility  b o th  to  c re a te  a n d  to  p u rsu e  
p u rp o se s  in  g en era l.68
I f  K a n t h a s  a rg u e d  leg itim ate ly  up  to  th is  p o in t, th e n  K a n t m ay  be 
ab le  to  m ak e  th e  l a s t  s te p  to w ard  th e  deduction  o f th e  f in a l  p u rp o se . K a n t 
h a s  a rg u e d  th a t  n a tu r e  p rom o tes  h u m a n s’ “a p ti tu d e  in  g e n e ra l” fo r se ttin g  
a n d  ach iev in g  p u rp o se s . B u t  K a n t h a s  also a rg u e d  t h a t  i f  su ch  p u rp o ses a re  
only  th e  p u rs u i t  of h a p p in e s s , h u m a n s  w ill fa il  in  th i s  p u rs u i t .  So i f  th ese  
a re  th e  on ly  p u rp o se s  o f h u m a n s , n a tu re  cou ld  n o t  b e  th o u g h t  o f a s  a  system , 
a n d  th e re  could  be n o  f in a l  purpose. B u t K a n t h a s  a lre a d y  a rg u e d  in  th e  so­
lu tio n  to  th e  a n tin o m y  o f th e  th ird  Critique t h a t  w e m u s t  th in k  o f n a tu re  as a  
sy s te m  o f  p u rposes. H ence , because h u m a n s  c a n n o t ach iev e  h a p p in e ss , a n d  
b e ca u se  n a tu re  does p ro m o te  th e  ab ility  of h u m a n s  to  fo rm u la te  p u rposes no t 
n e c e ss ita te d  by  n a tu re , th e  f in a l pu rpose  m u s t b e  th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f freely  
w illed  pu rp o ses. T h is  le a d s  K a n t to conclude, f in a lly , t h a t
if things in the world, which are dependent beings w ith regard to their exis­
tence, require a  suprem e cause th a t acts in term s of purposes, then  m an is the 
final purpose of creation. For without m an the chain  of m utually  subordinated 
purposes would not have a complete basis. Only in  m an, and  even in him only 
as a moral subject [i.e., as a freely willing creatmre], do we find unconditioned
62 p. 321 = Ak. 433.
63 p. 321 = Ak. 434.
64 See also: pp. 231-2 = Ak. 356-7.
65 We may well wonder why such a specific conclusion is necessary, i.e., why Kant does not 
simply conclude that the purpose of nature is to create and support human existence. The answer seems to 
be that mere human existence is always subject to the possibility of being simply a means; there always 
remains the question of why humans had to exist in the first place. And while human existence is a nec­
essary prerequisite for human free willing, it is not the final prerequisite. See especially: p. 372 = Ak.
477.
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legislation regarding purposes. It is this legislation, therefore, which alone en­
ables m an to be a final purpose to which all of n a tu re  is teleologically subordi­
nated .66
K a n t  se em s to h av e  su ccessfu lly  p roved  th a t  free  w illin g  is  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  
o f  a ll  o f c rea tio n , t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f  n a tu re , a n d  th a t  
th e  p e n u lt im a te  p u rp o se  o f  n a tu re  is  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  c u ltu re .
W hile  w e m a y  th in k  i t  r a th e r  m ore th a n  fo r tu ito u s  t h a t  K a n t’s a rg u ­
m e n t  fro m  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se s  le a d s  h im  to th e  conclusion  t h a t  free  (m oral) 
w illin g  is  th e  f in a l p u rp o se , i t  does n o t seem  c irc u la r . C e r ta in ly  K a n t h a s  
h u m a n  b e in g s  a lre a d y  in  m in d  a s  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  o f  n a tu r e  a n d  th e ir  
a b ili ty  fo r free  w illing  a s  th e  f in a l pu rpose , b u t  i t  is  n o t  uncom m on  to h av e  
th e  conclu sion  in  m in d  befo re  b eg in n in g  th e  p roof. Y e t w h a t  is  p e rh a p s  of 
m o re  specific  concern  is  th e  v e ry  connection  b e tw ee n  th e  u lt im a te  a n d  fin a l 
p u rp o se s ; even  th o u g h  K a n t  is  w o rk in g  “u p w a rd ” in  h is  p ro o f o f a  f in a l p u r ­
pose , h e  m a in ta in s  t h a t  w e c a n n o t decide on  a n  u lt im a te  p u rp o se  u n le ss  i t  
c a n  b e  fo u n d  in  re fe ren ce  to  a n  f in a l pu rp o se . B u t  th is  too seem s acceptab le . 
S in c e  w e h a v e  a lre ad y  a s su m e d  t h a t  th e re  is  a  f in a l p u rp o se  to  be  found , due  
to  th e  so lu tio n  o f th e  a n tin o m y , K a n t m ay  s im p ly  sa y  t h a t  w h a te v e r  th e  u l­
t im a te  p u rp o se  is, i t  w o u ld  s im p ly  n o t be a n  u l t im a t e  p u rp o se  i f  i t  d id  n o t 
le a d  to  or a t  le a s t  p rov ide  p a r t  o f th e  fo u n d a tio n  fo r th e  f in a l p u rp o se ; th is  is  
s im p ly  w h a t  i t  means to  b e  a n  u lt im a te  p u rp o se . A n d  K a n t  seem s r ig h t  to 
su s p e c t t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  a  good c a n d id a te  fo r th is  p u rp o se , b ecau se  o f th e ir  
su p e rse n s ib le  n a tu re , a lre a d y  g iven  in  th e  f i r s t  Critique. I f  so m e th in g  a p ­
p e a r s  a m iss  in  th e  proof, th is  connection  does n o t seem  to  be  it.
In  add ition , g iven  t h a t  K a n t  h a s  a lre a d y  s ta te d  t h a t  th e  cond ition  for 
a t te m p tin g  su ch  a  p ro o f in  th e  f i r s t  p lace  is  th e  m ere ly  regulative s ta tu s  of 
e x tr in s ic  teleology, i t  does n o t  seem  th a t  K a n t h a s  p ro v en  too m uch . K a n t 
c a n n o t a n d  does n o t c la im  t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  objectively  th e  u ltim a te  p u rpose
66 p. 323 = Ak. 435.
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o f n a tu re , or th a t  f re e  w ill is  objectively th e  f in a l  p u rp o se , b u t m ere ly  th a t  if  
a ll  o f n a tu re  w as c re a te d  by  a  d iv ine  a u th o r, a n d  i f  w e a re  le a d  to  a sk  th e  
re a so n  w hy i t  w as c re a te d , th e n  free  w ill m u s t  b e  t h a t  f in a l pu rp o se . In  fact, 
K a n t  sp ends a ll  o f  th e  n e x t  section  e x p la in in g  w h y  su c h  a  p roof does n o t a n d  
cou ld  no t le a d  to  k n o w led g e  of God. T h e re  a re  se v e ra l s ta te m e n ts  in  section  
85  m a in ta in in g  t h a t  w ith  re g a rd  to th e  f in a l p u rp o se , “n a tu re  does n o t te ll u s  
an y th in g , n o r ev e r w ill, w h ile  yet, a p a r t  from  th is  f in a l  in te n tio n , w e can  
form  no com m on re fe re n c e  p o in t for a ll  th e se  n a tu r a l  pu rp o ses, no  a d e q u a te  
teleological p r in c ip le ...”67 Also, g iven K a n t’s b e lie f  in  th e  possib ility  o r p rob ­
a b ility  of life  on  o th e r  p la n e ts , i t  does n o t se em  t h a t  K a n t’s  a rg u m e n ts  sh o u ld  
b e  th o u g h t to  be  too species-cen tric . K a n t’s a rg u m e n t m ig h t ap p ly  to  a n y  
c re a tu re  o f f in ite  in te llig e n c e  w h ich  is  c o n s titu te d  a s  p a r t  n a tu re  a n d  p a r t  
rea so n .
K a n t seem s to  h a v e  g o tten  r a th e r  f a r  in to  th e  conclusions o f th e  sec­
o n d  Critique th ro u g h  th e  f i r s t  a n d  th ird , a n d  g iv en  h is  conclusion  th a t  free  
w ill is  th e  f in a l p u rp o se , K a n t  seem s free  to  m ove o n  to  ad d itio n a l re la te d  a r ­
g u m en ts . In  th e  conclu sion  to  section  84, K a n t  f i r s t  a llu d e s  to th e  fac t th a t  a  
fre e  w ill is  su ch  t h a t  “th e  la w  in  te rm s o f w h ich  th e s e  b e in g s  m u s t d e te rm in e  
th e i r  p u rp o ses is  p re s e n te d  by  th e se  v e ry  b e in g s  a s  u n co n d itio n ed  a n d  in d e ­
p e n d e n t of co nd itions o f n a tu re , a n d  y e t n e c e ssa ry  in  its e lf .”68 W hile  th is  
p o in t is  no t a rg u e d  fo r  h e re , i t  is , o f course, th e  conclu sion  to  K a n t’s a rg u ­
m e n t  fo r th e  n e ce ss ity  of th e  ca tego rica l im p e ra tiv e  h e  sp e lls  ou t in  th e  
Grundlegung. S u ch  a  conclusion  f its  n icely  w ith  K a n t’s  cla im  th a t  th e  f in a l 
p u rp o se  m u s t be  u n c o n d itio n e d  by  n a tu re , y e t n e ce ssa ry , th o u g h  th e  conclu­
s io n  c an n o t be  a rg u e d  fo r w ith o u t th o se  p re m ise s  in  th e  Grundlegung.
In  a d d itio n , K a n t  a lso  a llu d es  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  n ecessa ry  object of 
h u m a n  free  (m oral) w illin g  is  th e  h ig h e s t good, “th e  object th a t  th is  b e in g  can
67 p. 329 = Ak. 440.
68 p. 323 = Ak. 435.
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se t befo re  i ts e l f  a s  its  h ig h es t p u rp o se .”69 T h is is  a rg u e d  fo r in  th e  f irs t  an d  
seco n d  Critique, a n d  K a n t gives a  v e ry  b r ie f  re s ta te m e n t o f su ch  a n  a rg u ­
m e n t  in  a  foo tno te  to section  84. A g a in , th is  seem s to  f i t  n icely  w ith  K a n t’s 
a rg u m e n t a b o u t th e  f in a l p u rp o se , b u t  i t  c an n o t be  a d e q u a te ly  su p p o rte d  
w ith o u t a d d itio n a l p rem ises .70 T h is  p o s itin g  of th e  h ig h e s t good th e n  gives 
K a n t  a  f u r th e r  m ea n s  to w a rd  th in k in g  a b o u t God:
in referring natu ra l purpose to an  intelligent world cause, as the character of 
our reason forces us to do, we now have a principle th a t  allows us to conceive 
of the  n a tu re  and properties of th is  first cause, i.e., the  supreme basis of the 
kingdom of purposes, and hence allows us to give determ ination to the concept 
of th is cause.71
G iven  th e  “lin k in g ” n a tu re  o f th e  th i r d  Critique, K a n t u n d o u b ted ly  t h in k s  
t h a t  th e  a rg u m e n t from  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se s  to  th e  f in a l p u rp o se , w h ich  th e n  
a llow s fo r su b se q u e n t a rg u m e n ts  fo r th e  h ig h es t good a n d  th e  n a tu re  of God, 
le n d s  f u r th e r  c re d it to h is  p h ilo so p h ica l system .
IV.
K a n t’s  conclusion a b o u t th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  of n a tu r e  lea d s  to  som e in ­
te re s t in g  consequences. T he f i r s t  i s  t h a t  th e  “Id ea  fo r a  U n iv e rsa l H isto ry  
w ith  a  C osm opo litan  In te n t” is  n o t re je c te d  by  th e  th ird  Critique, a s  m an y  
c o m m e n ta to rs  h a v e  claim ed, b u t  i s  in s te a d  supported . F re e  (m oral) w illing  is 
th e  f in a l  p u rp o se . N a tu re  as a  sy s te m  is  designed  to  su p p o r t su ch  w illing , 
th o u g h  i t  c a n n o t cause  i t  d irec tly . T h e  w ay  th a t  n a tu re  su p p o rts  su c h  w illing 
is  to  p ro v id e  th e  conditions n e ce ssa ry  fo r  i ts  fo rm ation  a n d  exercise. A nd  th is  
su p p o r t is  c u ltu re . B u t c u ltu re  a s  “t h a t  co n stitu tio n  o f h u m a n  re la tio n s  
w h e re  th e  im p a irm e n t to freedom  w h ic h  re su lts  from  th e  m u tu a lly  conflicting
69 p. 323 = Ak. 435.
70 These premises are given in the Critique o f Pure Reason (A 804-19 = B 832-47), the Cri­
tique o f Practical Reason, later in the third Critique, and modified slightly again in the Religion within 
the Limits o f Reason Alone.
71 p. 333 = Ak. 444.
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freedom  [of th e  in d iv id u a ls] is  c o u n te re d  by  law fu l a u th o rity  w ith in  a  w hole 
ca lled  civil society”72 a n d  c u ltu re  a s  “a  cosmopolitan w hole, a  sy s te m  o f a ll 
s ta te s  t h a t  a re  in  d a n g e r o f a ffec tin g  on  a n o th e r  d e trim e n ta lly ”73 s im p ly  is 
th e  “u n so c iab le  sociability” w h ich  K a n t  sp e lls  o u t in  th e  “Id e a .” K a n t  even 
re p e a ts  h is  n o tio n  from  th e  “Id e a ” h e re  in  th e  th ird  Critique t h a t  “th is  s h in ­
in g  m ise ry  h a s  to  do w ith  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f m a n ’s n a tu r a l  p red isp o sitio n s , 
a n d  [so] n a tu r e  s t i l l  ach ieves i ts  ow n  p u rp o se , even i f  that purpose is not 
ours.”7A H u m a n s  re q u ire  a n ta g o n ism , a lth o u g h , ev en tu a lly , p e a c e fu l a n ­
tag o n ism , in  o rd e r to  c u ltiv a te  th e ir  a b il i ty  to  s e t  them se lves p u rp o se s . 
H ence, i t  i s  n a tu r e ’s  resp o n sib ility  to  p ro m o te  th is  condition  o f an ta g o n ism , 
even  th o u g h  th is  s ta te  m ig h t n o t b e  o f  o u r  ow n choosing.75
A lso, i f  free  w illing  is  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se , a n d  K a n t is  r ig h t  to  m a in ta in  
t h a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  th e  p ro p e r  ob jec t o f su ch  a  will, th e n  w e h a v e  fu r th e r  
su p p o r t o f th e  im p o rtan ce  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good. W e m ig h t ca ll th e  h ig h e s t  
good th e  “f in a l  object" since i t  i s  w h a t  a  f re e  w ill is  ob liga ted  to  w ill. A n d  if  
th is  is  so, th e n  w e h a v e  m ore  re a so n  fo r th e  ra tio n a l hope (glaube) fo r th e  
ex is ten ce  o f God. I f  w e m u s t w ill th e  h ig h e s t  good, th e n  w e m u s t  a lso  w ill for
72 p. 320 = Ak. 432.
73 p. 320 = Ak. 432.
74 p. 320 = Ak. 432. Italics added for emphasis. Kant writes that the final purpose, which 
makes nature into a system, “[assists physical teleology by] directing our attention to the purposes of na­
ture and by [inviting us] to investigate the unfathomably great art that lies hidden behind nature’s forms, 
so that the ideas that pure practical reason supplies may find incidental confirmation in natural purposes,” 
(p. 334 = Ak. 445).
75 While the following discussion (in this footnote) could be placed in a number of places, let 
me place it here. Holly L. Wilson points out two important things in a footnote to her “A Gap in Ameri­
can Kant Scholarship: Pragmatic Anthropology as the Application of Kantian Moral Philosophy,” in 
Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kant-Kongresses, ed. Gerhard Funk, Band n.2 (Bonn: Bouvier 
Verlag, 1991), 403-419. She notes that Auxter’s discussion of moral teleology (in Kant's Moral Teleol­
ogy) is “dissatisfying since his notion of teleology is limited to human volition, and seems to mean little 
more than intentional behavior, using means for ends. Human teleology [however] is lived out in all of its 
natural predispositions. He also claims nature is adequately described by mechanism, and that nature has 
no teleological order which is conducive to human morality,” (407, fn.). But Auxter must be wrong, for 
as we have seen, and as Wilson concludes, “This contradicts Kant’s explicit claim that nature has an ulti­
mate end for the human species which contributes to the development of morality in human beings; it can 
produce the formal subjective condition of morality, which is the aptitude for arbitrary purposes,” (407. 
fn.).
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th e  cond itions in  w h ich  th e  h ig h e s t  good cou ld  com e in to  being ; th is  cond ition  
is  th e  ex is tence  o f a  m o ra l c re a to r  o f th e  w orld . Aga in , i t  is  no  coincidence 
th a t  K a n t  m oves from  sec tio n  84  to  h is  e x p la n a tio n  t h a t  th is  p roo f does n o t 
p rove  th e  ex istence  o f God, a n d  from  th e re  to  a  d isc u ss io n  o f th e  m oral p ro o f 
fo r th e  ex is tence  o f God. W hile  th e  p ro o f fo r th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  does n o t p ro v e  
th e  ex istence  of God, i ts  im p lica tio n s  a re  w elcom e co n firm a tio n  o f th e  u n ity  o f  
a ll  th re e  Critiques.
F in a lly , w h ile  w e  c a n  on ly  h in t  a t  i t s  im p o rta n c e  h e re  a n d  save  a  fu ll  
d iscu ssio n  for a  la te r  c h a p te r , w e see  in  K a n t’s d isc u ss io n  o f c u ltu re  th e  im ­
p o r ta n t  p rin c ip le  n o t on ly  t h a t  th e  w ill c a n  be  in flu e n ce d , b u t  t h a t  th e re  a re  
co n d itio n s u n d e r  w h ich  fre e  w illin g  is  b e tte r  p ro m o ted . P e rh a p s  th e  m ost 
im p o r ta n t  cond ition  is  a  co llection  of in d iv id u a lly  so v e re ig n  n a tio n s  w ith  r e ­
p u b lic a n  c o n s titu tio n s  t h a t  a re  n o t  a t  w a r  w ith  one  a n o th e r , fo rm in g  a  cos­
m o p o litan  w hole, “fo r on ly  in  th is  c o n s titu tio n  o f h u m a n  re la tio n s  can  ou r 
n a tu r a l  p red isp o sitio n s  develop  m ax im ally .”76 A s w e sa w  w ith  th e  “Id ea ” a n d  
a s  is  re in fo rced  in  th is  Critique, K a n t su rm ise s  t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  sim ply  n o t 
so c o n s titu te d  to  b e  c o n te n t w ith  th e i r  s i tu a tio n  fro m  m o m e n t to  m om ent, a n d  
th is  le a d s  to  u n re s t  b o th  w ith in  a n d  b e tw een  p e rso n s  a n d  n a tio n s . U n d e r 
th e se  conditions, p e rso n s  a re  n o t n a tu ra lly  co n te n t, a n d  a re  fo rced  to se t p u r ­
poses fo r them se lves, b o th  to w a rd  th e  e n d  o f h a p p in e s s  a n d  th e  e n d  o f m o ra l­
ity , a n d  to  a tte m p t to  ach ieve  th o se  p u rp o ses  in  th e  w orld . In  add ition , K a n t 
m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  fin e  a r t s  a n d  th e  sciences c a n  in c lin e  u s  aw ay  from  th e  
d e m a n d s  o f ou r n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s  or a t  l e a s t  le s se n  th o se  dem ands, m a k ­
in g  u s  “n o t in d ee d  m o ra lly  b e t te r  fo r society, b u t  s t i l l  c iv ilized  fo r it .”77 W ith  
K a n t’s  d iscussion  of th e  c u ltu re  o f sk ill a n d  o f  d isc ip lin e , th e  w ill can  be in ­
fluenced , a n d  th e re  e x is t b e t te r  a n d  w orse co n d itio n s fo r  th e  p rom otion  of 
fre e  w illing .
76 p. 320 = Ak. 432. This is an additional confirmation of the harmony between the third Cri­
tique and the “Idea.”
77 p. 321 =Ak. 433.
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In  a d d itio n , a n d  by  w ay  o f t r a n s i t io n  to  th e  n ex t ch ap te r, w e m ay  also 
no tice  t h a t  th e  S ta te  a n d  teleology a re  b o u n d  up  to g e th e r in  a  in te rd e p e n d e n t 
w ay. W hile  a  fu r th e r  d iscussion  o f th is  is  g iven  below , m en tio n  o f  th is  is  de­
s ira b le  h e re , w ith  K a n t’s d iscussion  o f  c u ltu re  f re sh  in  o u r m in d A s w e saw  
espec ia lly  in  th e  “Id e a ,” th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  a n  in te rn a l  c o n stitu tio n  fo r  a  S ta te  
a llow s i ts  in h a b i ta n ts  to b e t te r  p u r s u e  th e i r  ow n pu rposes, w ith o u t th e  th re a t  
of u n re s tra in e d  d e v as ta tio n . U n so c iab le  soc iab ility  lead s to  th e  fo rm a tio n  of 
a  S ta te . A n ta g o n ism  w ill a lw ays e x is t, how ever, since no one p e rs o n  c a n  
sa tis fy  a ll  h is /h e r  n a tu r a l  d e s ire s  fo r  h a p p in e s s  w ith o u t in te r fe r in g  w ith  th e  
fu lf illm e n t o f  th e  d esires  o f a n o th e r . A s th e  fo rm a tio n  of a  S ta te  a llow s for 
p e rso n s  to  s e t  th em se lv es  p u rp o se s  m o re  effectively  a n d  m ore free ly , p e rso n s  
w ill th e re b y  b e  in  a  p osition  to  w ill m o re  a n d  m ore  in  accord w ith  th e  m o ra l 
law . As th e y  a re  in c re as in g ly  f re e d  fro m  th e  th r e a t  of violence, th e y  c a n  w ill 
m ore  free ly  a n d  effectively. T h is  is , o f  co u rse , no g u a ra n te e  th a t  p e rs o n s  w ill 
in  fa c t becom e m ore  m oral, b u t  th e  s i tu a t io n  h a s  opened  its e lf  u p  fo r  th is  
g re a te r  p o ss ib ility . F ina lly , i f  p e rso n s  a re  w illin g  m ore in  accord  w ith  th e  
m o ra l law , in c re a s in g ly  w illin g  a n d  a c t in g  from  du ty , th e n  th e y  w ill h a v e  th e  
h ig h e s t good a s  th e i r  f in a l object. B u t  s in ce  p a r t  o f th e  h ig h e s t good in c lu d es  
th e  concep t t h a t  th e  freedom  o f each  p e rs o n  sh o u ld  be m ax im ized  a s  lo n g  as  
i t  does n o t  in te r fe re  w ith  th e  freed o m  o f o th e rs , a n d  since th e  S ta te  is  th e  
m o st e ffic ien t m e a n s  o f se cu rin g  s u c h  freed o m  betw een  p e rso n s  a n d  b e tw een  
n a tio n s , th e n  th is  n a tu ra lly  le a d s  to  p e o p le  w illin g  for a n  effective S ta te  a n d  
a  co sm opo litan  w orld . H ence th e  in te rd e p e n d e n c e  o f m ora lity  a n d  th e  p o li­
tics, a n d  th e  l in k  b e tw een  teleology a n d  th e  S ta te .





The Highest Good and Two Additional Links between Nature and Morality
L
In. C h a p te r  S ix  above n o t on ly  d id  we secu re  th e  concep t of teleology 
as a  re g u la tiv e  one, w e also  e n c o u n te re d  th e  f ir s t  o f th re e  a rg u m e n ts  w hich 
lin k s  th e  n a tu r a l  w orld  to  th e  m o ra l w orld, i.e., w h ich  l in k s  h u m a n s  in  th e ir  
m oral c ap a c ity  b o th  w ith  h u m a n s  in  th e ir  n a tu ra l  c ap a c ity  a n d  w ith  n a tu re  
as a  w hole. T h e  f ir s t  a rg u m e n t w a s  th e  “u p w ard ” p ro o f o f h u m a n s  a s  th e  fi­
n a l p u rp o se  o f  n a tu re , o ccu rring  i s  sections 82 th ro u g h  84, a s  w ell a s  th e  
suggestion  in  K a n t’s d iscussion  o f  c u ltu re  th a t  civ il society  m ay  o p era te  
teleologically . B u t  th e re  a re  tw o a d d itio n a l a rg u m en ts . T h e  second  a rg u ­
m en t is  f a m ilia r  to  bo th  th e  f i r s t  a n d  second Critique, a n d  re a so n s  from  h u ­
m an s  a s  m o ra l ag en ts  to  G od a n d  th e n  to  n a tu re  a s  th e  locus fo r th e  h ig h es t 
good. A fte r sp e llin g  o u t th is  a rg u m e n t, w e sh a ll ta k e  a  m o m e n t to  a g a in  a d ­
d ress th e  q u e s tio n  of th e  location  o f  th e  h ig h es t good, befo re  p roceed ing  to th e  
n ex t a rg u m e n t. T he  th ird  a rg u m e n t is  a lso  u n iq u e  to  th e  Critique o f Judg­
ment, a n d  a rg u e s  th a t  th e  ex p erien ce  o f b eau ty  a n d  n a tu r a l  p u rp o se s  gives 
u s  a t  le a s t  th e  hope  th a t  th e  w o rld  h a s  b een  c re a te d  w ith  a  m o ra l p u rp o se  in  
m ind. O f cou rse , none  o f th e se  a rg u m e n ts  for a  te leo log ica l l in k  betw een  
h u m a n s  a n d  n a tu r e  can  give p ro o f  th a t  such  a  lin k  m u s t  ex is t.
n.
N ow  K a n t’s a rg u m e n t in  sec tio n s 82 th ro u g h  84  seem s to  be  a  specific 
a tte m p t to  re a so n  “u p w a rd ” from  n a tu r a l  p u rp o ses to  th e  f in a l  pu rpose , be­
g in n in g  w ith  th e  a ssu m p tio n  of n a tu r e  as a  system . B u t in  sec tions 87 a n d  
88, K a n t a tte m p ts  a  p roo f w hich  m oves in  th e  opposite d irec tion , n am ely




“d o w nw ard ,” b eg in n in g  w ith  free ly  w illing  ag en ts  a s  th e  s ta r t in g  p re m ise  a n d  
m o v in g  b ack  th ro u g h  h u m a n s , to  God, a n d  f in a lly  to w a rd  n a tu re . As K a n t 
says:
There is a physical teleology; it provides us with a  basis th a t gives us sufficient 
proof... for assum ing the  existence of an intelligent cause of the world. But we 
also find in ourselves, and  even more so in the general concept of a  rational 
being endowed w ith freedom (of its causality), a  m oral teleology.
S tr ic tly  sp eak in g , K a n t’s  “u p w a rd ” p roo f cou ld  n o t le a d  to  a  p ro o f o f  God, 
sin ce  su c h  a  p re m ise  h a d  to  be a ssu m e d  in  o rd e r  fo r th e re  to  be  th e  poss ib ility  
o f  e x tr in s ic  teleo logy to  b e g in  w ith . W ith  th e  “dow nw ard” p ro o f o f m o ra l 
te leo logy , K a n t ho p es to  g ive a  ra t io n a l  p roof fo r th e  b e lie f  in  th e  ex is ten ce  of 
G od, a n d  a f te r  th a t ,  to  sh o w  th a t  i f  th e  w orld  w as c re a te d , th e n  i t  m u s t  be  
teleo log ical, su p p o rtin g  th e  h ig h e s t good. K a n t is  now  m o v ing  aw ay  from  th e  
e x a m in a tio n  o f w h a t  c a n  b e  g a in e d  from  a  p h y sica l teleology, to  w h a t  c a n  be 
d isco v ered  by  u s in g  a  m o ra l teleology. T his is  a  p ro o f s im ila r  to  th e  ones 
g iv en  in  th e  f i r s t  a n d  seco n d  Critiques, a n d  seem s to  b e  p re fe rre d  b y  K a n t  
ov er th e  “u p w a rd ” proof.
T he  f i r s t  p rem ise  in  th e  a rg u m e n t is  th a t  h u m a n s  h a v e  a  free  w ill, 
th e  a b ili ty  to sp o n ta n eo u s ly  g e n e ra te  uncond itioned  p u rp o se s . As su ch , th is  
free  w ill is  sub jec t to  th e  c a teg o rica l im p era tiv e , so t h a t  i t  is  n o t s im p ly  free, 
b u t  a lso  b o u n d  by  m o ra l n ecessity . T h is  is a rg u e d  fo r m o st ex ten siv e ly  in  th e  
seco n d  Critique a n d  th e  Grundlegung.1 B ecause  th e  m o ra l law  is  n e ce ssa ry  
a n d  n o t s im p ly  a  m e a n s  to  a n y th in g  e lse, th is  a u to m a tic a lly  m ak e s  h u m a n s  a  
n a tu r a l  c a n d id a te  fo r b e in g  th e  f in a l p u rp o se  o f c rea tio n , since  “m o ra l law s... 
p re sc r ib e  so m e th in g  to re a so n  a n d  th e y  p rescribe  i t  a s  a  p u rp o se  n o t su b jec t 
to  a  cond ition , a n d  h en ce  j u s t  a s  th e  concept o f a  f in a l p u rp o se  re q u ire s .”2 
Im p o rta n tly , th is  is  n o t to  sa y  th a t  h u m a n  b e in g s are th e  f in a l pu rp o se , b u t
1 See also: p. 362 = Ak. 468.
: p. 339 = Ak. 449.
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r a th e r  “t h a t  i f  th e re  is  in d e e d  to  b e  a  final purpose th a t  re a so n  h a s  to 
in d ic a te  a  p rio ri, th e n  i t  c a n  on ly  be  man  (or a n y  ra tio n a l b e in g  in  th e  w orld) 
under moral laws.”3 T h u s, K a n t  m a in ta in s  w e h av e  th e  fac t t h a t  h u m a n  
b e in g s  a re  m o ra l ag en ts , b u t  on ly  th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  h u m a n s  a re  th e  f in a l 
p u rp o se  o f  c rea tion : “i f  th is  is  n o t so, th e n  th e  ex istence  o f th e  w o rld  is  e ith e r  
b a se d  on  no  p u rp o se  a t  a ll  in  th e  c au se , o r on ly  on  p u rp o ses  w ith o u t a  f in a l 
p u rp o se .”4 S u ch  a  p o ss ib ility  is  a  d ep lo rab le  b u t  possib le  s itu a tio n .
H u m a n s , co n sid ered  h e re  a s  o r ig in a to rs  o f a n  u n c o n d itio n ed  series, 
a re  n o t d e te rm in e d  by  n a tu re , a n d  a re  o u ts id e  o f n a tu re  in  th is  re sp ec t. 
H ence , K a n t  w rite s  th a t  w e a re  no  lo n g e r concerned  w ith  “a  p u rp o se  o f (i.e., 
w ith in )  n a tu re ,  so f a r  a s  n a tu r e  [a lready ] ex is ts , b u t  w ith  th e  p u rp o se  o f th e  
[very] ex is ten ce  o f n a tu re  a n d  a ll  i t s  a rra n g e m e n ts . In  o th e r  w ords, w e a re  
co n ce rn ed  w ith  th e  u ltim a te  purpose o f creation...”5 I f  h u m a n  b e in g s  w ere  
co n ce rn ed  on ly  w ith  “th e ir  w ell-being" b u t  w ere  n o t ab le  to  free ly  c re a te  v a lu e  
fo r th em se lv e s , “th e n  th e re  w o u ld  in d e e d  be  p u rp o ses  in  th e  w orld ... b u t  no 
fin a l... p u rp o se , b ecau se  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  su c h  ra t io n a l  b e in g s w o u ld  s t i l l  a l­
w ays b e  p u rp o se less .”6
N ow  K a n t could  h a v e  b e g u n  th is  p ro o f in  th e  sam e  w ay  a s  h e  b eg an  
th e  “u p w a rd ” proof, n a m e ly  w ith  th e  a ssu m p tio n  o f (reg u la tiv e) e x tr in s ic  
teleo logy  w h ich  au to m a tica lly  b r in g s  in  th e  re fe rence  o f n a tu r e  to  a  d iv ine  
a u th o r ,
but the principle that [allows us to] refer the world to a supreme cause, as de­
ity, because some of the beings in it are morally destined for a purpose, does 
not do this by merely supplementing the psysicoteleological basis for proving
3 p. 338 = Ak. 448.
4 p. 339 = Ak. 450.
5 p. 332 = Ak. 443. This too should give us reason to consider Kant’s discussion in sections 
82-84 as something different from the more standard “downward” proof.
6 p. 339 = Ak. 449.
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[the existence of th is deity], in which case it would necessarily presuppose th a t 
basis. Rather, it is sufficient even by itself to provide th is reference...7
In  o th e r  w ords, w h ile  e x tr in s ic  teleology n e c e ss ita te s  th e  re fe re n c in g  of n a ­
tu r e  to  a  d iv ine  a u th o r  a s  a n  o rig in a l p rem ise , a  m o ra l te leo logy  does no t 
n e e d  to  m ak e  su ch  a  m ove, s in ce  i t  can  f in d  th e  co n n ec tio n  b e tw e e n  th e  w orld  
a n d  a  d iv in e  a u th o r  w ith o u t su c h  a n  assu m p tio n . T h is  is  w h y  K a n t’s  m ore 
com m on "dow nw ard” p ro o f is  s tro n g e r, a n d  w hy  K a n t  does n o t  u se  ex trin sic  
te leo logy  a s  a  p rem ise .
T h e  n e x t s te p  in  th e  p ro o f  is  th e  p rem ise  t h a t  th e  n e c e s sa ry  object o f 
h u m a n  free  w illing  is  th e  h ig h e s t  good. T he  h ig h e s t  good, a s  p re s e n te d  in  a ll 
th r e e  Critiques is  p e rh a p s  b e s t  d escrib ed  a s  th e  co m p le te  p ro p o rtio n in g  of 
h a p p in e s s  to  v ir tu e . K a n t  w r ite s  t h a t  th e  m o ra l la w  “also  d e te rm in e s  for us, 
a n d  a  p rio ri, a  f in a l p u rp o se , a n d  m ak es i t  o b lig a to ry  fo r u s  to  s tr iv e  tow ard  
[ach iev ing] it; a n d  th a t  p u rp o se  is  th e  highest good in the world t h a t  w e can  
ach iev e  th ro u g h  freedom .”8 K a n t  does n o t give a  le n g th y  a rg u m e n t h e re  as to  
w h y  th is  sh o u ld  be, b u t  w e c a n  ta k e  such  a n  a rg u m e n t a s  u n d e rs to o d  from  
th e  f i r s t  a n d  second  Critique. K a n t  only re i te ra te s  t h a t  th e  h u m a n  be ing ’s 
n a tu r a l  p u rp o se  is  h a p p in e s s , a n d  th a t  w e c an  o n ly  th in k  t h a t  su c h  h a p p i­
n e ss  m u s t  be “su b jec t to  th e  ob jective  condition  t h a t  m a n  b e  in  h a rm o n y  w ith  
th e  la w  o f morality...”9
T h is  lea d s  K a n t  to  p o s i t  th e  necessity  o f G od. T h e  h a rm o n y  betw een  
m o ra lity  a n d  h a p p in e ss  is  th e  n ecessa ry  object o f th e  h ig h e s t  good, b u t  we 
c a n  observe  n o th in g  in  n a tu r e  w h ich  in d ica te s  t h a t  m o ra lity  a n d  h a p p in e ss  
m ig h t a c tu a lly  be  lin k e d . T h u s  w e can n o t see h o w  su c h  a  h a rm o n y  w ould  be 
p o ss ib le  “i f  th e  c a u sa lity  o f n a tu r e  is  th e  only  c a u s a lity  (of a  m e a n s  [for
7 pp. 333-4 = Ak. 444.
8 p. 339 = Ak. 450.
9 Ibid.
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ach iev in g  th e  h ig h e s t  good]) t h a t  w e [necessarily] connec t w ith  o u r  f re e ­
dom .”10 B u t b ecau se  th e  h ig h e s t good is  th e  n ecessa ry  object o f free  w illin g,
in order to se t ourselves a  final purpose in conformity w ith the m oral law, we 
m ust assum e a  moral cause of the world (an au thor of the  world); and  to the 
ex ten t th a t  setting  ourselves a  final purpose is necessary... i t  is also necessary 
th a t we assum e [that there is] a  m oral cause of the world: in  other words, that 
there  is a God.11
I n  o th e r  w ords, b ecau se  th e  m o ra l la w  n e ce ss ita te s  th e  w illin g  o f th e  h ig h es t 
good, a n d  b e ca u se  th e re  is  no  in d ic a tio n  th a t  n a tu re  a lone  w o u ld  b r in g  abou t 
th e  h ig h e s t  good, w e m u st p o s tu la te  th e  ex is tence  o f a  m o ra l b e in g  w h ich  
w o u ld  co n n ec t h a p p in e ss  w ith  m o ra lity  in  th e  w orld . O f cou rse , K a n t  is  
q u ick  to  p o in t  o u t  t h a t  th is  is  on ly  a  p o s tu la te , a n d  “is  n o t m e a n t  to  p rov ide  
a n  objectively v a lid  p roof of th e  ex is ten ce  o f God.”12
N ow  i f  h u m a n  beings a re  th e  u ltim a te  p u rp o se , a n d  i f  G od ex is ts  and  
se cu re s  th e  p o ss ib ility  of th e  h ig h e s t  good, th e n  n a tu r e  w ill b e  teleo log ical be­
c a u se  G od w ill h a v e  c rea ted  i t  in  th is  w ay . K a n t h e re  is  m ore  in te re s te d  in  
th e  (sub jec tive) p ro o f for th e  ex is ten ce  o f G od a n d  e s ta b lis h in g  th e  n a tu r e  of 
G od a s  a  m o ra l in te lligence  th a n  h e  is  in te re s te d  in  p ro v in g  th a t  n a tu r e  is  
te leo log ica l. B u t su re ly  su ch  a  conclusion  is  w a rra n te d . K a n t  w rite s  e a rlie r  
in  sec tion  87  t h a t  w h ile  th e  m o ra l la w  does no t n e e d  re fe ren ce  to  G od in  order 
to  acco u n t fo r itse lf ,
on the o ther hand, this m oral teleology does deal w ith us as beings in the 
world; and  those same moral laws enjoin us to direct our judging to those other 
th ings [regarded] either as purposes or as objects for which we ourselves are 
the  final purpose. This moral teleology, then, deals w ith the  reference of our 
own causality  to purposes...13
10 p. 340 = Ak. 450.
11 p. 340 = Ak. 450.
12 p. 340n. = Ak. 450n.
13 p. 337 = Ak. 447.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
H ence, persons a re  n a tu ra l ly  concerned  w ith  th e  effects of m o ra l ac tio n  in  
n a tu re , a n d  p a r tic u la r ly  concerned  w ith  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f ach iev ing  th e  
h ig h e s t  good in  th e  w orld . By s ta r tin g  w ith  h u m a n  b e in g s  u n d e r  th e  m o ra l 
la w  a s  th e  f in a l p u rp o se , a n d  w ith  th e  p o s tu la te  o f th e  ex is ten ce  o f God, i t  
m u s t  b e  possib le fo r n a tu r e  to  be  c re a te d  su c h  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  
possib le . As K a n t w rite s  a t  th e  e n d  of sec tion  86:
the inner moral destination of man’s existence for a purpose has compensated 
for the deficiency in our knowledge of nature, by directing us to add something 
to the final purpose of the existence of all things... to add, [namely,] the 
thought of the supreme cause... as having properties that enable it to subject 
all of nature to th a t single intention (with nature merely as the instrument for 
achieving this intention).14
I f  n a tu r e  is  th e  c re a tio n  of a  m o ra l in te lligence , th e n  n a tu r e  w ill co n ta in  th e  
p o ss ib ility  for th e  h a rm o n y  be tw een  m o ra lity  a n d  h a p p in e ss , th o u g h  w e c a n ­
n o t see  th is  n ecess ity  th ro u g h  a n  e x am in a tio n  o f n a tu re . As such , n a tu re  
m u s t  b e  teleological, a  sy s tem  o f p u rposes c re a te d  w ith  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  o f 
th e  m o ra l law  in  m in d .
L est we ta k e  su c h  a  p ro o f to be co n s titu tiv e , a n d  th u s  too s trong ,
K a n t  gives u s  se v e ra l w a rn in g s  in  th e  n e x t few  sec tions t h a t  such  a  p ro o f 
te lls  u s  n o th in g  ob jectively  t r u e  e ith e r  ab o u t th e  n a tu r e  o f  G od or o f n a tu re  
itse lf . T his is  m ost c le a r ly  se en  in  th e  “R estric tio n  o f th e  V a lid ity  o f  th e  
M o ra l Proof,” “O n W h a t K in d  o f A ssen t T h e re  I s  in  a  T eleological P ro o f o f  th e  
E x is ten ce  of God,” a n d  “O n  W h a t K in d  o f A sse n t R e su lts  from  a  P ra c tica l 
F a i th ,” tho u g h  th e re  a re  se v e ra l o th e r p laces w h e re  K a n t  a d d re sse s  th is .15 
P e rh a p s  th e  m ost decisive  s ta te m e n ts  are:
14 p. 336 = Ak. 447.
15 In addition to these sections and the quotations to follow, see also: p. 327 = Ak. 439 and pp. 
329-30 = Ak. 440-1.
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can we not establish the objective reality  of the concept of a final purpose of 
creation in a  way th a t would satisfy pure reason’s theoretical demands?... Yet 
even this, little though it is, is far more th an  speculative philosophy can ever 
accomplish.16
And y e t [the concept of a] final purpose is merely a  concept of our practical 
reason; we cannot infer it from any d a ta  of experience, so as to judge nature  
theoretically [in term s of it], nor can we apply it to cognition of n a tu re .17
the existence of things in conformity w ith a  final purpose... requires us to m ake 
two assum ptions: first, th a t there  is, as au thor of the  world, an  intelligent 
being;... but, second, th a t [this] being is not merely in telligent b u t also moral, 
and hence a God. We can see from the  character of th is second inference th a t 
we m ake it only for [the use of] judgm ent in accordance w ith  concepts of prac­
tical reason, and hence for reflective ra th e r  th a t determ inative judgm ent.18
A gain , I  t a k e  i t  to  be in co n tro v e rtib le  t h a t  teleology is  in te n d e d  to  b e  a  m ere  
reg u la tiv e  id e a , a n d  n o t a  c o n s titu tiv e  one, a n d  th a t  in  ju d g in g  t h a t  th e  w orld  
ac ts  te leo log ica lly  a n d  th a t  i t  w ill e v e n tu a lly  conform  to  th e  n e cess itie s  o f th e  
h ig h e s t good, th is  ju d g m e n t is  m a d e  from  a  p ra c tic a l p o in t  o f  v iew  only.
m.
H a v in g  focused  so m u ch  a t te n t io n  on  th e  h ig h e s t  good, th is  seem s a  
good p lace  to  d iscuss th e  re c u r re n t  is s u e  o f w h e re  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  to be 
located . W h e re a s  bo th  th e  f i r s t  a n d  second  Critique seem  to  re v e a l K a n t’s 
a m b ig u ity  a s  to  th e  location  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good, I th in k  t h a t  th e  Critique of 
Judgment c e r ta in ly  p laces th e  e m p h a s is  on  i t  o ccu rring  in  th is  w orld , on 
e a r th . In d eed , th e  d iscussion  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good a ris e s  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace  w ith  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f w h e th e r  n a tu r e  a s  a  w ho le  co u ld  be  te leo lo g ica l o r w h e th e r  
“a ll  o f c re a tio n  w ould  be  a  m ere  w a s te la n d , g ra tu ito u s  a n d  w ith o u t a  f in a l 
p u rp o se .”19 K a n t  says th a t  “in  re fe ren ce  to  th e  highest good* G od m u s t  be 
th o u g h t to  b e  “omnipotent, so t h a t  i t  [God] c a n  m ak e  a ll  o f  n a tu r e  accord  w ith
16 p. 344 = Ak. 454.
17 p. 345 = Ak. 455.
18 pp. 345-6 = Ak. 455.
19 p. 331 = Ak. 442.
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t h a t  h ig h e s t p u rpose ,” a n d  a lso  be  “omnibenevolent a s  w ell a s  just... th e  con­
d itio n s  u n d e r  w hich a  su p re m e  cau se  o f th e  w orld  c a n  be th e  cause  o f th e  
w o rld  [tak en ] as th e  h ig h e s t  good u n d e r  m o ra l law s .”20 W e see  th is  in  th e  
"C om m ent” to  section  86 a n d  ag a in  in  th e  "C om m ent” to sec tion  88, w h ere  
K a n t  m a in ta in s  th a t  ev en  th e  th o u g h t o f  th e  ex is ten ce  o f C od  cam e from  a  
d issa tis fa c tio n  w ith  th e  la c k  o f  re w a rd  fo r v ir tu o u s  p e rso n s  in  th e  w orld, " th e  
su b jec tiv e  p rin c ip le  n o t to  s e t t le  fo r co n sid erin g  th e  w orld  in  te rm s o f th e  
p u rp o s iv e n e ss  i t  h a s  th ro u g h  n a tu r a l  causes, b u t  to  re g a rd  th e  w orld  as 
b a s e d  on  a  su p rem e  cau se  t h a t  ru le s  n a tu re  in  te rm s  o f m o ra l p rin c ip le s ,”21 
a n d  th e  th o u g h t th a t  " th is  is  n o t  how  i t  sh o u ld  be.”22 T h e  m o ra l p roo f fo r th e  
e x is te n ce  o f G od is f ra m e d  b y  a  d iscussion  o f n a tu re , a n d  n a tu r e ’s possib le  
re sp o n se  to  m oral action .
T im e  a n d  tim e  a g a in , K a n t  p re s e n ts  th e  q u es tio n  o f th e  h ig h e s t good 
in  te rm s  o f th is  w orld. In  th e  “In tro d u c tio n ,” K a n t sa y s  t h a t  “th e  effect [a t 
w h ich  w e a re  to  aim ] acco rd ing  to  th e  concept o f freedom  is  th e  f in a l p u rp o se  
w h ich  (or th e  ap p ea ran ce  o f  w h ich  in  th e  w orld  of sen se ) o u g h t to  ex is t...,”23 
a n d  t h a t  th e  “fin a l p u rp o se ... c a n  be  ac tu a lized  on ly  in  n a tu re  a n d  in  accor­
d a n ce  w ith  i ts  law s.”24 K a n t  w rite s  th a t  “w h a t re a so n  m ak e s  th e  f in a l p u r ­
p o se  is  th e  fu r th e ra n c e  of h a p p in e s s  in  h a rm o n y  w ith  m o ra lity . Now th e  
m o ra l la w  com m ands u s  to  f u r th e r  th a t  f in a l p u rp o se  (with regard to the be­
ings o f the world) as  fa r  a s  w e can ...”25 a n d  th a t  th e  m o ra l la w
provides us in addition w ith  a principle th a t is subjectively constitutive: the
concept of an object th a t only reason can th ink [the final purpose] and th a t we
20 p. 333 = Ak. 444. This occurs again at p. 354 = Ak. 461-2.
21 p. 335 = Ak. 446.
22 p. 350 = Ak. 458.
23 p. 36 = Ak. 195-6.
24 p. 37 = Ak. 196.
25 p. 341 = Ak. 451. Italics added for emphasis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
153
are to actualize in the world through our acts... [R]eason determines us a pri­
ori to strive to the utmost to further the highest good in the world.26
H u m a n  b e in g s  a re  th e  on ly  c a n d id a te s  fo r th e  f in a l p u rp o se  of c re a tio n  b e ­
cause  th e y  c a n  “cognize th e  [m oral] la w  a n d  th e  object of th is  c au sa lity , th e  
object th a t  th is  b e in g  can  s e t  before  i t s e l f  a s  i ts  h ig h e s t pu rp o se  (the  h ig h e s t 
good in  th e  w orld ).”27 In  th e  l a s t  p a ra g ra p h  of th e  book, K a n t w rite s  th a t  
from  th e  p ra c tic a l  p o in t o f  v iew  w e m u s t  a t t r ib u te  som e p ro p e rtie s  to  God 
“w hen  th is  a t t r ib u te  of i t s  c a u sa lity  c o n ce rn s a n  effect [to be  achieved] in  th e  
w orld  w h ich  invo lves a n  a im  th a t  is  m o ra lly  necessa ry ...”28 B etw een  th e  fac t 
th a t  th e  d isc u ss io n  of G od a n d  th e  h ig h e s t  good a lm o st a lw ays occurs w ith in  
a  d iscussion  o f th e  (possible) te leo log ica l c o n s titu tio n  of n a tu re , a n d  th e  n u ­
m erous re fe ren c es  by K a n t to  th e  h ig h e s t  good “in  th e  w orld,” I  th in k  th a t  th e  
Critique o f Judgment does e m p h asize  th e  loca tion  of th e  h ig h e s t good on 
e a rth .
H ow ever, th is  is  n o t to  say  t h a t  th e  th i rd  Critique is  solely concerned  
w ith  th e  h ig h e s t  good on  e a r th .  W hile  K a n t  does n o t specifically  m en tio n  th e  
h ig h es t good occu rring  in  a n  a fte rlife , h e  does ta lk  a b o u t th e  n ecessity  o f 
im m o rta lity  a s  one  of th e  p o s tu la te s  n e c e ssa ry  to  su p p o rt th e  m o ra l law .
T his d iscu ssio n  occurs p r im a rily  in  “O n  W h a t K in d  o f A ssen t R esu lts  from  a  
P rac tica l F a i th .” In  th is  d iscussion , K a n t  n e v e r p re se n ts  a n  a rg u m e n t a s  to 
w hy im m o rta lity  is  a  n ecessa ry  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l reason ; h e  m en tio n s  
bo th  God a n d  im m o rta lity  o f th e  so u l a s  n e ce ssa ry  p o s tu la te s  se v e ra l t im e s  in  
th is  section , b u t  no  a rg u m e n t is  g iven  fo r w hy  im m o rta lity  is  n ecessa ry . I t  is  
likely  t h a t  K a n t  ta k e s  th is  p ro o f to  be  ta k e n  from  th e  second Critique. 
How ever, w h a t  th is  in d ic a te s  is  th a t  e v en  th o u g h  th is  d iscussion  b eg in s  w ith  
“th e  highest good in  th e  w orld ,”29 ta lk  o f  im m o rta lity  is  n ecessa rily  ta lk  o f th e
26 p. 343 = Ak. 453.
27 p. 323 = Ak. 435.
28 p. 380 = Ak. 484.
29 p. 362 = Ak. 469.
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afte rlife . T he  rea so n  th a t  K a n t  needs to  b r in g  in  im m o rta lity  in  connec tion  
w ith  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  so t h a t  one c an  b e  re w a rd e d  or p u n ish e d  in  acco rd  
w ith  one’s v ir tu e , even  i f  su ch  a  co rre la tio n  w as n o t found  d u rin g  o ne’s  
life tim e. T h is  m u s t b e  th e  “o th e r  w orldly” h ig h e s t good, for th e  im m o rta li ty  
o f a n  in d iv id u a l m u s t ta k e  p la c e  in  th e  a fte rlife . H ence, w hile  I  be lieve  a  
ch an g e  in  e m p h a sis  a s  b een  m a d e  in  th is  Critique, I  do no t ta k e  th is  to  
in d ic a te  a n y  ra d ic a l sh if t  in  K a n t’s p o s itio n  re g a rd in g  th e  locus o f th e  h ig h e s t  
good.
IV.
T he  th ir d  a rg u m e n t fo r a  l in k  b e tw ee n  th e  n a tu ra l  a n d  m o ra l w o rld s  
is  p a r tic u la r ly  u n iq u e  to  th e  th i r d  Critique. T h is  l in k  is  f irs t  a llu d e d  to  in  
sec tio n  59 o f “P a r t  I.” K a n t n o te s  th a t  th e re  a re  c e r ta in  s im ila ritie s  b e tw e e n  
th e  ju d g in g  of a  b e a u tifu l object, in  w h ich  ju d g m e n t reflects free ly  u p o n  a n  
ob jec t a n d  g ives i ts e lf  i ts  ow n ru le  fo r ju d g in g , a n d  th e  (m oral) free  w ill, 
w h ich  free ly  p rov ides a  law  to  i ts e l f  fo r ac tio n . K a n t h e re  is  p r im a r ily  c o n ­
c e rn e d  w ith  th e  w ay  in  w hich  th e  th re e  fa c u ltie s  o f th e  m in d  a re  ab le  to  h a r ­
m on ize  to g e th e r. W h a t K a n t n o te s  in  th is  sec tion  is  th e  w ay in  w h ich  ju d g ­
m e n t’s  concept o f p u rp o siv en ess  is  a  n a tu r a l  m e d ia to r  be tw een  th e  o th e r  tw o 
facu ltie s . T h is  is  because  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  th e  im ag in a tio n  h a rm o n iz e  
to g e th e r  in  th e  ju d g m e n t o f b e a u ty , a n d  b e c a u se  re a so n  can  m ak e  th e  a n a l ­
ogy b e tw een  p u rp o siv en ess  a n d  i t s  own s e t t in g  o f pu rposes. A s K a n t e x ­
p la in s  in  th e  “In tro d u c tio n ,”
the spontaneity in the play of the cognitive powers, whose harmony with each 
other contains the basis of this pleasure, makes that concept of purposiveness 
suitable for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of nature 
with that of the concept of freedom, as regards freedom’s consequences, inas­
much as this harmony also promotes the mind’s receptivity to moral feeling.30
30 p. 38 = Ak. 197.
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Ju d g m e n t is  th e  n a tu r a l  m ed ia to r b e tw e e n  reason  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n d  
b ecau se  o f th e  s im ila r it ie s  be tw een  i t  a n d  p rac tic a l reaso n , re fle c tio n  u p o n  
th e  b e a u tifu l c a n  m o re  easily  p re p a re  th e  m in d  for m o ra l th in k in g .31
N o t only  th is ,  b u t  th e  m ore im p o r ta n t  p o in t K a n t m a k e s  i s  t h a t  a ll  
th re e  pow ers o f th e  m in d  m u s t n e c e ssa r ily  a p p ea l to  th e  su p e rse n s ib le  in  o r­
d e r  to  solve th e ir  an tin o m ies; u n d e rs ta n d in g  ap p ea ls  to  so m e th in g  t h a t  u n ­
d e rlie s  n a tu re  w h ic h  m a k e s  ou r in tu i t io n  o f i t  possible, ju d g m e n t a p p e a ls  to  
a n  in te llig e n t a u th o r  o f th e  w orld  w ho  th in k s  non-d iscursively , a n d  m o ra lity  
a p p e a ls  to  th e  su p e rse n s ib le  bo th  to  sh o w  t h a t  freedom  a n d  m a te r ia l  c a u s a l­
i ty  a re  n o t  in co m p a tib le  a n d  to show  t h a t  G od is  a  n ecessa ry  p o s tu la te  fo r th e  
object o f th e  m o ra l law , n am e ly  th e  h ig h e s t  good. K a n t e x p la in s  i t  in  th e  
“In tro d u c tio n :”
The understanding, inasmuch as it can give laws to nature a priori, proves 
that we cognize nature only as appearance, and hence a t the same time points 
to a supersensible substrate of nature; but it leaves this substrate wholly un­
determined. Judgment, through its a priori principle of judging nature in 
terms of possible particular laws of nature, provides nature’s supersensible 
substrate (within as well as outside us) with determinability by the intellectual 
power. But reason, through its a priori practical law, gives this same substrate 
determination. Thus judgment makes possible the transition from the domain 
of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.32
T h is  p a r tic u la r ly  d e n se  q u o ta tio n  is  th e  r e a l  f ru i t  of th e  th ir d  Critique. W h a t 
i t  sa y s  is  th is : th e  f i r s t  Critique sh o w ed  t h a t  o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  n a tu r e  
w as m ere ly  n a tu r e  a s  ap p ea ran ce , a n d  th u s  ap p ea led  to  a  su p e rse n s ib le  
a b o u t w h ich  n o th in g  co u ld  be sa id , i.e ., a n  u n d e te rm in e d  s u b s tr a te  o f  n a tu r e .  
T h e  second  Critique sh o w ed  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good w as th e  n e c e ssa ry  ob jec t o f
31 Note, however, that beauty is only a  symbol o f  morality, and also that Kant presents several 
differences between the power o f  judgment and the power o f  practical reason in legislating to  themselves. 
See p. 229 = Ak. 353-4, Pluhar’s discussion, pp. bri-lxvii, and Sidney Axinn, “On Beauty as the Symbol 
o f Morality,” in  Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kcmt-Kongresses, ed. Gerhard Funk, Band H.1 
(Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1990), 615-621.
32 p. 37 = Ak. 196.
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m o ra l w illing , a n d  th a t  w e m u s t  p o s tu la te  w h a te v e r  co n d itio n s  a re  necessary  
fo r  th e  p o ss ib ility  of i ts  ach iev em en t. In  th is  resp ec t, th e  su p e rse n s ib le  w as 
d e te rm in e d , th o u g h  on ly  from  a  p rac tic a l p o in t o f view , in  re s p e c t o f God’s 
m o ra l n a tu r e  a n d  God’s a b ili ty  to  c rea te  a  m o ra l w orld . B u t  h o w  is  i t  possible 
to  l in k  th e s e  tw o “w orlds”?33
I t  is  th e  so lu tio n  to  th e  an tin o m y  o f ju d g m e n t t h a t  a llo w s u s  “to 
th ro w  a  b rid g e  from  one d o m ain  to  th e  o th e r .”34 As w e sa w  above, ju d g m e n t 
d e m a n d s  th a t  w e conceive o f a  non -d iscu rsive  in te llig en ce  th a t ,  a s  P lu h a r  de­
sc rib es, “w o u ld  necessitate e v en  th e  p a r t ic u la r” a n d  th u s  p e rm it  “u s  to  think 
o f  th e  "contingency’ of th e  p a r t ic u la r  a s  b e in g  on ly  a  seeming con tingency ... 
b u t  a s  in  fac t b e in g  a  necessity.n35 H ow ever, s in ce  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  canno t 
conceive o f su c h  a  possib ility , w e m u st f in a lly  th in k  o f th e  w o rld  a s  created by 
a n  in te llig en c e , in  analogy  w ith  h u m a n  re a so n ’s a b ility  to  b r in g  a b o u t 
c h a n g e s  in  n a tu re . B u t su c h  a  so lu tion  te lls  u s  m ore  a b o u t n a tu r e  th a n  w as 
o b ta in e d  from  th e  f ir s t  Critique, a n d  w h ile  th is  does n o t te l l  u s  a n y th in g  con- 
s t i tu t iv e ly  a b o u t th e  su p e rse n s ib le , i t  does a llow  fo r th e  su p e rse n s ib le  to be 
d e te rm in a te , to  h a v e  u deter minability by the intellectual pow er”36 P lu h a r  
su m m a riz e s  th is  ex trem e ly  w ell: th e  so lu tio n  to  th e  a n tin o m y  o f ju d g m e n t 
g ive u s  th e  concep t of a  n o n -d iscu rs iv e  in te llig en ce ,
but our understanding... instead thinks of the supersensible basis of nature’s 
purposiveness as an intelligent cause of the world in terms of purposes... 
[This] makes determinable the concept of the supersensible as mere basis of 
nature... and thus “mediates” between this latter concept and the concept of 
the supersensible which is determined practically... Through this mediation 
judgment’s concept of the supersensible basis of nature’s... purposiveness... 
unites the “three” supersensibles into one. For the substrate of nature was
33 In  many respects this is the “possible ‘expansion’ o f knowledge which practical reason has 
taken from speculative reason” which I alluded to at the end o f  Chapter Four above, and we may now be 
able to see why Kant felt an entire Critique was necessary in order to address this issue.
34 p. 36 =  Ak. 195.
35 Pluhar, p. xciii.
36 p. 37 = Ak. 196.
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merely made determinate enough to be nature in itself as the “purpose” 
brought about by an intelligent cause, and then to be nature itself as caused 
by a moral author, a God.37
To sim plify  th is  som ew hat, we m ig h t say  t h a t  i f  w e m u s t  th in k  o f n a tu re  a s  
b e in g  c au sed  by  a n  in te lligence , a n d  if  w e m u s t  th in k  t h a t  th is  in te llig en ce  is  
a  m o ra l God, th e n  w e can  th in k  o f n a tu re  a3  teleo log ica l (th e  possib ility  of 
w h ich  w as o p en ed  up  by th e  fac t th a t  th e  f i r s t  Critique show ed u s  th a t  w e 
c a n n o t know  th e  su p e rsen s ib le  side  of n a tu re ) , b ecau se  G od w ill h a v e  c re a te d  
i t  to  su p p o rt th e  f in a l  object o f o u r  free  (m oral) w illing .
Now w h e re a s  th is  l in k  be tw een  th e  m o ra l a n d  n a tu r a l  “w orlds” c a n ­
n o t b e  p roven  th eo re tica lly , K a n t fin d s  w elcom e co n firm atio n  in  th e  fa c t th a t  
w e o ften  do d iscover in s ta n c e s  w h ere  n a tu r e  a p p e a rs  o rd e re d  ju s t  fo r o u r  u n ­
d e rs ta n d in g . T h is  occurs w ith  b eau ty , a s  w e ll a s  w ith  teleology. W hen  w e 
b eh o ld  a  b e a u tifu l object, th e  h a rm o n y  t h a t  i t  p ro v id es be tw een  th e  im a g in a ­
t io n  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  le a d s  u s  to  th e  ju d g m e n t t h a t  n a tu re  w as c re a te d  
w ith  h u m a n  fac u ltie s  in  m ind . S im ila rly , w h e re a s  “w e c a n  conceive o f r a ­
t io n a l be ings f in d in g  them selves su rro u n d e d  b y  a  n a tu r e  th a t  show ed no  d is ­
t in c t  trac e  o f o rg an iza tio n , b u t  only  th e  effects o f a  m ere  m echan ism  o f c ru d e  
m a tte r ,”38 w e o ften  f in d  th a t  th e  m an y  d iv erse  law s o f n a tu r e  a re  a c tu a lly  
u n d e rs ta n d a b le , a n d  “we rejoice... w hen, j u s t  a s  i f  i t  w ere  a  lucky ch an ce  fa ­
v o rin g  o u r a im , w e do fin d  such  sy stem atic  u n i ty  am o n g  m ere ly  em p irica l 
law s, even  th o u g h  w e n ecessa rily  h a d  to  a s su m e  t h a t  th e re  is  such  u n ity  even  
th o u g h  we h a v e  n o  in s ig h t in to  th is  u n ity  a n d  c a n n o t p ro v e  it .”39 W e recog­
n ize  t h a t  th e re  is  no  rea so n  for n a tu re  to p ro v id e  b e a u tifu l  th in g s  fo r u s, n o r  
is  th e re  an y  re a so n  w hy  th e  u t te r ly  c o n tin g e n t m ig h t be  o rgan ized  in  accor­
d an ce  w ith  re g u la r ity  a n d  (p a rticu la r)  sc ien tific  law s.
37 Pluhar, pp. ci-cii.
38 p. 373 = Ak. 478.
39 pp. 23-4 = Ak. 184
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In  th e  ju d g m e n t th a t  w e m u s t su b o rd in a te  m ech an ica l c a u sa lity  to 
te leo log ica l c au sa lity , we fin d  fu r th e r  c o n firm a tio n  th a t  th e  w o rld  m ay  in ­
d e ed  conform  to  o u r m o ra l n eed s. As K a n t  exp la in s:
the fact that the actual world offers the rational beings in it a wealth of ma­
terial for physical teleology (which indeed would not have to be so) does serve 
the moral argument as welcome confirmation, as far as nature is able to offer 
something analogous to the (moral) ideas or reason. For this [confirmation] 
provides the concept of a supreme cause tha t has understanding...40
T h e  w o rld  c e r ta in ly  does n o t h a v e  to  offer u p  b e a u tifu l objects, n o r  do specific 
n a tu r a l  la w s  h a v e  to be  sy s tem atizab le . B u t  n a tu r e  does g ive u s  th e se  p re s ­
e n ta tio n s . W hile  we b r in g  su ch  a  p r in c ip le  o f ju d g m e n t to ob jec ts o f n a tu re , 
b e a u tifu l  objects p rove ab le  to  h a rm o n iz e  w ith  o u r  h u m a n  fac u ltie s . Such  
p re s e n ta tio n s  allow  u s  to  ju d g e  th e m  a s  i f  th e y  w ere  c re a te d  fo r u s  by  a n  in ­
te l l ig e n t a u th o r  fo r th e  h a rm o n iz in g  o f o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g . T h o u g h  w e can ­
n o t p ro v e  th is  fo r ce rta in , since i t  is  m e re ly  a  reflective  ju d g m e n t, i t  does offer 
u s  a d d it io n a l  h o p e  th a t  th e  w orld  w as in d e e d  c re a te d  w ith  o u r  m e n ta l  pow ers 
in  m in d , a n d  i f  th is  is  so, th e n  i t  m ay  h a v e  b e e n  c re a te d  fo r th e  f in a l  pu rpose  
of h u m a n  b e in g s  a s  m o ra l ag en ts . A n d  i f  th is  is  so, n a tu re  w ill e v e n tu a lly  be 
a b le  to  conform  to  th e  h ig h e s t good. T h is  i s  th e  second  a rg u m e n t fo r th e  l in k  
b e tw e e n  n a tu r e  a n d  m o ra lity  p a r t ic u la r  to  th e  Critique of Judgment.
V.
T h e  reg u la tiv e  n a tu re  o f th e  id e a  o f  te leo logy com bined  w ith  th e  th ree  
p roofs w h ich  K a n t  offers u s  l in k in g th e  n a tu r a l  a n d  m oral "w orlds” in  th e  
Critique o f Judgment p rov ide  u s  w ith  a  s tro n g  fo u n d a tio n  fo r o u r in v e s tig a ­
tio n s . M o st im p o rtan tly , i t  show s ju s t  h o w  v i ta l  K a n t co n sid ered  th e  possib il­
i ty  o f  m o ra l p rog ress: i f  th e re  is  no  m o ra l a u th o r  o f th e  w orld , o r i f  h u m a n
40 p. 374 =  Ak. 479. Also: “if  we combine our cognition o f physical purposes w ith that of the 
moral purpose, then, because o f pure reason’s maxim to strive to unify principles as much as we can, 
physical purposes are very important, since they support the practical reality of the idea of God by the re­
ality that from a theoretical point of view it already has for judgm ent,” (p. 347 = Ak. 456).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
159
rea so n  c a n n o t im prove over tim e , th e n  th e re  c an  be  no f in a l p u rp o se  to  th e  
w orld . A  w o rld  w ith o u t m o ra l p ro g re s s  h a s , fo r K an t, l ite ra lly  no  pu rp o se , 
a n d  h a s  no v a lu e . M oral p ro g re ss  a n d  th e  object o f m o ra l w il l in g, th e  h ig h e s t 
good, m u s t b e  a ssu m e d  (p o s tu la ted ) to  b e  poss ib le  on  e a r th . M oreover, we 
a lso  see th a t  th e re  is  good re a so n  to  p o s tu la te  th is  possib ility , s in ce  K a n t h a s  
g iven  u s  th re e  specific re a so n s  w h y  th e  w o rld  seem s to  confirm  to  h u m a n  
n eed s . T he l in k  b e tw een  th e  m o ra l a n d  n a tu r a l  w orlds su g g ests  t h a t  n a tu re  
m a y  in d eed  a s s is t  u s  w ith  th e  p ro m o tio n  o f th e  h ig h e s t good; th e  h ig h e s t  good 
is  a  ve ry  ra t io n a l  b e lie f fo r K a n t. I n  a d d itio n , g iven  th e  th re e  p roofs a n d  
K a n t’s d iscussion  o f c u ltu re , w e a re  a g a in  b ro u g h t back  to  th e  q u e s tio n  of th e  
em p irica l co n d itio n s n e ce ssa ry  fo r m o ra l  im p ro v em en t, a n d  th e re fo re  b ro u g h t 
b a c k  to  a  d iscu ssio n  of po litics . N a tu r e  is  re sp o n sib le  w ith  p ro m o tin g  th e  
a b ility  o f h u m a n s  to  w ill free ly , a n d  i t  does th is  th ro u g h  a n ta g o n ism  a n d  u n ­
soc ia l sociab ility . T hough  K a n t  does n o t  d iscu ss  po litica l in s t i tu t io n s  a t  
le n g th  in  th e  th i r d  Critique, h e  does m e n tio n  a  “civil society” a n d  “a  cosmo­
politan  w hole, a  sy stem  o f a ll  s ta te s ” i n  h is  b r ie f  d iscussion  o f c u ltu re , th u s  
in d ic a tin g  th e  k ey  position  o f p o litic s  i n  n a tu r e ’s  p rom otion  of a  “m o ra l  b a ­
s is .”41 As we s h a l l  see in  th e  c h a p te r  a f te r  n ex t, i t  is  th e  “Id e a ” w h ic h  allow s 
u s  to  m ak e  s e n se  o f a ll o f th e se  co n ce rn s  o f K a n t’s; th e  “Id e a ” a n d  o th e r  of 
K a n t’s  po litica l w ritin g s  a llow  u s  to  ex am in e , o rgan ize, a n d  h a rm o n iz e  th e  
is su e s  of m o ra lity , politics, a n d  th e  h ig h e s t  good.
41 p. 320 = Ak. 433.
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Chapter Eight 
The Principle of Purposive Mechanisms Reexamined
L
I n  th is  (brief) c h ap te r, I  w a n t  only  to  a d d re s s  th e  q u estio n  o f th e  
“p rin c ip le  o f  p u rp o s iv e  m ech an ism s” ra is e d  in  c h a p te r s  Two a n d  F o u r  above. 
I  th in k  t h a t  w ith  th e  Critique o f Judgment w e c an  f in a lly  a n sw e r th is  q u es­
tio n  sa tis fa c to r ily . In  th e  f in a l a n a ly s is , I  b e lieve  t h a t  i t  is  K a n t’s  p o sitio n  
th a t  su c h  a  p r in c ip le  m u s t be  accep ted  only a s  a  re g u la tiv e  id ea , b u t  t h a t  i t  
m u s t  be  a p p lie d  to  in te rn a l  a s  w ell a s  e x te rn a l p u rp o siv en ess .
n.
R e c a ll t h a t  th e  p rob lem  o f th e  “p rin c ip le  o f p u rp o s iv e  m ec h an ism s” 
w as a s  follow s: in  se v e ra l p laces  th ro u g h o u t K a n t’s  w ritin g s  h e  sp e a k s  o f th e  
n ecess ity  o f  a s su m in g  th a t  o rgans, m ech an ism s, a n d  o rg an ism s h a v e  b een  
m ad e  fo r som e p u rp o se  or o th er. T h is  is  n o t th e  o v e ra ll p rob lem  o f  teleology, 
i.e ., n o t th e  q u e s tio n  o f w hen  w e a re  to  say  t h a t  so m e th in g  h a s  b e e n  created 
for a  p u rp o se , b u t  r a th e r  th e  q u e s tio n  o f w h e th e r  a ll  m ech an ism s o r  o rg a n ­
ism s in  n a tu r e  a r e  good for som e m o re  o r le ss  specific  ta s k . K a n t  sp e a k s  of 
th is  in  d if fe re n t w ay s a n d  in  d iffe rin g  s tre n g th s . S om etim es i t  se em s th a t  
th is  is  a  m e re ly  re g u la tiv e  id ea , w h ile  a t  o th e r  t im e s  i t  seem s to  b e  s im p ly  a  
fac t a b o u t n a tu r e .  S om etim es i t  seem s a s  i f  e a c h  o rg a n  o r m ec h an ism  sh o u ld  
be  th o u g h t to  h a v e  a  p a r t ic u la r  a n d  d e fin itiv e  p u rp o se  w hich  w ill c o n tin u a lly  
m ove to w a rd  p e rfec tio n , w hile  a t  o th e r  tim es i t  se em s th a t  th e y  m u s t  on ly  be 
th o u g h t to  b e  a b le  to  be  p u t  to  som e p u rp o se  o r o th e r . A ccordingly, I  o u tlin ed  
“s tro n g ,” “m e d iu m ,” a n d  “w eak” v e rs io n s  of th is  p rin c ip le . How a re  w e to  de­
cide am o n g  th em ?
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In  essence, I th in k  th e  Critique of Judgment g ives u s  a  r a th e r  sim ple  
a n s w e r  w hich w as, how ever, im p o ssib le  for K a n t to  h a v e  g rasp ed  before i ts  
w ritin g . In  essence, th e  so lu tio n  seem s to be  th a t  te leo logy  is  only a  re g u la ­
tiv e  id ea , b u t one w hich  w e m u s t  t r y  to  u tilize  in  all i t s  app lica tions. As we 
s a w  above, K a n t’s so lu tion  to  th e  an tin o m y  o f th e  th i r d  Critique ca lled  fo r th e  
n e c e ss ita tio n  o f th in k in g  o f a l l  n a tu r e  a s  i f  i t  h a d  b e e n  c a u se d  in  accord w ith  
a  p u rp o se . H ence, i t  is  a t  l e a s t  d e a r  th a t  we m u s t th in k  in  te rm s o f p u r ­
p o ses, a n d  h e re  is  th e  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r th e  ex istence o f  th e  “p rincip le  o f p u r ­
p o siv e  m echan ism ” in  som e fo rm  o r  o th er. T h is is  a lre a d y  a n  im provem ent, 
b e c a u se  i t  show s th a t  w e a re  a b le  (forced, actually ) to  re ly  on  th is  p rin c ip le  
e v en  in  cases w h e re  w e c a n n o t d isc e rn  an y  co n firm ation  d irec tly  from  n a tu re .
B u t w hich  form  o f th e  p r in c ip le  shou ld  w e accep t?  To begin  w ith , we 
h a v e  a lso  seen t h a t  th e  n o tio n  o f p u rp o siv en ess  can n ot b e  ta k e n  as c o n s titu ­
tiv e  o f n a tu re  a s  a  w hole, fo r K a n t  a rg u e s  th a t  th is  b a s ica lly  v io la tes th e  p a ­
ra m e te r s  o f th e  Critique of Pure Reason. H ence, w e a re  le f t  w ith  tw o a l te r ­
n a tiv e s : e ith e r th e  p rin c ip le  is  a  reg u la tiv e  one, or i t  j u s t  h a p p e n s  to  (also) be 
a  “fa c t” abou t n a tu re . In  o th e r  w ords, i t  c e rta in ly  is a  reg u la tiv e  p rincip le , 
b u t  i t  m ay  tu rn  o u t th a t  i t  a lso  describes som eth ing  w e c a n  know  ab o u t n a ­
tu re .  H ence, we m u s t a sk  w h e th e r  i t  is  a  fac t ab o u t n a tu re . I  a rg u ed  above 
th a t ,  w ith  reg a rd  to  th e  whole o f n a tu re , th e  “s trong” v e rs io n  seem s m is­
ta k e n , since th e re  seem  to  b e  c a se s  w h e re  organs or m ec h an ism s h av e  no 
p u rp o se , p e rh a p s  h a v in g  developed  on ly  on th e  “c o a tta ils” o f a n o th e r  t r a i t ,  
w h ile  th e  “m edium ” version  seem s to  b e  r a th e r  tr iv ia l, g iven  th a t  we could  
a lw ay s  th in k  of som e tr iv ia l  p u rp o se  o r o th e r fo r a n y  g iven  object. I n  a d d i­
tio n , w e m u st rec a ll K a n t’s a s se r tio n  t h a t  an  a c tu a l “e x p la n a tio n ” of th e  w ay 
so m e th in g  w orks m u s t  a lw ay s b e  u ltim a te ly  g iven th ro u g h  m echan ica l c a u ­
sa lity .
T h is is n o t to  say , how ever, t h a t  som e o rg an s o r m ech an ism s m ig h t 
n o t re a lly  have a  pu rpose , a n d  I  th in k  w e can  say  th is  physio -m echan ica lly .
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A p a r t ic u la r  gear on a  w a tch  does h a v e  th e  p u rp o se  o f k e e p in g  trac k  of sec­
onds. T h e  h e a r t  does h a v e  th e  p u rp o se  of c irc u la tin g  b lood  th ro u g h o u t a  
body’s  c ircu la to ry  sy s tem . Im p o rta n tly , n e ith e r  o f th e s e  d iscoveries could  
h a v e  b e e n  m ade  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace  w ith o u t a  te leo log ica l p rin c ip le . A nd  i t  
se em s th a t  we re a lly  c a n  ta lk  a b o u t p u rp o ses  h e re  b e c a u se  w e c an  exp la in  
th e m , u ltim a te ly , u s in g  ph y sio -m ech an ica l c a u sa lity . T h e  d ifference be tw een  
th e  w a tc h  a n d  th e  body, how ever, o u g h t to  rem in d  u s  o f  th e  d ifference b e ­
tw e e n  th e  g en era l q u e s tio n  of te leo logy  a n d  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  th e  "princip le  o f 
p u rp o s iv e  m ech an ism s” w h ich  w e a re  a d d re ss in g  h e re :  th e  g e a r  w as de­
s ig n e d  teleologically , i.e ., th e  concept o f th e  w hole ( th e  w a tch ) w as p a r t  o f th e  
com ing-to-be of th e  p a r t  ( th e  gear), w h e re a s  we w ill n e v e r  be  ab le  to  know  i f  
th e  sa m e  is  tru e  of th e  h e a r t .  H ence  th e  teleo log ical n o tio n
does quite splendidly in certain areas: Of what use are the things in the world 
to one another? What good is the manifold in a thing to that thing itself? In­
deed, we even seem to have grounds for assuming th a t nothing in the world is 
gratuitous, but that... everything is good for something or other in nature...1
T eleology in  a ll i ts  a sp ec ts  is  to be  u s e d  a s  a  gu ide  fo r  f u r th e r  scien tific  study , 
a  g u id e  fo r p hy sio -m ech an ica l ex p la n a tio n s .
To re tu rn  to th e  q u es tio n  o f w h ic h  form  o f th e  “p rin c ip le  o f purposive  
m ec h an ism s” we sh o u ld  accept, I  th in k  th e  a n sw e r i s  th is :  w e m u s t re g a rd  
th e  p r in c ip le  as reg u la tiv e , b u t  w e m u s t  t ry  to a p p ly  i t  in every possible way 
to  e v e ry th in g  in  n a tu re . T h a t  is, w e m u s t  re g a rd  th e  p r in c ip le  a s  being  
“w e ak ” b u t  a tte m p t to  a p p ly  i t  in  “s tro n g ” a n d  “m e d iu m ” ap p lica tio n . W here 
co u ld  w e d ra w  th e  lin e  in  o rd e r  to  s a y  w h e th e r  o r n o t  so m e th in g  h a s  a  p u r ­
pose? W e m u s t u se  th e  p rin c ip le  o f teleo logy  in  o u r ju d g m e n ts , a n d  th e re  
seem s to  be  no w ay w e co u ld  d iscern  lim ita tio n s  one  w a y  o r th e  o ther.
U n fo rtu n a te ly , K a n t  says v e ry  l i t t le  re g a rd in g  specific  app lica tions of 
th is  concep t a n d  I  do n o t be lieve  h e  re a liz e d  th a t  th is  specific  m a tte r  needed
1 p. 325 = Ak. 437-8.
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to  b e  d e a l t  w ith  a s  a  sp ec ia l a sp ec t of th e  is su e  o f teleology. H e  does seem  to  
in d ic a te  t h a t  i f  w e w e re  e v e r  to  fo rb id  th e  u se  o f  th e  p rin c ip le  in  one a rea , 
th e n  th is  w ould  le a d  to  a  “s lip p e ry  slope” w h ich  w ou ld  e v e n tu a lly  e lim in a te  
th e  p rin c ip le . In  a  d iscu ss io n  on  th e  n e e d  to  ju d g e  every  h e re d i ta ry  t r a i t  
w h ich  h a s  been  p a s s e d  dow n a s  h a v in g  a  p u rp o se , h e  w rites:
For if we depart from this principle, then we cannot [even] be certain as to 
whether some of the other features we now find in a species did not have an 
equally accidental and purposeless origin. And so we could no longer with any 
reliability apply the principle of teleology: the principle of judging nothing in 
an organized being as unpurposive if it is preserved in the being’s propagation.
G iven  t h a t  w e m u s t in d e e d  a p p ly  th e  p rin c ip le  in  o u r ju d g in g , K a n t’s p o in t 
seem s e sse n tia lly  to  b e  th is : once we m a k e  a  re s tr ic tio n  as to  th e  cases w h e re  
th e  te leo log ica l p rin c ip le  c a n  b e  app lied , th e n  th is  b eg in s a  c h a in , th e  r e s u l t  
o f w h ic h  is  th e  e lim in a tio n  o f th e  p rincip le . In  o th e r  w ords, i f  w e th in k  we 
h a v e  fo u n d  a  m ech an ism  w h ich  h a s  a b so lu te ly  n o  pu rpose , a n d  w e accept 
th is  a s  a  fac t, th e n  w e seem  to b e  able  to  d o u b t w h e th e r  o th e r  m ech an ism s 
w h ich  w e th o u g h t h a d  a  p u rp o se  m ig h t n o t a c tu a lly  h a v e  a  p u rp o se , a n d  so 
on. H ow ever, i t  is  n o t  c le a r  a s  to  th e  e x ac t n a tu r e  o f th is  p rob lem , a n d  h e re  i t  
a p p e a rs  to  be  m ore o f  a  m o tiv a tio n a l th a n  a  log ica l p rob lem .
K a n t  h a s  a lre a d y  h in te d  a s  so m e th in g  l ik e  th is  in  th e  “Id e a ,” th o u g h  
only  v ag u e ly . In  d isc u ss in g  th e  u se  o f th e  “p rin c ip le  o f p u rp o siv e  m echan ism  
h e  m a in ta in s  th a t  “i f  w e  s t r a y  from  th a t  fu n d a m e n ta l  p rin c ip le , w e no lo n g er 
h a v e  a  la w fu l b u t a n  a im le ss ly  p la y in g  n a tu re  a n d  hope less c h an c e  ta k e s  th e  
p lace  o f  re a so n ’s g u id in g  th re a d .”2 W hile  i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  K a n t’s  s ta te m e n t 
t h a t  every m ech an ism  o r o rg a n  m u s t h a v e  a  p u rp o se 3 is  too s tro n g , I  th in k  h is  
o v e ra ll p o in t  is  c lear: i f  w e c a n n o t u se  th is  p r in c ip le  in  ou r a t te m p t  to  in v e s­
tig a te  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d  n a tu re ,  th e n  w e w ou ld  so  c o n s tru e  n a tu r e  th a t  w e
2 “Idea,” Ak. 18.
3 Ibid.
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w o u ld  be le f t w ith  com plete chaos, u n p red ic ta b ility , a n d  inconceivab ility . A 
n a tu r e  w h ich  w ould  c re a te  o rg a n s  a n d  m ech an ism s w h ich  h a d  no  p u rp o se  
w o u ld  be  a  n a tu r e  so i r r e g u la r  t h a t  w e w ould  be u n a b le  to  u n d e rs ta n d  it. 
H en ce , K a n t  c a n  be ta k e n  a s  in d ic a t in g  t h a t  w e m u s t u s e  th e  p rin c ip le  i f  we 
a re  e v en  to  b eg in  ou r in v e s tig a tio n  in to  n a tu re , a n d  t h a t  w e  m u s t a tte m p t to 
u se  i t  w ith  a s  w ide a  ra n g e  a s  p o ss ib le .
T h e  on ly  o th e r  c lue  w e h a v e  a f te r  th e  w ritin g  o f th e  th ir d  Critique is  
th is  sec tio n  h o rn  th e  Lectures on Philosophical Theology'.
In the whole of organized nature it must be assumed as a necessary maxim of 
our reason that in every animal and plant there is not the least thing which is 
useless and without purpose; on the contrary, it must be assumed that every­
thing contains a means best suited to certain ends. This is a principle taken 
for granted in the study of nature, and every experiment made has confirmed 
it. Setting these experiments aside, the field of discoveries would be closed to 
the anatomist. Hence the cultivation of our own reason urges us to assume 
and use this maxim.4
A gain , K a n t  re a so n s  th a t  w e m u s t  a p p ly  th e  concept o f te leo logy  to  "the  
w hole  o f  o rg an iz ed  n a tu re .” T h e  ju s tif ic a tio n  seem s to  b e  th a t ,  since  th e re  is  
no prim a facie rea so n  to  lim it  th e  scope o f (regu la tive) te leo log ica l e x p la n a ­
tio n s , a n d  since  th e  a rtif ic ia l l im itin g  o f som e p a r t  of a  te leo log ica l e x p la n a ­
tio n  m ig h t c u t off sc ie n tis ts  fro m  c e r ta in  discoveries, th e  p r in c ip le  sh o u ld  be 
a p p lie d  to  th e  w hole of o rg an iz ed  n a tu re .  T hus, th e  so lu tio n  to  th e  prob lem  
seem s to  b e  th a t ,  w h ereas  th e  “s tro n g '’ ve rsion  is  too s tro n g  fo r  th e  w hole of 
n a tu re , a n d  th e  “m ed ium ” v e rs io n  is  r a th e r  spu rious, th e re  do a p p e a r  to  be 
case s  o f  p u rp o s iv e  m ech an ism s a n d  o rg a n s  in  n a tu re , c ase s  in  w h ich  a  
p h y sio -m ech an ica l e x p la n a tio n  fo r  th e  p u rp o se  c a n  be g iven , a n d  su ch  cases 
se rv e  to  f u r th e r  enforce th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f th e  p rin c ip le  o f  te leo logy  to  a ll 
p o ss ib le  a sp ec ts  o f n a tu re . U ltim a te ly , th e  no tion  m u s t  b e  re g u la tiv e , b u t  
t h a t  does n o t d e tra c t from  i ts  im p o rtan c e .
4 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, Allen W. Wood and Gerturde M. Clark, trans. (Ithica: 
Cornell University Press, 1978). p. 138.
S
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in.
W ith  re g a rd  to  th e  specific question  c o n ce rn in g  th e  a p p lica tio n  o f th e  
p rin c ip le  to  th e  facu lty  o f  re a so n , o u r conclusion seem s to  re m a in  th e  sam e, 
n a m e ly  th a t  w e c an n o t s a y  fo r c e r ta in  w h e th e r  o r n o t  re a so n  w as c re a te d  on 
accoun t of a  p u rp o se . H ow ever, a s  we saw  in  th e  l a s t  tw o c h a p te rs , th e re  a re  
s tro n g e r  rea so n s  to  th in k  th a t ,  in  fact, reaso n  m ay  in d e e d  h a v e  b e en  c re a te d  
w ith  a  p u rp o se  in  m in d . F ir s t ,  i f  a ll  of n a tu re  h a s  b e e n  c re a te d , o f w hich  
th e re  is  no c e rta in ty , th e n  i t  is  rea so n  w hich  is  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  o f creation . 
So, i f  n a tu re  w as in d e e d  c re a te d , th e n  reaso n  w as c re a te d  in  accord  w ith  a  
p u rp o se . Second, th e re  a re  h in ts  to  be  found  in  n a tu r e  t h a t  i t  w as  in d ee d  
c re a te d  for h u m a n  be ings. S u c h  h in ts  a re  th e  ex is ten ce  o f b e au ty , th e  con­
t in g e n t b u t  s ta b le  p a r t ic u la r  law s, a n d  th e  a b ility  o f  th e  th re e  facu ltie s  of 
h u m a n  cognition  to  h a rm o n iz e  so w ell together. So, w h e re a s  w e c an n o t know  
fo r c e rta in  t h a t  o u r re a so n  w a s  c re a te d  w ith  a  p u rp o se  in  th e  m in d  o f th e  
c rea to r, a n d  th u s  K a n t se e m s  to  step  too f a r  in  th o se  p lac es  w h e re  w h en  h e  
in s is ts  th a t  re a so n ’s  n a tu r a l  e n d  m u s t be m o ra lity  s in c e  i t  w as designed a n d  
since  i t  fu n c tio n s so poorly  in  f in d in g  h ap p in ess , n o n e th e le ss  w e c an n o t lim it 
th e  ap p lica tio n  o f th e  te leo log ica l p rincip le  to  rea so n .
H ence, r e tu rn in g  fo r  a  m om en t to th e  “Id e a ,” I  th in k  w e m u s t u l t i ­
m a te ly  re jec t K a n t’s “F i r s t  T h es is .” Recall t h a t  th is  th e s is  is  th e  s tro n g e s t 
v e rs io n  of th e  “p rin c ip le  o f  p u rp o s iv e  m echan ism s” w h ich  is  to  b e  found , an d  
s ta te s  th a t  “All o f a creature's natural capacities are destined (s in d  bestim m t) 
to develop completely and in conformity with their e n d ”* I  t h in k  th a t  th is  
m u s t  be  re jec ted , fo r i t  se em s s im p ly  too strong : i f  i t  i s  ta k e n  to  be  a  fac t 
a b o u t n a tu re , th e n  i t  re m a in s  unconfirm ed  “by  e x te rn a l  a n d  in te rn a l , a n a ­
ly tica l o bserva tion”6 a n d  th e r e  a p p e a r  to be  c o u n te rex a m p le s  to  w h ich  we 
cou ld  po in t. I t  seem s im p o ssib le  to  say  constitu tive ly , a s  K a n t seem s to w an t 
to  do h e re , t h a t  every  n a tu r a l  cap ac ity  will develop to  perfec tion .
5 “Idea,” Ak. 18.
6 Ibid.
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K a n t u se s  th is  “F i r s t  T hesis” a s  a  r a th e r  im p o r ta n t f irs t s tep  in  th e  
“Id ea .” B ecause  in d iv id u a ls  h av e  th e  fa c u lty  o f  rea so n , th e n  th is  facu lty  
m u s t  be th o u g h t to  develop  to  perfection . T h u s , K a n t’s  n e x t tw o th e se s  a re  
th a t  reaso n  is  to  develop  to  perfection , b u t  o n ly  in  th e  species, a n d  th a t  h u ­
m a n k in d  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  designed  for m o ra l p u rp o se s  since h u m a n  re a so n  is  
so in e p t a t  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  h ap p in ess . I t  seem s t h a t  i f  w e re ject th e  “F ir s t  
T hesis” w e h a v e  p la c e d  m u ch  of th e  “Id ea ” i n  jeo p a rd y .
H ow ever, h a v in g  rem oved  th is  th e s is  a s  K a n t  p re se n te d  it, I  th in k  w e 
c a n  rep lace  i t  w ith  th e  s tro n g e r  conclusions from  th e  Critique o f Judgment, 
th u s  im prov ing  th e  a rg u m e n t. Two im p o r ta n t  conclusions w ere  d raw n  from  
th e  Critique, b o th  o f  w h ic h  I  d iscussed  above. T h e  f i r s t  w as th a t  w e a re  
forced by  th e  “p e c u lia r ity  o f h u m a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g '’ to  t h in k  of th e  w orld  a n d  
n a tu re  a s  h a v in g  b e e n  c re a te d , tho u g h  w e c a n  n e v e r  know  th is  fo r c e rta in . 
B ecause o f th is , w e a re  m o re  th a n  ju s tif ie d  i n  u s in g  th e  teleological p rin c ip le  
w h en  in v e s tig a tin g  n a tu re ;  w e a re  re q u ire d  to  do so. T he  second conclusion  
dea ls  w ith  th e  re la tio n  b e tw een  n a tu re  a n d  h u m a n  beings. K a n t gives th re e  
a rg u m e n ts  a s  to  th e  lik e lih o o d  th a t  n a tu re  w ill b e  responsive  to  m o ra l con­
sidera tions: th e  “u p w a rd ” a n d  “dow nw ard” p ro o fs ,7 a n d  th e  fac t th a t  n a tu re  
conform s so w ell to  th e  h u m a n  facu lties  o f im a g in a tio n  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g . 
O f th ese  th re e  a rg u m e n ts , th e  f irs t  tw o seem  th e  m o st im p o rtan t. T he  f i r s t  
leaves u s  w ith  th e  fa c t  t h a t  i f  th e  w orld  w as c re a te d , th e n  i t  w as c re a te d  fo r 
h u m a n  be ings a s  r a t io n a l , m o ra l agen ts. T h e  second  a rg u e s  from  th e  m o ra l 
law  to th e  n ecess ity  o f  God, a n d  th e reb y  to  a  n a tu r e  w hich  w as c re a te d  by  a  
m o ra l au th o r. A ll o f  th e s e  considera tions g ive s tro n g  su p p o rt for th e  p ro g ress  
o f h u m a n  re a so n  a n d  m o ra lity .
So, th e  “F i r s t  T h e s is” can  be rep la ce d  by  th e s e  tw o g ran d  conclusions 
from  th e  th ird  Critique. F irs t , K a n t can  a rg u e  t h a t  w e a re  n e c e ss ita te d  in  
o u r  th in k in g  o f n a tu r e  a s  c rea ted , a n d  m u s t th in k  o f each  o rgan  or
7 See above: Chapters Six and Seven respectively.
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m ec h an ism  a s  h a v in g  a  p u rp o se , th o u g h  we can  n e v e r  sa y  th is  constitu tive ly . 
G iven  th is  conclusion, K a n t c a n  a rg u e  th a t  we can  ta k e  h um an rea so n  to  be 
p u rp o se fu l, a n d  w e can  go on  to  s e a rc h  for w h a t t h a t  p u rp o se  m ig h t be. B u t 
m o re  s trong ly , K a n t can  now  a rg u e  t h a t  h u m a n  re a so n  in particular o u g h t to 
b e  conceived  a s  h a v in g  th e  p u rp o se  o f  p ro g ress in g  to w a rd  p e rfe c t m o ra lity  
b e ca u se  o f th e  s tro n g  lin k s  a p p a re n t  be tw een  n a tu r e  a n d  h u m a n  b e in g s a s  
r a t io n a l  c re a tu re s . M oving  e i th e r  from  n a tu re  a s  d esigned , know ledge o f th e  
m o ra l law , th e  fee lin g  of th e  b e a u tifu l, o r  th e  c o n tin g e n t b u t  r e g u la r  law s of 
n a tu re , K a n t h a s  p re se n te d  s tro n g  ca se s  for th e  h u m a n  species a s  h a v in g  
b e e n  d esig n ed  fo r m orality . I f  w e re p la c e  th e  “F ir s t  T h es is” w ith  th e se  tw o 
conclusions, K a n t c an  be  sa v e d  from  a  s ta r tin g  p re m ise  w h ich  is  too s tro n g  to 
b e  u sed , a n d  h is  a rg u m e n t c a n  b e  g iv en  a  s tro n g e r fo u n d a tio n . F rom  th is  
p o in t, K a n t  can  c lea rly  m ove on  to  h is  su b seq u e n t c o n s id e ra tio n s , th e  second 
a n d  th ir d  “T h eses” fa llin g  n ice ly  in  lin e .
T h ese  tw o conclusions fro m  th e  Critique, o f cou rse , c a n n o t be  p ro v en  
c o n s titu tiv e ly . H ow ever, a s  I  w ill t r y  now  to a rgue , th e  “Id e a ” o u g h t n o t to  be  
th o u g h t  o f a s  a  sp ecu la tiv e  a n a ly s is  o f n a tu re  o r h is to ry , b u t  is  b e t te r  th o u g h t 
o f a s  th e  o u tlin e  of a  n e ce ssa ry  p o s tu la te  of p rac tic a l rea so n ; g iven  i t s  n a tu re  
a s  a  p o s tu la te , th e  conclusions o f  th e  th i r d  Critique m ak e  i t  a  very , b u t  n o t 
excessively , s tro n g  one.
t
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Chapter Nine
The “Idea” Reexamined: Moral Progress as a Postulate of Practical Reason
L
I t  h a s  b e e n  d ifficu lt fo r co m m en ta to rs  to  d ec id e  w h a t  to m ak e  o f 
K a n t’s w ork , “Id e a  fo r  a  U n iv e rs a l H is to ry  w ith  a  C osm opo litan  In te n t .” T h is  
a rtic le , w ritte n  th re e  y e a rs  a f te r  th e  C ritiq u e  o f P u re  R eason , b u t  a lm o st te n  
y e a rs  befo re  “O n th e  P ro v e rb : T h a t  M ay be  T ru e  in  T heory , B u t is  o f No 
P ra c tic a l  U se,” p re s e n ts  a  p ic tu re  o f a  w orld  h is to ry , so m ew h at like  H eg e l’s, 
in  w h ich  th e  ac tio n s o f  h u m a n  a g e n ts  w ill in e v ita b ly  le a d , o ften tim es d e sp ite  
th e  w ills  a n d  in te n tio n s  o f  th e  se lf- in te re s te d  p a r t ie s ,  to  a  b e tte r  cond ition , a  
w o rld  o f  h illy  r a t io n a l  a g e n ts  a c tin g  to g e th e r  in  a  p e rfe c tly  m o ra l w hole.
S om e h a v e  c la im ed  t h a t  su c h  a  teleo log ical n o tio n  o f  p ro g re ss  is  a  p re c u rso r  
to  H eg el, a n d  fu n c tio n s  a lo n g  s im ila r  lines. O th e rs , m o re  convincingly, h a v e  
m a in ta in e d  th a t  th is  p a r t ic u la r  fo rm u la tio n  o f te leo logy  is  a  c ru d e  no tio n  o f a  
r e g u la tiv e  idea , fu n c tio n in g  in  g e n e ra l for th e  a s s im ila tio n  of em p irica l d a ta  
in to  a  co n cep tu a l w ho le  a n d , specifically , fo r th e  b e t te rm e n t  of th e  s tu d y  o f 
h is to ry , th o u g h  th is  n o tio n  g e ts  im proved  a n d  f in a liz e d  in  th e  Critique o f 
Judgment.
I n  th is  c h a p te r , I  w ill  a rg u e  th a t  th is  te leo log ica l no tion  of p ro g ress  
is , in s te a d , a  p ro p o sitio n  d e m a n d e d  b y  p rac tic a l re a so n , a n d  one w hich  
sh o u ld  b e  re g a rd e d  a s  d isc re d ite d  b y  em p irica l ev id en ce  on ly  i f  such  ev idence  
is  co m p le te ly  conclusive. I  w ill a rg u e  th a t  th is  id e a  a lm o s t p rec ise ly  p a ra lle ls  
K a n t’s  position  in  th e  Critique of Practical Reason r e g a rd in g  th e  n ecessity  o f 
p o s tu la t in g  God a n d  im m o rta lity  fo r th e  e te rn a l  im p ro v e m e n t of ra tio n a l
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a g e n ts . H ow ever, because  one h a s  m o re  ex p e rien tia l d a ta  to d e a l w ith  w h e n  
ta lk in g  a b o u t th e  p ro g ressio n  o f th e  h u m a n  species on e a r th  th a n  w hen  
d e a lin g  w ith  th e  p ro g ressio n  o f th e  h u m a n  in d iv id u a l in  a n  afterlife , K a n t 
m u s t  a t te m p t to give a  m ore  th o ro u g h  a n d  em pirica l e x p la n a tio n  as to  how  
th is  “h ig h e s t  good on e a r th ” m ig h t com e about; a n d  th is  i s  w h a t th e  “Id ea ” 
does. I  w ill conclude b y  a rg u in g  t h a t  a  good w ay  to  u n d e rs ta n d  how  th is  p o s ­
tu la te  o f  p ra c tic a l rea so n  o p e ra te s  is  to  p lace  i t  w ith in  th e  c o n tex t of K a n t’s 
e ssay , “O n  th e  Proverb: T h a t  M a y  b e  T ru e  in  T heory, B u t is  o f N o P ra c tica l 
U se .”
T h is  c h a p te r  is  a  co n seq u en ce  o f  th e  foregoing  c h a p te rs , a n d  th u s  
m a n y  o f th e  n ecessa ry  p o sitio n s  h a v e  a lre a d y  b een  a rg u e d  for. I  h av e  a l­
re a d y  d isc u sse d  th e  m a in  te n e ts  o f  th e  “Id e a ” above. I  h a v e  p re s e n te d  K a n t’s  
d iscu ss io n  re g a rd in g  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p rac tic a l reaso n , a n d  th e  rea so n  for 
th e ir  n ecess ity . I h a v e  im p ro v ed  th e  f i r s t  “T hesis” of th e  “Id e a ” by  rep lac in g  
i t  w ith  th e  conclusions of th e  t h i r d  Critique. F in a lly , I h a v e  a lso  tr ie d  to  a r ­
g ue  above b o th  th a t  K a n t a s s e r ts  th e  n ecessity  fo r a n  “e a r th ly ” h ig h e s t good, 
a n d  t h a t  a  c o n s ta n t ten s io n  in  h is  w ritin g s  h a s  b een  h is  concern  reg a rd in g  
how  th is  p o ssib ility  m ig h t occur i n  th e  w orld. T h e  “Id e a ” is  K a n t’s in it ia l  a t ­
te m p t  to  a n sw e r th is  q u estio n . I t s  m a in  te n e ts  w ill re m a in  th ro u g h o u t th e  
r e s t  o f  K a n t’s w ork. T h is  la te r  a ssu m p tio n  w ill h a v e  to  be  a rg u e d  for la te r , 
th o u g h  w e c an  see a lre a d y  i t  is  t r u e  in  “T heory  a n d  P rac tice .”
n .
S e v e ra l in te rp re ta tio n s  fo r  su c h  s tra in s  o f th o u g h t in  K a n t’s ph iloso­
p h y  h a v e  b e e n  offered by  sch o la rs , e i th e r  d irec tly  o r in d ire c tly  a d d re ss in g  th e  
“Id e a ” itse lf . A  com m on e x p la n a tio n  fo r th e se  no tions, a s  m en tio n e d  above, is  
t h a t  th e y  a re  a  c rude  p rec u rso r  to  a  sy s te m  of th o u g h t w h ich  w o u ld  la te r  be  
e x p lica ted  a n d  g rea tly  im proved  b y  H egel. K an t, i t  m ig h t b e  a rg u ed , is  
s e a rc h in g  fo r a  w ay to  u n ite  th e  m o ra l la w  w ith  em p irica l in s titu tio n s  of 
ju s tic e . K a n t’s an sw er to th is , th e n , is, in  p a rt , to sk e tch  a  p ic tu re  of such  a
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p rog ression  o f p o litica l in s titu tio n s  in  th e  “Id e a ,” w here  g o v e rn m en ts  com e 
ab o u t th ro u g h  n a tu re , w ith o u t th e  u se  o f re a so n  an d  in  a n  i r ra t io n a l ,  
em p irica l w orld . H egel, th en , is  s a id  to  im prove  on th is  p ic tu re , fo r h e  is  ab le  
to m a in ta in  n o t  on ly  th a t  th e  w orld  i s  ra tio n a l, b u t  th a t  th e  A b so lu te  is  
w ork ing  to w a rd s  th e  rea liza tio n  o f re a so n  in  th e  world. As W illiam s ex p la in s  
in  Kant’s Political Philosophy, “H egel, o f course , affords a n  im p o r ta n t  con­
t r a s t  to  K a n t  in  th is  respect. H e  be lieves t h a t  rea so n  can  be  fu lf illed in  p ra c ­
tice, a n d  th is  is  done in  th e  ac tiv ity  o f  th e  loyal c itizen  w ith in  th e  m o d ern  
s ta te ”.1 O n  su c h  a n  in te rp re ta tio n , th e n , in  th e  “Id ea ,” K a n t d e s ire s  to  
exp la in  how  i t  is  t h a t  h u m a n s  can  a p p ro a ch  a  n e ar-p erfec t g o v e rn m en t, one 
w hich  w ill acco rd  w ith  th e  m o ra l law  b u t  w h ich  w ill be co n ce rn ed  w ith  
em p irica l in s t i tu t io n s , b u t  h e  does n o t  h a v e  th e  b ack g ro u n d  p h ilo so p h ica l 
concepts n e c e ssa ry  to  ju s tify  su c h  a  p ro g ressio n , a n d  i t  is  n o t u n t i l  H egel a n d  
h is  “E th ic a l  L ife” t h a t  h u m a n ity  a n d  th e  S ta te  c a n  bo th  be  fu lly  r a t io n a l  in  
th e  em p iric a l w orld .
A  seco n d  in te rp re ta tio n , p e rh a p s  m ore  p o p u la r a s  w ell a s  p la u s ib le , is 
th a t  su c h  n o tio n s  a s  found  in  th e  “Id e a ” fu n c tio n  a s  reg u la tiv e  concep ts for 
th e  im p ro v e m e n t o f th e  system  o f sp e cu la tiv e  rea so n  in  g e n e ra l a n d , specifi­
cally, th e  b e tte rm e n t  o f th e  s tu d y  of h is to ry . S u ch  a  basic  p o sitio n  m ig h t ru n  
som eth ing  lik e  L ew is W hite B eck’s in  h is  “E d ito r’s  In tro d u c tio n ” to  Kant: Se­
lections, w h e re  h e  w rites:
The word Idea... here is a  kind of a  priori model or paradigm  for w riting his­
tory. The facts of history are questions for historical research by  historians, 
b u t the  long-range meaning of the facts and their significance for our under­
standing  of hum an nature and  destiny are not questions to be answ ered by 
em pirical historical investigation. They are philosophical questions the
1 p. 57. Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basic Blackwell Publisher 
Limited, 1983). See also: Manfred Buhr and Gerd Irrlitz, “Immanuel Kant,” in Materialien zu Kants 
Rehctsphilosophie. ed. Zwi Batscha (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976), 102- 
124.
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answ ers to which, though conjectural, can guide research and give significance 
to the facts discovered by the historian... Thus the Idea is a  regulative con­
cept.2
In  o th e r  w o rd s , th e  “Idea” e s tab lish es  co n cep ts  a b o u t th e  te leo log ica l p ro g re s ­
sion  o f h is to ry  w h ich  w ill allow  one to  b e t te r  co m p reh en d  e m p iric a l e v e n ts  by  
p lac in g  th e m  in  a  correct a n d  u se fu l f ra m e w o rk  fo r  th e  a ch iev em en t o f a  
com plete  sy s te m  o f th o u g h t. T he  F re n c h  R ev o lu tio n  or th e  in v e n tio n  o f th e  
s te am  e n g in e , fo r  exam ple, m ig h t be b e t te r  u n d e rs to o d  i f  one p lac es  th e s e  
ev en ts  in  a  p a t te r n  o f teleological p ro g re ss io n  in  w h ich  h u m a n ity  is  m ov ing  
from  p r im itiv e  b eg in n in g s  to th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  a  w orld  com m unity; su ch  
a n  a rc h ite c tu re , th e n , w ill allow  one to  b e t te r  co m p reh en d  th e  o rd e rlin e ss , 
in fluence , a n d  sign ificance  of th e se  e v en ts . S u c h  reg u la tiv e  n o tio n s  a re  n o t 
to  be  fo u n d  in , o r  v e rified  by, th e  p h e n o m e n a l w orld , fo r th e y  a re  a priori 
concepts e n a b lin g  one to b r in g  to g e th e r  a  m y r ia d  o f  d a ta  w h ich  w o u ld  o th ­
erw ise  re m a in  a  con fusing  a n d  d is in te g ra te d  m an ifo ld . T hus, on  th is  ty p e  of 
in te rp re ta t io n , th e  “Id ea ” fun c tio n s a s  a  k in d  o f tem p la te , a  se t  o f  re g u la tiv e  
concepts w h ic h  a llow  one to  s tu d y  h is to ry  to  a  fu lle r  ex ten t.
T h e re  a re  sev era l v a ria tio n s  o f th is  ty p e  o f  in te rp re ta tio n  to  be  fo u n d  
in  th e  l i te r a tu r e .  Y irm iah u  Yovel in  h is  Kant and the Philosophy o f History, 
for exam ple , s im ila r ly  a rgues t h a t  th e  “Id e a ” in tro d u c e s  reg u la tiv e  concep ts 
for th e  in te g ra t io n  o f one’s sp ecu la tiv e  re a s o n ,3 b u t  ad d s t h a t  su c h  re g u la tiv e  
concepts a re  n o t  y e t fu lly  u n d e rs to o d  b y  K a n t  a t  th e  tim e of w r it in g  th e
2 p. 413. Lewis White Beck, “Editor’s Introduction,’’ to Kant: Selections, ed. Lewis White 
Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1988), 413-414.
3 Cf. pp. 3-25, where Yovel is concerned with the “architectonic unity of reason.” See also 
Chapters 3 and 4. Interestingly, Yovel also makes the link between Hegel and Kant, writing that, “It may 
well be that Hegel not only presented a more comprehensive and developed, but also a more coherent the­
ory [than Kant]” (Kant and the Philosophy o f History, p. 24). Williams also makes such an analogy be­
tween the way the “Idea” functions for history and the way other regulative concepts function for biology 
(p. 21), and maintains that “Kant’s Critique o f Judgment sheds a great deal of light on why he thinks it 
important to look at history from a teleological point of view” (p. 20). See also: Friedrich Kaulbach, “Der 
Zusammenhand zwischen Naturphilosophie und Geschichtsphilosophie bei Kant,” Kant-Studien 56, Heft
1 (1965): 430-451, and “Welchen Nutzen gibt Kant der Geschichtsphilosophie?” Kant-Studien 66 (1975): 
pp. 65-84.





“Id e a .” Yovel a rg u e s  t h a t  i t  is  n o t u n t i l  th e  w r it in g  of th e  Critique o f Judg­
ment t h a t  K a n t  is  a b le  to  s e t  o u t a n d  co m p le te ly  co m p reh en d  th e  n a tu r e  of 
re g u la tiv e  concep ts  in  g e n e ra l, a n d  te leo log ica l concepts in  p a r t ic u la r ;  th e  
“Id e a ” is  a  ro u g h  p ic tu re  o f  w h a t  is  to  be  p e rfe c te d  on ly  in  th e  th i r d  Critique. 
A s Yovel p o in ts  o u t, “h is to ry  i s  co n cep tu a lly  d is t in c t  from  m ere  ch rono logy  or 
a  chao tic  a g g re g a te  o f  fac ts . I t s  concep t p re su p p o se s  a  p a tte rn  o f u n i ty  o r  to ­
ta liz a tio n ...,” a n d  h e  m a in ta in s  th a t  i t  is  on ly  th e  th ir d  Critique w h ic h  p ro ­
v id es  th e  c o rre c t so r t  o f  e x p la n a tio n  for th is  fram ew o rk .4 Yovel concludes, 
th e n , th a t  n a tu r e ’s  p ro v id en ce ,
thus becomes an  a priori principle in  the  explanation of history, founded by 
pure reflection on em pirical history and  on its relation to reason... Among 
other things, we will have the rules for selecting relevant topics for historical 
research, for sifting ou t contingent and  incidental particulars, and  no less im­
portant, for discovering additional causal factors by which to supply the m iss­
ing links in  the  chain .5
T h e  “Id ea ” is  th e  b e g in n in g  o f a  no tion  o f re g u la tiv e  concepts w h ich  a re  to  
h e lp  one in  th e  u n if ic a tio n  o f rea so n  a n d  th e  s tu d y  o f h isto ry , b u t  su c h  con­
c ep ts  a re  on ly  ro u g h ly  c o n cep tu a lized  h e re . O n  accoun ts s im ila r  to  B eck  a n d  
Y ovel, th e n , i t  i s  a rg u e d  t h a t  in  th e  th i r d  Critique K a n t f in a lly  u n d e rs ta n d s  
t h a t  su ch  n o tio n s  fu n c tio n  on ly  as re g u la tiv e  concepts, th a t  w hile  b e in g  a 
priori, th e y  on ly  in s t r u c t  o ne  in  th e  p o ss ib ilitie s  fo r th e  o rg an iz a tio n  o f
4 Yovel, Philosophy o f History, p. 166.
s Ibid., p. 168. Such a quotation, and several others in the work which are similar, show, then, 
that even though Yovel often seems to take a position which is similar to mine, he finally concludes that 
Kant’s notions in the “Idea” are too strong, and, when corrected and spelled out fully in the third Critique, 
function to help one with the study of history and the unification of reason. Yovel writes that “the Idea 
seems to commit a major dogmatic error. It ascribes to nature as such a hidden teleological plan, by 
which the to ta lity  of empirical history is to be explained and predicted; but this stands in conflict with the 
Critique o f Pure Reason...” (pp. 154-5), and goes on to claim that the only way we can “explain that Kant 
so bluntly adhered to a dogmatic principle of purpose three years after the publication of the first Cri­
tique” (p. 156) is to suggest that Kant simply forgot what he had earlier argued. This is rather unfortu­
nate, since I think much of Yovel’s work is completely on target.
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know ledge a n d  th e  sy s te m a tiz a tio n  o f re a so n .6 T h ere  is  a n o th e r  possib le  
a n d , indeed , m o re  p ro b ab le  a lte rn a tiv e , how ever.
m .
The ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e  d e m a n d s  th a t  we t ry  to  b r in g  a b o u t th e  
h ig h e s t good on  e a r th ,7 b u t  o u r  d a ily  ex p erien ce  w ith  th e  w o rld  su g g e s ts  th a t  
su c h  a tte m p ts  w ill b e  f ru s tra te d . Y e t th e  h ig h e s t good is  d e m a n d e d  b y  re a ­
son  a n d  m orality . H en ce  th e  h ig h e s t  good m u s t in d ee d  be possib le .
M oreover, th e  h ig h e s t  good m u s t  b e  th o u g h t  to  be possib le  in  this w orld , no t 
s im p ly  in  som e a fte rlife . T h is, in  tu rn ,  im p lie s  th e  n ecessity  o f p o litica l 
o rg an iza tio n s8 w h e re  h u m a n s ’ freed o m  a n d  p u rs u i t  o f h a p p in e s s  c a n  be 
p e rfec tly  in s t i tu te d . Now , p e rh a p s , o n e  m a y  be  in  a  p o sitio n  to  u n d e rs ta n d  
w hy  i t  is  a  n e c e ssa ry  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c t ic a l  rea so n  to  a ssu m e  t h a t  th e  h u m a n  
species w ill p ro g re ss  to  a  p o in t o f p e rfe c t ra tio n a lity , a n d  also  to  see  w h y  th is  
p roposition  w ill n e e d  to  b e  sp e lled  o u t i n  a  s lig h tly  d iffe ren t w ay  fo r th is  
w orld  th a n  i t  w o u ld  b e  fo r a  w o rld  o f im m o rta l  souls. I f  i t  is  a  d u ty  to  p u rsu e  
th e  h ig h e s t good in  th is  w orld , w e m u s t  a s k  a fte r  th e  cond itions u n d e r  w hich
6 Pierre Laberge seems to offers us a third possibility, namely that Kant did indeed understand 
and adhere to the limits set by himself in the first Critique, and even anticipated much of the third Cri­
tique, but ultimately concludes that the “Idea” concerns only a “theoretical, reflective judgment,” and that 
it outlines only “a special instance of the development of natural aptitudes of all organized beings,” (p. 
151, all translations mine). But Laberge contradicts himself, for he later cites the “Idea” several times as 
supporting and even predating important aspects of “To [ward] Perpetual Peace” which he specifically 
indicates are tied with the “duty” to promote peace, and thus tied with practical and not merely theoretical 
reason. Thus, if we opt for his latter statements, he seems to support an interpretation of the “Idea” where 
it no longer deals only with speculative teleology. See: Pierre Laberge, “Von der Garantie des ewigen 
Friedens,” 149-170.
71 have tried to argue throughout this work that there are two locations for the highest good. 
For additional supportive material, see: Andrews Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant”; 
Philip J. Rossi, “The Final End of All Things: The Highest Good as the Unity of Nature and Freedom,” in 
Kant’s Philosophy o f Religion Reconsidered, ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 77-102; Victoria S. Wike, Kant on Happiness in Ethics, 
Chapters One and Six; and Yirmiyahu Yovel, “The Interests of Reason: From Metaphysics to Moral 
History,” in Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1986), 135-148.
8 This was discussed in Chapters Three. Four, and Seven above, and will be argued for again in 
greater detail below.
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th is  is  possible, i f  i t  is  p o ss ib le  a t  a ll. O ne  m ig h t a sk , W hy sh o u ld  I a tte m p t 
to  p u rsu e  th e  h ig h e s t  good in  th is  w orld  i f  n o t  on ly  w ill I  n o t be  ab le  to  
achieve perfec t m o ra lity  in  th is  lifetim e, b u t, im p o rtan tly , n a tu r e  a lso  does 
n o t re w a rd  m o ra l p e rso n s  w ith  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss?  I f  th is  q u estio n  
c an n o t be  p ro p erly  a n sw e re d , K a n t b e lieves t h a t  a  co n trad ic tio n  w ill occur 
w ith in  th e  m o ra l law .
I t  can  be  se e n  in  m a n y  of K a n t’s  w ritin g s , from  th e  “Id ea ” th ro u g h  
The Conflict o f the Faculties, t h a t  h e  b e liev ed  in  th e  necessity  o f av o id in g  
su c h  a  con trad ic tion . F o r  in s tan c e , in  th e  "Id ea” K a n t w rites :
For w hat use is i t  to laud  and  recommend observing the m ajesty and  wisdom 
of creation in the nonrational realm  of nature , if th a t p a rt of the great theatre  
of supreme wisdom th a t  contains the purpose of all the res t — the history of the 
hum an race -- should rem ain  an endless reproach to it, the sight of which com­
pels us against our wills to tu rn  our eyes aw ay from it and, since we despair of 
ever finding a perfectly rational objective in it, brings us to the point o f hoping 
for that end only in another worldT9
I n  “W h a t is  O rie n ta tio n  in  T h in k in g ,” w r it te n  in  1786, K a n t s ta te s  t h a t  th e
m o ra l law s
lead... to the idea o f the highest good th a t is possible in the world... and  on the 
other hand, they also lead to something which depends not ju st on hum an 
freedom, b u t also on n a tu re  -- namely the g rea test happiness, in so far as its 
distribution is proportionate to th a t of m orality. Now reason needs to assum e 
[this]... in order... to prevent the [highest good], along w ith m orality as a 
whole, from being regarded  merely as an  ideal...10
F in a lly , a s  a  la s t  ex am p le , K a n t  w rites, in  1798, in  The Conflict o f the Facul­
ties, t h a t  “ i t  is  a  v a in  a ffa ir  to  h av e  good so a l te rn a te  w ith  ev il th a t  th e  w hole 
tra ffic  o f o u r species w ith  i ts e l f  on th is  globe w ou ld  h av e  to  be  c o n sid e red  a s  a  
m ere  farc ica l com edy, fo r th is  c a n  endow  o u r  species w ith  no  g re a te r  v a lu e ...
9 Ak. 30. Italics added for emphasis.
10 pp. 242-3. Immanuel Kant “What is Orientation in Thinking?” in Kant: Political Writings, 
ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991).
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th a n  th a t  w hich  o th e r  a n im a l species possess...”11 T h e  q u e s tio n  a b o u t th e  
possib le  fu til i ty  o f a l l  m o ra l ac tio n s  m u s t be  an sw e red , a n d  th is  a n sw e r m u s t 
ta k e  th e  form  of p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l rea so n  i f  re a so n  is  n o t  to  be  p lag u e d  
w ith  doub ts a n d  c o n tra d ic tio n .12
Two p o s tu la te s , th e n , a re  needed , w h ich  a re  an a lo g o u s to  th e  p o s tu ­
la te s  o f im m o rta lity  a n d  God. T h e  f irs t, n a tu re  a s  w o rk in g  p ro v id en tia lly , 
fu n c tio n s an a lo g o u sly  to  th e  p o s tu la te  o f th e  ex is ten ce  o f G od  in  th e  second 
Critique. I t  is  n o t G od per se w h ich  allow s th e  h u m a n  sp ec ies  to  develop th e ir  
cap ac itie s  to  th e  fu lle s t, b u t  p ro v id e n tia l n a tu r e ,13 u til iz in g  m a n ’s  u n so c ia l 
sociab ility  to  develop m a n ’s  ta le n ts ;  “such  a  justification  o f  n a tu r e  -- o r b e tte r , 
o f providence — is  n o  u n im p o r ta n t  m otive fo r a d o p tin g  a  p a r t ic u la r  p e rsp ec ­
tiv e  in  observ ing  th e  w orld .”14 B u t  a  second p o s tu la te , sim ila r to  th e  im m or­
ta l i ty  o f th e  in d iv id u a l, i s  n e e d e d  so th a t  one m a y  ho p e  fo r th e  ach iev em en t 
o f pe rfec t m o ra lity . C lea rly , a  p e rfe c t w illing  obedience to  th e  m o ra l la w  is 
n o t possib le  fo r th e  in d iv id u a l  in  a  sing le  life. H ow ever, i t  m a y  b e  possib le  
fo r th e  h u m a n  species a s  a  w hole, a n d  i t  is  th is  a ssu m p tio n  w h ich  p ra c tic a l 
re a so n  adop ts. T a lk in g  a b o u t th e  sacrifices one  g e n e ra tio n  m a k e s  fo r th e  
n ex t, K a n t w rites , “no  m a t te r  how  p u zz lin g  th is  is , i t  is  n o n e th e le ss  eq u a lly  
a s  n ecessa ry  once one  a s su m e s  th a t  one species o f  anim al s h o u ld  h a v e  rea so n  
a n d  th a t  a s  a  c la ss  o f  ra t io n a l  b e in g s  -- each  m em b er o f w h ic h  d ies, w h ile  th e  
species is  im m o rta l -- i t  i s  d e s tin e d  to  develop i ts  c ap a c itie s  to  p e rfec tio n .”15 
W h erea s  one c a n n o t becom e p e rfec tly  m o ra l o n e se lf  in  a  life tim e , th e  h ig h e s t
11 p. 147. Immanuel Kant, The Conflict o f the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Lincoln: Uni­
versity of Nebraska Press, 1979).
12 We will have opportunity to discuss the exact nature of this “contradiction” of reason below, 
in Section Two, Chapter Five.
13 See Section Two, Chapter Six below.
14 “Idea,” Ak. 30. For more on the possible attributes of providence, see: Leslie A. Mulhol- 
land, “Freedom and Providence in Kant’s Account of Religion: The Problem of Expiation,” in Kant's 
Philosophy o f Religion Reconsidered, ed. Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, (Bloomington and Indian­
apolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 77-102.
15 Ibid. Ak. 20.
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good c an  be c o n tin u a lly  a p p ro x im a te d  i f  p ro v id e n tia l  n a tu re  b r in g s  i t  a b o u t 
t h a t  society  ap p roaches a  s ta te  w h e re  th e  sp ec ies  is  p e rfec tly  r a t io n a l  a n d  
m o ra l, a n d  each  p e rso n  is  ab le  to  p u rs u e  h is  o r h e r  ow n h a p p in e ss  w ith o u t 
in f r in g in g  u p o n  th e  freedom  o f  o th e rs . As K w a n g -S a e  L ee ex p re sse s  it,
K ant conceives a  definite analogy betw een m oral progress... a t  the level o f the  
individual and th a t  a t the  level o f world history tow ards the h ighest good... If  
a t the individual level, the  h ighest good is (or projects) the synthesis of th e  in ­
tention and the hope of th e  m oral man, a t  the  level of the en tire  hum an spe­
cies, it embodies (or projects) th e  total m obilization of hum an history th rough  
the cumulative efforts of generations of hum an ity .16
M o ra lity , a s  d iscussed  above, n e c e ssa r ily  im p lie s  p o litics , a n d  p o litics  le a d s  to  
th e  p u r s u i t  o f  th e  h ig h e s t  good fo r  a l l  p e rso n s  in  a  society . P e rfec t m o ra lity  
c an  on ly  occur in  a  w o rld  w ith  a  j u s t  co m m o n w ealth , a  p e rfec t n a tio n a l  co n ­
s t i tu t io n , a n d  a  cosm opolitan  a sso c ia tio n  o f n a tio n s . In f in ite  p ro g ress io n  is  
in d e e d  possib le  in  th is  w orld , th o u g h  n o t fo r th e  in d iv id u a l, a n d  su c h  a  cos­
m o p o litan  w orld  “is  th e re fo re  th e  h a rd e s t  t a s k  o f  a il, in d eed , i t s  p e rfec t so lu ­
tio n  is  im possib le; from  su ch  w a rp e d  wood a s  is  m a n  m ad e , n o th in g  s t r a ig h t  
c an  b e  fash io n ed . N a tu re  on ly  e n jo in s  u s  to  th e  a p p ro x im a tio n  o f th is  id e a .”17 
T h e  question  soon a r is e s , n o n e th e le ss , a s  to  h o w  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f 
th e s e  tw o p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l  re a s o n  m ig h t b e  a t te s te d  to in  th e  w orld , 
how  th e  perfec tion  o f re a so n  in  th e  species is  conceivab le , espec ia lly  g iven  
th a t  n a tu r e  seem s to b e  u n c o o p e ra tiv e  in  re w a rd in g  v ir tu o u s  b eh av io r. H e re , 
K a n t  can , o r p e rh a p s  m u s t, o ffe r a  m o re  d e ta ile d  a cc o u n t re g a rd in g  th is  
p o ss ib ility  th a n  h e  cou ld  w ith  th e  p o s tu la te  o f  im m o rta l i ty  o f th e  in d iv id u a l; 
g iven  th a t  one se t o f p o s tu la te s  c o n ce rn s  th e  re a lm  o f e m p irica l n a tu r e  a n d  
t h a t  th e  o th e r  se t, a s  e m p h a s iz e d  in  th e  second  Critique, concerns som e
15 p. SS3. Kwang-Sae Lee, “Some Reflections on the Idea of the Highest Good as a Regulative
Idea of Pure Practical Reason,” in Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kant-{Congresses, ed. Gerhard 
Funke, Band II.2 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1990), 551-561.
'' “Idea.” Ak. 23.
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d o m ain  o f w hich  p e rso n s  h av e  h a d  a n d  w ill hav e  no p o ss ib le  experience , i t  is  
poss ib le  to  f le sh  o u t th e  p o ss ib ility  o f p rogression  of th e  h u m a n  species w ith  
m ore  d e ta il  th a n  th e  im m o rta lity  o f th e  soul. H e m u st, how ever, a n sw e r th is  
q u e s tio n  u s in g  on ly  n a tu r a l  la w s  a n d  em p irica l d a ta , in  o rd e r  to  re m a in  tru e  
to  th e  f i r s t  Critique.
A s d iscu ssed  above, K a n t’s  d e ta ile d  accoun t o f how  th is  p ro g ressio n  
m ig h t b e  possib le  is  p re s e n te d  in  th e  "Idea” a n d  h a s  to  do w ith  th e  u nsoc ia l 
so c iab ility  o f in d iv id u a ls  a n d  th e  p ro v id en tia l m ovem en t o f  n a tu re .  O n e  c an ­
n o t e x p la in  how  a  p e rso n  (or t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  ego) re m a in s  im m o rta l, b u t  one 
c an  give som e con jectu res a s  to  h o w  h u m a n  rea so n  m ig h t p ro g re s s  to w a rd  
p e rfec tio n . W h a t is  im p o rta n t to  n o te , how ever, is  t h a t  th e  p o s tu la t in g  o f th is  
p ro g re ss io n  s tem s from  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f th e  m ora l law , a n d  is  n o t a  c la im  of 
sp e cu la tiv e  re a so n .18 S ee in g  th is  connection  b e tw een  m o ra lity  a n d  politics, 
a n d  th e  p lac e  th a t  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  th e  h ig h e s t good occupies in  K a n t’s  ph iloso­
ph y , i t  m a y  now  be  firm ly  p o s ite d  t h a t  the progress o f the hum an raze is a 
necessary postulate o f practical reason.
IV.
O ne m ay  conclude, th e n , t h a t  th o u g h  K a n t does n o t  s a y  so explicitly , 
th e  a c tu a l  d e ta ils  o f how  th e  p ro g re ss io n  of th e  species is  p o ss ib le  m a y  in d eed  
be m is ta k e n , b u t  th e  fa c t t h a t  th e  h u m a n  species is  p ro g re s s in g  is  a  p o s tu la te  
n e c e ss ita te d  b y  p u re  p ra c tic a l re a so n . In  o rder to  a d d re ss  th is  is su e  m ore  
th o ro u g h ly , I  w a n t to ex am in e  a  w o rk  w hich  K a n t p u b lis h e d  n in e  y e a rs  a fte r  
th e  “Id e a ,” n am e ly  “T heo ry  a n d  P ra c tic e ,”19 especially  th e  t h i r d  e s sa y  w hich
18 Kant writes in the Grundlegung: “Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends; morals 
regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the former the kingdom of ends is a theo­
retical idea for explaining what exists. In the latter it is a practical idea for bringing about what does not 
exist but can be made actual by our conduct, i.e., what can be actualized in accordance with this very 
idea” (Ak. 436 n.).
19 Immanuel Kant, “On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use,” 
in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral Practice, trans. Ted Humphrey 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Inc.. 1983). 61-92. All citations refer to Akademie page 
numbers.
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deals specifica lly  w ith  “th e  w e ll-b e in g  of th e  human race a s  a  w ho le .”20 T he 
id ea  o f th e  c o n tin u a l p ro g ress io n  o f th e  h u m a n  species ag a in  com es to  th e  
fore a s  K a n t a tte m p ts  to  d ia lo g u e  w ith  M oses M en d e lsso h n  re g a rd in g  th e  n a ­
tu re  of th e  developm en t of h u m a n  h is to ry , a n d  one m a y  be  ab le  to  g e t an  
even  c le a re r  p ic tu re  as to how  K a n t  in te n d s  u n iv e rs a l h is to ry  to  f i t  w ith  th e  
re s t  o f h is  ph ilo sophy .
K a n t b e g in s  th e  th i r d  sec tio n  o f “T heo ry  a n d  P rac tice” by  in d ic a tin g  
th a t  th e  a ssu m p tio n  of a  u n iv e rs a l  h is to ry  is  m ad e  fo r m o ra l re a so n s . M en­
de lssohn  w a s  o f  th e  opin ion  t h a t  th e  h um an species n e v e r  p ro g ressed , th a t  no 
m a tte r  how  h a r d  i t  m ig h t a t te m p t  to  ac t v irtu o u sly , h is to ry  s ta c k e d  th e  deck 
a g a in s t  h u m a n ity . K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  su ch  a  supposition ,
for a while m ay perhaps be moving and instructive, bu t the cu rta in  m ust fi­
nally fall. For in the long ru n  i t  becomes a farce... To be sure, if it is only a 
play, the punishm ent th a t  comes a t the end can m ake up for the  unpleasant 
sensations experienced along the way. But allowing vice to m ount upon end­
less vice in  the real world (even w ith an  occasional virtuous act interjected) so 
th a t in days to come there can be plenty to punish is, to say the least, contrary 
to our conception of the m orality of a  wise creator and  governor o f the world.21
N ote  th a t  ev en  i f  in  th e  a fte rlife , o r ana logously  a f te r  th e  p lay  is  over, a ll im ­
m o ra l ac tio n s a re  p u n ish ed , K a n t  m a in ta in s  th a t  th is  is  n o t e n o u g h  to  ju s tify  
a llow ing  vice to  m o u n t upon  vice, n o r  is  i t  a n  a d e q u a te  reaso n  fo r  p u rsu in g  
th e  h ig h e s t good on e a rth . A s w a s  a llu d e d  to  above, K a n t b e liev ed  th a t  i f  h is ­
to ry  is  s a id  to  a c t  a lw ays re g a rd le s s  o f m o ra l actions, even  i f  one’s m o ra lity  is  
rew ard e d  in  th e  a fterlife , life  in  th is  w orld  w ould  be fa rc ica l.22 T h is  is  im por­
t a n t  b ecau se  i t  show s ag a in  t h a t  K a n t  is  n o t only  concerned  w ith  th e  possib il­
i ty  o f w illing  a  m o ra l life for oneself, fo r sim ply  ac tin g  v ir tu o u s ly  o n  one’s 
ow n w ith  th e  r a t io n a l  hope t h a t  su c h  actions w ill be  re w a rd e d  in d iv id u a lly  in
20 “Theory and Practice,” Ak. 277.
21 Ibid., Ak. 308.
22 See also the “upward” proof of the third Critique discussed in Chapter Six above.
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th e  a fte rlife . K a n t  is  a lso  concerned  w ith  th e  im p ro v em en t o f th is  w orld , 
w ith  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f b r in g in g  ab o u t th e  h ig h e s t good on  th is  p la n e t, a n d  for 
su ch  a  good to  occur, one m u s t  p resu m e  m ore th a n  one’s  ow n re w a rd  in  th e  
a fte rlife .
K a n t  follow s th is  im p o r ta n t p a ra g ra p h  w ith  a n o th e r . H e  w rite s :
I will thus perm it m yself to assume th a t since the h u m a n  race’s n a tu ra l end is 
to m ake steady cultural progress, its m oral end is to be conceived as pro­
gressing tow ard the better... I t is not necessary for me to prove th is  assum p­
tion... For I res t my case on my innate duty — a duty belonging to everyone in 
the sequence of generations to which... I belong,... the  duty so to affect poster­
ity th a t  it  will become continually be tter (something th a t  m ust be assum ed to 
be possible)...23
In  th is  p a ra g ra p h , K a n t  c lea rly  re fe rs  n o t to  som e p re m ise  of th e o re tic a l o r 
sp ecu la tiv e  know ledge  fo r th e  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f h u m a n  p ro g ress , b u t  to  m o ra l 
p rin c ip le s  a n d  p u re  p ra c tic a l reason . K a n t “re s ts  h is  ca se ” on du ty , n o t  on 
theo ry . H e  even  concludes th a t ,
however uncertain  I m ay always be, and  may rem ain, as to w hether we m ay 
hope any th ing  b e tte r for the hum an race, yet this uncertain ty  can d e trac t nei­
ther from the maxim th a t from a practical point of view it is a tta inab le , nor 
from the  presupposition of its necessity.24
P ro g ress  is  a  m ax im  w hich , w ith o u t com plete ly  conclusive evidence to  th e  
co n tra ry , m u s t  be  ju d g e d  a s  “a tta in a b le ” a n d  is  a  n e ce ssa ry  “p re su p p o s itio n ” 
“from  a  p ra c tic a l p o in t  o f v iew .” T hese  s ta te m e n ts  seem  to  m ak e  i t  c le a r  t h a t  
K a n t is  b a s in g  th e  p ro g ress io n  of h u m a n  perfec tion  on  p ra c tic a l re a so n  a n d  
th o se  p o s tu la te s  w h ich  a re  n ecessa ry  for f a i th  in  th e  m o ra l law . In d e e d , in  
th e  n e x t p a ra g ra p h , K a n t  goes on to  c la im  th a t  w ith o u t su ch  a  su p p o s itio n  
one  cou ld  n o t “ra t io n a lly  h ope” for en lig h ten m en t, a n d  w rite s  th a t ,
23 “Theory and Practice.” Ak. 309.
24 Ibid., Ak. 309.
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empirical argum ents against the success of these resolutions, which are based 
on hope, fail here. For the argum ent th a t  som ething h as until now been un- 
successful and  therefore shall never be successful does not justify abandoning 
even a  pragm atic  or technical in ten tion  (for exam ple, travel by aerostatic ba l­
loons), m uch less a  morally obligatory one, unless, o f course, its a tta in m en t is 
dem onstrably impossible.25
H e re  K a n t s t r e s s e s  m o ra lly  ob liga to ry  in te n t io n s  over p ra g m a tic  a n d  te c h n i­
c a l ones, a n d  n o te s  a g a in  th a t  su c h  a  p ro g re ss io n  is  a  h o p e , p re su m a b ly  a  r a ­
t io n a l  hope o f p u r e  p ra c tic a l reason .
I t  is  o f im p o r ta n c e  to  n o te  t h a t  i t  is  o n ly  h e re , a f te r  s ta t in g  th e  p lace  
a n d  n ecessity  o f  p o s tu la tin g  th e  p ro g re ss io n  o f  h u m a n  m o ra l p erfec tion , t h a t  
K a n t  a tte m p ts  to  e x p la in  how  su c h  a  p ro g re s s io n  m ig h t b e  possib le . H e  e x ­
p la in s , in  th e  s a m e  v e in  as th e  “Id e a ” th a t ,
I f  we now inquire  as to the m eans by which th is e te rn a l progress tow ards b e t­
term ent can  be m aintained and perhaps even sped up, one soon sees th a t  th is 
im m easurably d istan t result depends no t so m uch on w hat we do... nor on 
w hat m ethod we adopt so as to b ring  it  about; instead, it  depends on w hat 
hum an nature does in and with us so as to compel us onto a path that we our­
selves would not readily follow.26
In  th is  p a ra g ra p h  a n d  th e  two th a t  follow , K a n t  se ts  o u t  a n  accoun t o f ho w  
th e  h u m a n  sp ec ie s  m ig h t p rog ress w h ic h  fo llow s a lo n g  m u c h  th e  sam e  l in e s  
a s  th e  e x p la n a tio n  in  th e  “Idea .” B asica lly , m a n ’s u n so c ia l soc iab ility  w ill 
le a d  h im  to c u lt iv a te  h is  sk ills a n d  ta le n ts ,  b u t  th e  c o n s ta n t  a n d  in c re a s in g ly  
v io le n t s tru g g le  b e tw e e n  persons a n d  n a t io n s  w ill le a d  m a n  to  seek  a  p e rp e t­
u a l  peace . T h is  c o n tin u a l m ovem ent is  a g a in  s a id  to  b e  e n a c te d  th ro u g h  self- 
co n ce rn  a n d  n o t n e ce ssa rily  a  d esire  to  b r in g  a b o u t a  m o ra l com m unity .
A fter e x p la in in g  a n d  sp e llin g  o u t  h o w  p ro g re ss io n  m ig h t ta k e  p lace , 
K a n t  e n d s  b o th  th e  sec tion  a n d  th e n  th e  a r t ic le  b y  s ta t in g  exp lic itly  t h a t  h is  
e x p la n a tio n  m a y  b e  m is tak en . H e  b e g in s  th e  l a s t  p a ra g r a p h  o f h is  th i rd
25 Ibid., Ak. 309-10.
26 Ibid.. Ak. 310.




section  o f “T h eo ry  a n d  P rac tice” by  w ritin g : “M eanw hile , th is  is  only  op in ion  
a n d  m e re  hypo th esis  -  a s  u n c e r ta in  a s  a ll ju d g m en t c la im in g  to  se t  o u t th e  
slow  a p p ro p r ia te  n a tu ra l  c a u se  fo r a n  in te n d e d  effect th a t  is  n o t e n tire ly  in  
o u r po w er.”27 T h is  quo ta tion , a lo n g  w ith  o th e rs  in  th is  piece, seem s to  
su p p o r t  th e  above h y p o th esis  t h a t  K a n t  is  try in g  to give a n  accoun t o f  ho w  
th e  p e rfe c tio n  o f th e  h u m a n  sp ec ies  m ig h t be  possible, one w hich  c an  be 
m u ch  m o re  d e ta ile d  th a n  th e  a cc o u n t o f im m o rta lity  fo r th e  in d iv id u a l, b u t  
a n  acco u n t w hich , no n e th e le ss , s te m s  from  a  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l re a so n  
a n d  w h ic h  cou ld  be  m is ta k e n  in  th e  d e ta ils , th o u g h  th e  concept m u s t  be  
re ta in e d . In  th e  fin a l p a ra g ra p h  o f  th e  w ork  h e  m a in ta in s  th a t ,
for my own part, I place my tru s t  in the theory about w hat the relation am ong 
m en and nations ought to be th a t  derives from the principle of right and  th a t 
recommends to the earth ly  gods the maxim always so to proceed in th e ir con­
flicts th a t such a  universal cosmopolitan nation will thereby be introduced, and 
th u s  to assum e tha t it  is possible (in praxi) and tha t it can exist.2*
O nce a g a in  i t  seem s th a t  K a n t is  m a k in g  th e  fin a l ap p ea l to  m o ra lity  to  j u s ­
tify  h is  b e lie f  in  th e  h u m a n  species a n d  i ts  h isto ry . H e h a s  a  fa i th  in  p ro ­
g ress io n  fo r rea so n s  of w h a t o u g h t to  be, for w h a t shou ld  be possib le  in  p ra c ­
tice. H is  acco u n t of how  th is  p ro g re ss io n  is  in s ta n tia te d  m ay  b e  m ere  h y ­
p o th es is , b u t  th e  be lief in  i t s  p o ss ib ility  is  a  p o stu la te  o f p ra c tic a l re a so n .29
V. Conclusion:
I  b e lieve  th a t  K a n t’s  “Id e a  fo r U n iv e rsa l H isto ry  w ith  a  C osm opo litan  
In te n t” i s  a n  e sse n tia l co m p o n en t in  K a n t’s  ph ilosophical system , a n d  t h a t  i t  
gives n e w  d e p th  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  to  K a n t’s m oral a n d  po litica l ph ilo sophy .
27 Ibid., Ak. 311-12.
28 Ibid., Ak. 313.
29 “Here, therefore, is a proposition valid for the most rigorous theory, in spite of all skeptics, 
and not just a well-meaning and practically commendable proposition: the human race has always been 
in progress toward the better and will continue to be so henceforth.” Conflict o f the Faculties, p. 159.
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“T heo ry  a n d  P rac tice” p ro v id es  a n  ex ce llen t ex am p le  of how  K a n t expects h is  
concepts of a  u n iv e rsa l h is to ry  to be in te g ra te d  in to  h is  ph ilosophy , th o u g h  
o th e r  te x ts  su ch  a s  “W h a t is  o rien ta tio n  in  T h in k in g?” a n d  “Is  th e  H u m a n  
R ace C o n tin u a lly  Im prov ing?” also affo rd  one  in s ig h ts  in to  th e  p lace  a n d  
fu n c tio n  K a n t in te n d s  th e  concep ts in v o lv ed  in  th e  “Id ea” to  h av e . As w as 
show n  above, in  h is  d e b a te  w ith  M endelssohn , K a n t  does n o t a p p ea l p r im a r ­
ily  to  n a tu re , reg u la tiv e  id e a s , o r em p irica l h is to ry  in  o rd er to  ju s tify  h is  p o s i­
tion . R a th e r , tim e  a n d  tim e  a g a in  h e  m a k e s  a n  a p p e a l to  m o ra lity , a n d  to  th e  
fu til i ty  w hich  w ould  r e s u l t  fro m  th e  re jec tio n  o f th e  id ea  o f th e  p ro g ress  of 
h u m a n  beings. R ecall a lso  t h a t  h e  m ak e s  su c h  a  c la im  d esp ite  th e  fac t th a t  
im m o rta lity  fo r th e  in d iv id u a l h a s  been  p o s tu la te d , a n d  th a t  one m ay  in d e e d  
expect re w a rd  fo r v ir tu e  in  a n  afterlife . I t  is  im p o r ta n t  for K a n t’s sy s tem  to 
p o s it a  p rog ression  so t h a t  p e rso n s  m ay  p u r s u e  th e  h ig h e s t good fo r th is  
w orld . I t  is  only  a fte r  su c h  ju s tif ic a tio n  h a s  b e e n  m ad e  th a t  K a n t a tte m p ts  to  
sp e ll o u t how  a  p ro g ressio n  m ig h t occur, a f te r  w h ich  h e  m a in ta in s  th a t  such  
a  d escrip tio n  is  m ere  h y p o th es is . T he “Id e a ” seem s b est accoun ted  for in  th e  
m a n n e r  p re se n te d  above, n a m e ly  th a t  i t  i s  a  p o s tu la te  of p u re  p rac tica l r e a ­
son, one th a t  m u s t be e n d o rse d  i f  one is  to  p u rs u e  th e  h ig h e s t good in  th is  
w orld, b u t  one th a t  m ig h t b e  sp e lled  o u t in  d iffe ren t w ays.





T h e  tra d itio n  o f K a n t  sc h o la rsh ip  h a s  te n d e d  to s e p a ra te  a n d  iso la te  
se v e ra l a sp ec ts  o f K a n t’s ph ilo so p h y , k e e p in g  m o ra l, teleological, po litica l, 
an d , often , re lig io u s c o n s id e ra tio n s  a p a r t  fro m  one  an o th e r. P e rh a p s  th e y  
a re  try in g  to  sav e  som e a sp ec ts  o f K a n t ’s  p h ilo so p h y  by c u tt in g  o u t o th e r  
p a r ts  w h ich  m ay  n o t be  a s  p a la ta b le . M o ra lity  m ay  be m o re  a p p e a lin g  i f  i t  is  
n o t b o u n d  u p  w ith  re lig ious im p lic a tio n s . T eleology m ig h t be  m ore  accep t­
ab le  a s  a  m ere  a id  to  science th a n  a n  in d ic a tio n  th a t  th e  h u m a n  species m ay  
h a v e  b een  c re a te d  fo r a  f in a l p u rp o se  b y  a  m o ra l a u th o r. A n d  w ho w a n ts  to 
a s s e r t  th e  p ro p o sitio n  th a t  h u m a n  b e in g s  a re  m o ra lly  im p ro v in g  in  f ig h t of 
su ch  tra g ic  e v en ts  a s  th e  H o locaust?  I t  is  p o ss ib le , how ever, t h a t  su ch  iso la ­
tio n  is  m ere ly  a  r e s u l t  o f th e  n e e d  fo r  specific  a re a s  of re se a rc h  in  K an t.
R eg ard le ss  o f th e  m o tiv a tio n  b e h in d  tra d itio n a l K a n t  sch o la rsh ip , I 
h av e  tr ie d  to  a rg u e  above th a t  m a n y  a sp e c ts  o f  i t  seem  to  be  m is ta k en , a n d  
th a t  K a n t b e liev ed  th e re  to  b e  s tro n g  c o n n ec tio n s  b e tw een  a ll  a sp ec ts  o f h is  
ph ilosophy . I f  m y  a n a ly se s  h a v e  b e e n  co rrec t, K a n t  in te n d s  h is  m o ra l p h i­
losophy  to  su p p o r t a n d  h a rm o n ize  w ith  a ll  o th e r  “m etap h y sica l” c o n s id e ra ­
tions. T h ro u g h o u t a ll  o f h is  w ritin g s , K a n t  w a s  concerned  w ith  th e  d ig n ity  o f 
th e  h u m a n  c re a tu re  a n d  th e  p lace  o f  re a so n  in  th e  world.
T h is  c h a p te r  p ro v id es a  t r a n s i t io n  b e tw e e n  Section O ne  a n d  Two, a n d  
is  d iv id ed  in to  th re e  p a r ts .  I n  th e  f i r s t  p a r t ,  I  t r y  to  briefly  su m m arize  th e  
im p o rta n t p o in ts  o f th e  above c h a p te rs , a n d  m en tio n  th e ir  d ifference  to  som e
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tra d itio n a l a sp ec ts  o f K a n t sc h o la rsh ip . A ll o f th e se  th em es w ill be  su p p o r te d  
a g a in  in  S ec tion  Two, th o u g h  w ith  m o re  specific co nsidera tions. In  th e  
second p a r t ,  I  d irec tly  en g ag e  w h a t I  ta k e  to  b e  m is ta k e n  p o sitio n s  in  th e  
secondary  l i te ra tu re  w ith  r e g a rd  to  th e  conclusions I  h av e  re a c h e d  so f a r  in  
th is  section . I  th in k  th is  is  im p o r ta n t  n o t  on ly  b ecause  i t  m ay  h e lp  to  co rrec t 
w h a t seem  to  b e  m is in te rp re ta tio n s  o f K a n t’s  ph ilosophy , b u t  a lso  b ecau se , in  
so doing, m y ow n po sitio n  w ill be  c la rif ied . F in a lly , in  th e  th ird  p a r t ,  I  s a y  a  
few  w ords in  tra n s it io n  to  S ection  Two.
n.
L et m e beg in  by  e m p h a s iz in g  som e p o in ts  w hich  o u g h t to  be  c le a r  a t  
th is  s ta g e  in  th e  w ork. F irs t ,  I  a rg u e d  t h a t  K a n t  h a d  a  c lea r concep tion  a s  to  
th e  lim its  of th e  em p loym en t of te leo log ica l id e a s . K a n t is  d e a r  on  th is  from  
th e  f i r s t  th ro u g h  th e  th ird  Critique, th o u g h , o f  course, th e  th ird  Critique of­
fe rs  m an y  n ew  in s ig h ts . A ssoc ia ted  w ith  th is  fac t is  th e  a p p a re n t  te n s io n  in  
th e  Critique o f Pure Reason b e tw een  w h a t  c a n  be considered  a s  knowledge 
a n d  w h a t K a n t  th in k s  w e o u g h t (m orally ) to  h o p e  for. I  c an n o t k n o w  t h a t  n a ­
tu re  w ill be  resp o n siv e  to  m o ra l w illin g  a n d  action , b u t  I  hope th a t  i t  w ill. 
Second, I  a rg u e d  in  m y d iscussion  o f each  o f th e  th re e  Critiques t h a t  th e re  
a re  tw o loca tions for th e  h ig h e s t  good. T h e  f i r s t  is  a n  “o therw orld ly” loca tion , 
co rre sp o n d in g  to  th e  p o s tu la te s  of G od a n d  im m o rta lity . T he  second  is  a n  
“e a r th ly ” loca tion . T hese  d iffe ren t a sp e c ts  seem  to h a rm o n ize  w ell in  th e  
follow ing po w erfu l s ta te m e n t by  K an t:
Teleology considers n a tu re  as a  kingdom of ends; morals regards a possible 
kingdom of ends as a  kingdom of na tu re . In  the former the kingdom of ends is 
a theoretical idea for explaining w hat exists. In  the la tte r it is a  practical idea 
for bringing about w hat does not exist b u t can be made actual by our conduct, 
i.e., w hat can be actualized in accordance w ith  this very idea.1
1 Grundlegung. Ak. 436 n.
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T h ese  th re e  a sp ec ts  o f K a n t’s th in k in g , teleology, th e  ten s io n  betw een 
know ledge  a n d  hope, a n d  th e  tw o  locations of th e  h ig h e s t  good com bine for a  
p o w erfu l new  in te rp re ta t io n  o f th e  “Id e a  for a  U n iv e rsa l H isto ry  w ith  a  
C osm opolitan  In te n t .”
A s I  s ta te d  above, in it ia l ly  i t  m ay  seem  d ifficu lt to  know  how  to a n a ­
lyze  th e  “Id ea .” B u t i f  w e accep t K a n t’s u n w a v e rin g  b e lie f  in  a n d  defense of 
th e  m o ra l law  a n d  th e  m a je s ty  o f reaso n , a n d  we c o n s id e r th e  above th re e  a s ­
p ec ts  o f K a n t’s  th in k in g , I  th in k  a n  in te rp re ta t io n  em erg es . I f  K a n t be lieved  
t h a t  th e  m o ra l la w  w as t h a t  a sp ec t o f h u m a n  ex is ten ce  w h ich  alone b ro u g h t 
v a lu e  to  th e  h u m a n  species, i f  h e  h o ped  th a t  n a tu r e  m ig h t in d eed  su p p o rt 
m o ra l w illing  a n d  action , a n d  i f  h e  believed  in  a n  e a r th ly  h ig h e s t good a s  th e  
n e c e ssa ry  object o f a ll  m o ra l w illing , th e n  i t  w ould  seem  t h a t  th e  “Id ea ” is  a  
n a tu r a l  fo rum  for K a n t to  b r in g  th e se  aspec ts  to g e th e r . K a n t  h a s  to  defend  
m o ra l p ro g ress  a n d  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  h ig h es t good on  e a r th , a n d  h e  h a s  to 
do so  w ith in  th e  lim its  o f th e  f i r s t  Critique. H e does th is  w ith  h is  n in e  
“T h e se s .”
L e t u s  a d d  m ore  b a c k g ro u n d  to  th is  em erg in g  p ic tu re . I a rg u e d  above 
t h a t  m o ra l w illing  c an  be  in f lu e n c e d  b y  em pirica l con d itio n s. T his is  n o t to 
sa y  t h a t  i t  can  be d e te rm in e d  by  th e se  conditions, fo r  m o ra l w illing  is  a lw ays 
free , b u t  only  to  say  th a t  K a n t  ag rees  w ith  th e  com m on in tu it io n  th a t  ad v erse  
co n d itio n s som etim es m a k e  i t  d ifficu lt to  w ill in  acco rd  w ith  th e  m o ra l law . 
B u t i f  th is  is  so, a n d  i f  w e a re  to  hope  for a  c o n tin u a l im p ro v em en t o f every  
p e rso n ’s m orality , th e n  i t  seem s w e h av e  a  d u ty  to  e lim in a te  those cond itions 
w h ich  m o st h in d e r  th e  p o ss ib ility  of m o ra l im p ro v em en t. K a n t is d e a r  in  a ll 
o f h is  w ritin g s  th a t  th is  is  th e  re sp o n sib ility  o f p o litica l in s titu tio n s . I t  is  th e  
fo rm a tio n  of a S ta te  w ith  a  p e rfe c t (in te rn a l)  c o n s titu tio n  w hich , in  tu rn , 
p a r t ic ip a te s  in  a  cosm opo litan  w hole  o f rep u b lican  n a tio n s  th a t  allows fo r th e  
m o ra l p ro jec t to  beg in  in  e a rn e s t .  I  sh a ll  d iscuss th is  ro le  o f po litica l in s t i tu ­
tio n s  in  m uch  g re a te r  d e ta il  below .




I f  th is  w ere n o t en ough , K a n t’s d iscussion  o f th e  u ltim a te  a n d  f in a l 
p u rp o se  o f n a tu re  in  th e  Critique of Judgment show s u s  w hy  K a n t is  so 
a d a m a n t  ab o u t th e  n e e d  fo r m o ra l p rog ress. H u m a n  ex istence  on e a r th  
would, b e  com plete ly  w ith o u t v a lu e  if  m o ra lity  c o u ld  n o t im prove. N ot s im p ly  
th e  e x is ten ce  of th e  m o ra l law , b u t  th e  ab ility  o f th e  h u m a n  species a s  a  
w ho le  to  m orally  im prove th ro u g h o u t h is to ry  is  w h a t  gives existence i ts  
w o rth . T h u s , m oral p ro g ress  o f th e  h u m a n  species in  h is to ry  is  c ruc ia l for 
K a n t, e v e n  th o u g h  w e c a n  n e v e r  h av e  c e r ta in  know ledge  o f such  p ro g ress . 
H ow ever, K a n t believes t h a t  th e  conclusions o f th e  th ir d  Critique offer u s  
in c re a s e d  h o p e  for th is  possib ility ; th e  “u p w a rd ” proof, th e  s ta n d a rd  
“d o w n w ard ” proof, a n d  th e  d iscussion  o f b e a u ty  a ll  give fu r th e r  con firm ation  
of th e  p o ss ib le  l in k  b e tw een  th e  m o ra l a n d  n a tu r a l  “w orlds.” T hese 
conclusions, com bined w ith  h is  d iscussion  o f “c u ltu re ,” allow  for a  ra t io n a l  
hope  t h a t  n a tu re  w ill a id  u s  in  o u r  m oral en d eav o rs .
W h ile  th e  n e e d  for m o ra l p rog ress is  e sp ec ia lly  c le a r  in  th e  th ird  Cri­
tique, K a n t’s d iscussion  o f A rc ad ian  sh e p h e rd s  a n d  T a h itia n  v illagers b r in g s  
h is  p o in t  ho m e forcefully. W hile  h u m a n  b e in g s a re  p a r t  o f n a tu re , th e y  w ere  
n o t m e a n t  to  live lik e  th e  r e s t  o f n a tu re , t h a t  is, co n ten ted ly . P rovidence “h a s  
m a rk e d  o u t fo r u s  so to ilsom e a  ro a d  th ro u g h  th is  e a r th ly  w orld”2 b u t  w ith  
good rea so n : an tag o n ism  a n d  n o t h a p p in e ss  is  m o re  h e lp fu l to  m oral c re a ­
tu re s . K a n t  a rg u es  th a t  c u ltu re , an tag o n ism , a n d  u n so c ia l sociability  a ll  fo s­
te r  o u r  a b ili ty  to w ill free ly  a n d  m orally . N a tu re  c a n n o t b r in g  abou t m o ra l 
im p ro v e m e n t itself, b u t  th e re  a re  conditions w h ich  m ay  m ore or le ss  a id  o u r  
r a t io n a l  ab ilitie s . A nd  w ith o u t m o ra l im p ro v em en t, w e w ould  be b u t  w o rth ­
le ss  sh e p h e rd s .
T h u s , I  believe th a t  K a n t’s  “Idea” is  a n  e x tre m e ly  im p o rta n t p iece  in  
h is  p h ilo so p h ica l w ritin g s . F o r  th e  f irs t  tim e  w e se e  specifically  how  K a n t 
m ay  h a v e  conceived o f th e  l in k  be tw een  m orality , po litics , a n d  relig ion, th e
2 "Conjectural Beginnings.” Ak. 121.
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l in k  b e tw een  m o ra l p ro g ress , po litica l in s t itu tio n s , a n d  th e  h ig h e s t good. I 
have  a rg u e d  th a t ,  fo r K a n t, th e re  m u s t  e x is t th e  p ossib ility  o f  a  h ig h e s t  good 
on e a r th  a n d  t h a t  m o ra l p ro g ress  is  a  n e c e ssa ry  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . 
A gain, th e  p ro b lem  t h a t  K a n t  faces th ro u g h o u t h is  e n tire  life  a n d  w ritin g s  is  
th e  defense o f th is  p o ss ib ility . W hile  K a n t  d id  n o t h av e  th e  H o lo cau st to  con­
te n d  w ith , h e  d id  h a v e  th e  d e v a s ta tin g  L isb o n  e a r th q u a k e , m a n y  in te r n a ­
tio n a l a n d  c iv il w ars , a n d  th e  g row ing  cyn ic ism  o f m an y  o f h is  c o n te m p o ra r­
ies  re g a rd in g  a n y  p o ssib le  h u m a n  im p ro v em en t. K a n t re fu se d  to  accep t even  
M endelssohn’s  s ta tic , cyclical m odel o f h is to ry . T h u s, K a n t fe lt  com pelled  to 
give som e acco u n t a s  to  h o w  h u m a n  p ro g re ss  m ig h t be possib le  d e sp ite  so 
m uch  ev idence to  th e  c o n tra ry . K a n t’s a n sw e r, to  be re p e a te d  a n d  e x p o u n d ed  
so often  in  a ll  o f  h is  p o litic a l w ritings , is  g iven  to  u s  in  th e  "Idea .”
m .
In  th e  l a s t  c h a p te r , I  p re se n te d  tw o  g e n e ra l schools o f th o u g h t r e g a rd ­
in g  how  to in te rp re t  th e  “Id e a ,” a n d  I  a rg u e d  t h a t  th ese  in te rp re ta t io n s  w ere  
flaw ed. L e t u s  ta k e  a  look a t  a  few  in te rp re ta t io n s  w hich  d e a l w ith  th is  topic 
of p rogress, th o u g h  n o t  n e ce ssa rily  w ith  th e  “Id e a ” itse lf. In  th is  w ay, I  hope 
n o t only  to  co rrec t som e com m on m is ta k e s , b u t  p e rh a p s  m y ow n p o s itio n  w ill 
th e re b y  becom e c le a re r . F irs t , le t  u s  look a t  M igum i S a k a b e ’s  artic le , 
“F reedom  as  a  R e g u la tiv e  P rinc ip le : O n  Som e A spects o f th e  K a n t — H e rd e r  
C ontroversy  on  th e  P h ilo so p h y  o f H is to ry ,”3 w h ich  concerns K a n t’s  a r tic le  on 
th e  “C o n jec tu ra l B e g in n in g  o f H u m a n  H is to ry .” To beg in  w ith , S a k a b e ’s  a r ­
ticle is  c e r ta in ly  a n  im p ro v em en t over m a n y  o th e rs , for, a s  th e  t it le  show s, i t  
a lread y  accepts K a n t  to  b e  u s in g  re g u la tiv e  concep ts in  h is  e a rly  e x a m in a ­
tions of h is to ry . S a k a b e  m a in ta in s  th a t ,
3 Megumi Sakabe, “Freedom as a Regulative Principle: On Some Aspects of the Kant — Herder 
Controversy on the Philosophy of History,” in Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. Yirmiyahu 
Yovel (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1986). 183-195.
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contrary  to the  generally accepted view as to the  development of K ant’s philo­
sophical reflections on the teleological principle, I strongly em phasize the im­
portan t, indeed definitive role played by his deliberations on the  s ta tu s  of this 
principle in  “Conjectural Beginning of H um an History”: the s ta tu s  of this
principle as a  regulative principle has its origin [here].4
S a k a b e  goes on  to  l in k  K a n t’s  a rtic le  to  h is  l a te r  artic le , “O n  th e  U se  o f 
T eleo log ical P rin c ip le s  in  P h ilo sophy ,” a n d  a s s e r ts  th a t  th e re  is  a  c le a r  l in e  of 
d ev e lo p m en t fro m  h e re  to th e  th ir d  Critique. A s f a r  as th is  a rg u m e n t goes, I 
th in k  S a k a b e  is  co rrec t in  h is  in s is te n c e  t h a t  K a n t  is  n o t co n fu sed  a s  to  th e  
basic  p a ra m e te r s  fo r h is u se  o f  th e  n o tio n  o f  teleology, t h a t  h e  looks a t  h is to ry  
from  a  re g u la tiv e  a n d  no t c o n s titu tiv e  p o in t  o f v iew , a n d  th a t  th is  is  precisely 
th e  re a so n  t h a t  K a n t  objects so s tre n u o u s ly  to  H e rd e r’s Ideas for a Philoso­
phy o f the History o f Mankind  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace .
H a v in g  s a id  th is , w h ile  S a k a b e  se e m s to  u ltim a te ly  re je c t th e  t r a d i ­
tio n a l a n  in te rp re ta t io n  of th is  p iece, S a k a b e  is  u n w illin g  to  see  th is  a s  a  
q u estio n  fo r  p ra c tic a l  philosophy. S a k a b e  se em s to  th in k  th a t ,  in  K a n t’s 
a n a ly s is  o f  h is to ry , K a n t h a s  in  m in d  so m e ty p e  o f  reg u la tiv e  p rin c ip le , 
th o u g h  h e  m a in ta in s  th a t  K a n t “m a k e s  i t  c le a r  t h a t  th e  ph ilo so p h y  o f  h is to ry  
is  a n  in te rm e d ia te  dom ain  b e tw een  th e o ry  a n d  p ra x is  or, from  sm o ther p o in t 
o f view , b e tw e e n  im ag in a tio n  a n d  re a so n .”5 S a k a b e  a p p ea rs  to  v iew  K a n t a s  
u s in g  a  co n cep t to  in te rp re t  h is to ry  t h a t  som ehow  “occupies a n  in te rm e d ia te  
p o sitio n  b e tw e e n  know ledge a n d  ac tio n  (o r th e o ry  a n d  p rax is )...”6 U ltim a te ly , 
p e rh a p s  S a k a b e  is  sim ply  try in g  to  a rg u e  t h a t  K a n t  is  h e re  co n ce rn ed  w ith  
so m e th in g  lik e  th e  facility  o f ju d g m e n t w h ic h  h e  in v e s tig a te s  in  th e  th i r d  Cri­
tique. H ow ever, reg a rd le ss  o f th e  s ta tu s  o f th is  reg u la tiv e  no tion , S a k a b e  
q u ite  p la in ly  s ta te s :
4 Ibid., p. 192.
5 Ibid., p. 183.
6' Ibid.. p. 193.
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In his controversy w ith H erder as to the problem of Averroism, K ant explicitly 
qualifies his vision of hum an  history as a  regulative principle (in contrast, 
perhaps, to the postulate o f the im m ortality of the  soul as a quasi-constitutive 
principle).7
N ow , i f  m y  a n a ly s is  o f K a n t’s  p o s itio n  re g a rd in g  h is to ry  is  correct, th e n  
S a k a b e  is  w ro n g  on  exactly  t h i s  p o in t, fo r K a n t’s  a n a ly s is  o f h is to ry  h a s  to  do 
w ith  a  p ra c tic a l p o s tu la te  t h a t  is  p rec ise ly  lik e  t h a t  o f th e  im m o rta lity  o f th e  
sou l.
I  th in k  th a t  S ak ab e , l ik e  m a n y  o th er co m m en ta to rs , fa ils  to  sa tis fa c ­
to r ily  a n sw e r th e  follow ing q u e s tio n : W hy is  K a n t so concerned  to  ex am in e  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f th e  p ro g ress  o f  h u m a n  reaso n  in  h is to ry ?  S a k a b e ’s a n sw e r is  
r a th e r  am b ig u o u s, a n d  seem s to  u ltim a te ly  to  re fe r  to  so m e th in g  lik e  K a n t’s 
in te r e s t  in  th e  ex am in a tio n  o f th e  concep t of teleology. W hile  th is  m ay  be in  
p a r t  t ru e , K a n t’s an sw ers  in  “C o n je c tu ra l B eg inn ing” a re  m uch  m ore s tr a ig h t  
fo rw ard :
I t  is of the  greatest im portance, however, to be content with providence (even 
though it has m arked out for us so toilsome a road through this earth ly  world), 
partly  so th a t we can always take  courage under our burdens and... fix our 
eyes on th a t  fact and not neglect our own obligation to contribute to the b e t­
term ent of ourselves.8
So th is is the  outcome of a  philosophical attem pt a t  se tting  out m an’s prim or­
dial history: Contentm ent w ith providence and w ith the course of hum an
th ings as a  whole, which do not progress from good to bad, but gradually de­
velop from worse to better; an d  in  th is progress n a tu re  herself has given eve­
ryone a p a rt to play th a t is bo th  his own and well w ith in  his powers.9
C le a r ly  K a n t’s  concern  is  n o t h is to ry  fro m  a  sp ecu la tiv e  p o in t of view , n o t a  
p h ilo so p h y  o f h is to ry  per se. B u t  n e i th e r  is  K a n t’s  specific  concern  th e  w o rk ­
in g  o u t  o f th e  p ro p e r use  o f th e  n o tio n  o f  teleology. K a n t, i t  seem s c lear, is
7 Ibid., p. 183.
8 “Conjectural Beginning,” Ak. 121.
9 Ibid.. Ak. 123.
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concerned w ith  tw o th in g s : a n  in te rp re ta t io n  o f h is to ry  th a t  w ould a llow  for 
th e  likelihood  o f  m o ra l p rog ress  a n d  t h a t  w ould, in  tu rn ,  keep in d iv id u a ls  
from  being  d isc o u rag e d  a n d  th u s  becom ing  s la ck  in  th e i r  efforts to c o n tr ib u te  
a s  m uch to  th is  p ro g re ss  a s  m ay be w ith in  th e ir  pow er. K a n t is  concerned  
w ith  the  p o ss ib ility  o f m o ra l p rog ress.
W hile  S a k a b e  seem s w illing  a t  le a s t  to  acknow ledge K a n t’s concern  
for a  “teleological sp ace  o f ‘u n d e rs ta n d in g ’ a n d  h o p e ’ w h ich  is  s i tu a te d  b e ­
tw een  k n o w led g e ’ a n d  ‘action’,”10 a n d  w h ile  th is  is  c e r ta in ly  to  be  c o n sid e red  
a n  im provem en t o v er m a n y  o th e r co m m en ta to rs , I  do n o t  believe h e  goes f a r  
enough. In  th e  en d , w e a re  le ft w ith  th e  fee lin g  t h a t  th is  is  a  “m ere” re g u la ­
tive  id ea .11
O n th e  o th e r  h a n d , F ried rich  K a u lb a c h  goes too f a r  in  th e  o th e r  d i­
rec tion  w ith  h is  w ritin g s , a tte m p tin g  to  re c o n s tru c t a  ph ilo sophy  of h is to ry  in  
w hich  K a n t is  in te r e s te d  in  h is to ry  from  a  th e o re tic a l a n d  specu la tive  p o in t 
o f v iew .12 A gain , th is  is  a n  im p ro v em en t over som e com m en ta to rs , s in ce  a t  
le a s t  th is  sp e cu la tiv e  p o in t of v iew  is  c o n s tru c te d  o u t o f leg itim a te  re g u la tiv e  
id e a s  a n d  does n o t  c h a rg e  K a n t w ith  a  “s lip ” b a ck  to  h is  p re -c ritica l th in k in g . 
K au lbach  c la im s t h a t  th e  “Id ea” concerns “th e  a tte m p t to  an sw er th e  q u e s­
tio n  of how  h is to ry  a n d  ph ilosophy  o f h is to ry  is  poss ib le  a s  a  science.”13 
W hile K au lbach  n o te s  t h a t  K a n t’s w ritin g s  co n ce rn in g  su c h  a n  a tte m p t a re  
“m eager,” h e  h o p e s  to  “reco n stru c t” su c h  a  sc ience .14
K au lb ach ’s  suggestion  is  to  rep la ce  K a n t’s c a teg o ry  of “c au sa lity ” w ith  
“probab ility .”15 H e  r ig h tly  no tes th a t  th e  m a in  p ro b lem  in  a tte m p tin g  a
10 Sakabe, “Regulative Principle,” pp. 191-2.
11 In this respect Sakabe is similar to Laberge.
12 Friedrich Kaulbach, “Der Zusammenhand zwischen Naturphilosophie und 
Geschichtsphilosophie bei Kant,” and “Welchen Nutzen gibt Kant der Geschichtsphilosophie?” All 
translations mine.
13 “Nutzen,” p. 65.
14 Ibid., p. 66.
15 Ibid.
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science o f  h is to ry  is  K a n t’s d iv is io n  b e tw een  th e  w orld  a s  a p p e a ra n c e , a n d  
th u s  su b je c t to  th e  law  o f c a u sa lity , a n d  th e  w orld  a s  n o u m e n a l, w here  
h u m a n  a c tio n s  o rig in a te  in  co m p le te  freedom . H ow  can  one  h a v e  a  science o f 
h is to ry  w h e re  i t s  cau ses o r ig in a te  in  freedom ? T h is  is  e sp ec ia lly  p ro b lem atic  
c o n s id e rin g  a  n a tu re  w hich  i ts e l f  m a y  be th o u g h t to  h a v e  i ts  ow n in te n tio n s  
o u ts id e  o f  th e  w ill o f in d iv id u a ls .16 K a u lb ac h ’s  so lu tio n  is  th a t ,  s in ce  a ll (free) 
ac tions m u s t  m a n ife s t th e m se lv e s  a s  a p p ea ra n c es , su ch  a p p e a ra n c e s  a re  
su b jec t to  th e  categories, a n d  th u s  m a y  b e  sub jec t to  som e g e n e ra liza tio n s  
a n d  p red ic tio n s . K au lbach  p o in ts  o u t K a n t’s in te r e s t  in  m a th e m a tic s  a n d  
s ta tis tic s , a s  w e ll a s  K a n t’s  re fe ren c es  to  K ep ler a n d  N ew to n  in  th e  “Id ea ,” 
a n d  c o n c lu d es t h a t  a  science o f  h is to ry  c a n  be c o n s tru c te d  o u t  o f p ro b ab ility  
th e o ry .17 T o q u ick ly  su m m arize  a n  o th erw ise  d e ta ile d  th eo ry , K au lb ach  
m a in ta in s  t h a t  w e a re  p e rm itte d  to  u tiliz e  th e  concep t o f “p u rp o s iv e n ess” as a  
re g u la tiv e  id e a  fo r th e  u n if ic a tio n  o f a ll  o u r  know ledge, a  u n if ic a tio n  req u ire d  
by  th e  “a rc h ite c to n ic  of rea so n ;” th u s , th is  allow s u s  to u n i te  th e  e v en ts  o f 
h is to ry  th ro u g h  th e  no tion  o f p u rp o s iv e n e ss  in  o rd e r to  e re c t a  science, a n d  to  
u tiliz e  th e  co n cep t o f p ro b ab ility  in  o rd e r to  in v e s tig a te  n a tu r e  a n d  th e reb y  
fu r th e r in g  th e  a rch itec ton ic  o f  rea so n . K au lb ach  recogn izes t h a t  th is  w ould 
n o t r e s u l t  in  know ledge per se, a n d  th u s  th e se  n o tio n s  w o u ld  n o t b e  
c o n s titu a tiv e  o f  experience, b u t  w o u ld  a llow  fo r a  sy s te m a tic  in v e s tig a tio n  of 
n a tu re .
In  re sp o n se  to th e se  w ritin g s , w h a t  I  w a n t to  a rg u e  is  t h a t  th e y  a re  
a n  e x ce llen t a t te m p t  a t  su c h  a  reco n stru c tio n , s ta y in g  v e ry  t r u e  to  K a n t’s 
c ritic a l w r it in g s , b u t  th a t  su c h  a  reco n s tru c tio n  is  a  n o n -s ta r te r .  L e t m e p re ­
s e n t  on ly  a  g e n e ra l a rg u m e n t h e re , b u t  one  th a t  o u g h t to  b e  obv ious from  th e  
above c h a p te rs . T h e  sim ple  q u e s tio n  w h ich  o u g h t to  be  a s k e d  is: d id  K a n t 
re a lly  h a v e  su c h  a  specu la tive  th e o ry  o f h is to ry  in  m in d  w h e n  h e  w ro te  h is
16 Kant often speaks in his political writings of nature as having its own “intentions” which 
differ from our own.
17 Kaulbach. “Nutzen.” p. 67.
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a r tic le s  re g a rd in g  h is to ry ?  I th in k  a n  e x a m in a tio n  o f a ll  of K a n t’s w rit in g s  
w ill show  th a t  K a n t  h a d  n o th in g  lik e  a  “p ro b a b ility  th eo ry ” in  m in d. A s w as 
sh o w n  above, in  h is  d e b a te  w ith  M e n d e lsso h n  in  “T h eo ry  a n d  P rac tice ,” K a n t 
does n o t  a p p ea l p r im a r ily  to  n a tu re , re g u la tiv e  id ea s , o r  em p irica l h is to ry  in  
o rd e r  to  ju s tify  h is  p o s itio n . R a th e r , t im e  a n d  tim e  a g a in  h e  m ak es a n  a p p e a l 
to  m o ra lity , a n d  to  th e  fu tility  w h ich  w o u ld  r e s u l t  fro m  th e  re jec tion  o f  th e  
id e a  o f  th e  p ro g re ss  o f  h u m a n  b e in g s . K a n t  a p p e a rs  to  be  in d ic a tin g  t h a t  h is  
concep tion  o f h is to ry  i s  n o t one concerned , a t  le a d  in  th e  m ain , w ith  e m p iric a l 
in fo rm a tio n  o f th e  p a s t  b e in g  u n if ie d  b y  a n d  fo r th e  arch itec ton ic . K a n t  is  
co n ce rn ed  w ith  th e s e  e v e n ts  only  in so fa r  a s  th e y  show  “w h a t peop les a n d  
g o v e rn m en ts  h a v e  d o n e  to  c o n tr ib u te  to  o r im p a ir  th e  objective o f cosm opol­
i ta n is m .”18 In  fac t, a s  I  n o te d  above in  C h a p te r  T h ree , i f  we ta k e  K a n t’s re c ­
o m m en d a tio n s  se rio u s ly  ab o u t h ow  to  c o n s tru c t a  th e o ry  of em p irica l e v en ts , 
th is  w ou ld  seem  to  b e  a  r a th e r  im p o v e rish ed  h is to ry  indeed ; K a n t’s e x am p le s  
h a v e  on ly  to do w ith  “fo cu sin g  e v e ry w h ere  on ly  on  c iv il c o n s titu tio n s  a n d  
th e i r  law s a n d  on  th e  re la tio n s  a m o n g  n a tio n s .”19 T h is  is  a  h is to ry  w ith o u t 
sc ience , w ith o u t in v e n tio n s , w ith o u t l i te ra tu re ,  w ith o u t a r t , a n d  p re su m a b ly  
ev e n  w ith o u t g re a t  in d iv id u a ls .20 I t  is  a  h is to ry  o f po litics  a n d  ex p lo ra tio n , 
a n d  on ly  th e se  b e c a u se  th e y  a re  th e  d r iv in g  fac to rs  b e h in d  th e  p ro g re ss  o f  th e  
h u m a n  race  to w a rd  m o ra l perfec tion . K a u lb a c h  is  r ig h t  to  no te  th a t  K a n t’s 
w r it in g s  on a  sc ience  o f  h is to ry  w ere  “m ea g e r” a n d  t h a t  K a n t o ften  re m a in e d  
“s i le n t” re g a rd in g  th e  p ro b lem  how  to  m ove from  freed o m  to p ro b ab ility ; I  do 
n o t  th in k  th is  w as u n in te n t io n a l  on  K a n t’s  p a r t .
T h ere  is  a n o th e r  concern  re g a rd in g  K a u lb a c h ’s position . H a v in g  
e s ta b lis h e d  th is  sp e c u la tiv e  th eo ry  o f h is to ry , K a u lb a c h  a rg u e s  th a t  i t  c a n  be
18 “Idea,” Ak. 31.
19 Ibid., Ak. 30.
201 include the last because Kant’s focus is on “the play o f the human will's freedom in the 
large" (17), and thus seems to exclude important individuals. However, it is possible that they would 
have to be included in descriptions of wars, politics, and constitutions; it is likely, as I noted above, that 
Kant would want to include King Frederick William II as an important instigator of enlightened reforms.
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fu r th e r  u se d  a s  a  w ay  o f o rien tin g  o n ese lf fo r  p rac tic a l ends. H e  b e g in s  by  
describ ing  K a n t’s  th o u g h t  ex p erim en t re g a rd in g  th e  ab ility  to  te s t  a n y  
p a r tic u la r  m ax im  b y  th in k in g  of i t  a s  b e in g  im p le m e n te d  a s  a  la w  o f  n a tu re . 
K au lbach  m a k e s  a n  a n a lo g y  be tw een  th is  w a y  o f  th in k in g  a b o u t a  poss ib le  
n a tu re  a n d  th e  sp e c u la tiv e  th in k in g  o f a  h is to r ic a l  a n d  p u rp o siv e  n a tu re ,  
s ta tin g  th a t  th e re  is  “a lso  a n  analogous fu n c tio n  in  th e  sk e tch  (Entwurf) o f a  
ph ilosophy  o f h is to ry  d esc rib in g  n a tu re  fo r p o litic a l actions, w h ich  sh o u ld  
an d  w a n ts  to  w o rk  w ith  [h u m an s] to w ard s th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f a  w orld-w ide 
co n stitu tio n  (weltbiirgerlischer Verfassung)”21 I f  w h a t K au lb ach  m e a n s  by  
such  a n  an a lo g y  a n d  su c h  a n  o rien ta tio n  fo r  p ra c tic a l ac tiv ity  is  s im p ly  th a t  
th e  p o ss ib ility  o f a  p u rp o s iv e  n a tu re  a llow s u s  to  hope  th a t  a  s ta te  o f  peace  
could com e a b o u t e v en  i f  i t  is  n o t o u r d irec t goal, th a n  th is  seem s accep tab le .
B u t i t  a p p e a rs  a s  i f  K au lbach  w a n ts  to  go fu r th e r , to c la im  t h a t  w e 
som ehow  o u g h t to  u s e  th e  ac tions of n a tu re  a s  a  m odel for o u r ow n ac tio n s .22 
I f  th is  is  th e  case , i t  se em s th a t  th e  an a lo g y  is  d an g ero u sly  m is lead in g , a n d  
lead s u s  to  a  p o s itio n  s im ila r  to  H egel. T he  re a so n  fo r th is  concern  is  t h a t  i f  
n a tu re ’s u se  o f  w a r, h o s tili ty , a n d  a n ta g o n ism  is  som ehow  to se rv e  a s  a  
m irro r fo r b eh av io r, th e n  o u r  actions w ou ld  n o t v e ry  likely  be m o ra l a t  a ll, 
b u t  p rec ise ly  im m o ra l. S im p ly  s ta ted , i f  w e m ir ro r  n a tu re ’s u se  o f 
in d iv id u a ls , th e n  w e w o u ld  u se  o th ers  a s  m e a n s  a n d  n o t ends, w e w o u ld  be 
in c lin ed  to  w age w a r  in  th e  hope o f a  r e s u l t in g  b e t te r  co n stitu tio n , w e w ould  
be  v io len tly  a n ta g o n is tic , a n d  we w ould  n o t b e  im m ed ia te ly  co n ce rn ed  w ith  
m o ra l ends. T h e  p o ss ib ility  t h a t  a n ta g o n ism  w ould , u ltim a te ly , le a d  to  a  
s ta te  o f p e rp e tu a l  p e ac e  is  m ere ly  a  hope t h a t  a  s ta te  of R ig h t w o u ld  em erge
21 “Nutzen,” p. 76.
22 This seems to be what Kaulbach intends, given 1) the strength of the analogy between an 
imagined moral world and the pseudo-knowledge of a purposive nature with regards to political institu­
tions, 2) his insistence that it is nature’s handling of individuals and politics which gives us our practical 
orientation, 3) his analogy between the “three questions” of metaphysics and the three sections of his pa­
per, and 4) the fact that the following section deals specifically with hope and therefore not with an orien­
tation for action but rather a hope that progress may be brought about despite our actions.
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th o u g h  w e ou rse lv es have  n o t w o rk ed  d irec tly  to w a rd  i t ;23 i t  is in  no w ay  a  
m odel fo r m o ra l behavior, b u t  on ly  a  hope  th a t  w h a t  a p p e a rs  a  th r e a t  to  
m o ra l p ro g re s s  w ill actually  t u r n  o u t to  h e lp  i ts  p ro m o tio n . W hile K a u lb ac h  
h a s  s ta y e d  t r u e  to  th e  f ir s t  Critique, I  th in k  h e  h a s  m o v ed  fa r  aw ay  from  th e  
sp ir i t  o f  th e  r e s t  o f  K an t’s w ritin g s  co n cern in g  h is to ry .
F in a lly , h a v in g  sk e tch e d  o u t h is  rec o n s tru c tio n  o f a  science o f h is to ry , 
K a u lb a c h  concludes th a t  i t  c an  b e  u s e d  “to a llow  a  prognosis”2* re g a rd in g  th e  
fu tu re . H e  a rg u e s  th a t ,  u tiliz in g  th e  science o f h is to ry , th e  no tion  o f p u r ­
po siv en ess , a n d  p robab ility  th e o ry  a s  a priori g u id es , w e can  hope th a t  p ro g ­
re ss  w ill h a p p e n  on  e a r th .25 H ow ever, K au lb ach  in s is ts  t h a t  “th e  p o ss ib ility  
o f p ro g n o sis  re q u ire s  th a t  h is to ry  a s  a  science h a s  fo u n d  i ts  ph ilo soph ical 
ju s tif ic a tio n ,”26 in  o th er w ords, t h a t  h o p e  can  only  b e  fo u n d ed  on sp e cu la tiv e  
th eo ry . F u r th e r ,  w hile  K au lb ach  is  co rrec t to  in s is t  t h a t  h u m a n  b e in g s  do 
in d e e d  h a v e  a  n a tu r a l  in te re s t  in  th e  outcom e o f th e i r  w illin g  a n d  th u s  a  
n e ed  fo r  hope, h e  w rites specifically  t h a t  “p ro g ress  in  h is to ry  c an n o t be  m a in ­
ta in e d  in  th e  fo rm  o f a  p o s tu la te  o f re a so n .”27 H e  p ro v id es  only two b r ie f  ex ­
p la n a tio n s  fo r th is  im possib ility  o f p ro g re ss  b e in g  a  p o s tu la te :  “H is to ry  is  n o t 
a  T dngdom  o f G od,’ b u t in s te a d  a  k ingdom  of m en ,”28 a n d , “th e  q u estio n  o f th e  
p o ss ib ility  o f th e  ^highest good’ o f  h is to ry  c an n o t be  a n sw e re d  w ith  re g a rd  to 
a  Tdngdom  o f G od,’ b u t in s te a d  m u s t  f in d  i ts  a n sw e r from  th e  s ta n d p o in t o f 
h is to ry  itse lf ...”29 A p paren tly  K a u lb a c h  believes, a s  m a n y  com m enta to rs , 
th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good m u st occur in  a n  “a fte rlife ,” o r a t  le a s t  believes t h a t  i t  
h a s  l i t t le  to  do w ith  political in s t i tu t io n s .
23 This will be discussed further in Section Two, Chapter Six below.
24 “Nutzen,” p. 79.
25 Given Kaulbach’s position regarding the use of nature as a point of practical orientation, and 
given the discussion to follow, it is unclear how much Kaulbach considers this progress moral progress.
26 “Nutzen,” p. 82.
27 Ibid., p. 78.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.. p. 81.
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I find  th is  p o sitio n  v e ry  d ifficu lt to h a rm o n ize  w ith  th e  re s t  o f K a n t’s 
w ritin g s . W hile i t  seem s t r u e  t h a t  concrete  ex am p les  from  h is to ry  w ould  
b o ls te r  one’s hope in  th e  p o ss ib ility  fo r (m oral) p ro g re ss , I  th in k  i t  goes 
a g a in s t  m uch  of K a n t’s  p h ilo so p h y  to  d em an d  t h a t  h o p e  be  b a se d  on 
sp e cu la tiv e  a n d  n o t p ra c tic a l  re a so n . P e rh a p s  i f  K a u lb a c h  th o u g h t th a t  a  
h ig h e s t  good on  e a r th  w e re  p ossib le , a n d  i f  h e  b e liev ed  in  th e  connection  
b e tw e e n  m orality  a n d  po litics , h e  w o u ld  be m ore w illin g  to  consider p ro g ress  
a s  a  p o s tu la te .30 H ow ever, to  b a se  b o th  hope a n d  ac tio n  on  a  s ta tis t ic a l  
a n a ly s is  of h is to ry  seem s m isg u id e d  a t  best, a n d  d a n g e ro u s  to  th e  K a n tia n  
p ro jec t a t  w orst.
M oving on to  o th e r  co m m en ta to rs , s im ila r  ty p e s  o f  m is in te rp re ta tio n s  
do n o t stop  w ith  K a n t’s e a r l ie r  w orks. L e t u s  tak e , fo r ex am p le , a  re c e n t a r ­
tic le  by  Irm g a rd  S ch e re r, “K a n t’s E schato logy  in  Zum  ewigen Frieden: T he  
C oncep t o f P u rp o s iv en ess  to  G u a ra n te e  P e rp e tu a l P e a ce .”31 I n  th is  piece, 
S c h e re r  m a in ta in s  th a t  e v en  “P e rp e tu a l  Peace” is  p r e m a tu re  to  th e  id e a s  o f 
th e  th i r d  Critique, a n d  m a in ta in s  t h a t  “th e  concept o f  p e rp e tu a l  peace... is  
in te llig ib le  only  th ro u g h  th e  concep t o f p u rp o siv en ess  in  th e  Critique of 
Judgment.”32 S ch e re r c o n tin u e s  to  m a k e  a n  e rro r  w ith  “P e rp e tu a l  P eace” 
t h a t  m a n y  com m en ta to rs m a k e  w ith  th e  “Id ea ,” n am e ly , h e  poses th e  follow ­
in g  q u estio n  a n d  expects a n  e ith e r /o r  an sw er: “is  th e re  in  n a tu re  a n  objective 
r e a l i ty  for p ro v id en tia l p ro cesses , o r a re  ‘p u rposes o f  n a tu r e ’ c o n s tru c ts  o f th e  
m in d ?”33 In  o th e r w ords, S c h e re r  w a n ts  to know , g iven  K a n t’s epistem ologi- 
c a l b ack g ro u n d  from  th e  Critique o f Pure Reason, h o w  co u ld  w e possib ly  ob­
se rv e  a  teleological p rocess in  n a tu re ,  su ch  a s  th e  one  g iven  in  “To[w ard]
30 In addition, Kaulbach seems to overlook Kant’s direct insistence in the Religion of the vic­
tory of the good over the evil principle which results in the kingdom of God on earth.
31 Irmgard Scherer, “Kant’s Eschatology in Zum ewigen Frieden: The Concept of Purposive­
ness to Guarantee Perpetual Peace,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke 
Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 437-43.
32 Ibid., p. 437.
33 Ibid.. p. 440.
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P e rp e tu a l P eace,” su c h  t h a t  we cou ld  say  w e know  i t  ex is ts?  C learly  th e  a n ­
sw er is  th a t  w e co u ld  n e v e r  say  fo r c e r ta in  t h a t  su c h  teleology ex ists , a n d  
S c h e re r  ju m p s to  th e  conclusion  a lo n g  w ith  m o s t o th e r  com m en ta to rs , t h a t  
p ro g re ss  is  b e s t u n d e rs to o d  a s  a  m ere ly  re g u la tiv e  id e a . A nd, w e see  th e  
fa m ilia r  conclusion t h a t  K a n t  m u s t b e  m is u s in g  th is  n o tio n  of teleology h e re  
in  “P e rp e tu a l  P eace ,” w h ic h  he  w ill f in a lly  u s e  co rrec tly  in  th e  th ird  Critique.
B u t I  h a v e  t r ie d  to  a rg u e  specifica lly  a g a in s t  su c h  a  conclusion, a s  
w ell a s  a g a in s t su c h  a n  e ith e r /o r  p oss ib ility . R e g a rd in g  th e  f irs t, I  h a v e  t r ie d  
to  show  th ro u g h o u t S e c tio n  O ne th a t  K a n t u n d e rs to o d  th e  g en era l n a tu r e  o f 
teleo logy all along, f ro m  th e  f ir s t  Critique o n w a rd s . T h u s , th e  n a tu r a l  q u e s ­
tio n  w h ich  sh o u ld  b e  r a is e d  is  why, g iven  th is  u n d e rs ta n d in g , w ould  K a n t  
in s is t  on  w ritin g  a b o u t p ro g ress  a n d  n a tu r e ’s  g u a ra n te e  o f peace for h is  e n ­
t ire  “c ritic a l pe riod”? K a n t  m u s t  be  g iven  th e  b e n e f it  o f  a n  ex am in a tio n , i f  
n o t th e  b en efit o f th e  d o u b t, a n d  th a t  is  w h a t  I  h a v e  t r ie d  to  do, w ith  th e  of­
fe re d  conclusion  t h a t  K a n t  w as c o n s is te n tly  in te r e s te d  to  m a in ta in  su ch  a  
p o sitio n  b ecause  o f  h is  co n cern  w ith  th e  m o ra l p ro g re s s  o f th e  species. T h u s , 
r e g a rd in g  th e  second  conclusion , I  h a v e  a rg u e d  t h a t  th e re  is  n o t a  d e fin ite  
e ith e r /o r  possib ility  w h e n  i t  com es to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f m o ra l teleology. I t  i s  n o t 
m ere ly  a  question  o f s a y in g  th a t  teleology is , o r  is  n o t, know n  fo r c e r ta in  in  
n a tu re , fo r th e  th ir d  p o ss ib ility  ex is ts  th a t  m o ra l  te leo logy  is  a  p o s tu la te  o f 
p ra c tic a l reason . I f  t h i s  is  so, as  I  h a v e  a rg u e d  t h a t  i t  is , th e n  K a n t is  faced  
w ith  th e  ad d itio n a l p ro b le m  o f how  to  explain the mechanism by  w h ich  su c h  
p ro g ress  m ig h t ta k e  p la c e , o r  a t  le a s t  h e  fee ls  c a lle d  to  g ive th e  skep tics a  
d u e  th a t  th is  in d e e d  m ig h t  be  th e  case. F o r th is  p u rp o se , K a n t tu rn s  to  u n ­
social sociab ility  in  i t s  m a n y  form s. B u t, a s  I  h a v e  t r ie d  to  argue , look ing  e s ­
p ec ia lly  a t  “T heory  a n d  P ra c tice ,” K a n t  k now s fu ll  w e ll t h a t  h e  cou ld  be  
w ro n g  in  th e  ex ac t w a y  t h a t  h e  h a s  sp e lled  o u t  su c h  p ro g ress . T h is is  K an t ’s
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b e s t guess, a s  i t  w ere, a n d  p e rh a p s  w e a re  in c lin ed  to agree w ith  h im , b u t  i t  
is  on ly  a  guess. T h e  p o stu la te , n o n e th e le ss , re m a in s .34
T h e  su b je c t o f th e  F ren ch  R ev o lu tio n  a lso  seem s to be  c au se  fo r sev ­
e ra l  m isconcep tions o f K a n t’s  v iew  o f  teleology. P e te r  B urg , fo r exam p le , 
seem s s im p ly  w ro n g  to  a sse r t  in  h is  book  a b o u t th e  F re n ch  R evo lu tion  th a t ,
causality an d  finality of history can  be an  object of hum an knowledge. In  the 
prediction of the  unforgettability of the  [French] revolution, the claim is in­
cluded, th a t knowledge concerning the  course and goal of history exists. The 
knowledge o f history is founded on a  knowledge of man, because historical de­
velopment is founded on the fact th a t  m an is moving toward a goal.35
T h is  seem s w ro n g  n o t only because , a s  K a n t  in s is ts  tim e  a n d  tim e  a g a in , 
p ro g ress  c an  n e v e r  be  a  “fact” o r a n  ob jec t o f know ledge, b u t also  b ecau se  
K a n t  is  m ore  co n ce rn ed  w ith  th e  attitudes o f th e  observers, n o t w ith  th e  ac ­
tu a l, p re d ic ta b le  course  o f h isto ry . K a n t’s  o ften  q u o ted  observation  co n ce rn ­
in g  w h a t is  im p o r ta n t  abou t th e  R ev o lu tio n  is  th a t:
This event consists neither in m om entous deeds nor crimes com m itted by 
men... I t is simply the mode of th ink ing  of the spectators which reveals itself 
publicly in th is  game of great revolutions... Owing to its universality, th is 
mode of th inking  dem onstrates a charac ter of the hum an race... which not only 
perm its people to hope for progress tow ard the better, bu t is already itself pro­
gress...36
T h u s, w e see  t h a t  i t  is  n o t even th e  re v o lu tio n  itself n o r  so m eth in g  a b o u t th e  
p a r t ic ip a n ts  o f t h a t  revo lu tion  w h ich  g ives u s  a  clue  t h a t  th e  h u m a n  species 
is  p ro g ressin g , b u t ,  r a th e r ,  th e  d u e  is  re v e a le d  m ere ly  in  th e  a t t i tu d e  o f th e
34 See my concluding chapter of Section Two, below.
35 p. 38. Peter Burg, Kant und die FranzOsische Revolution (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1974). All translations mine. I shall remind the reader of this again in Chapter Three of Section Two.
36 p. 1S2. Immanuel Kant, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly 
Progressing?” in On History, trans. Lewis Beck, Robert Anchor, and Emil Fackenheim, copyright ©1975. 
The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1968 by The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., reprinted by permission of the 
publisher in Conflict o f  the Faculties. by Immanuel Kant, trans. Mary J. Gregor. (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1992) 139-71.
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spectators. T hus, i t  concerns n e ith e r  th e  p a rtic ip a n ts  n o r  th e  outcom e of th e  
F re n c h  revo lu tion .
S im ila rly , B u h r  a n d  I r r l i tz  a lso  seem  to ta k e  too m u ch  from  K a n t’s 
re flec tio n s  of th e  R evo lu tion .37 A t som e po in ts , i t  so u n d s lik e  th e y  a re  a rg u ­
in g  fo r m y  position  exactly , w riting ;
K ant aims a t a  universal m oralization (higher development, perfection) of hu­
m ankind -- society should become a  “moral whole.”38
K ant knew th a t his thoughts on the philosophy of history were more likely hy­
potheses and  practical-moral orders (Aufforderungen) th an  scientifically 
grounded and confirmed through experience... In th is  respect, he searched 
world history for incidents and  evidence which could prove the views of his 
philosophy history.39
C e rta in ly  th is  so u n d s s im ila r  to  m y  co n ten tio n  th a t  K a n t’s  th o u g h ts  on  h is ­
to ry  h a d  to  do w ith  p ra c tic a l c o n s id e ra tio n s  a n d  th a t  h e  on ly  looked  to  em ­
p ir ic a l s i tu a tio n s  a s  (p a rtia l, b u t  n o t  fac tu a l) co n firm atio n  o f p ro g ress .
H ow ever, B u h r  a n d  I r r li tz  fo llow  th e  above s ta te m e n t  b y  w ritin g
th a t :
In  his old age he [Kant] came to the conclusion th a t a t  least one event in re­
cent history could be mentioned, which shiningly and irrefutably  confirms the 
theses of continual progress of the  hum an race and w ith i t  the prim ary insight 
of his philosophy of history: the French Revolution.40
In  su p p o r t of th is  a rg u m e n t th e  a u th o rs  c ite  K a n t’s q u o ta tio n  (g iven  in  th e  
p a ra g ra p h  above) re g a rd in g  th e  p o s itio n  o f th e  sp ec ta to rs . H ow ever, su ch  a  
re flec tio n  on  th e  R evo lu tion  in  no w a y  “sh in in g ly  a n d  i r re fu ta b ly ” confirm s a
37 Manfred Buhr and Gerd Irrlitz, “Immanuel Kant,” in Materialien zu Kants Rehctsphiloso- 
phie, ed. Zwi Batscha (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976), 102-124. All trans­
lations mine.
38 Ibid., p. 188.
39 Ibid., pp. 118-9.
40 fbid.. p. 119.
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th e s is  o f a n y  ty p e  o f p rogress, m o ra l o r  po litica l. S u c h  p rogress, a s  w e h av e  
seen , c a n  n e v e r  be confirm ed. W h a t K a n t  (p resum ab ly ) in te n d s  w ith  h is  
s ta te m e n t  is  ex ac tly  w h a t he  s ta te s  a n d  no  m ore: t h a t  th e  a tt i tu d e  o f th e  
sp e c ta to rs  re v e a ls  a n  a p titu d e  a n d  p ro p e n s ity  of in d iv id u a ls  to w a rd  w h a t  is  
r ig h t  a n d  w h a t  is  m ora l, even  th o u g h  th is  s i tu a tio n  m ay  be  h a rm fu l to  th e  
sp e c ta to rs  th em se lv es . W olfgang R od  s ta te s  i t  w ell:
K an t did not w ant to leave th is general observation [of progress] a t  tha t, and 
searched for a clue in experience which could indicate a tendency tow ard de­
velopm ent. He found it in the reaction of m ost individuals to the French 
Revolution -- not in the revolution itself! -- nam ely in the participation of the 
observer a t  the efforts of the French to construct a  good, tha t is, a  republican 
constitution.41
K a n t does see  a n  in d ica tio n  of p ro g re ss  su r ro u n d in g  th e  F ren ch  R evo lu tion , 
b u t  th is  i s  to  b e  fo u n d  precise ly  in  th e  a t t i tu d e s  o f th e  specta to rs , a n d  sa y s  
n o th in g  f a c tu a l  a  p red ic tab le  fu tu re .
F ro m  a  d iffe ren t perspective , G eo rg  C a v a lla r  in  h is  book Pax Kan- 
tiana42 d o es a n  exce llen t job of d e fe n d in g  K a n t’s b e lie f  in  th e  p ro g ress  o f 
R igh t, b u t  seem s to  go too fa r  in  h is  d e fe n se  by  w ay  o f c u ttin g  ou t th e  n e ce s­
s ity  o f th e  b e lie f  in  m o ra l p rog ress.43 I  w ill sp en d  som e tim e  d iscu ssin g  h is  
book, s in c e  h e  is  th e  only  w rite r  b e s id es  Yovel to  d iscu ss  th e  “Id ea” in  d e p th .
T o b eg in  w ith , le t  u s  no te  se v e ra l p o in ts  in  com m on betw een  C aval- 
la r ’s th e s is  a n d  m y  ow n. T he f i r s t  p o in t  is  t h a t  C a v a lla r  ag rees th a t ,  acco rd ­
in g  to  K a n t ,  w e c a n n o t see  in to  th e  p u rp o se s  of n a tu re ,  a n d  th u s  can  h a v e  no
41 p. 140. Wolfgang R6d, “Die Rolle transzendentaler Prinzipien in Moral und Politik,” in 
“Zum ewigen Frieden:" Grundlagen, Aktualitdt und Aussichten einer Idee von Immanuel Kant, eds. 
Reinhard Merkel and Roland Wittmann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), 125-141. All transla­
tions mine.
42 Georg Cavallar, Pax Kantiana: Systematisch-historische untersuchung des Entwurfs “Zum 
ewigen Frieden ” (1975) von Immanuel Kant (Wein: Bdhlan Verlag, 1992). All translations mine.
43 It is my belief that they are so concerned to make a palatable defense of the seemingly over- 
optimistic claim of political progress that they try to divorce themselves (and Kant) from any thought of 
moral progress for the human race.
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k n ow ledge  per se reg a rd in g  p ro g re ss . H e  also  n o te s  t h a t  “above all, h u m a n s  
c a n n o t fo resee  th e  free ac tio n s o f h is to r ic a l ac to rs ,”44 s in c e  “h u m a n s  a s  h o m o  
n o u m e n o n ,’ a s  m o ra l beings, a re  u n k n o w n  u n d e r  th e  co n d itio n s  o f ex p eri­
ence .”45 H e  w rite s  th a t, “th e  co u rse  o f h is to ry  c a n  b e  d e te rm in e d  ‘a  p rio ri’ 
re g u la tiv e ly  th ro u g h  th e  m o ra l c e r ta in ty  of d u ty ... [but] la y s  no  c la im  [to b e ­
ing ] a  p rio ri.”46 H e  also m a k e s  th e  in te re s t in g  p o in t th a t ,  s in ce  w e c an n o t 
k n o w  w h e th e r  n a tu re  h a s  p u rp o se s  o r no t, i t  is  e q u a lly  d o g m atic  to  a ssu m e  
t h a t  i t  does n o t, a s  i t  is to  a s su m e  th a t  i t  does.47
Second, C av a lla r  a g re e s  t h a t  K a n t’s d iscu ssio n  o f  h is to ry  h a s  n o th in g  
to  do  w ith  a  th e o re tic a l in v e s tig a tio n  o f h is to ry , b u t , a s  I  h a v e  a rg u ed , h a s  to 
do w ith  n e c e ssa ry  m oral a ssu m p tio n s . C a v a lla r  w rite s  v e ry  p la in ly  th a t:
K ant’s philosophy of history is dependent on prem ises of m oral teleology. He 
develops it within the scope of a theory of culture as a “final end of na tu re ,” 
which should close the gap betw een freedom and  na tu re . The necessity of the 
assum ption th a t ethical ends m ust be established in the  world, is only a moral 
necessity. Moral teleology asks, w hether and how ethical ends in the world are 
possible. Hence, nature m ust itself be purposeful in its em pirical m anifesta­
tions: Moral teleology desires a  n a tu ra l teleology. K ant’s philosophy of history 
“in praktischer Absicht” (Frieden A 65) is founded on m oral principles. The 
certain ty  th a t  hum ankind is progressing tow ards the b e tte r  is grounded not in 
history... b u t in duty.48
The coercion towards peace m ay not be understood in the  sense of a merciless, 
na tu ra lly  caused necessity. Not a prophesy from a philosophy of history, bu t 
instead  a “duty” “to work tow ard  th is goal” of perpetual peace exists in the ex­
p lanation  of the  guarantee [of nature] in the first place. This [duty] first w ar­
ran ts  the hope “in praktischer Absicht” th a t the  n a tu ra l h a lf  of m an will not 
lead to destruction.49
44 Cavallar, Pax Kanticma, p. 266.
45 Ibid., p. 267.
46 Ibid., p. 292. See also 290.
47 Ibid., p. 290 and 292.
48 Ibid., pp. 268-9.
49 Ibid.. p. 286.
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K eep ing  a ll  th is  in  m ind , we c a n  ap p rec ia te  C a v a lla r’s conclusion  th a t  th e  
no tion  o f “th e  ‘c u n n in g  o f n a tu r e ’50 is  a  reg u la tiv e  p rin c ip le  o f reflective  
ju d g m e n t,”51 a n d  th ere fo re  a ssu m e  th a t  h e  m e a n s  a  re g u la tiv e  p rin c ip le  n o t  
m ere ly  fo r th e  th e o re tic a l s tu d y  o f  h isto ry , b u t  reflec tive  fo r p ra c tic a l p u r ­
poses.52
T h ird , C a v a lla r  ag rees  t h a t  th e re  is  no  b re a k  b e tw een  K a n t’s e a r l ie r  
a n d  la te r  w ritin g s  on h is to ry  a n d  teleology. N o t on ly  is  th e  “Id e a ” n o t a n  i n ­
com plete  a n d  o v e rs ta te d  p ic tu re  o f  teleology w h ich  ge ts im p ro v ed  w ith  th e  
Critique o f Judgment, b u t  C a v a lla r  a rg u es  t h a t  th e  “Id e a ” is  co n s is ten t w ith  
a ll  o f K a n t’s l a te r  w ritings .
K ant’s tra in  of thought in the  explanation of the guarantee [of n a tu re  in 
“Perpetual Peace”] follows th a t  in the “Idea [for a  Universal History].”53
The m aintained break  betw een the writings before and after the appearance of 
the th ird  Critique (1790) is... not available. Ultim ately, there is no ground to 
assum e th a t  K ant had  been moved from the political events of 1789 to a  revi­
sion of his philosophy of history.54
C a v a lla r  a lso  a rg u es , a s  I  have , t h a t  th is  is t ru e  ev en  o f th e  th ird  Critique, 
w hich  “offers no  p rin c ip a lly  new  conception  of th e  ph ilo sophy  o f h is to ry ”55:
The “Idea [for a Universal History]” could be in tegrated  w ith every paragraph  
of the Critique o f Judgment where K ant moves from the view of n a tu ra l 
products to the history of the hum an race. There he changes the teleological 
reflection, and now no longer asks about the  form of organized n a tu ra l
50 Several authors use the term “cunning of nature,” taken from Hegel, in place of Kant’s own 
term “providence” or providential nature.
51 Cavallar, p. 281.
52 Many other citations on such conclusions are possible. See chapters nine and ten from 
Cavallar’s book.
53 Cavallar, p. 282.
54 Ibid., p. 270.
ss Ibid.. p. 320.
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productions as ends, bu t instead  asks about the end of na tu re’s existence and 
ultim ately  about the ultim ate end.56
F o u r th , a n d  la s t, I  w ill s im p ly  a d d  t h a t  C a v a lla r  also  ag rees t h a t  p o ­
litic a l p ro g re s s  c a n  ta k e  p lace  w ith o u t re q u ir in g  m o ra l p rog ress; “a  m o ra l 
rev o lu tio n  in  th e  w ay  of th in k in g  is  in  no w a y  n e c e ssa ry  fo r th e  e s ta b lish ­
m e n t o f a  c o n d itio n  of R igh t.”57
H ow ever, w hile  C a v a lla r’s  conclusions a g re e  w ith  m y own in  m a n y  
w ays, i t  seem s th a t  C av a lla r  is  so in te re s te d  to  d e fen d  th e  possib ility  o f p o ­
litic a l p ro g re ss  t h a t  h e  is  n o t w illin g  to  in c o rp o ra te  th e  n o tio n  of m o ra l p ro g ­
ress . T h e  w a y  C a v a lla r  a llow s fo r th is  p o ss ib ility , i t  seem s, is  to co n s tru c t a  
b re a k  b e tw ee n  K a n t’s w ritin g s  on  h is to ry  a n d  h is  w ritin g s  on religion; “th e  
in w a rd  e d u c a tio n  (Bildung) o f e th ic s  re la te s  to  th e  h is to ry  o f religion, w h ich  
K a n t leav es  o u t  o f h is  po litica l h is to ry .”58 C a v a lla r  c e r ta in ly  does n o t w a n t  to 
d eny  a  p lace  fo r  re lig ion  a n d  theo logy  in  K a n t’s  th in k in g,56 b u t  he a p p e a rs  to  
w a n t to  m a in ta in  th a t  K a n t’s re lig io n  h a s  to  do w ith  in te rn a l  a n d  m o ra l 
g row th  w h ile  K a n t’s h is to ry  h a s  on ly  to  do w ith  po litics  a n d  th e  e s ta b lish ­
m e n t o f R ig h t; “K a n t  excludes [co n s id era tio n s o f  m o ra l p rogress! h o rn  h is  
p h ilo sophy  o f  h is to ry , w hich  co n cern s th e  h o p e  o f R ig h t a n d  lega lity .”60 
C a v a lla r  is  co n ce rn ed  th a t  K a n t’s s t r ic t  v iew s o f  au to n o m y  a n d  rad ica l ev il 
cou ld  n o t  a llow  u s  to  say  a n y th in g  a b o u t th e  p o ss ib ility  o f m o ra l p rog ress, 
a n d  “th e  m a in  q u e s tio n  is, how  th is  conviction  [of m o ra l p rogress] is  co n sis­
te n t  w ith  th e  p rin c ip le  o f m o ra l au tonom y .”61
56 Ibid., p. 272.
57 Ibid., p. 281. See also 314 and 319.
58 Ibid., p. 267.
59 See especially sections 10.1 and 10.2.
60 Cavallar, p. 322. See also 296.
61 Ibid., p. 294. See also 295.
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A  second  of C a v a lla r ’s objections seem s to  be th a t  th e  s tru g g le  to 
achieve p eace  m ay  m ak e  o n e  m ore  clever, “b u t  n o t m orally  b e t te r ,”62 in  o th e r  
w ords, t h a t  R ig h t does n o t  d irec tly  p rom o te  m o ra lity . L ikew ise , a  th i r d  ob­
jec tion  seem s to  be  th a t  w e c a n  “d iffe ren tia te  b e tw een  ‘m o ra l s te p s ’ a n d  ‘s tep s  
to w ard  m o ra lity ’,” w hich  th e n  allow s u s  to  n o te  th a t  po litica l p ro g re ss  is  
m ere ly  t h a t  la te r , a n d  n o t th e  fo rm er.63 H e  s ta te s  f in a lly  t h a t  “th e  develop­
m en t o f m o ra l p ro p en s itie s  h a v e  no  “p lace” in  th e  ph ilo sophy  o f h is to ry .64
L e t m e  try  to a d d re s s  th e se  objections in  o rder. R e g a rd in g  th e  m a in  
objection, t h a t  th e re  e x is ts  som e s tro n g  d iv is ion  be tw een  K a n t’s  re lig io n  a n d  
politics as it concerns history, I  th in k  th a t  C a v a lla r  u ltim a te ly  c o n tra d ic ts  
h im self. To p u t  i t  sim ply , i f  C a v a lla r  be liev es t h a t  K a n t’s p h ilo so p h y  of h i s ­
to ry  re s ts  on moral concerns, a n d  th a t  i f  h is  a ssu m p tio n s  r e g a rd in g  p o litica l 
p rog ress a re  ju s tif ie d  only  in  reference  to  K a n t’s  m o ra l theo ry , th e n  I  th in k  
C av a lla r c a n n o t m ak e  a  d iffe ren tia tio n  b e tw ee n  po litica l a n d  m o ra l im ­
p ro v em en t in history. T h a t  is  to  say, c e r ta in ly  th e re  is  a  d iffe rence  b e tw een  
m oral a n d  m ere ly  po litica l o r  leg a l im provem en t, b u t  i f  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f po­
litica l im p ro v em en t is  only a ssu m e d  b e ca u se  of th e  n eed  fo r m o ra l ac tions to 
h av e  a n  effect in  h isto ry , th e n  C a v a lla r  ca n n ot c u t  o u t th e  p o ss ib ility  of a s ­
sum ing  m o ra l p ro g ress  b a s e d  on  th e  sam e  n e e d  o f m orality . C a v a lla r  h im se lf  
w rites th a t  “th e  ph ilo sophy  o f  h is to ry  is  g ro u n d ed  n o t in  theo logy , b u t  both 
[are  g rounded] in  th e  m o ra l la w  a n d  m o ra lity .”65 B u t C a v a lla r  ca n n o t h av e  i t  
bo th  w ays: i f  hopes a n d  p red ic tio n s  for fu tu re  h is to ry  a re  b a se d  on  th e  m o ra l 
n e ed  to  h a v e  good actions h a v e  good effects, i.e., th e  hope th a t  n a tu r e  is  n o t 
com pletely  u n co n cern ed  w ith  m orality , a n d  i f  th is  hope is  n o t b a s e d  on  an y
62 Ibid., p. See also 293 and 331-2.
63 Ibid., p. 294.
64 Ibid., p. 293. For the whole of Cavallar’s objections, see esp. pp. 293-9, 313-4, 319, 322, and
331-5.
65 Ibid.. p. 334. Italics added for emphasis.





kn o w led g e  of n a tu re  itse lf, th e n  h o p e  fo r a  re a l m o ra l (n o t m ere ly  legal) p ro g ­
re s s  m u s t  be  spoken  a b o u t w ith in  h is to ry  a s  well.
P e rh a p s  th is  c o n trad ic tio n  c a n  b e s t  be  seen  in  C a v a lla r ’s  d iscussion  o f 
th e  th re e  possib le  in te rp re ta t io n s  o f  h is to ry  a s  K a n t  e n v is io n s  th em . R eca ll 
t h a t  th e s e  th re e  p o ss ib ilitie s , w h ich  K a n t  d iscu sses  i n  re s p o n se  to  M en ­
d e lsso h n , a re  th a t  h is to ry  is  p ro g re ss in g , reg re ss in g , o r cyclical. C a v a lla r  
w r ite s  t h a t  “b e tw een  th e se  th re e  p o ss ib ilitie s , th e o re tic a l (anschauende) r e a ­
so n  c a n  m ak e  no decision ... T he  p h ilo so p h y  o f h is to ry  h a s  to  do w ith  ‘free ly  
a c tin g  a g e n ts ’, a b o u t w hom  one c a n n o t p re d ic t ‘w h a t  th e y  w ill do’ (A 139) ”66 
H ow  a re  w e (or, p a rtic u la rly , K a n t)  to  decide  b e tw een  th e s e  in te rp re ta t io n s  o f 
h is to ry ?  A s C a v a lla r  concludes, “n a tu ra l ly ,  K a n t does n o t  re m a in  agnostic .
H e  goes fu r th e r  a n d  decides on moral grounds for th e  m o d e l o f  p rog ress... 
K a n t  a rg u e s  a g a in s t M en d e lsso h n  above  a ll  m oral-ph ilo soph icaU y . A cyclical 
m o d el o f h is to ry  cau se s  (errege) m o ra l d isg u s t, a n d  is  th e re fo re  re jec ted .”67 
T h e  q u e s tio n  to a sk , th e n , is: H ow  c a n  C a v a lie r  go from  th is  conclusion  
a b o u t m o ra l p ro g ress  in  h is to ry  to  th e  mere p ro g ress  o f R ig h t  a n d  lega lity?  
H ow  c a n  p o litica l p ro g re ss  be  a s su m e d  on  th is  m o ra l b a s is  w ith o u t m ak in g  
s im ila r  a ssu m p tio n s  re g a rd in g  m o ra l p ro g ress?  P re su m a b ly , i t  c an n o t. I f  
p o litic a l p ro g ress  is  a  n ecessa ry  a ssu m p tio n  from  th e  s ta n d p o in t  o f  m o ra lity , 
a n d  i f  th e re  ex is ts  “no  p ro o f’66 fo r su c h  p o litica l p ro g ress , th e n  su re ly  m o ra l 
p ro g re s s  s ta n d s  o r fa lls  on  th e  sa m e  co n sid e ra tio n s .
F u r th e r , does th e  p o ss ib ility  o f  “ra d ic a l  evil” s p e a k  a g a in s t  m o ra l 
p ro g re s s  in  h isto ry?  C a v a lla r’s  p o s itio n  co u ld  ru n  one  o f  tw o  w ays. F irs t , i t  
c o u ld  b e  a  concern  over th e  im p o ss ib ility  o f p re d ic tin g  a  f u tu r e  o f fu lly  
au to n o m o u s c re a tu re s . B u t th is  c a n n o t b e  a  le g itim a te  c o n c e rn  on  C a v a lla r’s 
p a r t ,  s ince  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f R ig h t w o u ld  involve s im ila r  concerns, a n d
66 Ibid., p. 290.
67 Ibid., p. 291. Italics added for emphasis.
68 Ibid.




C a v a lla r  is  correct to th in k  t h a t  i t  is  n o t a  question  a b o u t p re d ic ta b ility  from  
n a tu r e  itse lf , b u t a  q u e s tio n  a b o u t m o ra l be liefs. Second, how ever, C a v a lla r  
cou ld  b e  concerned  over th e  im p o ssib ility  o f m o ra l p e rfec tion  given K a n t’s 
conv ic tion  in  th e  Religion o f  th e  p resen ce  o f “rad ic a l ev il in  h u m a n  n a tu r e .” 
D oes th i s  ra d ic a l ev il p re c lu d e  th e  p o ssib ility  o f m oral p ro g ress?
In  resp o n se  to th is ,  l e t  m e  su m m arize  th e  position  o f  H e n ry  E  A llison  
in  h is  h e lp fu l, a n d  I  th in k  m o stly  correct, a rtic le , “K a n t’s  D oc trine  o f R a d ic a l 
E v il.”69 A llison  reaso n s t h a t  ra d ic a l ev il c a n n o t come h o rn  th e  n a tu r a l  in c li­
n a tio n s , s ince  K a n t re p e a te d ly  in s is ts  t h a t  th e y  a re  n o t bad. in  th em se lv es , 
a n d  c a n  ev en  be good. N o r  c a n  i t  be  th o u g h t to  ex ist som ehow  a p a r t  fro m  th e  
free  w ill o f  th e  ind iv id u a l, so m e th in g  th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l s im p ly  c a n n o t h e lp , 
for i t  w o u ld  m ak e  th e  a t t r ib u t io n  of g u ilt o r resp o n sib ility  im possib le . A llison  
concludes t h a t  th e  n a tu re  o f  ra d ic a l  evil “m u s t be  u n d e rs to o d  a s  th e  m a x im  to 
give p r io r ity  to  th e  n o n -m o ra l in cen tiv e , even  in  those  case s  w h ere  i t  con flic ts  
w ith  th e  d ic ta te s  o f m o ra lity ,”70 in  o th e r  w ords, to w illing ly  su b o rd in a te  
m o ra l m a x im s  to m ax im s o f  n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n . In  ad d itio n , such  a  
“p ro p e n s ity ” to evil m u s t b e  th o u g h t  o f a s  m ere ly  th e  fa c t t h a t  “fin ite , s e n s u ­
ously  a ffe c te d  ra tio n a l b e in g s  a re  n o t on ly  au tonom ous m o ra l ag en ts  b u t  a lso  
c re a tu re s  o f desire  a n d  in c lin a tio n , w hich , a s  re s tin g  on  n a tu r a l  c au ses , a re  
n e i th e r  com plete ly  in  th e i r  c o n tro l n o r n ecessa rily  in  a g re e m e n t w ith  th e  d ic­
ta te s  o f  m o ra lity .”71 W h at th is  m e a n s  is  th a t ,  to  rem a in  t r u e  to  K an t, w e  
c a n n o t sa y  t h a t  th e re  is  so m e  e x te rn a l rea so n  fo r th e  h u m a n  rac e  to  h a v e  a  
p re d isp o s itio n  tow ards ev il, b u t  r a th e r  w e m u s t say  th a t  th is  p red isp o s itio n  
ex is ts  o n ly  in  th e  fac t t h a t  th e  m o ra l s ide  o f h u m a n  be ings c o n tin u a lly
69 Henry E. Allison, “Kant’s Doctrine of Radical Evil,” in Akten des Siebenten Intemationaler 
Kant-Kongress, ed. Gerhard Funke, Band I (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), 52-72.
70 Ibid., p. 57.
1 Ibid.. p. 65.
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s tru g g les  a g a in s t  th e  se n su o u s  s id e  w hich is  in c lin ed  s im p ly  to  follow  n a tu ra l  
in s tin c ts  re g a rd le ss  of m o ra l co n sid era tio n s.72
T h u s , C a v a lla r’s  concern  over rad ic a l ev il se em s m isp laced . C e rta in ly  
K a n t does th in k  th a t  “ra d ic a l  ev il” ex ists, a n d  th a t  h u m a n s  a re  n e v e r  like ly  
to ach ieve  m o ra l pe rfec tion . B u t th is  in  no  w ay  ex c lu d es th e  p o ss ib ility  of 
c o n tin u a l m o ra l im p ro v em en t. R ad ica l ev il does n o t e x is t  som ehow  o u ts id e  of 
th e  in d iv id u a l’s  au tonom y, th u s  p rec lu d in g  a n y  m ove to w a rd  m o ra l 
pe rfec tion .73 I t  ex is ts in  th e  fac t t h a t  people a re  a lw ay s te m p te d  to  
su b o rd in a te  th e  m ora l la w  to  co n sid era tio n s o f h a p p in e ss . B u t th is  is  a n  
au to n o m o u s decision, a  q u e s tio n  ab o u t m o ra l w illing , a n d  th is  b e in g  th e  case, 
th e re  i s  n o  theoretical ju s tif ic a tio n  for choosing a  p ro g re ss iv e , reg ress iv e , o r 
cyclical m odel o f h is to ry . W ho is  to  say  w h a t w ill h a p p e n  in  a  s ta te  o f 
p e rp e tu a l p e ac e  w here  th e  focus o f  c u ltu re  w ill b e  d ev o ted  to  m o ra l 
im p ro v em en t?74 “No o n e ,” is  th e  a n sw e r from  th e  p o in t o f  v iew  o f theo ry , 
th o u g h  K a n t  a rg u e s  th a t ,  from  th e  p o in t o f v iew  o f m o ra lity , w e h a v e  every  
r ig h t to  a ssu m e  th a t  m o ra l p ro g re ss  is  possib le .
M oreover, w h a t a b o u t K a n t’s d iscussion  of “T h e  V ic to ry  o f th e  Good 
over th e  E v il P rinc ip le , a n d  th e  F o u n d a tio n  o f a  K ingdom  o f G od on  E a r th ” 
from  th e  Religion? C e r ta in ly  th is  t it le  a lone seem s a n  e x ce llen t prima facie 
rea so n  to  th in k  n o t on ly  t h a t  m o ra l p rog ress is  possib le , b u t  m ore  
im p o rta n tly  fo r  th is  d iscu ssio n  o f C avalla r, t h a t  su ch  p ro g re s s  w ill h a p p e n  on  
e a r th , a n d  th e re fo re  in history. W hile  we can  in d e e d  s e p a ra te  a  d iscussion  o f 
p o litica l a n d  re lig ious p ro g re ss , i t  seem s th a t  b o th  n e c e ssa r ily  ta k e  p lace  in  
h isto ry , a n d  t h a t  b o th  a re  b a se d  u p o n  m ora l c o n sid e ra tio n s . I f  th e re  is  a
72 “The very feet that we are never beyond the possibility of temptation, which for Kant means 
that we only obey the law reluctantly (ungem), indicates not merely a lack of holiness but also an actual 
propensity to subordinate moral considerations to our needs as sensuous beings...” (Ibid., p. 66).
73 If this were the case, it would throw more into question than merely the possibility of moral 
progress in history.
4 See Chapter Four below.
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re a so n  to igno re  K a n t’s ow n in sis ten ce  th a t  a  k ingdom  of God on e a r th  is  
possib le , C a v a lla r  h a s  c e r ta in ly  n o t p ro v id ed  it .
I  th in k  th e  b asic  in co n sis ten cy  in  C a v a lla r’s  position  sp e a k s  a g a in s t  
a ll  o f h is  objections, b u t  le t  m e say  a  few  a d d itio n a l w ords a d d re s s in g  th e  
m ore  specific objections. C e rta in ly  C a v a lla r  is  r ig h t  to  d iffe ren tia te  b e tw e e n  
"m oral s te p s” a n d  "steps to w a rd  m o ra lity ,” a n d  c e r ta in ly  m ere  le g a lity  a n d  
R ig h t a re  th e  la t te r ,  s ince  a ll  im m o ra l p e rso n s  c o u ld  behave  lega lly . B u t, a s  I  
h a v e  a rg u e d  above,75 K a n t  be lieves t h a t  t ru e  s te p s  to w a rd  m o ra l p ro g re s s  c an  
on ly  b e  ta k e n  in  th o se  cond itions of in te rn a l  a n d  e x te rn a l R igh t. M o ra lity  
re q u ire s  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a  sy s tem  o f R ig h t n o t  on ly  because  i t  i s  th e  
p ro p e r  w ay  to  e x p re ss  freedom , b u t  also  b ecau se  su c h  a  condition  is  n e c e ssa ry  
i f  th e  m o ra l p ro jec t is  to  be  ta k e n  on in  e a rn e s t. I n  add ition , a s  w e sa w  above 
w ith  th e  d iscussion  o f th e  Critique of Judgment, i t  is  c lear t h a t  K a n t  
conceived  of n a tu r e  a s  b e in g  ab le  to in d ire c tly  p ro m o te  m o ra lity  th ro u g h  
c u ltu re , th a t  sk ill  a n d  d isc ip line  cou ld  a id  p e rso n s  in  m oral w illing . W h a t 
H o lly  W ilson s a id  w ith  re g a rd  to  a n  a rtic le  by  T h o m as A ux ter co u ld  b e  
a p p lie d  to  C a v a lla r  h e re : C a v a lla r’s p o sitio n  "co n trad ic ts  K a n t’s ex p lic it 
c la im  th a t  n a tu r e  h a s  a n  u ltim a te  e n d  fo r th e  h u m a n  species w h ich  
c o n tr ib u te s  to  th e  d ev e lopm en t of m o ra lity  in  h u m a n  beings; i t  c an  p ro d u ce  
th e  fo rm al sub jec tive  cond ition  o f m o ra lity , w h ich  is  th e  a p titu d e  fo r 
a rb i t r a ry  p u rp o se s .”76 W hile  w e o u g h t to  d iffe re n tia te  be tw een  “m o ra l s te p s” 
a n d  m ere  "steps to w a rd  m o ra lity ,” th is  in  no w ay  a llow s us to  exclude  th e  
f irs t .
IV.
W hereas S ec tion  O ne  h a s  d e a lt w ith  som e r a th e r  b ro ad  th e m e s , th e  
fo llow ing  S ection  w ill d e a l exclusively  w ith  m o ra l p rog ress, po litics, a n d  th e
75 And as I shall argue below.
76 Holly L. Wilson, “A Gap in American Kant Scholarship: Pragmatic Anthropology as the 
Application of Kantian Moral Philosophy.” p. 407 fn.
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h ig h e s t good. In  th e  above sec tion , I  h a v e  c leared  th e  w ay  fo r  th is  second  
sec tion  w ith  th e  a n a ly s is  o f K a n t’s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f te leo logy  a n d  b y  a rg u in g  
t h a t  m o ra l p ro g ress  is  a  n e c e ssa ry  p o s tu la te  of p ra c tic a l re a so n . In  th is  way,
I  h a v e  tr ie d  to  give su p p o rt to  K a n t’s  seem ing ly  g ra n d  c la im s in  o rd e r  th a t  we 
m ig h t a tte m p t to an a ly ze  th e m  se rio u s ly . B u t, g iven th is  b ro a d  c le a rin g , how  
a re  w e specifically  to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  p o s tu la te  of m o ra l p ro g re s s  o f  th e  
species?  W h a t is  th e  p rec ise  n a tu r e  o f th e  h ig h e s t good w h ic h  is  th e  
n e c e ssa ry  object o f a ll m o ra l w illing?  Is  K a n t c o n s is ten t in  h i s  conceptions? 
A n d  how  does th e  p o s tu la te  o f m o ra l p ro g ress  function?  W hy  is  i t s  b e lie f  
n ecessa ry ?  W h a t is  th e  e x ac t l in k  b e tw ee n  m o ra lity  a n d  po litic s?  W e saw  
above t h a t  e x te rn a l fac to rs  c a n  in f lu e n c e  m o ra l w illing , b u t  w h a t  ro le  m u s t 
po litics  p la y  in  p ro m o tin g  a  m o ra l fo u n d a tio n ?  A nd  how  does K a n t  env is ion  
m o ra l p ro g ress  to ta k e  p lace?  W h a t a re  th e  fac to rs w h ich  p ro m o te  a n d  
d e tra c t su ch  progress?  W h a t is  th e  u lt im a te  p ic tu re  w h ich  h e  en v is io n s?
A n d  how  a re  w e to  e v a lu a te  su c h  c la im s?  I t  is  to q u estio n s  su c h  a s  th e s e  th a t  
w e now  tu rn .
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Chapter One 
Defense of the Highest Good
I.
T ho u g h  i t  seem s in co n tro v ertib le  th a t  K a n t w a n te d  th e  concep t o f th e  
h ig h e s t  good, o r summum bonum, to  p la y  a n  im p o rta n t ro le  in  h is  e th ics  a n d  
p h ilo sophy , th is  concept h a s  b e en  ta k e n  by  som e K a n t co m m en ta to rs  to  be 
p ro b lem atic . T he  m a in  is su e  h a s  to  do w ith  w h e th e r  th is  concep t is  e ssen tia l, 
u n n e c e ssa ry , o r fla tly  in co m p atib le  w ith  th e  re s t  o f K a n t’s p h ilo so p h ica l sy s­
tem  in  g en era l, a n d  h is  m o ra l th e o ry  in  p a rtic u la r . B eg in n in g  w ith  Lew is 
W h ite  B eck’s a tta c k  on th is  co n cep t1 a n d  Jo h n  S ilb e r’s defense ,2 se v e ra l 
c o m m en ta to rs  h ave  offered c o n tr ib u tio n s  on  how  one is  to  b e s t  u n d e rs ta n d  
th e  h ig h e s t  good. In  th is  c h a p te r  I  hope to  p re s e n t w h a t I  ta k e  to  be  th e  m ost 
im p o r ta n t  p o in ts  of th is  debate ; I  s h a ll  b e g in  w ith  th o se  p o in ts  w hich  a re  
m o st l ik e ly  to  be  se ttle d  a n d  u n co n tro v e rs ia l, a n d  p roceed  w ith  in c reas in g ly  
c o n tro v e rs ia l e lem en ts w hich  I  w ill a rg u e  to  be n ecessa ry  b u t  w hich  a re  no t 
lik e ly  to  be  read ily  accepted . W ith o u t g iv ing  a  specifically  h is to ric a l account 
o f th e  d e b a te ,3 I  hope to  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  d ialogue in  tw o w ays: by  show ing  
w h ich  is su e s  a re  m ost like ly  to b e  a lre a d y  se ttled , or a t  le a s t  by  a rg u in g  for 
som e n e c e ssa ry  p a ra m e te rs  to  th e  d eb a te , a n d  by g iv ing  som e o rig in a l in te r ­
p re ta tio n s  a n d  conclusions w h ich  follow  from  m an y  o f th e se  im p o r ta n t  po in ts .
1 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason.
2 See especially: John R. Silber, “Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and 
Transcendent,” Philosophical Review 68 (October 1959): 469-492; “The Importance of the Highest Good 
in Kant’s Ethics,” Ethics (April 1963): 179-197; and, “The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest Good 
as the Canon of Pure Reason in Kant’s Philosophy,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language (Summer 
1959): 233-244.
3 For such an account see: Lance Simmons. “Kant’s Highest Good: Albatross, Keystone, 
Achilles Heel.” History o f  Philosophy Quarterly 10. no. 4 (October 1993): 355-368.
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n.
/. One can have the duty to strive for the highest good even if  one cannot, in fact, 
achieve it
T h is  p o in t is  m a d e  especially  w ell in  J o h n  R . S ilb er’s fam ous p iece, 
“K a n t’s C onception  o f  th e  H ig h est Good a s  Im m a n e n t a n d  T ra n sc e n d e n t.”
T he p rob lem  is  th is :  K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  n e ce ssa ry  object of th e  m o ra l 
law  is  th e  h ig h e s t  good, a n d  th a t  one is  th e re fo re  com m anded  to  p u rs u e  th e  
h ig h e s t good. B u t  h e  a lso  c la im s th a t  i t  is  im p o ssib le  for h u m a n  b e in g s  to  
achieve th e  h ig h e s t  good, or, a t  le a s t, t h a t  i t  is  im possib le  for h u m a n  b e in g s  
to  b rin g  i t  a b o u t th e m se lv e s .4 In  ad d itio n , K a n t h a s  a rg u e d  th a t  so m e th in g  
c an n o t be  co m m an d ed  o f a  pe rson  i f  i t  is  im p o ssib le  for th a t  p e rso n  to  p e r ­
form  su ch  a  d u ty  ( th is  is  p a r t  of h is  a rg u m e n t fo r th e  necessity  of freed o m  in  
th e  second Critique). O n  th is  account, i f  one  a tte m p ts  to b r in g  ab o u t th e  
h ig h es t good in  th e  w o rld  and , p red ic tab ly , fa ils , one  th e n  m u s t be c o n s id e re d  
b lam ew orthy , s ince  i t  w a s  one’s d u ty  to  ach iev e  th e  h ig h e s t good. H ence , 
how  c an  i t  b e  one’s d u ty  to  p u rsu e  th e  h ig h e s t  good i f  i ts  a tta in m e n t  is  im ­
possible?5
S ilb e r’s a n sw e r  is  to  posit th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good m u s t be  c o n sid e red  
a s  a  m odel fo r ac tion . W h a t K a n t sh o u ld  h a v e  b e en  c lea re r in  say ing , a rg u e s  
S ilber, is  th a t  “m a n  is  o b lig a ted  n o t to a t ta in  in  fu ll, b u t r a th e r  to a p p ro x i­
m a te  th e  h ig h e s t good to  th e  fu lle s t possib le  deg ree .”6 I t  c a n n o t be  one’s d u ty  
to  achieve th e  h ig h e s t good, b u t i t  is  su re ly  w ith in  one’s pow er to a t te m p t  to 
p rom ote th e  h ig h e s t  good, a n d  one c an  be ju d g e d  b lam ew o rth y  i f  one  fa i ls  to  
m ak e  su ch  a n  a tte m p t. T hough  one c a n n o t m a k e  o th e rs  m ore v irtu o u s , one
4 The importance of making such a distinction will become clear later in this chapter.
s It should be noted that, as Silber points out (“Kant’s Conception,” pp. 473-479), Kant needs 
to keep these premises in order to keep his proof for the existence of God. If he denies the highest good as 
the final object of the moral law, the necessity of the possibility of achieving what is one’s duty, or the 
impossibility of man to bring about the highest good on his/her own. then Kant must reject the need for 
God and immortality.
6 "Kant’s Conception.” p. 478.
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can  w o rk  on  becom ing  a b e tte r  m o ra l a g e n t oneself, a n d  can  also , S ilb e r 
m a in ta in s , m a k e  oneself a n d  o th e rs  h a p p y  to  th e  degree th a t  one ju d g es  th e  
a g e n t to  b e  d e se rv in g .7 In  th is  w ay, one  c a n  p rom o te  th e  h ig h e s t  good w ith ­
o u t b e in g  co m m an d ed  to ach ieve it, a n d  i t  se rv es  th e  im p o r ta n t  fu n c tio n  of 
g iv ing  one  a  m odel fo r action:
The idea of the highest good as transcenden t -- th a t is, the idea of the highest 
good as the  object which m an is obligated to a tta in  in full — is the m easure 
th a t  m an uses in  assessing the lim its of his capacity. This is the only norm 
which can assure  him th a t he does not sell him self and his freedom short, th a t 
he does not become insensitive to his capacities and hence to w hat m ay be his 
duties... While Kant insists on representing  the  highest good as transcendent 
in its  em ploym ent as the ideal m easure for hum an striving, he also insists on 
represen ting  it as im m anent in its em ploym ent as the m easure of moral ac­
countability.8
W ith  th e  h ig h e s t  good as a n  id e a l or m odel fo r action , i t  e n su re s  t h a t  one w ill 
n o t s im p ly  a c t  b a se d  upon  w h a t one h a s  d o n e  o r h a s  b een  c ap a b le  o f doing in  
th e  p a s t. G iven  th e  n a tu re  of h u m a n  b e in g s  a s  free  beings, o n e  sh o u ld  no t 
re ly  on  p a s t  ac tio n s  a s  p red ic tions a s  to  w h a t  is  possib le  fo r th e  fu tu re , an d  
th e  h ig h e s t  good a s  th e  id ea l e n d  o f th e  m o ra l la w  e n su re s  t h a t  one w ill no t 
u n d e re s t im a te  o ne’s p o ten tia l fo r action . B u t K a n t  c an n o t re q u ire  t h a t  th e  
h ig h e s t good a c tu a lly  be ach ieved  in  one’s  life tim e , hence  a s  f a r  a s  cu lp ab ility  
is  concerned , o n e  is  only  b lam ew o rth y  i f  o n e  does n o t s tr iv e  to  ach ieve  th e  
h ig h e s t good.9
2. One cannot will without an object - or - one cannot simply will a good will
To b e g in  w ith , i t  is  im p o rta n t to  k e ep  in  m in d  t h a t  w h e n  K a n t ta lk s  
ab o u t th e  m o ra l la w  a n d  i ts  ca teg o rica l c o m m an d s  to  hum an b e in g s , h e  is
71 will argue below that this second element of making ourselves and others happy based on 
our judgment of desert or worth needs modification.
8 “Kant’s Conception,” pp. 484-5.
9 See also: Kwang-Sae Lee, “Some Reflections on the Idea of the Highest Good as a Regulative 
Idea of Pure Practical Reason.” in Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kant-Kongresses. Band II. I 
(Bonn: Bouvier Verlag. 1990). 551-561.





a lre a d y  c o n ce rn ed  w ith  h u m a n  b e in g s  as fin ite  ra tio n a l c re a tu re s , a n d  no t 
s im p ly  any p o ss ib le  ra t io n a l  b e in g , su c h  as God. H u m a n  b e in g s  a re  no t holy, 
s ince  th e y  a re  f in ite  a n d  h a v e  a  se n su o u s  side  to th em  as  w e ll a s  a  ra tio n a l 
s ide . In d e e d , th e  ca tegorica l im p e ra tiv e  canno t command a  w ill t h a t  is  holy, 
for su c h  a  w ill to ta lly  u n in f lu e n c e d  b y  a  sensuous or f in ite  n a tu r e  w ould  
a lre a d y  a c t  in  accord w ith  th e  m o ra l la w  because i t  w ou ld  b e  w holly  
r a t io n a l .10 K a n t  ex p la in s  in  th e  se co n d  Critique th a t,
though we cam suppose th a t  m en as rational beings have a pure will, since 
they  are affected by w an ts an d  sensuous motives we cannot suppose them  to 
have a holy will, a will incapable o f any maxims which conflict w ith the moral 
law. The moral law for them  [hum an beings], therefore, is an  imperative, 
com m anding categorically because i t  is unconditioned.11
A  ho ly  w ill, th e  w ill of God, s im p ly  w o u ld  w ill in  accord  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , 
a n d  th e re fo re  th e  law  w o u ld  n o t  co m m an d  per se. Human b e in g s  a s  f in ite  
r a t io n a l  c re a tu re s , th o u g h  th e y  h a v e  a  p u re  will, also h a v e  a  se n su o u s  n a ­
tu re , a n d  do n o t a lw ays fo rm u la te  m ax im s in  accord w ith  th e  m o ra l law .
T h u s, su c h  c re a tu re s  a re  “in  n e e d  o f th e  m oral c o n s tra in t o f  th e  re s is ta n c e  
offered  b y  th e  p rac tic a l re a so n , w h ic h  m ay  be called  a n  in n er b u t  in te lle c tu a l 
com pulsion .”12
T h e re  seem  to b e  tw o good a rg u m e n ts , th en , fo r th e  p o s itio n  th a t  one 
n e ed s  a n  ob ject fo r th e  w ill to  e n g a g e  in  the  ac t of w illing . W e s h a l l  leav e  th e  
second  a rg u m e n t fo r p o in t n u m b e r  th re e  below, b u t  th e  f i r s t  com es from  
M a ry -B a rb a ra  Z eld in ’s a rtic le , “T h e  S um m um  B onum , th e  M o ra l L aw , a n d
10 Certainly a holy will by mere definition is only a will which would be incapable of being de­
termined by sensuous inclinations, and thus a holy will could be sensuously impressed. However, it seems 
clear from Kant's discussion of a holy will in the second Critique that he has in mind a will which is, in 
fact, uninfluenced by sensuous inclinations. Cf. Ak. 32, 33, 84, 122, and 123n. Regardless, it is certainly 
clear that human beings cannot become holy, but can only approximate a holy will, and this is all I need 
for my current point concerning the command of the moral law.
"  Critique o f Practical Reason. Ak. 32.
12 Ibid.. Ak. 33.





th e  E x is ten ce  of God,”13 a  d irec t response  to B eck’s a t ta c k  on th e  h ig h es t 
good. Z eld in  w rites:
any being whose practical reason can be impure and  for whom, consequently, 
the  m oral law is a  law of duty which commands, m u st understand, not merely 
logically through unschem atized categories, b u t as an  object, the moral law as 
a  command, and m ust therefore be able to schem atize it by some schema both 
as to its m eaning and  as to its complete object... T hus no rational being whose 
will is not holy can be commanded what cannot really  be, because he would 
then  simply not be aw are of the command and it would thus not be a command 
for him. To be commanded the production of a  something-I-know-not-what is 
tan tam ount to being aw are of something which m eans nothing and is thus not 
a  som ething.14
As w as d iscu ssed  above, th e  m o ra l law  com m ands f in i te  ra t io n a l  c re a tu re s  
only, n o t c re a tu re s  w hose w ills  a re  holy. As such , h u m a n  b e in g s m u s t  find  
som e c o n te n t fo r th e  form  o f th e  m o ra l law . I f  h u m a n  b e in g s  h a d  ho ly  w ills, 
th e  form  o f th e  m oral law  w o u ld  be  enough, since  th e y  s im p ly  w ould  w ill in  
accord  w ith  th is  law . B u t p e rso n s  m u s t  w ill so m e th in g  o r o th e r  in  th e ir  
w illing , e lse  th e y  h av e  only  th e  em p ty  form  o f th e  la w  w ith  n o th in g  th a t  th ey  
c a n  concep tualize; as K a n t ex p la in s ,
pure practical reason is a capacity for ends generally, and  for it to be indiffer­
en t to ends, th a t is, to take  no interest in them , would therefore be a contra­
diction, since then it would not determine m axim s for actions e ither (because 
every maxim of action contains an  end) and so would not be practical reason.15
R ecall from  o u r d iscussion  o f th e  second  Critique above  t h a t  K a n t defines th e  
w ill a s  “a  facu lty  e ith e r  o f b r in g in g  fo rth  objects c o rre sp o n d in g  to  conceptions 
o r o f d e te rm in in g  itself*16 in  a  law -lik e  fash ion , a n d  th u s  a s  a  facu lty  of
13 Mary-Barbara Zeldin, “The Summuxn Bonum, the Moral Law, and the Existence of God,” 
Kant-Studien 62, no. 1 (1971): 43-54.
14 Ibid., p. 46.
15 The Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, Ak. 395. See also: Immanuel Kant, Relig­
ion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 3-6.
16 Second Critique. Ak. 15.
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d esire , i t  is  a  facu lty  o f re a liz in g  a n  object (in p a rt)  th ro u g h  th e  
re p re se n ta tio n  o f it. F o r re a so n  to  be  p rac tica l i t  m u s t act, a n d  in  o rd e r  to  act 
in  f in ite  ra t io n a l  agen ts, i t  m u s t  h a v e  som e end, som e c o n te n t fo r w illing .
L e t u s  p roceed  to  th e  n e x t sec tion , s in ce  i ts  d iscussion  is  in te r tw in e d  w ith  
th is  one.
3. The highest good is the proper object o f moral willing.
T h is  is  p e rh a p s  too c o n tro v e rs ia l a  po in t to a d d re ss  so h ig h  u p  th e  
lis t, b u t  I  th in k  i t  is  b e st d isc u sse d  h e re  n ev erth e less . W e can  th e n  a lso  give 
th e  second  re a so n  m en tio n ed  above a s  to  w hy w illin g  n e ed s  a n  object.
K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  “th e  object w h ich  is  g iven  to 
[the  m o ra lly  d e te rm in ed  will] a  p rio ri,”17 a n d  “is  a  sy n th e tic  p ra c tic a l p ro p o ­
s itio n  a priori (a n d  in d ee d  ob jectively  p rac tica l) g iven  by  p u re  re a so n .”18 A n 
“object o f p ra c tic a l reaso n ” is, fo r K an t:
the idea of an  object as an  effect possible through freedom. To be an  object of 
practical knowledge as such signifies, therefore, only the relation o f the will to 
the  action whereby it or its opposite is brought into being. To decide w hether 
or not something is [such] an  object... is only to discern the possibility or im­
possibility of willing the action by which a certain object would be m ade reed, 
provided we had the ability to bring it about...19
O n  th e  one h a n d , K a n t concludes t h a t  th e  object o f free  w illin g  sh o u ld  be  free  
w illin g  itse lf. O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , K a n t a lso  c learly  s ta te s  th a t  “i t  is  c e r ta in ly  
u n d e n ia b le  th a t  every  v o lition  m u s t  h a v e  a n  object a n d  th e re fo re  a  m a te ­
r ia l .”20 In d eed , th is  is  th e  b a s is  fo r K a n t’s rejection  o f W olffs  a n d  B a u m g a r-  
te n ’s  u se  o f “perfection” as th e  fo u n d a tio n  o f m orality , fo r n o t only  i s  i t  
“em p ty , in d e te rm in a te , a n d  h e n c e  o f no  u se  for f in d in g  in  th e  im m e a su ra b le
17 Ibid., Ak. 4.
18 Religion, p. 6 n.
19 Second Critique, Ak. 57.
20 Ibid.. Ak. 34. See also: Religion, pp. 3-6.
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f ie ld  o f possib le re a lity  th e  m ax im u m  sum  s u ita b le  fo r u s ,”21 i t  is  also sim p ly  
“tau to lo g ica l.”22 B u t th is  a lso  seem s tru e  of th e  n e c e ss ity  o f w illing  a  free  
w ill. By defin ition , w illin g  to  h a v e  a  good w ill co n ce rn s m ere ly  th e  form o f 
w illing , a n d  th e re fo re  is  e m p ty  o f  co n ten t. T h u s  K a n t  w rite s  th a t  “in  th e  a b ­
sence  o f a ll re fe ren ce  to  a n  e n d  no  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  w ill can  ta k e  p lace  in  
m an , since su ch  d e te rm in a tio n  c a n n o t be fo llow ed b y  no  effect w h a tev e r.”23 I f  
w e n ecessa rily  n e e d  m a te r ia l  fo r a n y  type  o f w illing , th e n  K a n t m u s t p rov ide  
a  su ita b le  co n ten t.
T he m o ra l la w  s ta te s  t h a t  th e  m ere form  o f th e  w ill m u st be th e  de­
te rm in in g  g ro u n d  o f th e  w ill, b u t  th is  does n o t  ru le  o u t th e  necessity  for 
w illin g  so m e th in g  o r o th er; “th e  m a te r ia l  o f th e  m ax im  c a n  in d eed  rem a in  
b u t  c an n o t b e  i t s  cond ition .”24 A s long  as w e do n o t m a k e  desire  for som e ob­
je c t th e  fo u n d a tio n  of w illing , a n d  a s  long  a s  i t  is  n o t  p ro h ib ite d  w ith  th e  
ap p lica tio n  o f th e  m o ra l law , su c h  a n  object is  a llow ab le ;
though the highest good m ay be the entire object o f a  pure practical reason, 
i.e., of a  pure will, it is still not to be taken  as the  determining ground of the 
pure will; the m oral law  alone m ust be seen as the  ground for making the 
highest good and its realization or promotion the object of the pure will.25
K a n t is  co n s is ten t in  te ll in g  u s  t h a t  so m eth in g  o r o th e r  m u s t  be th e  object o f 
o u r  w illing , t h a t  th e  good w ill is  n o t  i ts e lf  su ch  a n  object, a n d  th a t  th is  n e e d  
is  n o t p ro h ib ited  b y  th e  fa c t t h a t  th e  m o ra l la w  m u s t  b e  free  of con ten t, so 
lo n g  a s  th e  object does n o t p ro v e  to  be  th e  d e te rm in in g  g ro u n d  o f th e  w ill.
T he h ig h e s t good a s  th e  “to ta lity  o f th e  ob ject o f  th e  p u re  p rac tica l 
re a so n ”26 is  th e  p ro p e r  object o f o u r  m o ra l w illing , th o u g h  i t  is  n o t th e
21 Grundlegung, Ak. 443. Ellington translation.
22 See Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, pp. 24-26, and 29.
23 Religion, p. 4.
24 Second Critique, Ak. 34.
25 Ibid., Ak. 109.
26 Second Critique. Ak. 108.
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d e te rm in in g  g ro u n d . T h o u g h  th is  p o in t m ay  s till  b e  co n sid ered  con troversia l, 
I  th in k  i t  h a s  b een  w ell a rg u e d  for in  th e  p a s t, a n d  m u s t  be  accep ted  a s  one of 
th e  p a ra m e te rs  o f th e  d e b a te  concern ing  th e  h ig h e s t  good. B eck, M urphy , 
F rie d m a n , and , to  som e e x te n t, A u x te r h a v e  a ll  a rg u e d  th a t  “no  fo rm u la tio n  
o f  th e  ca tegorica l im p e ra tiv e  c o n ta in s  a n y  re fe ren c e  to  th e  h ig h e s t  good,”27 
th a t  th e  fo rm al m o ra l la w  c o n ta in s  n o  co n ten t, a n d  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t good 
c a n n o t p rov ide th is  co n te n t. B u t S ilber, P ack er, A nderson-G old , Rossi, and , 
im p o rta n tly , M a ry -B a rb a ra  Z eld in  h a v e  a ll d e fe n d ed  th e  v iew  th a t  one can  
d ed u ce  th e  h ig h e s t good from  th e  m o ra l law . L e t u s  see  how  a  defense m ig h t 
b e  possib le .
To beg in  w ith , a  good prima facie re a so n  fo r  th in k in g  th a t  th e  concept 
m ig h t be  in fe rre d  fro m  th e  m o ra l la w  is  K a n t’s th i r d  fo rm u la tio n  of th e  c a te ­
g o rica l im p era tiv e , n am ely , “a c t in  su c h  a  w ay  t h a t  you  t r e a t  h u m an ity , 
w h e th e r  in  your ow n p e rso n  o r in  th e  p e rso n  o f a n o th e r , a lw ays a t  th e  sam e  
tim e  a s  a n  e n d  a n d  n e v e r  s im p ly  a s  a  m e a n s ,”28 w h ic h  h e  la te r  m odifies, 
s ta tin g :
The concept of every rationed being as one who m ust regard him self as legislat­
ing universal law by all his will’s maxims... leads to another very fruitful con­
cept, which depend on the aforementioned one, viz., th a t  of a kingdom of ends. 
By “kingdom” I understand  a system atic union of different rational beings 
through common laws... [T]herefore,... it will be possible to th ink  of a whole of 
all ends in system atic connection (a whole both of rational being as ends in 
themselves and also o f the particular ends which each may set for himself);...”29
H e re , in  K a n t’s  n o tio n  o f  th e  k ingdom  o f ends, one  f in d s  n o t on ly  a  collection 
of ra t io n a l  ag en ts , b u t  a lso  th e i r  specific, “p a r t ic u la r  e n d s  w h ich  each m ay  s e t
27 Jeffrie G. Murphy, “The Highest Good as Content for Kant’s Ethical Formalism: Beck ver­
sus Silber,” Kant-Studien, 56 (1965): 104.
28 Grundlegung, Ak. 429.
29 Ibid. Ak. 433. Italics added for emphasis.




for h im se lf.”30 As Zeldin  su m m arize s , “th e  kingdom  of e n d s  is , how ever, 
id e n tic a l w ith  th e  id ea  o f a  m o ra l w o rld  a s  described  in  th e  Critique of Pure 
Reason a n d  th e  la tte r , in  tu rn , is  th e  summum bonum. T h u s , th e  com m and  
to  p rom o te  th e  summum bonum , a s  th e  k ingdom  o f ends, is  fo u n d  in  th e  th ird  
fo rm u la tio n  of th e  categorica l im p e ra tiv e .”31 W ith  th e  h ig h e s t  good a s  th e  
collection o f a ll ends w hich  a re  w ille d  by  ra tio n a l a g en ts  in  acco rd  w ith  th e  
m o ra l law , th is  is  eq u iv a len t to  th e  k ingdom  of en d s a n d  th e  summum bo­
num. I f  th e  m oral law  com m ands one  to  w ill u n iv ersa lly , a n d  to  t r e a t  o th e rs  
a n d  o n ese lf  as ends in  th em se lv es , a n d  since th e  law  co m m an d s f in ite  r a ­
tio n a l a g e n ts  as c re a tu re s  w ith  a  se n su o u s  n a tu re  a s  w ell a s  a  r a t io n a l  n a ­
tu re , i t  th ere fo re  com m ands one  to  ta k e  th e  p a rtic u la r  e n d s  o f a n o th e r  as 
one’s  ow n ends, though  o f co u rse  o n ly  i f  th e se  p a r tic u la r  e n d s  a re  p e rm iss i­
b le .32
L e t u s  defend th e  h ig h e s t  good a s  th e  n ecessa ry  ob ject o f m o ra l w ill­
in g  from  a n o th e r  d irection , w ith  th e  questio n : W h at is  th e  co nnec tion  be­
tw e en  v ir tu e  a n d  h ap p in ess?  I  h a v e  t r ie d  to  show  above t h a t  th e  m o ra l law  
a lre a d y  concerns h u m a n  b e in g s  a s  f in ite  c rea tu re s , b ecau se  th e  la w  com­
mands. W e also know  th a t ,  a s  c re a tu re s , h u m an  be ings h a v e  a  n a tu r a l  con­
c e rn  w ith  th e ir  happ iness: “to  b e  h a p p y  is  n ecessa rily  th e  d e s ire  o f every  r a ­
tio n a l b u t  fin ite  being, a n d  th u s  i t  is  a n  unavo idab le  determ in an t  o f i ts  fac­
u l ty  of d esire ,”33 and , “m a n  is  a  b e in g  of needs, so fa r  a s  h e  b e lo n g s to  th e
301 find it interesting that while Auxter believes the notion of the highest good to have to philo­
sophical value, he himself recognizes the importance of Kant’s discussion of “particular ends.” See: 
Thomas Auxter, “Kant’s Theory of Retribution,” in Akten des Siebenten Intemationalen Kant- 
Kongresses, Band II.2 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1990), 307-315, (especially p. 313).
31 Zeldin, “The Summum Bonum,” p. 49.
32 This does not, it should be mentioned, present a problem of motivation for Kant As Zeldin 
explains: “heteronomy is not, however, involved [even though the relation of the summum bonum to the 
moral law is synthetic and not analytic]... since the summum bonum as the goal is not the determining 
factor... [Sjince the summum bonum is in fact no more than the moral law brought ‘nearer to intuition,’ 
[that is, “schematized”] it would, as the kingdom of ends and the goal of a pure but finite practical reason, 
involve a heteronomous element only insofar as is required for such a reason to have a moral end at all” 
(Ibid., p. 50).
33 Second Critique. Ak. 25.
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w orld  o f sen se , a n d  to th is  e x te n t h is  re a so n  ce rta in ly  h a s  a n  in escap ab le  re ­
sp o n s ib ility  from  th e  side  of h is  s e n su o u s  n a tu re  to  a t te n d  to i ts  in te re s t  a n d  
to  form  p ra c tic a l m axim s w ith  a  v iew  to... h a p p in e ss ...”34 N ow  i f  w e accept 
th is , th e n  p e rso n s  h av e  b o th  th e  n e e d  to  b e  m o ra l a n d  th e  n e e d  to  b e  h ap p y , 
a n d  re a so n , w h ich  h a s  b een  p ro v ed  b y  th e  second  Critique to  be  p rac tic a l i t ­
self, m u s t  th e n  be  necessarily co n ce rn e d  w ith  bo th . O f course, th is  gives rise  
to  th e  p ro b lem  th a t  "hap p in ess  a n d  m o ra lity  a re  tw o specifically  d iffe ren t 
e le m e n ts  o f th e  h ig h e s t good a n d  th e re fo re  th e ir  com bination  c a n n o t be 
k n o w n  an a ly tic a lly ,”35 a n d  th is  le a d s  K a n t  to  h is  so lu tion  of th e  “an tin o m y ” of 
th e  second  Critique. T h u s  th e  h ig h e s t  good sim p ly  a rise s  o u t o f th e  fac t th a t  
p ra c tic a l re a so n  h a s  a  n ecessa ry  co n ce rn  w ith  th e  h u m a n  b e in g  b o th  a s  a  
m o ra l a g e n t a n d  a s  a  b e in g  of n e ed s .
A n o th e r  app roach  is  possib le . K a n t ca lls  th e  h ig h e s t good th e  
“to ta lity  o f th e  object of th e  p u re  p ra c tic a l  rea so n ,”36 “th e  [sum  of] in ev itab le  
consequences o f m axim s ad o p ted  a s  conform able  to  [m orality]”37 a n d  “th e  
concept o f a  f in a l  e n d  o f a ll th in g s  (h a rm o n y  w hich , w hile  n o t m u ltip ly in g  
m en ’s d u tie s , y e t p rov ides th em  w ith  a  sp ec ia l p o in t of focus for th e  u n ific a ­
tio n  o f a ll  e n d s).”38 Now c e r ta in ly  th e  m o ra l la w  com m ands som e actions, 
p ro h ib its  som e, a n d  p e rm its  o th e rs . M a n y  of th e se  re q u ire d  ac tions a re  
sp e lled  o u t in  K a n t’s Metaphysics o f Morals, th e  h a p p in e ss  of o th e rs  (as a  
w ide du ty ) a n d  a  c e rta in  form  o f re p re s e n ta tiv e  governm ent, fo r exam ple. 
T h ere  a re  n e ce ssa ry  objects of th e  w ill a n d  o f p rac tic a l reaso n , fo r th o u g h  one 
c an n o t b eg in  w ith  such  en d s a n d  th e n  f in d  th e  n ecessa ry  m ax im s fo r th e ir  
a tta in m e n t, “in  e th ics  th e  concept o f duty  w ill le a d  to  e n d s  a n d  w ill h a v e  to 
e s ta b lish  maxims w ith  resp ec t to  e n d s  w e ought to  se t  ou rse lves, grou n d in g
34 Ibid., Ak. 61.
35 Ibid., Ak. 113.
36 Ibid., Ak. 108.
37 Religion, p. 4.
38 Ibid.. p. 5.
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th em  in  accordance w ith  m o ra l p rinc ip les;”39 “fo r th is  rea so n  e th ics  can  a lso  
be d e fin e d  as th e  sy s te m  o f th e  ends o f p u re  p ra c tic a l  rea so n .”40 T h u s, I ag ree  
w ith  R e a th ’s s ta te m e n t:
One can view the H ighest Good as a  final end  w ithout t hinking th a t it is sup­
posed to provide a  m ateria l content th a t com plem ents the otherwise purely 
form al character of th e  Moral Law... (T]he H ighest Good is a system atization 
of the  content of the M oral Law, which can be generated  by individuals apply­
ing the  Moral Law to the ir conduct. If the  M oral Law could not generate any 
content, there could be no place for [the] H ighest Good in Kant’s theory...41
H u m a n  b e in g s  m u s t  w ill so m e th in g  o r o th e r , a n d  i t  is  th e  concept o f th e  
h ig h e s t good as th e  to ta l i ty  o f a ll m ora l m ax im s w h ich  p rov ides th e  a p p ro p ri­
a te  c o n te n t for th e  w ill.42
T h is  lead s, f in a lly , to  th e  second re a so n , m e n tio n e d  in  th e  q u estio n  
above, w h y  one c a n n o t s im p ly  w ill to  h a v e  a  good w ill, th o u g h  th is  rea so n  is  
co n n ec ted  w ith  th e  w illin g  o f th e  h ig h e s t good. T h is  a rg u m e n t com es from  
Jo h n  S ilb e r ’s a rtic le , “T h e  Im p o rtan ce  of th e  H ig h e s t  Good in  K a n t’s  E th ic s .” 
S ilb e r b e g in s  by ru lin g  o u t p o ss ib ilities  fo r c o n te n t o th e r  th a n  th e  h ig h e s t 
good. In s te a d  o f sim p ly  w illin g  to w ill in  acco rdance  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , 
w hich  w a s  show n above to  b e  void o f n e c e ssa ry  c o n te n t, one possib ility  fo r a n  
e n d  o f p ra c tic a l re a so n  m ig h t be  to w ill to  h a v e  a  good w ill, to b r in g  th e  w ill 
to  m o ra l perfection . H ow ever, th is  w ill n o t w ork , S ilb e r  a rg u es, b ecau se  “in  
a n  ac t o f vo lition  one does n o t sim ply  w ill a  good d isposition . R a th e r  one ex ­
p re sse s  a  good d isp o sitio n  b y  w illing  so m e th in g  m ore  concrete .”43 T h e  w illin g  
o f a  good w ill does n o t a d d  a n y  co n ten t to  th e  m o ra l la w  a n d  does n o t in fo rm  
one a s  to  w h a t  to  do i f  o n e  w a n ts  to w ill in  acco rdance  w ith  th e  m o ra l law .
39 The Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 382.
40 Ibid., Ak. 381.
41 Reath, p. 604 n.
42 See also Zeldin. “The Summum Bonum.” p. 51.
43 Silber. “The Importance o f the Highest Good.” p. 186.
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S ilb e r  m a in ta in s  th a t  in  K a n t’s a tta c k  on  W olff a n d  B a u m g a rte n  h e  w as 
“w e ll aw are  o f th e  n e e d  to  sa y  m ore,” a n d  d eem ed  a n y  eth ics a s  u se le ss  w hich  
g av e  th e  tau to lo g ica l p ro p o sitio n  th a t  i t  w a s  good to  do w h a t w as good.44 A n­
o th e r  possib ility  fo r c o n te n t o f th e  m o ra l la w  is  th e  w illing  o f th e  p e rfec tio n  of 
o n e ’s n a tu ra l  capac itie s. B u t, sis S ilb e r p o in ts  ou t, e ith e r  th is  is  ju s t  a n o th e r  
w a y  o f w illing  to  h a v e  a  good w ill, in  w h ich  case  i t  is  aga in  a  m ere  tau to logy , 
o r  i t  is  w illing  a n  uncond itioned , n a tu r a l  good, in  w hich  case  th e  w ill is  b e in g  
d e te rm in e d  by  a n  object a n d  n o t th e  m o ra l la w .45 I t  is  only th e  h ig h e s t  good, 
S ilb e r  concludes, w hich  can  p rov ide  th e  n e c e ssa ry  m a te r ia l  fo r th e  m o ra l law .
S ilb e r a rg u e s  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good, a s  th e  com bination  o f v ir tu e  a n d  
p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss  fo r a ll, is  th e  o n ly  e n d  possib le  for th is  ro le . As w as 
sh o w n  above, e th ics  is  concerned  w ith  e n d s . T h e  h ig h e s t good as  a  sing le  
“id e a ” encom passes a ll  o f th e  e n d s  w h ich  a re  in  conform ity  to  th e  m o ra l law ;
Kant’s theory is well prepared, of course, for the extension of reason to the 
conditions of m an since it has its foundation in the hum an situation. K ant 
builds his ethics on the foundation of th e  experience of obligation, which is the 
experience, not of a  pure rational being, b u t of man, a rational-sensible be­
ing.46
A s a  h u m a n  being , one sh o u ld  w ill t h a t  o n e  s tr iv e  tow ards m o ra l perfection , 
t h a t  one do w h a te v e r  one can  to  b r in g  one’s  w ill in to  conform ity  w ith  th e  
m o ra l  law . B u t a s  a  h u m a n  being , one  m u s t  a lso  ta k e  in to  co n sid e ra tio n  th e  
n a tu r a l  e n d  o f h a p p in e ss ; hence , th is  seco n d  a sp ec t o f th e  h ig h e s t good n ec ­
e s sa r ily  follows from  K a n t’s concern  w ith  a  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e  w h ich  
com m ands n o t a  ho ly  b u t  a  h u m a n  w ill. O f  cou rse , one can n o t w ill on ly  one’s 
ow n  h a p p in e ss , n o r  c a n  one w ill one’s h a p p in e s s  w h e n  i t  is  opposed to  th e  
m o ra l law . As S ilb e r su m m arizes:
44 Ibid., p. 186.
45 Ibid, pp. 187-190.
46 Ibid. p. 191.
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Now a  m ateria l object of volition tha t can inform and direct the  will in the act 
of volition is supplied. And yet, remarkably, th is m aterial stands under the 
determ ination of law because it is a dem and of the law and not of inclination 
th a t one m ust seek the happiness of others...47
B ecause  th e  w illin g  c re a tu re  u n d e r  c o n s tra in ts  o f th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e  
is  a  h u m a n  be ing , n o t a  ho ly  be ing , an d  b ecau se  a n y  m axim  m u s t  b e  u n iv er- 
sa lizab le , th e  h ig h e s t  good a s  th e  collection o f a ll  en d s  o f ra t io n a l  b u t  h u m a n  
c re a tu re s  i s  th e  a p p ro p ria te  e n d  to  supp ly  th e  n ecessa ry  m a te r ia l  fo r th e  
m o ra l w ill.48
4. Questions o f morality are a priori concerned with man as a natural creature, Le., 
not as the possessor o f a holy will
T h is  p o in t sh o u ld  be c le a r  ho rn  th e  above d iscussion , a n d  is  d iscussed  
in  m ore  d e ta i l  by  S tev en  G. S m ith  a n d  R.Z. F r ie d m a n .”49 T h e  c a teg o rica l im ­
p e ra tiv e , a s  n o te d  above, c an  o n ly  com m and i f  i t  w ould  n o t be  obeyed  n a tu ­
ra lly , t h a t  is , i t  c a n n o t c o m m and  a  holy will; a s  F rie d m a n  e x p la in s ,
ne ither is it correct to suggest th a t reason in its critical or self-reflective func­
tion h as  before it m an as a  rational creature ‘undiluted’ by a  n a tu ra l dimen­
sion... We m ust remind ourselves tha t in K ant’s analysis a... creature subject 
to the m oral law m ust be both natural and rational, directed by inclination to 
happiness yet possessed of a  disinterested respect for the m oral law.50
47 Ibid., pp. 191-2.
48 Kant gives us a possible third argument for the highest good as the necessary material of the 
moral will in the Metaphysics o f Morals when he writes: “But ethics goes beyond this [concern only with 
the formal condition of outer freedom] and provides a matter (an object of free choice), an end of pure 
reason that it presents as an end which is also objectively necessary, that is, an end which, as far as men 
are concerned, it is a duty to have. For since men’s sensible inclinations tempt them to ends (the matter of 
choice) that can be contrary to duty, lawgiving reason can in turn check their influence only by a moral 
end set up against the ends of inclination, an end that must therefore be given a priori, independently of 
inclinations,” (Ak. 380-1).
49 Steven G. Smith, “Worthiness to be Happy and Kant’s concept of the Highest Good,” Kant- 
Studien 75 (1984): 168-90; and R.Z. Friedman, “The Importance and Function of Kant’s Highest Good.” 
Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 22 (1984): 325-342.
50 Friedman. "Kant’s Highest Good.” p. 341.
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T h u s , n o t on ly  does one again  see  th a t  som e c o n te n t is  n ecessa ry  for m oral 
w illing , b u t  a lso  t h a t  m orality , s in ce  i t  com m a n ds h u m a n  b e in g s , m u st say  
so m e th in g  a b o u t h a p p in e ss  a priori’, a s  S m ith  no tes , "reason  in tro d u c es  th e  
id e a  o f h a p p in e ss , i t  is  tru e , b u t  on ly  b e ca u se  w e a re  n a tu ra lly  c o n s titu te d  to  
d e s ire  n a tu r a l  goods... I t  [the ru le  to  se e k  h a p p in e ss ]  is  co n d itio n a l on a n  
e m p irica l fa c t o f  h u m a n  ex istence, a lb e it a n  em p irica l fac t k n o w n  a priori.”51 
As h u m a n  b e in g s , w e seek  h a p p in e ss . T h is  is  a  fac t a priori. B u t  a s  h u m a n  
b e in g s , we a lso  h a v e  a  du ty  to  b e  m o ra l, in d ee d , w e can  only  re a lly  be free  i f  
re a so n  gives th e  m o ra l law  to  itse lf . P ro p o s itio n s  o f m o ra lity  m u s t, therefo re , 
sa y  so m e th in g  a b o u t b o th  th e  q u e s t  fo r v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e ss . S m ith  a rgues:
The merely formal moral law does not hang  in the air, enjoining universality of 
practical judgm ent in the abstract; it  appears to us as a condition of our al- 
ready-ongoing quest for happiness. H um an m orality is structured  a priori by 
the  fact th a t  we are hum an beings and not angels. Therefore, if we cannot be 
moral human beings -  if the h ighest good is demonstrably unattainable be­
cause its  component parts are irreconcilable -  then  we cannot be moral a t all.52
T h e  m o ra l la w  m u s t  ad d ress  th e  q u e s tio n  o f p e rso n s ’ q u est for h a p p in e ss . 
K a n t’s  a n sw e r to  th is  question , o f course , is  t h a t  h a p p in e ss  m u s t  b e  allow ed 
on ly  in  p ro p o rtio n  to  v irtu e , s ince  th e re  a re  m a n y  th in g s  ( ta le n ts , in te lli­
gence, m oney, etc .) w h ich  m ig h t e i th e r  b e  good or ev il d ep en d in g  upon  how  
th e y  a re  p u t  to  u se , t h a t  is, d e p e n d in g  u p o n  th e  w ill o f th e  p e rso n  p u rsu in g  
th e se  ends. B u t th e  im p o rta n t conclusion , th e n , is  t h a t  h a p p in e ss  is  no t 
som ehow  a d d e d  h o rn  th e  ou tside, som e e x tra n e o u s  concept w h ich  h a s  no 
p lace  in  th in k in g  a b o u t m oral issu e s ; h a p p in e s s  is  p a r t  a n d  p a rc e l w ith  th e  
m o ra l law  b e ca u se  th e  law  can  o n ly  c o m m an d  f in ite  ra tio n a l c re a tu re s . T he 
m o ra l la w  m u s t  s a y  som eth ing  a b o u t h a p p in e s s , a n d  th is  is  in co rp o ra te d  in to  
th e  e n d  of th e  h ig h e s t  good.
51 Smith, “Worthiness,” p. 171.
52 Ibid.. p. 172. Second set of italics added for emphasis.
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5. One cannot observe anyone’s worthiness or virtue, and hence cannot reward an­
other in proportion to virtue.
T h is  p o in t is  ab so lu te ly  e s s e n tia l  to  th e  is su e  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good, 
th o u g h  i t  m a y  be  a  d ifficu lt p ill  fo r som e p ro p o n e n ts  of th e  h ig h e s t  good to  
sw allow . I t  seem s to  be  v e ry  c le a r  t h a t  K a n t in s is ts  one s im p ly  c a n n o t ob­
se rv e  w h e th e r  a n o th e r  is  w illin g  com ple te ly  o u t  o f a  sen se  o f d u ty , o r w h e th e r  
in c lin a tio n  h a s  a  p a r t  in  th e  m o tiv a tio n  fo r a n y  m axim . I t  a lso  seem s c le a r  
t h a t  K a n t  d id  n o t th in k  one  co u ld  b e  s u re  o f th e  p u r ity  ev en  o f one’s ow n 
w illing :
In fact there  is absolutely no possibility by m eans of experience to m ake out 
w ith complete certainty a single case in  which the maxim of action th a t m ay in 
o ther respects conform to duty has rested solely on moral grounds... I t  is in­
deed som etim es the case th a t after the keenest self-examination we can find 
nothing except the moral ground of duty  th a t could have been strong enough to 
move us to th is or th a t good action and  to such great sacrifice. But there can­
not w ith certainty  be a t  all inferred from th is th a t some secret impulse of self- 
love, m erely appearing as the idea of duty, was not the actual determ ining 
cause of the  will.53
O n e  c a n n o t k now  w h a t a n o th e r  is  th in k in g  or w h a t  so rt of m ax im  th e y  m ig h t 
h a v e  in  m in d  w h en  p e rfo rm in g  som e action . O n e  c an n o t know  w h e th e r  o n e ’s 
ow n w ill i s  p u re , or i f  i t  h a s  b een  in f lu e n c e d  in  som e w ay  b y  in cen tiv es.
H ence, i t  seem s th a t  i t  is  s im p ly  im p o ssib le  to re w a rd  anyone, in c lu d in g  o n e ­
self, w ith  h a p p in e s s  w hich  w ou ld  b e  p ro p o rtio n a te  to  v irtu e .
S u c h  a n  im possib ility  is  a rg u e d  fo r m o st c learly  b y  J e ffr ie  G. M u rp h y  
in , “T h e  H ig h e s t  Good a s  C o n ten t fo r  K a n t’s  E th ic a l F o rm alism .”54 I f  one i n ­
te rp re ts  th e  d u ty  to  p rom ote  th e  h ig h e s t  good a s  th e  d u ty  to  re w a rd  p e rso n s  
w ith  h a p p in e s s  in  p ro p o rtio n  to  th e i r  v ir tu e ,55 th e n  i t  seem s im possib le  to
53 Grundlegung, Ak. 407.
54 Murphy, pp. 102-110.
551 shall argue below, in defense of the highest good, that this is not precisely how we are to 
interpret such a duty.
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prom ote  th e  h ig h e s t good, since  o n e  c a n n o t k n o w  th e  v ir tu e  o f a n o th e r  or of 
oneself;
the good act, occurring as it does in the phenomenal world, would be the only 
datum  which we could use in a ttem pting  to determine a m an’s virtue of moral 
worth -- a  datum  which is (since true  virtue of disposition occurs noumenally) 
totally insufficient. Thus we a re  m et w ith an  insurm ountable epistemological 
problem: we can never know if ano ther person is, in fact, virtuous.56
A ll one can  observe  w ith  r e g a rd  to  o th e rs  is  th e i r  actions, b u t  th is  te lls  u s  
n o th in g  d efin itiv e  re g a rd in g  th e  m ax im  w h ich  w as u sed  to  p ro d u ce  su ch  a n  
action . B ecause  m o ra l w o rth  co n ce rn s  th e  n o u m e n a l rea lm , one c a n n o t even  
a ccu ra te ly  a sse ss  one’s  ow n m o ra l w o rth . H ow  th e n , a s  M u rp h y  a sk s , c an  i t  
be  possib le  to  p ro p o rtio n  h a p p in e s s  to  w o rth  i f  one can  h a v e  no  w ay  to  ob­
se rv e  an y o n e’s d isposition?  S ilb e r  i s  s im p ly  w rong , i t  a p p ea rs , in  h is  r a th e r  
in fam o u s a s se r tio n  t h a t  “in  r e a r in g  c h ild ren , se rv in g  on ju r ie s  a n d  g rad in g  
p a p e rs”57 w e a re  ab le  to  ap p o rtio n  h a p p in e s s  to  w o rth in ess , a n d  w ro n g  in  
th in k in g  th a t  “a lth o u g h  th is  ta s k  [of a p p o rtio n m en t] is  G od-like in  d im en ­
sion, i t  does n o t  to ta lly  tra n s c e n d  th e  pow ers o f c itizens a n d  leg is la to rs .”58 
R e a th  is  th e re fo re  a lso  w rong, in  h is  o th e rw ise  o u ts ta n d in g  a rtic le , to  th in k  
th a t  “one cou ld  c o n s tru c t th e  id e a  o f  a  h is to r ic a l s ta te  o f a ffa irs in  w h ich  so­
c ia l in s t i tu t io n s  w ere  a r ra n g e d  to  p ro m o te  h a p p in e ss  in  p ro p o rtio n  to  v ir ­
tu e .”59 O ne  c a n n o t k n o w  a  p e rso n ’s v ir tu e , th u s  one c an n o t ap p o rtio n  h a p p i­
n ess  to  i t .60
56 Murphy, p. 107.
57 Ibid, p. 109.
58 Silber, “Importance of the Highest Good,” p. 195.
59 Reath, p. 602.
60 This is why I think it must be concluded that Beversluis’ solution to the problem of the high­
est good, namely that we can promote it through rewarding legality and not morality, though perhaps ap­
pealing, is fundamentally flawed. It seems clear that one may be very far from having a good will, though 
(as Kant pointed out) one may act completely in accord with Right. See: John Beversluis. “Kant on 
Moral Striving.” Kant-Studien 65. no. 1 (1974): 67-77.
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O ne sh o u ld  be carefu l, how ever, n o t to  conclude too m u ch  from  th is  
ep istem ological problem . T h o u g h  one can n o t know  th e  m o ra l w o rth  o f in d i­
v idua ls, one c a n  know  a t  le a s t  th re e  im p o r ta n t th in g s . F irs t , one can  know  
w h en  th e  ac tio n  o f a n o th e r  is  n o t  leg a l, th a t  is, w h en  i t  is  n o t in  accord  w ith  
R igh t. K a n t is  v e ry  c le a r  in  th e  “M e tap h y s ica l F ir s t  P rin c ip les  o f th e  Doc­
tr in e  of R ig h t” t h a t  one c an  conclude  th a t  c e r ta in  e n d s  a re  one’s d u ty  to  p ro ­
m ote, th a t  c e r ta in  fo rm s o f g o v e rn m e n t a re  n o t in  con fo rm ity  w ith  th e  m o ra l 
law , a n d  th a t  som e actions a re  in  d irec t v io la tion  o f th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra ­
tive . T hough  o n e  c an n o t coerce a n o th e r  to h a v e  c e r ta in  en d s, one c a n  coerce 
th e m  to b e h av e  in  c e r ta in  w ays. Second, one can  im prove  one’s ow n m o ra l 
perfection . K a n t  is  a lso  v e ry  c le a r  in  h is  w ritin g s , p e rh a p s  m ost c le a rly  in  
“M etap h y sica l F i r s t  P rin c ip le s  o f th e  D octrine  o f V irtu e ,” th a t  one can  id e n ­
tify  those  a sp e c ts  o f o u r liv e s  w h ich  one can  w ork  on  to  b e tte r  o n e se lf  m o r­
a lly . G ra n te d  t h a t  one can  n e v e r  know  th a t  one is  w illin g  on ly  fo r th e  sa k e  of 
d u ty , b u t one c a n  know  on occasion  (p e rh a p s  q u ite  o ften) th a t  one h a s  w illed  
so m eth in g  on ly  b ecau se  of o ne’s in c lin a tio n s  to  h a v e  t h a t  object, a n d  one can  
also  know  som e ac tiv itie s  w h ich  w ill he lp  to  s tre n g th e n  one’s  m o ra l c h a ra c te r  
(“to  be a  u se fu l m em b er o f th e  w orld ,” fo r exam ple, a n d  n o t laz ily  id lin g  th e  
d ay s aw ay61). T h ird , a n d  p e rh a p s  m ore  con troversia lly , one c a n  id e n tify  a  
la c k  of co nd itions w h ich  h e lp  to  p ro m o te  m o ra l v ir tu e  i n  o th e rs . K a n t  is  ce r­
ta in ly  concerned  w ith  th e  n a tu r a l  s id e  o f h u m a n  be ings, a n d  m a in ta in s  over 
a n d  over a g a in  t h a t  th e  h u m a n  w ill is  so m eth in g  th a t  can go a s t r a y  from  th e  
m o ra l law  i f  th e  lu re  o f in c lin a tio n s  is  s tro n g . T ho u g h  one c a n n o t d irec tly  
m ak e  a n o th e r  m o re  v irtu o u s , th e re  a re  conditions, p o v e rty  fo r exam ple , 
w h ich  d e tra c t fro m  th e  ease  w ith  w h ich  th e  w ill can  w ill in  accord  w ith  th e  
m o ra l law . M ore  w ill be  s a id  on  th is  below , b u t  for now  one sh o u ld  n o t p re ­
c lude  th e  p o ss ib ility  th a t  p ro m o tio n  o f th e  h ig h e s t good is  possib le , n o r 
sh o u ld  one conclude  m ore th a n  is  n e ce ssa ry  from  M u rp h y ’s an a ly s is .
61 Metaphysics o f  Morals. Ak. 446.




6. Pure practical reason needs no sensible motivation.
T h is  is  th e  lesso n  o f th e  second  Critique, th ough  m an y  c o m m en ta to rs  
se em  n o t to  tak e  th is  conclu sion  a s  se rio u sly  a s  th ey  m ig h t w hen  try in g  to  
e x p la in  w hy  one n eed s  a  g u a ra n te e  o f  th e  possib ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t good. In  
th e  second  Critique K a n t is  a s k in g  w h e th e r  o r n o t "pure” rea so n  is  also 
“p ra c tic a l,” th a t  is , w h e th e r  re a s o n  c a n  m o tiv a te  a  p e rso n  to  action  or 
w h e th e r  reaso n  m u s t b e  th o u g h t  to  b e  p r im a rily  specu la tive  o r m ere ly  p r a g ­
m a tic  i n  i ts  function ing . T h is , o f  cou rse , le a d s  K a n t to  w h a t h a s  b e en  c a lle d  
h i s  “C o p em ican  revo lu tion” in  e th ic s , n a m e ly  th a t  th e  p r im a ry  a n d  fu n d a ­
m e n ta l  sp h e re  of rea so n  m u s t  b e  p rac tic e  in s te a d  of theory . O ne’s know ledge  
o f th e  m o ra l law  lea d s  to  th e  d iscovery  o f freedom , a n d  freedom  e n ta ils  th e  
p o ss ib ility  an d , consequen tly , th e  n e ce ss ity  of ac tin g  in  accord w ith  th e  la w .62 
In d e e d , i t  seem s to  be  K a n t’s  c la im  th a t  one  c an  only be tru ly  au to n o m o u s i f  
o n e  w ills  in  accord w ith  th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e .63 H ence, rea so n  is  p ra c t i ­
ca l, a n d  th o u g h  one can  n e v e r  h a v e  a n  in tu it io n  of au tonom ous freedom , one 
does k n o w  th a t  rea so n  n eed s  no  e x te rn a l  c a u se  o r m o tiva tion  to  w ill in  acco rd  
w ith  th e  m o ra l law . G ra n te d  t h a t  K a n t  does m a in ta in  th a t  th e re  c a n  be  a  
su b je c tiv e  side  of m o tiv a tio n  o f th e  m o ra l law , th a t  th e  m o ra l law  does offer a  
“m o ra l fee lin g ” of c o n te n tm e n t fo r a c tin g  in  accord w ith  th e  m o ra l law ,64 b u t  
th is  is  n o t  a  necessa ry  in ce n tiv e  to  a c tin g  m o ra lly .65 O ne m u s t be c a re fu l to
62 Second Critique, Ak. 29-31.
63 Second Critique: “Subordinate to reason as the higher faculty of desire is the pathologically 
determinable faculty of desire, the latter being really and in kind different from the former, so that even 
the slightest admixture of its impulses impairs the strength and superiority of reason,” (Ak. 23). See also 
especially: Ak. 28-9 and Ak. 33.
64 Ibid., see especially Ak. 73-77. For more on the nature of “contentment,” see the following
chapter.
65 In this respect, I think that Packer’s conclusion that the highest good is needed because it 
provides an end which is necessary to the motivation of a person is fundamentally flawed. See: Mark 
Packer, “The Highest Good in Kant’s Psychology of Motivation,” Idealistic Studies 13 (Mav 1983): 110- 
19.
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ta k e  th is  in to  co n sid e ra tio n  w h en  try in g  to a rg u e  for th e  n e c e ss ity  o f the  
g u a ra n te e  o f  th e  h ig h e s t good.66
7. Virtue is not its own reward -or- contentment is not happiness.
T h is  is  a n o th e r  p o in t w h ich  seem s v e ry  c le a r  i n  K a n t, b u t  is  often 
fo rg o tten  o r d is re g a rd e d  b y  c o m m en ta to rs . K a n t’s d isc u ss io n  o f h a p p in e ss  
a n d  o f th e  S to ics in  th e  second  Critique show s th a t  v i r tu e  a n d  h a p p in e ss  a re  
“w ho lly  he te ro g en eo u s... h a p p in e s s  a n d  m o ra lity  a re  tw o  specifica lly  
d iffe ren t e le m e n ts  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good a n d  th e re fo re  th e i r  co m b in a tio n  can n o t 
be  k n o w n  a n a ly tic a lly  (as  i f  a  p e rso n  w ho... fo llow ed v i r tu e  fo u n d  him self 
ipso facto h a p p y  in  th e  consc iousness o f th is  conduct).”67 K a n t  specifically  
a d d re sse s  th e  p roposition  th a t  k now ledge  o f a  v ir tu o u s  d isp o s itio n  is, in  fact, 
h a p p in e s s  w ith  h is  rep ro ach  o f th e  S toics. T h e  S to ics w e re  w ro n g  n o t only to 
th in k  th a t  v ir tu e  w as th e  sam e  a s  h a p p in e ss , a n d  th u s  n o t  reco g n iz in g  th a t  
v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e s s  a re  h e te ro g en eo u s, b u t  a lso  in  th in k in g  t h a t  one’s 
n a tu r a l  in c e n tiv e s  w ere  b ad . K a n t’s m a tu re  p o sitio n 68 i s  to  a rg u e  th a t  
“n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s , considered in themselves, a re  good, t h a t  is , n o t  a  m a tte r  
o f rep ro ach , a n d  i t  is  n o t on ly  fu tile  to  w a n t to  e x tirp a te  th e m  b u t  to  do so 
w o u ld  also  b e  h a rm fu l a n d  b lam ew o rth y .”69 T he  h ig h e s t  good n o t only  
co m m an d s th e  p e rfec tion  o f one’s  v ir tu e , b u t  a s  th e  p e rfe c t good a n d  n o t ju s t  
th e  su p re m e  good,70 i t  com m ands h a p p in e ss  a s  w ell. H a p p in e s s  is  n o t v irtue , 
n o r  is  h a p p in e ss  considered  in  i ts e l f  a  b a d  th in g . H a p p in e s s  is  m ere ly  th e  
sa tis fa c tio n  o f n a tu ra l ,  h u m a n  in c lin a tio n s , w h ich  is  th e  e n d  o f e v e ry  h u m a n  
b e in g  a s  a  c re a tu re  ex is tin g  in  th e  p h e n o m e n a l rea lm . T h u s , i t  seem s th a t
66 Victoria S. Wike, I think, is careful to do this even though she argues that it is acceptable to 
have the concept of an end as part of the determining ground for an action. See: Kant on Happiness in 
Ethics, Chapters 3, 5, and 6.
67 Second Critique, Ak. 112-3.
68 There may be some debate as to whether Kant holds this belief before the Religion.
69 Religion, p. 51.
0 For this distinction see: second Critique. Ak. 110-11.




an y  d e fen se  o f  th e  h ig h e s t  good w h ich  e q u a te s  v ir tu e  w ith  h a p p in e ss , o r 
w h ich  c la im s v i r tu e  to  be  i ts  ow n re w a rd , s im p ly  m isco n s tru es  th e  
h e te ro g en e o u s  n a tu r e  o f v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e s s  a s  w ell as th e  aim  o f th e  
h ig h e s t good.71
8. Reason has a necessary “interest” in the outcome o f its witting.
T h is  i s  a n  im p o rta n t, b u t  r a th e r  n eg lec ted , p o in t m ad e  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  
th e  w ritin g s  o f  S ilb e r , R ossi, a n d  Yovel,72 b u t  i t  o u g h t to  be  r a th e r  in tu it iv e ly  
c le a r  g iv en  K a n t ’s  in s is te n c e  th a t  ( th e  sa m e ) re a so n  h a s  b o th  th e o re tic a l a n d  
p ra c tic a l a p p lic a tio n s , w ith  th e  p ra c tic a l c o n ce rn s  ta k in g  p recedence. S ilb e r, 
Rossi, a n d  Y ovel m a in ta in  th a t  rea so n , a s  p u re  b u t  fu n d a m e n ta lly  p ra c tic a l, 
h a s  a  “w o rld -co n s tru c tin g ” c h a ra c te r , a n d  t h a t  re a so n  h a s  a n  “in te re s t” i n  th e  
ou tcom e o f i t s  c o n s tru c tio n . As R ossi e x p la in s , “I  ta k e  ‘w o rld -co n stru c tin g ’ to  
b e  one w ay  o f u n d e rs ta n d in g  K a n t’s c h a ra c te r iz a tio n  o f rea so n  a s  a  fa c u lty  
w h ich  se e k s  to  e s ta b l is h  th e  to ta lity  o f  th e  u n co n d itio n ed .”73 K a n t w rite s  in  
th e  f i r s t  Critique:
Now the transcenden tal concept of reason is directed always solely tow ards ab ­
solute to ta lity  in the synthesis of conditions... Reason concerns itself exclu­
sively w ith  absolute totality  in the  em ploym ent of the concepts of the  under­
standing... Reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the  em ploym ent of 
understanding ... in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction to­
w ards a certa in  unity  of which it h as  itse lf no concept, and in such a m anner
71 Thus, I think that both Packer’s approach in “The Highest Good in Kant’s Psychology of 
Motivation,” and Auxter’s conclusions in Kant's Moral Teleology are flawed because of this equation of 
virtue and happiness. See: Thomas Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology (Macon: Mercer University Press, 
1982). For more on the exact nature of “happiness,” see the following chapter.
72 See: John R. Silber, “The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest Good as the Canon of 
Pure Reason in Kant’s Philosophy,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language (Summer 1959): 233-44; 
Philip Rossi, “Moral Interest and Moral Imagination in Kant,” The Modem Schoolman 57, no. 2 (Spring 
1980): 149-58; Philip Rossi, “Autonomy and Community: The Social Character of Kant’s ‘Moral Faith’,” 
The Modem Schoolman 61 (March 1984): 169-186; Philip Rossi, “Kant’s Doctrine of Hope: Reason’s 
Interest and the Things of Faith,” New Scholasticism 56 (Spring 1982): 228-238; and Yirmiyahu Yovel, 
“The Interests of Reason: From Metaphysics to Moral History,” in Kant's Practical Philosophy Recon­
sidered, ed. Yimiyaho Yovel (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986), 135-148. See also Kwang- 
Sae Lee, pp. 551 and 559-61.
73 Rossi, “Moral Interest and Moral Imagination.” p. 150 n.
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as to unite all the acts of the understanding, in respect of every object, into an 
absolute whole.74
T h is  w orld -construc ting  fu n c tio n  o f rea so n  m ig h t a lso  be  c a lle d  th e  
“arch itec ton ic” n a tu re  o f re a so n . W e h a v e  seen  th is  in  d e ta il  in  S ec tion  O ne 
above, p a r tic u la r ly  th o se  c h a p te r s  d ea lin g  w ith  th e  “id e a s  o f  re a so n ” w hich  
a re  s e t  to  u s “a s  a  ta s k .” R e aso n  d irec ts  one to  f in d  th e  sy n th e s is , th e  u n ity  of 
th e  uncond itioned ; in d eed , th is  is  w hy, K a n t says, re a so n  o ften  le a d s  i ts e lf  
a s t r a y  in to  th in k in g  t h a t  i t  is  a b le  to  give sp ecu la tiv e  a n sw e rs  to  m e ta p h y s i­
c a l q u estio n s  ab o u t ob jects o f  w h ich  one can  h a v e  no  ex p erien ce . B u t  reaso n  
n o t  on ly  p o in ts  to th e  lim its  o f w h a t  w e can  know , i t  a lso  in s is ts  in  p u sh in g  
to w a rd  th e  to ta lity  o f th e  u n co n d itio n ed , to w ard  th e  f in a l  a n d  u ltim a te  en d  of 
re a so n .
T h u s  rea so n  h a s  a n  in te r e s t  in  th e  outcom e o f  i t s  w illing , a n d  th is  is 
w h y  S ilb e r  m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good m u s t be  se e n  a s  th e  can o n  even 
o f  p u re  reaso n . R eason  se e k s  a  u n ity . R eason  is  a lso  ab le  to  a c t sp o n ta n e ­
ously , t h a t  is, i t  can  p ropose  i t s  ow n objects to  itself;
reason produces of its own spontaneity ideas which are its own necessary ob­
ject to which no corresponding objects can be given in  sense experience... 
These ideas, as the necessary objects which reason imposes on itself, are the 
ends of reason which guide it in practice, th a t is, in all the  reasoning processes. 
Having projected these ideas as its necessary ends, reason reveals additional 
spontaneity in its striv ing  tow ard their realization. This striving of reason 
takes place in all of its em ploym ents.75
H e re  one sees th a t  re a so n  is  p ra c tic a l n o t only in  i ts  im p o r ta n t  m o ra l fu n c ­
tio n , b u t  also p rac tic a l in  t h a t  i t  g u id es th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g ’s  se a rc h  for th eo ­
re t ic a l  t ru th s  a n d  sp e cu la tiv e  u n i ty  a s  well.
74 Critique o f Pure Reason, A 326-7 = B 382-3. Rossi also points to A 409-10 = B 436-7 and A 
462-85 = B490-513.
5 Silber. "Metaphysical Importance.” p. 234.
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W e see  th is  especially  w ell in  K a n t’s  d iscussion  as to th e  n a tu re  of 
“ph ilo so p h y ” in  th e  Critique of Practical Reason. H e  u rg es  t h a t  we u n d e r ­
s ta n d  p h ilo so p h y  a n d  “w isdom ” in  a  w ay  s im ila r  to  how  th e  G reek s  u n d e r ­
stood i t ,  n a m e ly  “in s tru c tio n  in  th e  concep t w h e re in  th e  h ig h e s t good w a s  to 
be  p la c e d  a n d  in  th e  conduct by  w h ich  i t  w a s  to  be  o b ta in ed .”76 N ot on ly  th is , 
b u t  K a n t  a lso  m a in ta in s  th a t  w e sh o u ld  t ry  to  “b r in g  i t  [the  h ig h e s t  good] to 
[the lev e l of] sc ience” a n d  “c o m p reh en d  u n d e r  th e  n a m e  o f ph ilo sophy  th e  
love o f science, a n d  th u s  of a ll  sp e cu la tiv e  ra t io n a l  know ledge, so far as it is 
serviceable to reason [in  defining] t h a t  concep t a n d  th e  p ra c tic a l d e te rm in in g  
g ro u n d .”77 G iven  th is  d iscussion , a s  w e ll a s  K a n t’s  re m a rk s  in  “O n  th e  P r i ­
m acy o f  th e  P u re  P ra c tic a l R eason ...” a n d  “E x te n d in g  P u re  R easo n  in  a  P ra c ­
tic a l R espec t...”, i t  sh o u ld  be no  s u rp r is e  t h a t  even  “p u re ” re a so n  h a s  a n  in ­
te re s t. F o r  Yovel, K a n t  is  concerned  w ith  a  “u n ity  o f p u rp o se” o f  w hich
m orality, politics, religion, and  th e ir  encompassing domain of moral history, 
are  to provide hum an reason w ith a  legitim ate field in which to satisfy the 
m etaphysical in te rest in its u ltim ate  and  totalizing thrust... In consequence, 
the  u ltim ate objective of m etaphysics is no longer T ru th  or Being as such but 
the  Good, more precisely, the H ighest Good, taken as a historical ideal.78
K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  p u re  rea so n  is  th e  sa m e  a s  p ra c tic a l rea so n , a n d  th ese , 
in  tu rn , a re  th e  sa m e  as  th e  (au tonom ous) w ill. As such , w ith  K a n t’s 
“C o p em ican  R evo lu tion ,” reaso n  m u s t  h a v e  a n  in te re s t  in  th e  outcom e o f i ts  
w illing .
I t  is  re a so n  w h ich  “p resc rib es  to  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  i ts  d irec tio n ,” a  
m ovem en t n o t on ly  a im ed  a t  a  sy n th e tic  u n i ty  o f specu la tive  know ledge, b u t, 
m ore fu n d a m e n ta lly , a  u n ity  o f a ll e n d s  o f p ra c tic a l reaso n : a  m o ra l w hole.
As S ilb e r  ex p la in s ,
76 Second Critique, Ak. 108.
7 Ibid.. Ak. 108. Second italics added for emphasis.
8 Yovel. “The Interests of Reason."
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the realization, however, th a t reason is not only practical and  active in the 
projection and realization of ideas b u t also is active in  several employments 
sim ultaneously, leads to the conclusion th a t reason m ust have some suprem e 
or comprehensive end. There m u st be some general idea in  term s of which 
reason itself can be directed so th a t  all its ideas and in te rests  are capable of 
realization in a  way th a t satisfies the  demands of its to ta l nature ... All o ther 
aim s and  ideas of reason are re la ted  as means to the end of morality which is 
the  h ighest in terest of hum anity  and  of reason itself.79
R eason  is  sp o n tan eo u s  in  i ts  a b ili ty  to  p ropose  a n d  p u r s u e  ob jec ts of i ts  ow n 
c rea tio n . T h is  sp o n ta n e ity  n a tu r a l ly  le a d s , how ever, to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f w h a t 
so rt o f e n d  re a so n  sh o u ld  p u rsu e , w h a t  s o r t  of w orld  re a so n  sh o u ld  c rea te ;
take a m an who, honoring the m oral law, allows the thought to occur to him 
(he can scarcely avoid doing so) o f w h a t sort of world he would create, under 
the guidance of practical reason... He would not m erely m ake the  very choice 
which is determ ined by th a t m oral idea of the highest good... he would also will 
th a t  [such] a world should by all m eans come into existence (because the moral 
law dem ands th a t the highest good possible through our agency should be real­
ized)...80
T h u s, th e  sp o n ta n e ity  of re a so n  in  i t s  m a n y  p rac tic a l a p p lic a tio n s  lea d s  one 
to  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  a n d  th e  n e c e ss ity  o f th e  h ig h e s t good. R e aso n  is  w orld- 
c o n s tru c tin g  in  i ts  v e ry  n a tu re , a n d  i t  n a tu ra lly  a sk s  w h a t  s o r t  o f  w orld  i t  
sh o u ld  c re a te . W ith  th e  know ledge  o f  freedom  a n d  th e  a u to n o m y  o f th e  will, 
th is  le a d s  to  th e  necessity  o f w illin g  in  accord  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , b u t  i t  a lso  
le a d s  to  th e  n ecessa ry  p ro jec tion  o f a  w o rld  w hich  w ou ld  b e  th e  a p p ro p ria te  
object o f th e  m o ra l law . R eason , b e c a u se  o f i ts  in te re s t  i n  th e  outcom e of i ts  
w illing , show s th a t  i t  is  n o t en o u g h  to  th in k  of th e  h ig h e s t  good; one  m u s t try  
to  b r in g  i t  in to  ex istence  a s  well.
R ossi ta k e s  su ch  a n  a rg u m e n t to  p o in t  to th e  n e c e ss ity  o f t h in k in g 
th e  h ig h e s t  good to be  a  social good. If, h e  reasons, “K a n t’s o v e ra ll account of
79 Silber, “Metaphysical Importance,” p. 235.
80 Religion. p. 5.




th e  fu n c tio n s  o f h u m a n  re a so n ... p re s e n ts  h u m a n  re a so n  a s  fu n d a m e n ta lly  
o rd e re d  to  re p re se n tin g  a n d  to  fa sh io n in g  th a t  to ta l ity  o f in te rc o n n e c te d  
co n d itio n s w h ich  c o n s titu te  th e  id e a  o f a  ‘w orld’,”81 th e n
the highest good is the  represen ta tion  th a t reason appropriately  m akes of the 
to tality  and  interconnectedness th a t  can  be hoped for as the outcome of the ex­
ercise of hum an m oral freedom. This outcome is a shared  and  sharable world 
of abiding good... This ordering  of freedom to m utuality  th u s  can be under­
stood as the fundam ental w ay in  which the “world-constructing” character of 
reason m anifests itself in the  practical use of reason.82
B ecau se  o f th e  w o rld -co n s tru c tin g  n a tu r e  o f rea so n , re a s o n  h a s  a n  in te re s t  in  
th e  ou tcom e o f  i ts  w illing , a n  ou tco m e ta k in g  p lace , th o u g h  n o t  exclusively , in  
th e  p h e n o m e n a l rea lm . A s su c h , re a so n ’s p r im a ry  ta s k  m u s t  b e  to  u n ify  its  
sp e c u la tiv e  know ledge, b u t  th i s  c a n n o t b e  se en  a s  th e  m o s t im p o r ta n t  ta sk  of 
re a so n . R a th e r , reaso n ’s p r im a ry  ta s k  is  th e  u n if ic a tio n  a n d  o rd e r in g  of all 
e n d s , th e  m o st im p o rta n t fu n c tio n  o f  w h ich  is  to  s u b o rd in a te  o th e r  e n d s  to 
re a s o n ’s m o ra l ends. So, in  a s k in g  w h a t  so r t o f w o rld  re a so n  sh o u ld  create , i t  
m u s t  b e  a  m o ra l world, b u t  a lso  a  w o rld  in  w h ich  one h a rm o n iz e s  w ith  o th ­
e rs . In  so doing, one m u s t  “im a g in e ” h o w  one’s  w illin g  w ill a ffec t th e  world, 
w o n d e rin g  w h a t so rt of s t ru c tu re s  w o u ld  develop a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  m axim s w illed 
to  b e  u n iv e rsa lly  accep ted  a s  “n a tu r a l” law s. K a n t  e x p la in s  th a t ,  re g a rd in g  
th e  fo rm u la tio n  of every  m ax im , w e m u s t  “a lw ay s in q u ire  in to  w h a t  i t  shou ld  
be i f  i t  w ere  to  ho ld  a s  a  u n iv e r s a l  la w  o f n a tu re ,”83 a n d  th u s  q u e s tio n  
w h e th e r  i t  “cou ld  no t c o n s titu te  a  p e rm a n e n t  n a tu r a l  o rd e r .”84 I f  i t  is  g ran te d  
t h a t  re a so n  h a s  a  w o rld -co n s tru c tin g  n a tu re , a n d  t h a t  i t  th e re fo re  h a s  a n  in ­
te r e s t  in  th e  outcom e of i t s  o rd e r in g  a n d  c o n stru c tio n  o f e n d s , th e n  i t  seem s
81 Rossi, “Autonomy and Community,” p. 171.
82 Ibid, pp. 179-80.
83 Second Critique, Ak. 45.
84 Ibid, Ak. 44. See also especially: Rossi, “Moral Interest and Moral Imagination." p. 153. 
Rossi is right to note that his conception of how to formulate and evaluate maxims of the categorical im­
perative is similar, though not identical, to Onora O’Neil's interpretation in Acting on Principle. 1975.
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t h a t  re a so n  m u st a lso  be co n ce rn ed  a b o u t th e  concrete , s ta b le , a n d  e n d u rin g  
re la tio n s  th a t  i t  w ou ld  w ill b e tw ee n  i ts e lf  an d  o th ers . T h is , th e n , is  th e  h ig h ­
e s t  good, a  n ecessa rily  social good, a n d  a  good w hich  o n e  m u s t  ta k e  p a in s  to 
p rom ote .
m.
In  th is  section , I  w a n t  to  o ffer th re e  m ore p o in ts  w h ich  w ill be  e lab o ­
r a te d  in  th e  follow ing c h a p te rs . I  c a n  a t  le a s t  offer a  p a r t i a l  de fen se  of th e m  
h e re , w h ile  a  fu ll defense  c an  be  h a d  th ro u g h  th e  c o n te n t o f th e  n e x t se v e ra l 
c h a p te rs .
9. The moral law does not only pertain to ourselves; it commands action in a physical 
world, one inhabited by other human beings.
T h is  is  p e rh a p s  s t i l l  a  c o n tro v e rs ia l p o in t in  K a n t  sch o la rsh ip , b u t 
one  th a t  I  th in k  h a s  b een  w ell a rg u e d  for, especially  by  A nderson -G o ld  a n d  
R ossi. F rie d m a n , for exam p le , is  s im p ly  w rong  to  s ta te  th a t ,  “th e  m o ra l la w  
co m m an d s n o t th a t  one  m a k e  th e  w orld  b e tte r , th a t  is , h a p p ie r , b u t  th a t  one 
m a k e  o n e se lf  b e tte r , t h a t  is  m ore  w o rth y ... T he focus o f K a n t’s  e th ic a l th e o ry  
is  th e  in d iv id u a l a n d  h is  choosing ,”85 a n d  th a t, “m o ra lity  fo r K a n t  is  n o t con­
c e rn e d  w ith  th e  p ro d u c tio n  of b en efic ia l consequences o r co n d itio n s in  th e  
w orld . M o ra lity  is  co n cern ed  w ith  th e  in d iv id u a l a n d  h is  goodness. T he  dy ­
n a m ics  of K a n tia n  m o ra lity  a re  p la y e d  o u t in  th e  w ill, n o t  in  th e  w orld .”86 To 
d e fen d  a g a in s t su ch  a n  in te rp re ta t io n , th e  a rg u m e n ts  n e e d e d  a re  s im ila r  to 
th o se  fo r p o in ts  th re e  a n d  fo u r above, n am e ly  to  show  t h a t  o th e r  p e rso n s  a re  
o f im m e d ia te  concern  in  th e  c a teg o rica l im p era tiv e , a n d  t h a t  a s  e n d s  in  
th em se lv es , one m u s t a lso  ta k e  th e i r  specific, p h e n o m e n a l e n d s  a s  one’s ow n.
To p o sit th a t  m o ra lity  sh o u ld , accord ing  to  K a n t, on ly  be  concerned  
w ith  o u r  ow n w ill a n d  v ir tu e , seem s m u ch  too s tro n g  a  c la im , a n d  in  f la t
85 Friedman, “Kant’s Highest Good,” p. 336.
86 Ibid. p. 339.
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con trad ic tion  w ith  m uch  o f K a n t’s w ritin g s . A gain , th e  prima facie a rg u m e n t 
a g a in s t su ch  a  p o sitio n  w ould  be K a n t’s th i r d  fo rm u la tio n  o f th e  c a teg o rica l 
im p e ra tiv e  a n d  h is  su b se q u e n t com m ents o n  th e  k ingdom  of ends. In d eed , 
th e  m oral la w  a d d re sse s  u s  a s  be ings w ho a re  already in  re la tio n  to  o th e r  
fin ite  ra t io n a l  c re a tu re s . T h is  re la tio n  to  o th e rs  is  p re se n t from  th e  v e ry  
b eg in n in g  o f th e  m o ra l law . As K a n t w rite s  in  a n  o ften  quo ted  p a ssa g e  fro m  
th e  Religion, “th e  species o f  ra tio n a l b e ings is  objectively, in  th e  id e a  o f 
reason , destined , fo r a  soc ia l goal, n am ely , th e  p ro m o tio n  of th e  h ig h e s t good 
a s  a  social good.”87 T he  categorica l im p e ra tiv e  e n jo in s  one to  w ill u n iv e rsa lly , 
to  t r e a t  o th e rs  a s  en d s in  them selves, a n d  to  ta k e  th e i r  ends a s  one’s ow n. As 
R ossi exp la in s:
w hat the textbook picture fails to capture... is the fact th a t K ant quite clearly... 
characterizes such elevation [of m an as noum enal] as an introduction into a 
“realm ” or “world”, i.e., into a connected and  ordered totality of relations to the 
moral agency of all o thers who constitute th e  hum an moral community. Thus, 
moral decision... is the precise point of contact w ith and full participation in 
the hum an m oral community[,]... placing us in a world constituted by persons 
in m utual m oral relation...: m utual respect and  m oral interdependence am ong 
persons.88
T he  m oral law  im m e d ia te ly  p laces one in  a  re la tio n sh ip  w ith  o th ers , a  r e la ­
tionsh ip  of co n cern  a n d  respec t, a n d  one w h ich  is  in  th e  p h en o m en a l a s  w ell 
a s  th e  n o u m e n a l w orld.
87 Religion, p. 89. Many passages of Kant’s, especially those in the Religion, seem to speak 
against Friedman’s claim that, though the notion of a perfect, moral world is an ideal in a sense, “...this 
does not mean that the moral world does not exist, that it is merely a goal to be aimed at, a target for our 
moral activity. It is an already existent world which we discover in the awareness of ourselves as agents 
subject to the moral law” (“Kant’s Highest Good,” pp. 329-30). In one respect, certainly it is correct that 
we are already related to others as a noumenal being in a noumenal realm (another reason it is odd Fried­
man insists that the moral law is only about willing my own virtue), but it seems mistaken to think that we 
already have a moral commonwealth, given that the moral law can command us only as finite rational 
beings and not beings with a holy will.
88 Philip Rossi, “Kant as a Christian Philosopher: Hope and the Symbols of Christian Faith.” 
Philosophy Today 25 (Spring 1981): 28.
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F rie d m a n  is  r ig h t, I  th in k , n o t to w a n t  th e  h ig h e s t good to p re sc rib e  
d u tie s  above a n d  bey o n d  those  g iven  by  th e  m o ra l law , d u tie s  w hich  w ou ld  
s im p ly  n o t be  encom passed  by th e  m o ra l law ;89 b u t  i t  does no t seem  t h a t  th is  
h a s  to  be  th e  case . V ic to ria  S. W ike p rov ides a  good d iscussion  o f th is  p o in t,90 
m a in ta in in g  am ong  o th e r  th in g s  th a t ,
K ant’s writings argue th a t the highest good is not foreign to, separate  from, or 
o ther th an  the m oral law though it is not the  sam e as the moral law. I t  is the 
object of the m oral law, the necessary, final object, though not the  law itself... 
I t  is special, it is sui generis. While th is account is difficult and complex, it 
does not seem to be contradictory. There is no contradiction if  som ething 
which is not separate  from a  th ing is yet different from the th ing and such is 
the  case with the highest good and the m oral law.91
P e rh a p s  th e  b e s t w ay  to  su m m arize  su ch  a  p o ss ib ility  is  K a n t’s s ta te m e n t  
t h a t  “i t  c a n n o t be  a  m a t te r  of unconcern  to m o ra lity  a s  to  w h e th e r  o r n o t  i t  
fo rm s fo r i ts e l f  th e  concept of a  f in a l e n d  o f a ll  th in g s  (h arm o n y  w ith  w h ich , 
w h ile  n o t m u ltip ly in g  m en ’s  du ties, y e t p ro v id es th e m  w ith  a  sp ec ia l p o in t  o f 
focus fo r th e  u n ific a tio n  o f ends).”92 P e rh a p s  th e  m o st im p o r ta n t fu n c tio n  of 
th e  h ig h e s t  good is  to  focus one’s p rac tic a l rea so n , a  re a so n  w hich  fo rm u la te s  
m ax im s for th e  a t ta in m e n t  of c e r ta in  objects w h ich  a re  to  be p u rsu e d , focused  
aw ay  from  a  s tr ic tly  in d iv id u a l ap p ro ach  to  th o se  e n d s  w hich  a re  socia l in  
n a tu re ;  in  o th e r  w ords, to  p rev e n t su c h  a n  in te rp re ta t io n  as F r ie d m a n ’s. 
T h o u g h  i t  m a y  be  a  so m ew h at co n tro v ersia l c la im , I  th in k  th a t  one could 
fo rm u la te  m ax im s w ith in  th e  b o u n d s of th e  m o ra l la w  w hich  h a v e  l i t t le  to  do 
w ith  concern  for o th ers ; th is  m ig h t be  ta k e n  a s  su b je c t m ere ly  to  th e  n e g a tiv e  
co m m an d  sim p ly  n o t to  t r e a t  a n o th e r  a s  a  m e a n s  to  one’s own end . H ow ever,
89 And, indeed, in taking such a stance on the formal qualities of the moral will, I think Fried­
man is stuck with the moral law as simply the command to “will a good will” (c.f., “Kant’s Highest 
Good,” p. 330), a violation of point number two above.
90 See: Wike, Kant on Happiness, Chapter 5, especially pp. 138-48.
91 Wike, Kant on Happiness, p. 146.
92 Religion, p. 5.
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th e re  seem s to be a  positive  c o m m an d  a s  w ell t h a t  w o u ld  be  m issed  i f  th e  
h ig h e s t  good d id  n o t “focus” o n e ’s  w ill to w ard s  th e  c o n ce rn s  o f  o thers .
P e rh a p s  K a n t w as concerned  to  av o id  a n  a tt i tu d e  l ik e  t h a t  o f  th e  S to ics w ho  
w ere  so  concerned  on ly  w ith  th e i r  ow n v ir tu e  t h a t  th e y  s a t  id ly  by w h ile  
R om e w e n t to  ru in s . M ore n e e d s  to  b e  sa id  re g a rd in g  su c h  a  possib ility , b u t  
th e  p o in t  sh o u ld  a t  le a s t  be  a n  in tu it iv e ly  accep tab le  o n e .93
Also, consider th e  follow ing: W h a t o f th e  “M e ta p h y s ic a l F ir s t  P r in c i­
p les  o f th e  D oc trine  o f R ig h t”? W hy  w o u ld  K a n t in c lu d e  a  p a r t ia l  t r e a t is e  on  
g o v e rn m e n t in  th e  Metaphysics o f Morals i f  one’s  c o n ce rn  w ith  m o ra lity  
sh o u ld  on ly  b e  w ith  one’s v ir tu e ?  W hy, fo r th a t  m a t te r ,  s h o u ld  K a n t in s is t  
t h a t  p o litic a l questions, even  q u e s tio n s  ab o u t w h a t  s o r t  o f  g o v e rn m en t sh o u ld  
be e s ta b lish e d , a re  p ro p erly  c o n s id e re d  moral q u e s tio n s?  A n d  w hy in c lu d e  
th e  seco n d  p a r t  o f th e  M e ta p h y s ic a l  F i r s t  P rin c ip le s  o f  th e  D octrine  o f V ir­
tu e ,” n a m e ly  th e  “D u tie s  o f V ir tu e  to  O th e rs ,” specifica lly  d isc u ss in g  o u r  d u ty  
to w a rd s  th e  h a p p in e ss  of o th e rs , in  th is  t re a tis e  on  m o ra ls?  A n d  w hy  is  th e  
m o ra l la w  a n d  th e  h ig h e s t good m e n tio n e d  or a llu d e d  to  n o t  only  in  w o rk s 
lik e  th e  second  Critique a n d  th e  Religion b u t  a lso  in  m o s t o f  K a n t’s  p o litic a l 
w ritin g s?  T he  a n sw ers  to  th e s e  q u e s tio n s  seem  to  a rg u e  i n  fav o r o f th e  p o in t  
th a t  th e  m o ra l law  com m ands a c tio n  in  th e  p h y s ic a l w orld , a n d  a g a in s t 
F r ie d m a n ’s c la im s th a t  “m o ra lity  fo r K a n t  is  n o t co n ce rn e d  w ith  th e  p ro d u c ­
tio n  o f b en efic ia l consequences o r cond itions in  th e  w o rld .”
93 In her excellent article, “Kant's Ethical Commonwealth: The Highest Good as a Social 
Goal,” International Philosophy Quarterly 26 (March 1986): 23-32, Sharon Anderson-Gold presents a 
strong case for a very similar interpretation. Space prevents me from discussing it here, but it is Ander- 
son-GoId’s position that “the concept of the highest good is reformulated by Kant in the Religion as a so­
cial goal as a consequence of his introduction in this work of the concept of radical evil," and claims that, 
“if virtue is... primarily an orientation toward others, then the duty to promote the ideal of social union is 
inseparable from the goal of individual moral perfection” (p. 24).




10. Though reason is interested in bringing about the highest good, it is ultimately 
helpless to do so.
T h is  m ay be a  d ifficu lt p re m ise  to  a sse n t to, b u t  I  th in k  i t  is  a  neces­
s a ry  one, a n d  one th a t  w ill n o t s t a n d  in  th e  w ay of o u r a b ili ty  to p ro m o te  th e  
h ig h e s t  good ( in te rp re te d  in  a  n ew , n o n tra d itio n a l m a n n e r) . I  th in k  w e m u s t 
ta k e  K a n t  se riously  in  h is  c la im s th a t ,  a lth o u g h  i t  is  one’s  d u ty  to  p rom o te  
th e  h ig h e s t  good, w e do n o t h a v e  c o n tro l over w h e th e r h a p p in e s s  co u ld  be  
p ro p o rtio n e d  exactly  to  v ir tu e ; in d e e d , th is  is  w hy K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  
e s ta b lis h m e n t of a n  e th ica l co m m o n w ealth  can  only h a v e  th e  s ta tu s  o f a  
hope . A s R ossi exp la ins , "K an t h a s  p lac ed  a  lim it upon  a u to n o m y ’s  ro le  in  
d e te rm in in g  th e  e sse n tia l c h a ra c te r  o f h u m a n  m oral p e rsonhood . T h is  lim it, 
m oreover, is  no t a n  acc id en ta l one; i t  h a s  i ts  g round  in  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f 
au to n o m y  a s  an  exercise o f re a so n  in  i ts  p ro p e r h u m an  m odality : f in ite  r e a ­
son .”94 F ro m  th e  f ir s t  Critique (“su c h  a  R u le r to g e th er w ith  life  in  su c h  a  
w orld , w h ich  we m u s t re g a rd  a s  a  fu tu re  w orld, reaso n  f in d s  i ts e lf  con ­
s t r a in e d  to  assum e... since  w ith o u t th is  p o s tu la te  th e  n e c e ssa ry  consequence  
w h ich  i t  i ts e l f  connects w ith  th e s e  law s  cou ld  no t follow”95), to  th e  “an tin o m y ” 
o f th e  seco n d  Critique (“i t  is  n o t im p o ssib le  th a t  th e  m o ra lity  o f in te n tio n  
s h o u ld  h a v e  a  necessa ry  re la tio n  a s  c a u se  to  h ap p in ess  a s  a n  effect in  th e  
se n su o u s  w orld; b u t th is  re la tio n  i s  in d ire c t, m ed ia ted  by  a n  in te llig ib le  
A u th o r  o f n a tu re ”96), to  h is  Religion (“th e  id e a  of a  h ig h e s t good in  th e  w orld  
fo r w hose  possib ility  w e m u s t p o s tu la te  a  h ig h er, m oral, m o s t ho ly  a n d  om ­
n ip o te n t  B e in g  w hich a lone  c an  u n i te  th e  tw o e lem en ts o f th e  h ig h e s t  
good”97), K a n t  a sse rts  t h a t  th o u g h  one  know s th a t  one h a s  freedom , one does 
n o t  k n o w  i f  h a p p in e ss  w ill b e  th e  r e s u l t  o f one’s m oral w illing . S e v e ra l m ore
94 Philip Rossi, “Moral Autonomy, Divine Transcendence and Human Destiny: Kant’s Doc­
trine of Hope as a Philosophical Foundation for Christian Ethics,” The Thomist 46 (1982): 446.
95 First Critique, A 811 /  B 839.
96 Second Critique. Ak. 115.
9' Religion, p. 4-5.
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p a ssa g e s  from  K a n t cou ld  be  p re s e n te d  h e re , b u t as  th is  p o in t h a s  been  a r ­
g u e d  a t  len g th  by  R ossi,98 th e re  seem s no  n eed  to do so h e re .
T h ere  is  a  f u r th e r  re a so n  to  th in k  th a t  th is  p o in t  sh o u ld  be ta k e n  se ­
rio u sly . T here  a re  a  n u m b e r  o f su g g estio n s m ade b y  K a n t  t h a t  even i f  every  
s in g le  p e rso n  reso lved  to  w ill in  accord  w ith  th e  m o ra l la w  from  th is  p o in t on, 
th e  e th ic a l com m unity  w o u ld  n o t sim p ly  come in to  b e in g  a t  t h a t  po in t. Two 
p ro p o sitio n s  a re  n e ed e d  to  p e rce iv e  th is  possib ility . T h e  f i r s t  is  K a n t’s in s is ­
ten c e  t h a t  th e  perfec tion  o f  re a so n , a n d  th e re b y  m o ra l p e rfec tio n , ta k e s  tim e, 
in  fac t, a n  in fin ite  a m o u n t o f tim e . As K a n t describes th e  s itu a tio n , “rea so n  
i ts e l f  does n o t o p era te  o n  in s t in c t ,  b u t  re q u ire s  tr ia l, p rac tic e , a n d  in s tru c tio n  
in  o rd e r  g rad u a lly  to  p ro g re ss  from  one s ta g e  of in s ig h t to  a n o th e r . T h e re ­
fore, e ach  in d iv id u a l m a n  w o u ld  h a v e  to  live  excessively lo n g  i f  h e  w ere to 
m ak e  com plete  u se  of a ll  h is  n a tu r a l  capac ities.”99 I t  is  th is  fa c t abou t rea so n  
w h ich  le a d s  K an t to  p o s tu la te  th e  n ecessity  of th e  b e lie f  in  im m o rta lity ;
the utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is  to make sure of the 
unending progress of its m axim s toward this model and o f the constancy of the 
finite rational being in m aking continuous progress... One can never, in fact, 
achieve moral perfection, only infinite approximation is possible. This is vir­
tue, and... it can never be perfect.100
B u t th is  sh o u ld  le a d  one to  th e  co n sid era tio n  th a t  i t  is  n o t  lik e ly , a t  le a s t  
from  K a n t’s po in t o f view , t h a t  even  i f  everyone in  th e  w o rld  m ad e  th e  deci­
s io n  to  fo rm u la te  m ax im s in  acco rd  w ith  th e  m oral law , th e  e th ic a l com m u­
n ity , th e  p erfec ted  k ingdom  o f  en d s, w ou ld  th ereb y  com e a b o u t. R eason ta k e s  
tim e  to perfec t, a n d  a lth o u g h  i t  seem s th a t  K a n t th in k s  w e  h a v e  m ade p ro g ­
re s s  in  th is  respect, “i ts  p e rfe c t so lu tio n  is  im possible; fro m  su c h  w arp ed
98 See especially: Rossi, “Moral Autonomy,” pp. 441-458. See also Anderson-Gold, “Kant’s 
Ethical Commonwealth.”
99 “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” Ak. 19. See especially also: sec­
ond Critique, Ak. 32-3, 121-4, and Religion, p. 62.
100 Second Critique, Ak. 32-33.
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w ood a s  is  m a n  m ade, n o th in g  s t r a ig h t  c an  be fash io n ed .”101 T h e  perfec tion  
o f re a so n  c a n  only ta k e  p lace  by  in f in ite  p rog ress a n d  ap p ro x im atio n .
T h e  second p roposition  n e e d e d  to  conceive o f th e  p o ss ib ility  t h a t  th e  
e th ic a l com m un ity  m ig h t n o t com e in to  b e in g  even  i f  ev ery  in d iv id u a l so 
w ille d  i t  com es from  A nderson-G old . S h e  a rg u es  th a t ,  w ith  K a n t’s so lu tio n  to  
th e  p ro b lem  of rad ic a l ev il in  th e  t h i r d  book  of th e  Religion, v ir tu e  m u s t now  
fu n d a m e n ta lly  be seen  as a n  a p p ro p r ia te  m ora l a t t i tu d e  to w a rd s  o thers , 
th e re b y  avo id ing  th e  p ro p en s ity  o f re a s o n  to  fa ll in to  self-love; “action  in  ac ­
co rd an ce  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , good c h a ra c te r , is  fu lly  co m p a tib le  w ith  th e  
c o n tin u e d  dom inance  o f th e  p r in c ip le  o f self-love. W h a t is  a t  s ta k e  is  a  re o r i­
e n ta t io n  o f  th e  self, a  positive  a c t o f id en tific a tio n  w ith  o th e rs  w h ich  m oves 
bey o n d  th e  o rd in a ry  social co n d itio n .”102 T h e  p e rh a p s  s u rp r is in g  conclusion  
th is  le a d s  to , how ever, is:
The problem of virtue as developed by Kant in the Religion is not reducible to 
the fulfillment of duties of benevolence as characterized by Kant’s exam ples in 
the Groundwork, that is, of providing material assistance to someone in need... 
The development of an ethical com munity goes beyond questions of the redis­
tribution of material possessions. It entails minimally the abandonment of 
aggressive and competitive attitudes toward others, and maximally the adop­
tion of cooperative and supportive networks .103
A m ong th e  in te re s tin g  conclusions w h ic h  c an  be d raw n  from  th is  lin e  of 
a rg u m e n ta tio n  is th a t ,  w hen  co m b in ed  w ith  th e  f ir s t  p ro p o sitio n  above a b o u t 
th e  im p erfec tio n  of reason , th o u g h  ev ery o n e  m ay  decide to  t ry  to  be v irtu o u s , 
th e  n e c e ssa ry  system s o f “cooperative  a n d  sup p o rtiv e  n e tw o rk s” m ay  be a  
lo n g  tim e  in  com ing.104 T he h ig h e s t good a s  th e  g re a te s t  p o ssib le  v ir tu e  for
101 Kant, “Idea,” p. 34/23.
102 Anderson-Gold, “Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth,” p. 28.
103 Ibid., p. 30.
104 There has been a fair amount of debate in the last few years, this being the 200th 
anniversary of Kant’s article “Towards Eternal Peace,” about how to understand Kant’s notion of 
historical progress, especially as it relates to politics. I will discuss this in full below. However. I think 
that some of the answers to these questions can be found in examining this 10th (and forthcoming 11th)
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a ll h u m a n  beings, th e n , w ill d e p e n d  u p o n  s tru c tu re s  a n d  re la tio n s h ip s  of 
in te rco m m u n ic a tio n  w h ich  s im p ly  m a y  n o t be possib le  to  b r in g  in to  ex is ten ce  
by  j u s t  decid ing  to  do so; in  o th e r  w ords, v ir tu e  c an n o t be forced, e sp ec ia lly  a s  
i t  r e la te s  to  th e  h ig h e s t  good.
11. Though there are limits to one’s ability to promote the highest goody one can im­
prove those structures that make it easier fo r all to strive to be virtuous.
G iven  th e  d iscussion  above, w h a t can  th e  d u ty  to  p ro m o te  th e  h ig h e s t  
good a m o u n t to? I t  can n o t, I  h a v e  a rg u e d , be th e  d u ty  to  re w a rd  v i r tu e  w ith  
p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss ; h e re  I  a m  in  ag re em e n t w ith  B eck a n d  M u rp h y . 
N e ith e r , I  th in k , c a n  i t  b e  th e  p ro p o rtio n a te  re w a rd in g  o f m ere ly  le g a l  a c ts ;105 
th is  m a y  b e  a  te m p tin g  so lu tio n , b u t  I  th in k  i t  ru n s  c o n tra ry  to  K a n t’s  d is ­
cu ssio n  in  h is  p o litica l w ritin g s , e sp ec ia lly  The Metaphysics o f Morals, o f one 
w ho a c ts  w ith in  th e  b o u n d s o f  le g a lity  b u t  does n o t h a v e  a  good w ill. A lso, I  
do n o t th in k  th a t  th e  d u ty  c a n  be  to  t ry  a n d  m axim ize h a p p in e s s  fo r a ll, in ­
c lu d in g  oneself, re g a rd le ss  o f v ir tu e ; w h ile  th is  m ay  be so m e th in g  m o re  u n ­
d e r th e  in d iv id u a l’s d irec t con tro l, K a n t  c lea rly  th in k s  t h a t  a  good l ik e  h a p ­
p in e ss  c a n  only  be co n sid ered  a  good i f  i t  is  in  accord w ith  th e  m o ra l law , th a t  
is, a  co n d itio n a l good, a n d  h a p p in e s s  o u g h t only to be  g iven  in  c o rre sp o n ­
dence w ith  w orth . N o r do I  th in k  t h a t  th e  p u rs u i t  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good is  th e  
on ly  w a y  to  u n ite  w h a t  w ou ld  o th e rw ise  be  sim ply  a  se rie s  o f  “im m e d ia te  
m o ra l ac tio n s ,” th e  on ly  w ay  to  h a v e  a  “m o ra l life” a s  T e rry  F . G odlove, J r .
point in more detail. For example, when Kant writes that, “if we now inquire as to the means by which 
this eternal progress towards betterment can be maintained and perhaps even sped up, one soon sees that 
this immeasurably distant result depends not so much on what we do (e.g. on the education we give the 
world's children), nor on what method we adopt so as to bring it about; instead, it depends on what 
human nature does in and with us so as to compel us onto a path that we ourselves would not readily 
follow. Only from nature, or rather only from providence... can we anticipate a result that will affect the 
whole...” (“Theory and Practice,” p. 310), and when Kant insists, in many places in his writings, that 
culture is to play such an important role in the progression of the species. I think he must have something 
in mind like this 10th point, namely that the highest good and even our own moral perfection is not as 
much up to us as we would perhaps be inclined to think.
los See Beversluis. “Kant on Moral Striving.” for this suggestion.
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a rg u e s .106 O n th e  o th e r  h a n d , I  th in k  A nderson-G old’s acco u n t o f th is  d u ty  to 
p ro m o te  th e  h ig h e s t good, th o u g h  correct in  su m  a n d  su b s ta n c e , does no t 
ta k e  in to  accoun t th e  m a n y  concrete  acts t h a t  K a n t gives a s  exam p les for 
a id in g  in  th e  p e rfec tio n  o f v ir tu e . G iven a ll  th e  p o in ts  above, w h a t  conclusion 
o u g h t to  b e  d raw n?
W h a t one’s  d u ty  m u s t  be, finally , is  n o t on ly  to  s tr iv e  to  im prove one’s 
ow n v ir tu e , b u t is  a lso  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t of th e  n e ce ssa ry  s tru c tu re s  for i n ­
te ra c tio n , w orld  peace , a n d  con tro lled  com petition  (“a n ta g o n ism ”) w hich w ill 
a llow  everyone  to  p u r s u e  th e  perfection  o f th e ir  ow n v ir tu e ; in  o th e r  w ords, 
w ork  fo r v ir tu e  a n d  h o p e  fo r h a p p in e ss .107 As a  s ta r t in g  p o in t  fo r th is  a rg u ­
m en t, i t  sh o u ld  be  k e p t  in  m in d  th a t  K a n t w as in d ee d  co n ce rn ed  w ith  th e  
m a n y  in flu en ces  u p o n  th e  w ill, com ing bo th  from  n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s  for 
e m p iric a l objects a n d  fro m  th e  social a n d  econom ic s i tu a tio n s  in  w hich  one 
w as im m e rse d .108 I t  c a n n o t be  sa id  th a t  K a n t w as n a iv e  a b o u t th e  d ifficu lties 
in v o lv ed  in  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  th e  m o ra l w ill o r invo lved  in  s e t t in g  u p  m ore e n ­
lig h te n e d  sy stem s o f g o v e rn m en t. K a n t’s m a in  concern, e sp ec ia lly  in  h is  po ­
litic a l w ritin g s , is  t h a t  th e re  a re  c e rta in  social a n d  econom ic s tru c tu re s  w hich  
in h ib i t  th e  in c re a s in g  p e rfec tio n  of v irtue . W ar w ould  be th e  fo rem ost ex­
am p le  o f  su ch  a n  im p ed im en t:
But we Eire a long w ay from being able to regard ourselves as moral. For the 
idea of morality belongs to culture... So long, however, as nations expend all 
their energies on their vain and violent designs, thus continuously inhibiting 
their citizens’ plodding efforts to shape internally their w ay o f t h in k in g, even  
withholding all support for it, no progress of this sort is to be expected, because
106 Teriy F. Godlove, Jr., “Moral Actions, Moral Lives: Kant on Intending the Highest Good,” 
The Southern Journal o f  Philosophy 25, no. 1 (1987): 49-63. I think that Godlove’s distinction between 
the kind of life an atheist can live versus the kind of “moral life” which only the religious person can live 
ultimately falls flat, particularly given the points above, Kant’s discussion of “character” in the Religion, 
and a conception of the highest good which seems to have little to do with the unity of one’s actions.
107 For Kant, of course, this happiness would have to be “proportionate.” But I think there are 
problems with this picture; see the following chapter.
108 It is for this reason that I am in some, though perhaps only slight, disagreement with Ander­
son-Gold's account.
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the formation of citizens requires a long process of preparation... The human 
race will likely remain in th is state until... it has worked itself out o f this cha­
otic state of national relations .109
O ne’s ab ility  to  p u rs u e  m oral p e rfec tio n  does d e p en d  on  one’s c u ltu ra l  e n v i­
ro n m en t. In  a  s ta te  o f w ar, h u m a n  b e in g s c an n o t c o n tin u e  th e  d ifficu lt ta s k  
o f p u rsu in g  th e i r  m o ra l p e rfec tio n  w ith o u t severe  h in d ran c es .
In  o rd e r  to  p roperly  d e fen d  th is  v iew  t h a t  o n e ’s  ab ility  to w ill m ora lly  
c an  be effected  b y  e x te rn a l c ircu m stan ces , i t  is  n e c e ssa ry  to tu rn  o u r a t te n ­
tio n  to  th e  “M e tap h y sica l F i r s t  P rin c ip le s  of th e  D o c trin e  of V irtu e” in  th e  
Metaphysics o f Morals. In  th is  w ork , K a n t a rg u e s  t h a t  we do in d ee d  h av e  
v ir tu o u s  d u tie s  to w a rd  o thers , th e  d u tie s  of “love” a n d  “respect.” T he  d u ty  of 
re sp ec t a s  “th e  m ax im  th a t  l im its  o u r se lf-esteem  b y  th e  d ign ity  of h u m a n ity  
in  a n o th e r  p e rso n ... [is] a c tu a lly  on ly  n eg a tiv e  (no t to  ex a lt o n ese lf above o th ­
e rs)...”110 B u t th e  d u ty  of love is  positive , p a r tic u la r ly  th e  d u ty  o f “b en efi­
cence,” a n d  is  th u s  of p a r t ic u la r  in te r e s t  to  u s  h e re .
L et u s  b e g in  by  a sk in g  h o w  th is  d u ty  of love com es about. In te re s t ­
ingly , K a n t a rg u e s  th a t  i t  com es a b o u t b ecause  w e ourselves o ften  f in d  o u r­
selves in  p o s itio n s  o f need:
For every m an who finds him self in need wishes that he might be helped by 
other men. But if he should make known his m axim  of not wanting to give 
assistance in turn to others in  their need... then everyone would likewise ref­
use him assistance when he was in need... Thus the selfish maxim conflicts 
with itself w hen it is made a universal law . ..111
T h u s, b ecau se  I  m ig h t f in d  m y se lf  in  n eed , a n d  w o u ld  there fo re  w a n t som e­
one to  a s s is t  m e, I  m u s t m ake  i t  a  m ax im  th a t  I  sh o u ld  he lp  o th e rs  in  need , 
le s t  m y m ax im  c o n tra d ic t itse lf. P u t  succinctly , “I  w a n t  every o th e r p e rso n  to
109 Kant, “Idea,” Ak. 26.
110 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 449.
111 Ibid.. Ak. 453
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h a v e  benevolence... fo r m e; I shou ld  th e re fo re  be b en ev o len t to every  o th e r  
p e rso n .”112
Now, b e ca u se  w h a t I  desire  is  “h a p p in e ss ,” “w elfa re ,” o r “w ell-being ,” 
w e m ig h t be te m p te d  to  in te rp re t  K a n t  in  th e  follow ing w ay. B ecau se  I  w a n t 
to  be  h ap p y , th is  is  a llo w ab le  only u n d e r  tw o conditions: 1) i ts  w illin g  does 
n o t invo lve  a  m ax im  w h ich  is  c o n tra ry  to  th e  m o ra l law , 2) I  co u n t m y se lf  as 
p a r t  o f  h u m a n k in d  a s  a  w hole, a n d  a m  allow ed to  be  b en ev o len t o r b en eficen t 
to  m y se lf  b ecause  I  a m  b en ev o len t o r b en eficen t to  ev eryone .113 T h u s , w h a t 
K a n t is  concerned  w ith , accord ing  to  th is  in te rp re ta tio n , is  a n  in te re s t  in  
m a n y  d iffe ren t so r ts  o f  h a p p in e ss  w h ich  w e a ll d e s ire  a s  c re a tu re s  o f n a tu re .
H ow ever, w h ile  th is  in te rp re ta t io n  m ay  be a llow able, I  do n o t th in k  
th is  is  w h a t  K a n t h a s  in  m in d  h e re  in  th e  Metaphysics o f Morals. I t  seem s 
th a t  K a n t  is  m ore co n ce rn e d  h e re  w ith  case s  w here  anyone  (m yse lf inc luded) 
is  in  need o f h a p p in e ss , i.e ., n o t a  case  w h e re  one desires, say , a  (perm issib le) 
lu x u ry  item , b u t  r a th e r  a  case  w here  o n e  h a s  a  g re a t n e e d  o f a n  object, m ost 
lik e ly  food, sh e lte r , a n d  th e  like. Two fac to rs  in d ic a te  th a t  th is  is , in  fact, 
w h a t K a n t  h a s  in  m in d .
T h e  f irs t  in d ic a tio n  o f K a n t’s t r u e  concern is  t h a t  in  th e  few  p laces 
w h e re  h e  a c tu a lly  d iscu sses  th e  d u tie s  o f  “beneficence” K a n t a lw ay s sp e a k s  of 
one b e in g  in  “n e ed ,” a n d  n o t  one s im p ly  d esirin g  h a p p in e ss . In  th e  
“In tro d u c tio n ,” K a n t  s ta te s  th a t  th e  d u ty  o f beneficence concerns o u r n e e d  
“...to o b ta in  help  fro m  th e m  [“o th ers”] in  case  of n eed .”114 In  th e  f i r s t  p a r a ­
g ra p h  w h e re  K a n t d iscu sses  th e  “D u tie s  to  O th e r People C o n sid ered  S im ply  
as  M en ,” h e  n o tes  t h a t  “w e acknow ledge ourse lves o b lig a ted  to  be  b eneficen t 
to  a  poo r m an .”115 L a te r , in  section 29, h e  m en tio n s th e  “d u ty  t h a t  everyone
112 Ibid, Ak. 451.
113 Though, of course, “one person may be closer to me than another, and I am the one closest 
to myself as far as benevolence in concerned” {Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 451).
114 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 393.
115 Ibid. Ak. 448.
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w ho h a s  th e  m e a n s  show  beneficence to  th o se  w ho a re  n eed y .”116 I n  sec tion  
30 h e  ta lk s  a b o u t o n e  b e in g  “in  need” a n d  re g a rd in g  “fellow  m en ... a s  n eed y  
ra t io n a l  b e in g s .”117 F in a lly , in  section  31 h e  is  concerned  w ith  th e  “r ic h  m a n ” 
a s s is tin g  “th e  n e e d y ,” a  s i tu a tio n  w hich, K a n t c la im s, “is  fo r th e  m o s t p a r t  a  
r e s u l t  o f  th e  p a tro n a g e  o f  v a rio u s  m en  ow ing  to  th e  in ju s tic e  of g o v e rn m en t, 
w hich  in tro d u c es  a n  in e q u a li ty  o f w ea lth  t h a t  m a k e s  beneficence  n e c e s ­
sa ry .”118 Now, p re s u m a b ly  K a n t  could  h a v e  h a d  in  m in d  b o th  h e lp in g  th o se  
in  d ire  s t r a i ts  a s  w e ll a s  m ere ly  h e lp in g  o th e rs  to  ach ieve  p e rm iss ib le  e n d s  o f 
p le a su re  a n d  h a p p in e s s ;  b u t  h e  m en tio n s on ly  th e  fo rm er, a n d  re se rv e s  a ll 
ta lk  o f th e  l a t t e r  fo r  h is  d iscu ssio n  of “(p u re ly  m o ra l) fr ie n d sh ip .”119
T he  second  in d ic a tio n  com es from  a  close e x a m in a tio n  o f th e  concept 
of “avarice .” To b e g in  w ith , l e t  u s  exam ine  w h a t  K a n t’s ta k e s  a v a r ic e  to  be. 
C onsidered  a s  a  d u ty  to  oneself, i t  is “one’s re s tr ic tin g  h is  ow n en jo y m en t o f 
th e  m e a n s  of l iv in g  w e ll to  a  p o in t below  th e  m e a su re  o f h is  t ru e  n e e d  [an d  
th u s] conflicts w ith  h is  d u ty  to  h im self.”120 K a n t  a lso  sp e a k s  o f “p o ssess in g  
th e  m ea n s  to  a ll  k in d s  o f  en d s , b u t  w ith  th e  p rov iso  o f n o t w a n tin g  to  u se  an y  
of th e m  fo r o n e se lf  a n d  so o f robb ing  o n ese lf  o f th e  a g re ea b le  en jo y m en t of 
life; su c h  a  th in g  is ... d ire c tly  opposed to  one’s  d u ty  to  h im se lf.”121
W hile  w e m ig h t  b e  in c lin e d  to in te r p r e t  th e s e  s ta te m e n ts  a s  in d ic a t­
in g  th a t  K a n t is  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  th e  m ere  en jo y m en t o f life, w h en  w e ex am in e  
exac tly  w hy  a v a rice  is  opposed  to  ou r d u ty  to  ou rse lves, we see  th is  is  n o t
116 Ibid., Ak. 452.
117 Ibid, Ak. 453.
118 Ibid, Ak. 453-4.
119 Ibid, Ak. 469-474. There may be a further indication in the feet that Kant not only main­
tains that the duty of love “at the same time obligate[s]” the recipient, but that “this kindness also... hu­
miliates him,” (Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 448). This is not definitive, however, because “this” kindness 
may be a specific type of beneficence. On the other hand because beneficence always obligates the recipi­
ent, this lends itself to thinking about cases of real need.
120 Ibid, Ak. 432.
121 Ibid. Ak. 432-3.
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t ru e . W hy is  th is  “m iserly  a v arice ,” “s t in g in e s s ,” a n d  “m in u te  exac tness  in  
sp e n d in g ” c o n tra ry  to du ty?  K a n t re p lie s  th a t :
M iserliness is not mere m isunderstood th rif t bu t is the  slavish resignation of 
oneself to the goods of fortune, ra th e r  th an  the m astering of them ... 
[M ]iserliness is opposed to the principle o f being independent of everything else 
except the moral law, and  it is, accordingly, a fraud which the  subject commits 
aga in st himself.122
I t  se em s t h a t  th e  rea so n  th a t  a v a rice  is  o p p o sed  to  v ir tu e  is  t h a t  in  b e in g  
m ise rly , one  h a s  v io la ted  th e  m o ra l p r in c ip le  by  su b o rd in a tin g  m o ra l con­
c e rn s  to  e m p iric a l ones, re s ig n in g  o n e se lf  to  n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s . T h is  m ir ­
ro r s  a n o th e r  p a ssa g e  in  th e  Metaphysics o f Morals'.
Adversity, pain, and w ant are great tem ptations to transgress one’s duty... It 
is not directly a  duty to seek affluence for itself; bu t indirectly it m ay very will 
be a  duty, namely, in order to guard ag a in st poverty, which is a great tem pta­
tion to vice. But then  it is not my happiness, bu t the preservation of the in­
tegrity  of my morality, th a t is my end and a t  the same tim e my duty.123
H e re , K a n t  i s  concerned  to  re je c t th e  p o ss ib ility  th a t  se e k in g  m y ow n h a p p i­
n e s s  c o u ld  b e  a  du ty . K a n t sa y s  t h a t  th is  c a n n o t be  a  d u ty  re g a rd in g  h a p p i­
n e s s  per se, b u t  c an  be a  d u ty  b ecau se  som e m in im a l leve l o f h a p p in e ss  is  
n e c e ssa ry  to  p re v e n t u n d u e  in flu en ce  from  th e  sen su o u s  s id e  of h u m an  ex is­
ten c e . T h o u g h  i t  is  a lw ays one’s  d u ty  to  a c t in  accord w ith  th e  ca tegorica l 
im p e ra tiv e , th e re  a re  d e fin ite  e x te rn a l in f lu e n c e s  w hich m a y  m ak e  i t  h a rd e r  
fo r  one  to  do so.
N ow , so fa r , th is  is  a  d u ty  to  oneself. W h a t does th is  h a v e  to  do w ith  
o u r  d u ty  to w a rd  o thers?  I t  concerns o th e rs  b ecau se , in  fo rm u la tin g  th e  
m a x im s  o f th e  w ill, I  m u s t co n sid er m y se lf  a s  p a r t  o f h u m a n ity  W h a t is  
av a rice ?  I t  is  a  s i tu a tio n  in  w hich  I  h a v e  th e  m e a n s  (w hich I  do n o t u tilize ) to
122 Ibid., Ak. 434.
123 Ibid., Ak. 388.
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provide m y se lf h a p p in e ss . B u t, co n sid ered  from  a  u n iv e rsa l p o in t of view , 
w h a t is  th is  b u t  a  case  w h e re  one p e rso n  (m yself as m o ra l be ing) h a s  a  d u ty  
to a n o th e r  p e rso n  (m y se lf a s  h u m a n  being) to  be  beneficen t, to  p rov ide a n ­
o th e r w ith  h ap p in ess?  I t  is  th e  sam e  s itu a tio n , th o u g h  co n sid ered  from  dif­
fe re n t p o in ts  of view . T h ere fo re , i f  I  h a v e  a  d u ty  to p rov ide  m y se lf w ith  h a p ­
p iness, w h en  I  c o n sid e r h u m a n k in d  in  g e n e ra l (though “one  p e rso n  [i.e., m y­
self] m ay  b e  closer to  m e  th a n  a n o th e r”124), I  h av e  a  d u ty  to  t r y  to p rom ote  th e  
h a p p in e ss  o f o th e rs  a s  w ell. In d ee d , i t  is  p rec ise ly  because  I  w a n t h a p p in e ss  
in  th e  f i r s t  p lace, p rec ise ly  b e ca u se  I  am  concerned  w ith  m y  ow n needs, th a t  I 
m u st consider th e  h a p p in e s s  o f o th e rs . T herefore , th o u g h  K a n t  m a in ta in s  
th a t  “ad v ersity , p a in , a n d  w a n t  a re  g re a t tem p ta tio n s  to t ra n s g re s s  one’s 
duty” only  in  re la tio n  to  a  d u ty  one h a s  to  oneself, su re ly  th is  is  app licab le  to 
o u r d u ty  of beneficence to w a rd  o th ers .
T h u s  I  th in k  t h a t  w e m ay  conclude th a t  one’s d u tie s  o f  love, p a r t ic u ­
la r ly  beneficence, a n d  o n e ’s d u tie s  o f re sp ec t a re  a ll a im ed  a t  c u r ta il in g  pos­
sible effects w hich  m ig h t n e g a tiv e ly  in flu en ce  th e  p u rsu it  o f  m o ra l perfection . 
C e rta in ly  i t  is  p e rm iss ib le  to  f u r th e r  th e  specific ends of o th e rs , a n d  th u s  
prom ote  th e ir  h a p p in e ss  on  se v e ra l d iffe ren t (m orally  p e rm iss ib le ) levels, 
w hen  K a n t ta lk s  in  th e  Metaphysics o f Morals abou t th e  duties we h a v e  to ­
w ard s o th e rs , h e  seem s a lw ay s  concerned  w ith  th e  o ther’s a b ility  to w ill 
m orally . R e g ard in g  love, n o t  on ly  beneficence b u t  also g ra t i tu d e  a n d  sy m p a­
th y  a re  a ll  d u tie s  n o t on ly  b e ca u se  g ra ti tu d e  is  “a  du ty  w hose  v io la tion ... can  
destroy  th e  m o ra l in c e n tiv e  fo r beneficence  in  i ts  very  p rin c ip le ”125 a n d  b e ­
cause  “m alice , w hich  is  d ire c tly  c o n tra ry  to  sym pathy ... w o u ld  destroy  th e  
g en era l good of th e  w orld ...”126 In  ad d itio n , th e  “negative” d u tie s  of re sp ec t 
w hich  w e “owe” to  o th e rs ,127 th e  opposite  of w hich  a re  “p rid e ,” “ca lum ny ,” a n d
124 Ibid., Ak. 451.
125 Ibid, Ak. 455.
126 Ibid, Ak. 459-60.
127 Ibid, Ak. 488.
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“m ockery,” a re  n ecessa ry  b e ca u se  w ith o u t th em , in  th e  ex trem e  case , “every  
given sc a n d a l w eak en s th is  re sp e c t [the  respec t “ow ed h u m a n ity  in  g e n e ra l”] 
a n d  m ak e s  i t  in cred ib le ; y e t u p o n  th is  resp ec t dep en d s th e  im p u lse  to  w h a t is  
m ora lly  good.”128 T h u s , th e  e n tir e  d iscussion  a n d  to n e  invo lved  in  K a n t’s d is­
cussion  o f  o u r  d u tie s  to w a rd  o th e rs  in d ic a te s  th a t  K a n t’s concern  h e re  is  w ith  
th o se  s tru c tu re s  w h ich  a re  im p e d im e n ts  to th e  a b ility  o f o th e rs  to  w ork  on 
th e ir  v ir tu e . T h u s, b r in g in g  u s  b a ck  to  ou r o rig in a l topic, I  th in k  th is  gives 
u s  a d d itio n a l rea so n s  w hy  th e  p rom o tion  of th e  h ig h e s t good o u g h t to  be  con­
ce rn ed  w ith  th e  d u ty  to  p ro m o te  th o se  in s titu tio n s  a n d  o rg an iz a tio n s  w hich  
he lp  o th e rs  to  becom e in d e p e n d e n t from  “th e  goods o f fo rtu n e .”
M oving  on from  th e  Metaphysics of Morals, g iven  th e  specific p re m ­
ises t h a t  re a so n  ta k e s  tim e  to  p e rfec t, th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l is  u l tim a te ly  u n ­
ab le  to  e n s u re  th e  ou tcom e o f h is /h e r  m o ra l w illing , a n d  t h a t  th e re  a re  e x te r­
n a l, s t ru c tu r a l  in flu en ces  u p o n  one’s  p ro p en s ity  fo r m o ra l w illing , i t  seem s 
o u r d u ty  to  p u rs u e  th e  h ig h e s t  good m u s t be n o t only  to  w ork  on  o u r ow n v ir ­
tu e , b u t  im p o r ta n tly  to  t ry  to  rem ove  a s  m an y  o f th o se  im p e d im e n ts  to  th e  
p u rs u i t  o f o th e rs ’ v ir tu e  a s  possib le . C e rta in ly  K a n t is  r ig h t  to  in s is t  th a t  th e  
a c tu a l im p ro v em en t o f th e  v ir tu e  o f a n o th e r  c an n o t be  one’s d u ty . B u t  he  
also in s is ts  t h a t  im p e d im e n ts  to  su c h  im provem en ts, p o v erty  a n d  w a r  for ex­
am ple, do e x is t  a n d  c a n  be  le ssen ed . In  add ition , i f  A nderson-G old  a n d  Rossi 
a re  co rrec t in  th e ir  an a ly s is , th e n  one’s own m o ra l perfection  s im p ly  c an n o t 
ta k e  p lace  w ith o u t in c re a se d  p e rfec tio n  in  o thers ; v ir tu e , th e y  a n d  I  h a v e  a r ­
gued, is  n o t u p  to  th e  in d iv id u a l.
T h e re  is  also  th e  su g g estio n  in  K a n t’s  “Id e a  fo r a  U n iv e rsa l H isto ry ” 
t h a t  one s im p ly  cou ld  n o t  im prove  one’s ta le n ts , th o se  im p o rta n t fo r th e  in ­
c re a s in g  p e rfec tio n  o f re a so n  a n d  su b se q u e n t m orality , i f  one d id  n o t e x is t in  
society. T h e  h u m a n  s i tu a tio n  is  d escribed  as one o f “u n so c ia l soc iab ility ,”
128 Ibid. Ak. 466.
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a n d  i t  is  on ly  su ch  a n tag o n ism  w h ich  w ill a id  in  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f one’s ta l­
e n ts  a n d , su b seq u e n tly , one’s  rea so n :
In  th is way,... all m an’s ta len ts  are  gradually developed, his ta s te  is cultured, 
and  through progressive enlightenm ent he begins to establish  a  way of th ink­
ing th a t  can in time transform  the crude n a tu ra l capacity for m oral discrimi­
na tion  into definite practical principles and th u s transform  a  pathologically en­
forced agreem ent into a  society and, finally, into a  moral whole. W ithout those 
characteristics of unsociability... m an would five as a A rcadian shepherd, in 
perfect concord, contentm ent, and  m utual love, and  all ta len ts  would he e ter­
nally  dorm ant in their seed;...129
T h u s, one  m u s t  p rom ote  th e  ty p e  o f  society, n a m e ly  one w h e re  th e r e  is  in te r ­
ac tio n  b u t  n o t  w a r  b e tw een  a ll  p e rso n s  o f th e  w orld , in  w h ich  o n e  is  ab le  to  
in te r a c t  a n d  be  a n ta g o n is tic  w ith o u t in fr in g in g  on  o th e r’s r ig h ts , a n d  a  w orld  
in c re a s in g ly  f ree  from  poverty , s ick n ess , w ar, a n d  o th e r  d e tr im e n ts  to  th e  
c u ltiv a tio n  o f  v ir tu e  for a ll p e rso n s .
In  one  resp ec t, th is  m ay  be  a  m ore “p o litica l” view  o f K a n t’s  m o ra l 
p h ilo so p h y  th a n  is  u su a lly  ta k e n . I n  p ro m o tin g  th e  h ig h e s t good, o n e  m ain  
ta rg e t  o f  moral concern  m u s t be  th e  social s t ru c tu re s  w hich  in f lu e n c e  u s  all; 
w a r  m u s t  b e  e lim in a ted , p o v e rty  abo lished , a n d  s tru c tu re s  o f t r u e  c a re  a n d  
co m m itm en t e s tab lish ed . I n  a n o th e r  respec t, th is  is  also  a  m o re  “re lig io u s” 
v iew  o f K a n t’s  ph ilosophy . H u m a n  b e in g s  a re  u ltim a te ly  u n a b le  to  b r in g  
a b o u t th e  h ig h e s t  good, even  i f  e v e ry  sing le  p e rso n  im m e d ia te ly  dec id ed  to 
t ry  to  w ill in  accord  w ith  th e  m o ra l law :
Therefore, we shall seek to estab lish  the grounds of th a t possibility prim arily 
w ith  respect to w hat is im m ediately in our power, and secondarily in th a t 
which is beyond our power b u t which reason holds out to us as the  supplem ent 
to our impotence to [realize] the possibility of the  highest good, which is neces­
sa ry  according to practical principles.130
129 Kant, “Idea,” Ak. 21.
130 Second Critique. Ak. 119.
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T he p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l re a so n , p a r t ic u la r ly  G od a n d  im m o rta lity , p lay  a 
la rg e  ro le  in  th is  p ic tu re  o f K a n t’s  sy s tem , for th e y  a re  so re ly  n eed ed  to g u a r­
a n te e  th e  outcom e o f o u r  m o ra l  s tr iv in g . I t  sh o u ld  n o w  b e  c le a r, how ever, 
w h y  su c h  p o s tu la te s  a re  n e c e ssa ry , a n d  w hy  th e  h ig h e s t  good provides such  
a n  im p o r ta n t  focus to  o u r  m o ra l en d eav o rs .
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Chapter Two
Problems with the Highest Good: Worthiness and Conceivability
I.
In  th e  la s t  c h a p te r  I  a rg u e d  t h a t  K a n t’s no tion  of th e  h ig h e s t  good 
w as com patib le  w ith  th e  r e s t  o f h is  w ritin g s , a n d  th a t  i t  w as a  concep t w hich 
co u ld  be defended  from  w ith in  th e  s ta n d p o in t o f K a n t’s  p h ilo so p h ica l system . 
E s se n tia lly  I  a rg u e d  th a t  th e  concept o f th e  h ig h e s t good is  n a tu ra l ly  an d  
n e c e ssa rily  g e n e ra te d  from  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  m o ra l law  a s  a  ca teg o rica l im ­
p e ra tiv e  commands. As su ch , i t  a lre a d y  d ea ls  w ith  h u m a n  b e in g s  a s  c rea ­
tu re s  w ith  n e ed s  a n d  a  d e s ire  fo r h a p p in e ss . A nd  since th e  q u e s tio n  of m o­
ra l i ty  w ou ld  n o t even a ris e  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace  i f  th e re  ex is ted  on ly  a  sing le  in ­
d iv id u a l in  com plete  iso la tio n , th e  m o ra l law  m u s t com m and  in d iv id u a ls  
w ith in  a  com m unity , i.e., a  k in g d o m  o f ends. H ence, th e  concept o f th e  h ig h ­
e s t  good flow s n a tu ra lly  from  th e s e  tw o fac ts, since th e  m o ra l la w  m u s t say  
so m e th in g  a b o u t “objects” o f w illing , b o th  fo r m yse lf a n d  fo r o th e rs , p a rtic u ­
la r ly  since  K a n t believes w e c a n n o t s im p ly  w ill to  h av e  a  good w ill. I  tr ie d  to 
a rg u e , th e n , t h a t  we h av e  a  d u ty  to  p rom ote  th e  h ig h es t good, th o u g h  no t 
ach ieve  it ,  b u t  th a t  th is  d u ty  c a n n o t be  t ra n s la te d  in to  h u m a n s  rew ard in g  
th e  v ir tu e  of o th e rs  th ro u g h  h a p p in e s s  o r in to  v ir tu e  i ts e lf  b e in g  h ap p in ess . 
W e s h a l l  h a v e  to  w a it a  few  c h a p te rs  to  see  exactly  w h a t th is  d u ty  en ta ils , 
th o u g h  I  t r ie d  to  h in t  in  th e  la s t  c h a p te r  th a t  i t  is  e sse n tia lly  th e  com m and  to 
im p ro v e  m y  ow n m o ra lity  w h ile  p ro m o tin g  th o se  s tru c tu re s  w h ich  allow  for 
o th e rs , i f  th e y  so will, to im p ro v e  th e ir  ow n m orality .
In  th is  c h a p te r  I  w a n t to  d iscu ss  tw o p rim a ry  objections to  K a n t’s 
fo rm u la tio n  of th e  h ig h e s t good, bo th  o f w hich  I  tak e  to be va lid . T he  f irs t
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co n ce rn s K a n t’s a sse rtio n  th a t  v ir tu e  (m o ra lity ) is  “w o rth in ess  to be h a p p y .”1 
T h is  is  a  c e n tra l  te n e t  w hich o p e ra te s  in  th e  b a c k g ro u n d  of a ll  d iscu ssio n s o f 
th e  h ig h e s t  good, a n d  needs to  b e  ex am in ed . N o t on ly  th is , b u t  K a n t a lso  
sa y s  t h a t  w o rth in ess  e n ta ils  “h a p p in e ss  in  exact proportion to  m o ra lity  (a s  
th e  w o rth  o f a  p e rso n  a n d  h is  w o rth in ess  to  be  h a p p y )...”2 U ltim ate ly , I  b e ­
lie v e  t h a t  th is  eq u a tio n  o u g h t to  be  re jec ted , a t  le a s t  w ith  an y  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
o f  “w o rth in e ss” a s  desert. I  th in k  K a n t i s  co rrec t to  a s s e r t  th a t  w e sh o u ld  n o t 
d e n y  o u rse lv es  h a p p in e ss  i f  w e h a v e  a  good w ill, b u t  th is  is  n o t th e  sa m e  a s  
th in k in g  t h a t  w e deserve su ch  h a p p in e ss . M y  conclusion  goes a g a in s t K a n t’s 
ex p lic it a s se r tio n  of th is  eq u a tio n . In  th is  re sp ec t, I  a m  argu in g  d irec tly  
a g a in s t  K a n t’s  s ta te d  position . H ow ever, I  th in k  th is  is  co n sis ten t w ith  th e  
r e s t  o f K a n t’s w ritin g s . I  w ill d e a l w ith  th e s e  co n sid era tio n s  in  th e  f i r s t  p a r t  
o f  th is  c h a p te r .
Second, a n d  m ore p rob lem atic , how ever, is  w h a t  I  te rm  th e  
“conce ivab ility” prob lem  of th e  h ig h e s t good. T h is  p rob lem  p e rta in s  m a in ly  to 
a n  “o th erw o rld ly ” h ig h es t good, b u t  I  th in k  is  p ro b lem atic  for b o th  v e rs io n s. I  
a rg u e  th a t ,  a s  K a n t h a s  sp e lled  i t  out, th e  h ig h e s t  good is  sim ply  inconceiv ­
ab le , a n d  th u s  c an n o t leg itim a te ly  be th e  ob ject o f o u r  w illing. T hese in c o n ­
c e iv ab ility  p rob lem s hav e  to  do w ith  th e  n a tu r e  o f h a p p in e ss  a s  K a n t h a s  d e ­
f in e d  i t, p a r t ic u la r ly  a s  i t  re la te s  to h u m a n s  a s  in te llig ib le . A gain , th e n , I  am  
a rg u in g  d irec tly  a g a in s t K a n t’s  s ta te d  p o sitio n , th o u g h  I  th in k  a  p a r t ia l  r e ­
c o n s tru c tio n  is  possible, one w h ich  I  w ill p re s e n t.  I  w ill deal w ith  th e se  co n ­
s id e ra tio n s  in  th e  th ird  p a rt.
n.
O n e  of th e  m ost s ig n ifican t p ro b lem s w ith  th e  h ig h e s t good is  K a n t’s 
r a th e r  b la n k e t  a sse rtio n  th a t  m o ra lity  c a n  b e  in te rp re te d  as “w o rth in ess  to
1 “That virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of whatever appears to 
us to be desirable... [has] been proved in the Analytic.” Critique o f  Practical Reason, Ak. 110. Italics 
added for emphasis.
2 Ibid.. Ak. 110. Italics added for emphasis.
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be h ap p y .” H ow  is  th is  to  be ta k e n , a n d  how  is  i t  g ro u n d ed ?  I f  K a n t in te n d s  
th is  to be  a  fac t w hich  is  a n a ly tic  a priori, th is  s im p ly  seem s im possib le . C e r­
ta in ly  a n  ac tion  m ay  be w o rth y , b u t  th is  is b ecau se  i t  h a s  m o ra l w orth , a n d  
su ch  w o rth  seem s to  h a v e  n o th in g  to  do w ith  h a p p in e ss . K a n t co m m en ta to rs  
a re  r ig h t  to  th in k  th a t  th e re  is  no  re a so n  th a t  th is  e q u a tio n  can  be  m a d e  
an a ly tica lly . B u t is  th is  in  i ts e l f  a  p rob lem  fo r K a n t?  D oes K a n t a c tu a lly  
th in k  th a t  th is  c an  be kn o w n  a n a ly tic a lly  a priori?
G iven th a t  th e  p r im a ry  d iscu ssio n  o f th e  w e d d in g  o f h a p p in e ss  a n d  
m o ra lity  occurs on ly  a f te r  th e  “A n a ly tic” of th e  seco n d  Critique, a n d  g iven  
th a t  K a n t exp lic itly  w rite s  t h a t  “h a p p in e ss  a n d  m o ra lity  a re  tw o specifica lly  
d iffe ren t e lem en ts  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good a n d  th e re fo re  th e i r  com b ination  c a n n o t 
b e  know n  a n a ly tic a lly ,”3 i t  seem s c le a r  th a t  K a n t d id  n o t  expec t th e  tw o com ­
p o n e n ts  to be  l in k e d  a n a ly tica lly ; “since  [“th is  c o m b in a tio n ”] c an n o t be  a n a ­
ly tic , a s  h a s  b een  show n, i t  m u s t  b e  th o u g h t sy n th e tic a lly ...”4 B u t, u n fo r tu ­
n a te ly  i t  is  n o t c le a r  ju s t  why th e  tw o  a re  linked , a n d  K a n t  n e v e r  gives u s  a n  
exp lic it an sw er. U ltim a te ly , I  do n o t  believe th a t  K a n t  c a n  p rov ide  a  c o h e r­
e n t  a rg u m e n t a s  to  w hy  v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e ss  a re  l in k e d  o r w hy m o ra lity  
im p lies w o rth in ess .
A.
I  h a v e  fo u n d  on ly  one co m m en ta to r w ho a d d re s s e s  th is  q u e s tio n  d i­
rectly , a n d  th is  is  S te v en  G. S m ith  in  h is  a rtic le  “W o rth in e ss  to be  H a p p y  a n d  
K a n t’s C oncep t o f th e  H ig h e s t Good.”5 S m ith  in d ic a te s  t h a t  K a n t a p p ro a ch e s  
th e  w o rth in ess  e q u a tio n  from  tw o s ta n d p o in ts , t h a t  o f  h a p p in e s s  a n d  m o ra l­
ity . F rom  th e  s ta n d p o in t  o f h a p p in e ss , “th e  h u m a n  q u e s t  fo r h a p p in e ss , 
w hich  is  c o n s titu tiv e  o f h u m a n  n a tu re , is  m ocked i f  m o ra lity  b a rs  th e  door to
3 Ibid., Ak. 112.
4 Ibid, Ak. 113.
5 Steven G. Smith. “Worthiness to be Happy and Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good.” Kant- 
Studien 75 (1984): 168-190.
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h a p p in e ss ,”6 a n d  from  m orality , “h u m a n  e ffo rts  in  b e h a lf  o f th e  m o ra l law  a re  
m ocked, i f  v i r tu e  is  n o t a t  le a s t  id e a lly  p ro p o rtio n e d  to  h a p p in e ss .”7 In  o th e r  
w ords, S m ith  a s s e r ts  th a t  th e re  a re  tw o  d irec tio n s  from  w h ich  to  d e fe n d  a  
n ecessa ry  l in k  b e tw ee n  m o ra lity  a n d  h a p p in e ss . L e t u s  ta k e  S m ith ’s  d isc u s­
sion from  th e  s ta n d p o in t  o f h a p p in e s s  f irs t.
S m ith  a rg u e s  th a t  th e re  a re  tw o  re a so n s  fo r su ch  a  lin k  s te m m in g  
from  th e  n e e d s  o f  h a p p in e ss . T h e  f i r s t  h e  ca lls  “th e  p rob lem  o f m o tiv a tio n ,” 
w hich  s te m s  fro m  K a n t’s d iscussion  in  th e  “C an o n  o f P u re  R easo n ” o f th e  f i r s t  
Critique t h a t  th e  id e a s  o f m o ra lity  c o u ld  b e  ob jects o f ap p ro v a l “b u t  n o t 
sp rin g s  o f p u rp o se  a n d  action .”8 N ow  S m ith  r ig h tly  n o tes  t h a t  th is  n e e d  is  
e lim in a te d  b y  K a n t  h im se lf  w ith  th e  c la im  in  th e  second  Critique t h a t  th e  
m oral la w  c a n  i ts e l f  m o tiva te . H ow ever, S m ith  a lso  c la im s th a t  “a  p ro b lem  
re m a in s  c o n ce rn in g  m a n ’s su sce p tib ility  to  m o ra l m o tiva tion , w h ich  is  on ly  
solved b y  th e  p o ss ib ility  of th e  h ig h e s t  good.”9 S m ith  says l i t t le  a b o u t th is , 
b u t p e rh a p s  h e  is  a llu d in g  to  K a n t’s  m a n y  s ta te m e n ts  th a t  w e sh o u ld  believe  
in  m o ra l p ro g re s s  so a s  no t to  be  o v e rly  d isc o n te n t w ith  life. B u t th is  does n o t 
show  u s  w h y  th e  w o rth in ess  e q u a tio n  sh o u ld  ex is t. I f  th e re  is  a n  a rg u m e n t 
h e re , i t  is  o n ly  t h a t  a n  in d iv id u a l o u g h t n o t to  becom e too d is illu s io n e d  by  
h a rd sh ip .
S m ith ’s  second  rea so n  for th e  l in k  is  “th e  p rob lem  o f th e  u n i ty  of r e a ­
son.”10 S m ith  e x p la in s  th a t  th is  is  “th e  is su e  o f p e rso n a l s a n ity  itse lf . T he  
sp lit b e tw ee n  p h e n o m e n a l a n d  n o u m e n a l h u m a n ity, w hich p ro d u ces  th e  
‘n a tu r a l  d ia lec tic ’ [Grundlegung, A k. 405]... is  fe lt  by  K a n t to  be  in to le r ­
able.”11 In  o th e r  w ords, in d iv id u a ls  a s  r a t io n a l  c re a tu re s  h a v e  tw o in te re s ts ,
6 Ibid., p. 174.
7 Ibid.
8 Critique o f  Pure Reason, B 841.
9 “Worthiness,” p. 175.
10 Ibid., p. 176.
11 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
f255
o ften tim e s  in  opposition  to  one an o th e r, a n d  th e re  is a  n e ed  of re a so n  to  f in d  
som e w ay  of o rd e rin g  th e s e  d isp a ra te  in te re s ts . As S m ith  ex p la in s , a p a r t  
from  th e  h a rm o n iz in g  concep t of th e  h ig h e s t  good, w hich p rov ides a n  o rd e r 
fo r th e s e  tw o concepts, “th e  in te re s ts  of re a so n  rem a in  m ere ly  h e te ro g en eo u s, 
a n d  re a so n ’s v e ry  n a tu re , w hich  is  to  sy s te m a tiz e  is  v io la ted .”12
I  th in k  S m ith  is  on  to  so m eth ing  h e re , b u t  I  th in k  th a t  h is  a rg u m e n t 
is  n o t  n e a r ly  com plete . H e  b rin g s up  K a n t’s concept in  th e  Critique o f Judg­
ment o f th e  “f in a l p u rp o se ,” a n d  a llu d es  to  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  h ig h e s t good is  
n e c e ssa ry  to secu re  th is  f in a l  pu rpose . B u t  w e a re  s till la c k in g  a n  a rg u m e n t 
a s  to  w h y  th is  is  so, a n d  w h y  i t  sh o u ld  be  t h a t  “m ora lity  h a s  i ts  ow n in te re s t  
in  h a p p in e ss , a n d  th e re fo re  i ts  own in te re s t  in  p a rtic ip a tin g  in  th e  m e d ia tin g  
so lu tio n  o f th e  concep t o f th e  h ig h es t good.”13 T h is  is th e  v e ry  q u e s tio n  a t  i s ­
su e . I  a lso  th in k  t h a t  S m ith  is  ap p ro ach in g  this p a r tic u la r  a rg u m e n t from  th e  
w ro n g  side , n am ely  a s  a  n e e d  of h a p p in e ss . H e  cla im s th a t  “is  seem s to  be  
th e  in te re s t  in  h a p p in e ss , a n d  no t m o ra lity , t h a t  is  u rg in g  [th is] reco n c ilia ­
tio n ,”14 a n d  th is  does n o t q u ite  seem  to  be  t ru e , fo r i t  a p p e a rs  th a t  i t  is  re a so n  
a n d  i t s  “in te re s t” in  sy s te m a tiz a tio n  w h ich  u rg e s  such  reconcilia tion . W e s ti ll  
do n o t seem  to h av e  a  ju s tif ic a tio n  for th e  e q u a tio n  w hich n e ce ssa rily  l in k s  
m o ra lity  w ith  (p ro p o rtio n a te ) h a p p in e ss .15
T he  only re a l  a rg u m e n t to be  fo u n d  in  S m ith ’s e ssa y  fo r m o ra lity ’s 
(positive) in te re s t  in  h a p p in e ss , a n d  th u s  fo r th e  “w o rth in ess” e q u a tio n , is
12 Ibid., p. 176-7. This is similar to Silber’s point about the “interest” of reason.
13 Ibid., p. 177. I shall try to offer my own argument in the next chapter. However, given that 
Smith seems to reject the necessity of a moral author of the world (God), his failure to embrace an argu­
ment from moral teleology may be intentional.
14 Ibid.
15 It is not clear how much Smith is interested to prove from his discussion of the two stand­
points addressing the highest good. On the one hand, he does seem to think that we can deduce some­
thing about the nature of this “worthiness” link from the standpoint of morality’s interest in happiness 
(though I fail to find any conclusive arguments for this). On the other hand, it does not seem that Smith 
really thinks we can address such a question until he comes to the next section of his paper, for he writes 
that “we have not yet seen... why there should be a ratio between virtue and happiness, or why the latter 
should issue from the former.” (p. 183-4).




S m ith ’s s im p le  a sse rtio n  th a t  a  w o rth y  a c t is  n o t m ere ly  w o rth y  b u t “p ra is e ­
w o r t h y 16 S m ith ’s p o in t com es dow n to  th e  following: w e  a re  involved  w ith  
o th e rs  in  a  com m unity , a n d  w h en  som eone (else) a c ts  m o ra lly , w e n a tu ra lly  
feel th e  n e e d  to  re sp o n d  in  som e w ay;
his role in this case is not to act immediately on the m axim  th a t has been ex­
hibited  by his virtuous neighbor, b u t ra ther to use the  only timely means 
available to him of expressing his assen t to the maxim: he m ust in some sense 
repea t the other’s adoption of it, ratify  it, consummate the  universalizing of the 
m axim  th a t the other willed, if he willed morally — “rew ard” it by praise.17
W hile S m ith  seem s r ig h t  to  ta k e  in to  accoun t th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l  is  a lre ad y  
d irec tly  invo lved  w ith  o th e rs  i f  th e  q u e s tio n  of m o ra lity  is  to  a rise , ho rn  
w h ere  does h e  d raw  th e  conclusion  th a t  w e hav e  a  n e e d  to  re sp o n d  e x te rn a lly  
to a n y  o r a ll  m orally  w orthy  actions?  H e  m ay  be r ig h t  to  a s s e r t  th a t  w h en  we 
h a p p e n  to  w itn ess  a  m orally  w o rth y  act, w e w ill feel a  re sp e c t fo r th e  m ora l 
law . B u t  w h y  sh o u ld  th e re  by  a n y  n e e d  to  externalize su c h  a  fee ling  of r e ­
spect. S m ith  s ta te s  th a t
the  sense of this moral approval is connected w ith universalization. He who 
approves, will[sl th a t everyone should act on the maxim adopted by the one of 
whom he approves. By so willing, he acknowledges th a t  he too should adopt 
th e  maxim  to govern his own behavior...18
T h is  se em s rea so n ab le  enough , b u t  h ow  th e n  do w e get to  th e  fac t th a t  su ch  
a n  ack n o w led g m en t m u s t b e  ex te rn a lize d , a n d  th a t  th is  sh o u ld  also ta k e  th e  
fo rm  o f  a  “re w a rd ”? T here  seem s l i t t le  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r th is ,  p a rtic u la rly  from  
an y  o f K a n t’s w ritings.
T h e re  a re  tw o ad d itio n a l p ro b lem s w ith  su ch  a  d e fen se  o f th e  h ig h e s t 
good. T h e  f i r s t  is  th e  problem , s ta te d  in  th e  la s t  c h ap te r , t h a t  w e cannot
16 Ibid., p. 187.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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know  w h e n  a n  ac tio n  h a s  been  w illed  fro m  d u ty  alone. W e c a n n o t know  th is  
ev en  fo r o u r  ow n w illing , le t  a lone  fo r  som eone  else’s. So, a re  w e to re w a rd  
th o se  a c tio n s  w h ich  seem m ost m oral?  O r  on ly  those  w h ich  a re  m ere ly  legal?  
N e ith e r  o f  th e s e  seem  to  be le g itim a te  p o ss ib ilitie s . S m ith ’s  d iscu ssio n  of 
k n ig h ts  a n d  d rag o n s  is  n o t p a r t ic u la r ly  h e lp fu l. T he second  p ro b lem  is  a  lo­
g is tic a l one , ev en  g ra n tin g  th a t  th e  f i r s t  p ro b lem  could  b e  so lved . How cou ld  
w e p ra is e  o r  r e w a rd  every  observed  a c tio n  t h a t  w as m oral, e sp ec ia lly  i f  su ch  
re w a rd  h a d  to  be  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f happiness? To p u t  i t  s im p ly , i t  seem s 
im possib le  to  e n v is io n  how  w e w ou ld  b e  a b le  to  co n tin u a lly  re w a rd  a ll  su ch  
ac tio n s fo r ev e ry  s in g le  p e rso n  we o b serv e , a n d  how  we c o u ld  p o ss ib ly  p ro ­
duce th e  r e q u is ite  h a p p in e ss  in  o th e rs . Y e t S m ith  seem s to  in d ic a te  th a t  
th e re  m u s t  be  a  positive rew ard , n o t m e re ly  th e  re fra in in g  fro m  do ing  som e­
th in g  b a d  to  th e  v ir tu o u s  person .
E v e n  i f  w e g ra n te d  a ll  o f th is , S m ith ’s  fu r th e r  d e fen se  o f  th e  n e e d  fo r 
th e  h ig h e s t  good seem s m isgu ided  a s  w ell, i f  S m ith  even  in te n d s  fo r i t  to  be  a  
defense . N ow , b e ca u se  S m ith  h a s  d e fe n d e d  th e  “w o rth in ess” e q u a tio n  from  
th e  s ta n d p o in t  o f th e  com m un ity  a n d  th e  n e e d  for a n y  o b se rv e r o f a  m o ra l 
ac tio n  to  “p ra is e ” o r “rew ard ” th a t  a c tio n , S m ith  a rg u es  t h a t  th is  in  n o  w ay  
e n ta ils  th e  n e e d  fo r a  God. S m ith  w r ite s  t h a t  God is  on ly  e x p ec ted  to  re w a rd  
m o ra l ac tio n s  i f  th e re  is a  God, for in  th is  ca se  God w ou ld  be  a n  o b se rv er a s  
w ell. I t  is  a n  “object o f hope, a n  ex p ec ted  rec ip ro ca tin g  g e s tu re , on ly  on  th e  
su p p o s itio n  th a t  G od is  a  m em ber o f th e  m o ra l com m unity ,”19 a n d  th u s  
“p u rp o se le ssn e ss  is  m o ra lly  offensive o n ly  i f  G od is ta k e n  to  b e  th e  a u th o r  o f 
i t .”20 S m ith  a rg u e s  t h a t  w e c a n  conv ince  th e  a th e is t  o f God’s  e x is te n ce  “only 
if, p re su p p o s in g  th e  av a ila b ility  of im m o rta l  b liss, w e w ish  to  c o n tro l th e  d is ­
p e n sa tio n  th e re o f  w ith  m oral c o n s id e ra tio n s .”21 O f cou rse , th is  cou ld  n e v e r
19 Ibid., p. 188.
20 Ibid., p. 189. Given his views, Smith probably should have written: “...morally offensive 
only if God is taken to be the moral author of it.”
21 Ibid.




convince a n  a th e is t  o f G od’s  ex istence , because, a s  S m ith  h a s  a lre ad y  in d i­
c a ted , only  i f  th e  a u th o r  o f th e  w orld  is  a  moral b e in g , a n d  th u s  is  a lre ad y  in ­
vo lved  in  th e  co m m u n ity  o f  m o ra l ag en ts , is  th e re  a n y  d u ty  to  “p ra ise ” or 
“re w a rd ” h a p p in e ss , h e re  o r in  th e  afterlife .
N ow  th is  v iew  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good a n d  G od is  n o t  in co n s is te n t, b u t  i t  
seem s to b e  ex trem e ly  u n -K a n tia n . O ne re a so n  fo r  th is  I  n o te d  above, 
n a m e ly  th a t  th e re  does n o t  seem  to  be a n y th in g  in  K a n t’s w ritin g s  w hich  in ­
d ica te s  th e  n e ce ss ity  o f e x te rn a lly  p ra is in g  o r re w a rd in g  th e  m o ra l actions of 
o th e rs ; in d ee d , th is  seem s n o t on ly  n o t like ly , b u t  im possib le . B u t  in  a d d i­
tio n , i f  v ir tu e  o r m o ra lity  re a lly  is  w o rth in ess  to  b e  h a p p y , th e n  I  th in k  S m ith  
h a s  n o t co n sid ered  ju s t  h o w  se rio u s  th e  consequences o f th is  eq u a tio n  a re , or 
a t  le a s t  how  se rio u s  K a n t  ta k e s  th em  to  be. I f  S m ith  re a lly  ta k e s  th e  w o rth i­
n e s s  e q u a tio n  to  be  t ru e , th e n  th e  re a l p rob lem  o f th e  w orld  seem s to be  th is : 
n a tu r e  seem s w holly  u n c o n c e rn e d  w ith  th e  ou tcom e o f w o rth y  actions. A  
p e rso n  w ho p e rfo rm s a n  a c tio n  s tr ic tly  h o rn  d u ty  m a y  o r m a y  n o t ga in  h a p ­
p in e ss . T h is  m ay  b e  b e c a u se  th e  consequences o f  th is  ac tio n  m ay  go com ­
p le te ly  aw ry , fo r ex am p le  th e  m oney  we give to  a  p o o r w om an  m ay  be s to len  
befo re  sh e  c a n  b u y  food, o r  b e ca u se  th e  action  goes d irec tly  a g a in s t  w h a t 
w o u ld  m ak e  u s  h a p p y , fo r in s ta n c e  re tu rn in g  som eone  e lse ’s m oney  w h en  we 
a re  v e ry  poor. T he  p ro b lem  is  t h a t  n a tu re  is  seem in g ly  u n co o p era tiv e  w ith  
th e  outcom e o f m o ra l w illing . A n d  th is  p rob lem  does n o t seem  to  be solved by 
s im p le  “p ra is e .” W hile  p ra is e  m ig h t be a  n ice  c o n firm a tio n  t h a t  w e h a v e  done 
o u r  du ty , i t  is  n o t lik e ly  to  so lve th e se  ty p es o f p ro b lem s, a n d  p ro p o rtio n a lity  
seem s u t te r ly  im possib le . W h a t k in d  of h ig h e s t good co u ld  S m ith ’s h ig h e s t 
good be? K a n t’s h ig h e s t  good th u s  req u ire s  God, fo r  on ly  G od c a n  c re a te  th e  
co nd itions n e c e ssa ry  fo r th e  re a l i ty  of th e  “w o rth in e ss” e q u a tio n . T h u s S m ith  
h a s  ta k e n  se rio u s ly  n e i th e r  th e  re q u ire m e n ts  a n d  c o n seq u en ces o f th is  e q u a ­
tio n  n o r  th e  fa c t t h a t  K a n t’s h ig h e s t  good sh o u ld  h a v e  a  r e a l  ch an ce  of con­
v in c in g  th e  a th e is t  a t  le a s t  o f th e  necessity  o f p o s tu la t in g  G od’s existence.
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S m ith ’s in te rp re ta t io n  of th e  “w o rth in ess” e q u a tio n  seem s u n sa tis fa c ­
to ry , a n d  s in c e  i t  is  th e  on ly  one av a ilab le , I  m u s t  t r y  to  p ropose m y  ow n. I 
ta k e  i t  to b e  im p o ss ib le  t h a t  th e  e q u a tio n  c a n  be  p ro v en  a n a ly tic a lly  a priori. 
B u t c an  i t  b e  d e fe n d e d  a s  a  sy n th e tic  a priori p roposition?  I do n o t th in k  th a t  
i t  can , even  i f  w e ta k e  i t  to  be a  conclusion  o f K a n t’s, in s te a d  o f a  p rem ise , as  
K a n t seem s to  u se  i t .  I n  o rd er to a rg u e  a g a in s t  th is  e q u a tio n , le t  m e  give 
w h a t I  ta k e  to  b e  th e  s tro n g e s t possib le  a rg u m e n t t h a t  one could  m a k e  in  f a ­
vor o f th is  e q u a tio n , a n d  th e n  I  w ill show  w hy  i t  i s  u n sa tis fac to ry .
T he  r e a l  p ro b lem  seem s to  be  how  to  g ro u n d  th e  lin k  b e tw een  m o ra l­
i ty  a n d  h a p p in e s s , a n d  w h a t  I  w a n t to  a rg u e  is  t h a t  th e  lin k  b e tw ee n  th e se  
tw o d isp a ra te  in g re d ie n ts  m ig h t be g ro u n d ed  in  th e  n a tu r e  of h u m a n  beings; 
th e  tw o e le m e n ts  a re  n ecessa rily  l in k e d  on ly  b ecau se  w e fin d  th e m  b o th  e x is t­
in g  a s  n e e d s  fo r  h u m a n  be ings. In  essence , p e rh a p s  K a n t  co n sid ers  th e  
eq u a tio n  n e c e s sa ry  b e ca u se  th e  low er fa c u lty  o f d e s ire  is  a  desire  fo r th e  e n d s  
of h a p p in e ss  (p lea su re ) , w h ile  th e  h ig h e r  fac u lty  o f d e s ire  is  a  “d esire” fo r th e  
e n d s  o f m o ra lity , b u t  b o th  a re  concerned  w ith  b r in g in g  ab o u t a n  object in  ac­
cordance  w ith  law s. B o th  facu ltie s  a re , in  fac t, one. R eca ll th a t  “th e  faculty 
of desire is  th e  fa c u lty  su c h  a  be ing  h a s  o f cau sin g , th ro u g h  its  id ea s , th e  
re a lity  o f th e  ob jec ts  o f th e s e  id eas,”22 a n d  t h a t  “th e  cap ac ity  to  se t o n ese lf  a n  
e n d  -  a n y  e n d  w h a tso e v e r  — is  w h a t c h a ra c te riz e s  h u m a n ity ...”23 B u t  th e  
w ill a s  th e  “fa c u lty  e i th e r  o f b rin g in g  fo rth  objects co rresp o n d in g  to  concep­
tio n s  or o f d e te rm in in g  itse lf , i.e., i ts  c a u sa lity  to  e ffect su ch  objects...”24 is  th e  
sam e  a s  d e s ire  a n d  b o th  a re  e q u a te d  w ith  p ra c tic a l rea so n . A nd  th e  p ra c tic a l 
n a tu re  o f re a so n  is  on ly  one  aspec t o f p u re  rea so n , so t h a t  th e  sa m e  rea so n  is
22 Second Critique, Ak. 9 n.
23 Metaphysics o f  Morals, Gregor trans., Ak. 392.
24 Second Critique, Ak. 15.
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bo th  sp e c u la tiv e  a n d  p rac tica l. T h e  u p s h o t o f a ll th is  is t h a t  p u re  rea so n , a s  
th a t  w h ich  p ro v id es law s a n d  sy n th e s is , m u s t  n ecessarily  p rov ide  a  sy n th e s is  
for a ll p o ss ib le  e n d s  of th e  w ill.
H en ce , reaso n  is  n a tu ra lly  a n d  n e ce ssa rily  concerned  w ith  th e  o rd e r­
in g  of e n d s  w h ic h  a re  possib le  ob jec ts o f w ilting . So, w h a t en d s  sh o u ld  be 
w illed? O f  co u rse , K a n t concludes t h a t  “th e re  is  no possib ility  o f  th in k in g  of 
a n y th in g  a t  a l l  in  th e  w orld, or ev en  o u t  o f i t ,  w hich can  be  re g a rd e d  a s  good 
w ith o u t q u a lifica tio n , excep t a  good w ill”25 a n d  th is  le a d s  u s  to  th e  c a teg o ri­
ca l im p e ra tiv e . B u t w h a t o f th e  e n d s  o f h a p p in e ss?  R eason  m u s t sa y  som e­
th in g  a b o u t th e m , since th e y  a re  ob jec ts o f d e s ire  for every  h u m a n  being: 
“c e r ta in ly  o u r  weed a n d  woe a re  v e ry  im p o r ta n t  in  th e  e s tim a tio n  o f o u r 
p ra c tic a l re a so n .”26 R eason m u s t so lve  th e  “n a tu r a l  d ialec tic” b e tw ee n  th e  
d em an d s o f m o ra lity  a n d  th e  “p o w erfu l co u n te rw eig h t” o f th e  in c lin a tio n s  of 
h a p p in e ss .27 K a n t  concludes th a t  p le a su re s , w hile  som etim es good “can  also  
becom e e x tre m e ly  b ad  a n d  h a rm fu l i f  th e  w ill... is  n o t good.”28 O n  th e  o th e r  
h a n d , th e re  is  no  reason  th a t  h a p p in e s s  n e e d  be  th o u g h t o f a s  b a d  o r ev il in  
itse lf: “th e  g ro u n d  of... evil... c a n n o t b e  p laced , a s  is so com m only done, in  
m a n ’s  sensuous nature a n d  th e  n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s  a r is in g  th e re fro m .”29 
T h ere  is  n o th in g  w rong  w ith  th e  d e s ire  fo r h ap p in ess , as  long  a s  i t  does n o t 
in te rfe re  w ith  th e  d ic ta tes  of th e  m o ra l law , a n d  as long a s  i t  is  h a d  by  one 
w ith  a  good w ill. H ence, b ecau se  a  sy n th e s is  is  necessary , K a n t a rg u e s  th a t  
th e  only  one  o f w h ich  rea so n  could  conceive is  th a t  “a  good w ill seem s to  con ­
s t i tu te  th e  in d isp en sab le  cond ition  o f b e in g  ev en  w orthy  o f h a p p in e ss ,”30 in
25 Grundlegung, Ak. 393.
26 Second Critique, Ak. 61
11 Grundlegung, Ak. 405.
28 Ibid., Ak. 393.
29 Religion, Ak. 30.
30 Grundlegung. Ak. 393.
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o th e r  w ords, t h a t  a  good w ill i s  th e  “su p re m e ”31 good, a n d  “h a p p in e s s , th o u g h  
so m e th in g  a lw ay s p le a sa n t to  h im  w ho p o ssesses  it, is  n o t o f i t s e l f  ab so lu te ly  
good in  ev ery  re sp ec t b u t  a lw ay s p re su p p o se s  conduct in  acco rdance  w ith  th e  
m o ra l la w  a s  i t s  condition .”32
C
W hile  th is  seem s to  b e  th e  s tro n g e s t  c la im  for th e  “w o rth in e s s” e q u a ­
tion , I  th in k  th a t  i t  is  u ltim a te ly  u n sa tis fa c to ry . T he  re a l  p ro b lem  is  th a t  
K a n t  b e g in s  w ith  th e  p rem ise  t h a t  b o th  v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e ss  a re  l in k e d  in  
th e  concep t o f th e  h ig h e s t good, a n d  th e n  s e ts  ab o u t to  d iscover th e  n a tu re  o f 
th is  lin k . T h e n  h e  in v e s tig a te s  th e  n a tu r e  o f th is  link , co n c lu d in g  t h a t  v ir tu e  
m u s t  f in a lly  be  th e  cond ition  fo r h a p p in e s s ,33 a n d  th u s  th e  r e s u l t in g  
“w o rth in e ss” eq u a tio n , w ith  s u b s e q u e n t “p ro p o rtio n a lity ” c la u se . P re su m a b ly  
K a n t co n c lu d es th a t  h a p p in e ss  sh o u ld  b e  re w a rd e d  “p ro p o rtio n a lly ” p rec ise ly  
b e ca u se  v ir tu e  is  th e  cause o f h a p p in e s s . B u t  th e  o rig in a l p re m ise  o f  th e  nec­
e s sa ry  l in k  seem s ten u o u s , a n d  th e  co n c lu sio n  th e re fo re  c irc u la r . I f  K a n t 
c a n n o t g ive u s  a  reaso n  w hy th e  tw o  a re  n ecessa rily  l in k e d  in  th e  concep t of 
th e  h ig h e s t  good in  th e  f i r s t  p lace , th e n  th e re  seem s to  be no  le g itim a te  w ay 
to  conclude  t h a t  (because th e y  axe n e c e ssa r ily  linked ) th e y  m u s t  b e  in  a  re la ­
tio n sh ip  o f g ro u n d  a n d  consequence , a n d  th u s  v ir tu e  m u s t be  w o rth in e s s  to 
be h a p p y . A s I  s ta te d  above, th e  o n ly  l in k  be tw een  th e se  tw o co n cep ts  seem s 
to  be  t h a t  th e y  a re  lin k e d  a s  u n iv e rs a l  e n d s  o f h u m a n  be ings. B u t  th is  lin k  
does n o t  seem  to  be s tro n g  en o u g h  to  su p p o r t  conclusions w h ich  K a n t  w ishes 
to  d raw .
To b eg in  w ith , th e  on ly  l in k  t h a t  seem s to ex is t b e tw een  th e  tw o h e t­
e ro g en eo u s e le m e n ts  is  th a t  th e y  b o th  h a p p e n  to be  objects o f  d e s ire  fo r  h u ­
m a n  b e in g s . B u t th is  seem s m u ch  too c o n tin g e n t to  be  th e  g ro u n d s  fo r th e
31 Second Critique, Ak. 110.
32 Ibid., Ak. 111.
33 Ibid.
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conclusion  t h a t  v ir tu e  is  w o r th in e s s  to be  h ap p y . P a r t ic u la r ly , w h a t  is  m iss­
in g  is  a n  a rg u m e n t to  th e  e ffec t t h a t  h u m a n s  h a v e  a  right to  h a p p in e ss . C er­
ta in ly  w e c a n  ag ree  w ith  K a n t  t h a t  v ir tu e  i ts e lf  is  n o t h a p p in e s s , t h a t  h a p p i­
n ess  is  n o t  good in  i ts e lf , a n d  t h a t  th e  e n d s o f h a p p in e s s  o u g h t to  b e  s y n th e ­
sized  by  re a s o n  a lo n g  w ith  i t s  o th e r  (m oral) en d s . B u t u n le s s  h u m a n s  h a v e  a 
r ig h t to h a p p in e ss , w e  a re  le f t  o n ly  w ith  th e  conclusion  t h a t  i f  th e re  is  to  be 
any h a p p in e ss , i t  sh o u ld  o n ly  b e  h a d  w hen  i t  is  perm iss ib le ,' h a p p in e s s  is  no t 
evil, b u t  i t  is  n o t good in  a ll  c ircu m stan ces , th u s  i t  is  o n ly  p e rm iss ib le  to  p u r ­
su e  it. B u t th is  is  f a r  f ro m  s a y in g  th a t  h u m a n s  h a v e  a  r ig h t  to  h a p p in e ss , 
a n d  fa r  fro m  a  conclu sion  t h a t  v ir tu e  is  w o rth in e ss  to  b e  h a p p y .
T h e  p ro b lem  se e m s  to  lie  in  K a n t’s ju s tif ic a tio n  o f  th e  lin k , w hich , as 
fa r  a s  I  c a n  see , re a lly  c o n s is ts  o f on ly  tw o p o in ts : f irs t, t h a t  p ra c tic a l rea so n  
is  c e r ta in ly  co n ce rn e d  w ith  o u r  w e a l a n d  woe,34 a n d  second , t h a t  “to  be  in  
n e e d  of h a p p in e s s  a n d  a lso  w o rth y  o f i t  a n d  y e t n o t  to  p a r ta k e  o f i t  co u ld  n o t 
be  in  acco rdance  w ith  th e  co m p le te  vo lition  o f a n  o m n ip o te n t r a t io n a l  being , 
i f  w e a ssu m e  su ch  o n ly  fo r th e  s a k e  o f th e  a rg u m e n t.”35 A ssu m in g  God, th en , 
w h a t K a n t is  in d ic a tin g  is  t h a t  th e re  is  no  re a so n  w hy  a  p e rs o n  w ith  a  good 
w ill sh o u ld  d ep riv e  h im /h e rs e lf  o f h a p p in e ss . B u t  th is  is  o n ly  a n  a rg u m e n t 
for p e rm iss ib ility , fo r i n  th is  case , th e  e n d  o f h a p p in e s s  is  n o t  c o n tra ry  to 
du ty . I f  a  p e rso n  w ills  in  acco rd  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , th e n  K a n t  seem s r ig h t 
to  in s is t  t h a t  th e re  is  n o  re a s o n  w h y  such  a  v ir tu o u s  p e rs o n  sh o u ld  n o t  p a r ­
ta k e  in  h a p p in e ss . B u t  to  in s i s t  t h a t  a  v ir tu o u s  p e rso n  is  som ehow  entitled to 
h a p p in e ss , t h a t  som ehow  th e y  a re  deserving o f h a p p in e s s  re q u ire s  a n  a rg u ­
m e n t w h ich  is  n o t g iven . A g a in , th e re  is  no  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r  w h y  v ir tu e  a n d  
h a p p in e ss  a re  n e c e ssa r ily  l in k e d . As T heodore M . G re en e  su m m a riz e s  
K a n t’s p rob lem :
34 Ibid., Ak. 61.
35 Ibid.. Ak. 110.
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In order to secure hum an freedom he has analyzed mein into two irreconcilable 
natures; the one abstractly  rational and noumenai, the other phenomenal and 
purely sentient. The former is completely severed from the empirical world 
and  all empirical motives, desire and  impulses, and... [t]he la tte r is em pty of 
all m oral reasonableness and is concerned solely w ith irrational sensuous sa t­
isfaction.36
W hile  G re en e ’s s ta te m e n t  a n d  p o s itio n  a re  s tro n g e r th a n  n e ce ssa ry  fo r o u r 
c u rre n t  a rg u m e n t, i t  does in d ic a te  a  p rob lem  w ith in  K a n t’s  ph ilo sophy  w ith  
w hich  w ere  a re  h e re  co n ce rn ed . In  sh o rt, in  o rd e r  to  free  h u m a n s  from  d e ­
te rm in a te  n a tu r a l  c a u se s , K a n t  h a s  p o s ited  a  w ill t h a t  c an  be (u ltim ate ly ) 
free  from  th e  in c lin a tio n s  o f  lo w er d esire . T h a t b e in g  sa id , K a n t m u s t  te ll  u s  
w h ere  th e  (necessa ry ) l in k  b e tw ee n  v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e ss  re a p p e a rs , a n d  th is  
m u s t  b e  m o re  th a t  th e  m ere ly  c o n tin g e n t l in k  of tw o d isp a ra te  e n d s  o f p ra c ti­
ca l rea so n .
T h is  e n ta ils  a n  a d d itio n a l p rob lem . K a n t seem s ju s tif ie d  in  s ta t in g  
th a t  h u m a n s  do in d e e d  n e e d  some h a p p in e ss , b u t  w hy  proportionate h a p p i­
ness?  W e sh o u ld  a g re e  w ith  K a n t  t h a t  th e re  e x is t e x te rn a l c ircu m stan ces 
a n d  s ta te s  o f a ffa irs  in  w h ich  a  p e rso n  w ould  be u n d e r  g re a t s t r a in s  to ac t 
m o ra lly  ( th o u g h  i t  w o u ld  s t i l l  be  a  du ty ), conditions su ch  as ex trem e p o v erty  
or w ar; “to  secu re  o n e ’s  ow n h a p p in e s s  is  a  du ty  (a t  le a s t  ind irectly ); fo r d is ­
c o n te n t w ith  one’s co n d itio n  u n d e r  m a n y  p re ss in g  c a re s  a n d  am id u n sa tis f ie d  
w a n ts  m ig h t eas ily  becom e a  g re a t  te m p ta tio n  to  tra n s g re s s  one’s fu tu re  d u ­
tie s .”37 H ence , i t  se em s a s  th o u g h  th e re  is  in  som e se n se  a  “r ig h t” to  th is  
m in im a l h a p p in e ss , a  n e e d  fo r h a p p in e s s  from  th e  s ta n c e  o f m orality , a  n e e d  
to  be  free  from  p o v erty  a n d  w a r  so t h a t  one w ill n o t b e  s tro n g ly  te m p te d  to  
v io la te  th e  m o ra l law . B u t  is  th e re  a  n e e d  for m ore  h a p p in e ss  th a n  th is?  Is  
th e re  a  n e e d  fo r a  m o re  v ir tu o u s  p e rso n  to  receive m ore  h a p p in e ss , a n d  on ly
36 Theodore M. Greene, “The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant’s Relig­
ion" “Introduction” to Religion Within the Limits o f  Reason Alone, by Immanuel Kant, trans. Theodore 
M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row. 1960). lxii.
3 Grundlegung. Ak. 399.
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in  exac t p roportion?  A gain, K a n t seem s w a rra n te d  in  m a in ta in in g th a t  
h a p p in e ss  is  n o t to be avo ided  by th e  m o ra lly  good person , b u t  w hy  shou ld  
th a t  p e rso n  b e  deserv ing  o f a  p a r t ic u la r  p ropo rtion?
T h e  on ly  a d d itio n a l a rg u m e n t w h ich  K a n t  seem s to  offer fo r th e  
e q u a tio n  is  a n o th e r  b la n k e t  s ta te m e n t  t h a t  p e rso n s  w ith o u t a  good w ill 
sh o u ld  n o t  be  h appy . Now, w e m ay  in d e e d  be  r ig h t  to ag ree  w ith  th e  q u o ta ­
tion  (above) t h a t  som e p le a su re s  c an  b e  “e x tre m e ly  b ad  a n d  h a rm fu l i f  th e  
will... is  n o t good.” B u t th is  is  a n  a rg u m e n t a s  to  th e  effects o f a  p e rso n  w ith  
a  b a d  w ill, fo r in s tan c e  t h a t  “th e  coo lness o f a  v illa in  m a k e s  h im ... m uch  m ore  
d an g ero u s...”38 H ere  w e a re  co n cern ed  w ith  ac tio n s  w hich  m ig h t h u r t  o thers , 
cause  w a r, o r genera lly  im p ed e  th e  p ro g re ss  o f  o th e rs ’ m o ra l developm ent, 
t ra n s g re s s in g  n o t only th e  m o ra l la w  b u t  p ro b ab ly  th e  leg a l code a s  well. B u t 
th is  is  n o t  a n  a rg u m e n t th a t ,  fo r in s ta n c e , a  law -ab id in g  p e rso n  o u g h t n o t to 
be h a p p y , th o u g h  such  a  p e rso n  m ay  n o t  h a v e  a  good w ill. T h e  on ly  such  
ju s tif ic a tio n  is  K a n t’s m ere  a sse r tio n  t h a t  “th e  s ig h t of a  b e in g  w ho is  n o t 
g raced  b y  a n y  touch  of a  p u re  a n d  good w ill b u t  w ho y e t en joys a n  u n in te r ­
ru p te d  p ro sp e r ity  can  n e v e r d e lig h t a  r a t io n a l  a n d  im p a r tia l  sp ec ta to r,”39 a n d  
th is  “n o t m ere ly  in  th e  p a r t ia l  eyes o f a  p e rso n  w ho m akes h im s e lf  h is  en d  
b u t  even  in  th e  ju d g m e n t o f a n  im p a r tia l  rea so n ...”40 P e rh a p s  w e c an  sy m p a­
th ize  w ith  K a n t’s a sse rtio n  th a t  i t  p a in s  u s  to  see  (ap p aren tly ) im m o ra l p e r­
sons w ho a re  happy , b u t  is  i t  unreasonable t h a t  su ch  p e rso n s  m ig h t be 
happy? C e rta in ly  I  m ay  w ell feel d isco u rag ed  i f  m y  m oral w illin g  h a s  k ep t 
m e from  g re a t  h ap p in ess , b u t  is  th e re  som e offense to rea so n  itse lf?  W hile 
th is  m ay  b e  a  fin e  a n d  com m on se n tim e n t, i t  be longs m ore to  p a r t  one of th e  
Grundlegung th a n  i t  does to  a  t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  deduction  o f th e  objects of th e  
m oral law . A gain , w hy m u s t h a p p in e ss  be  l in k e d  w ith  v ir tu e ?  W e n eed  m ore
38 Ibid., Ak. 394.
39 Ibid., Ak. 393.
40 Second Critique, Ak. 110.
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th a n  th e  seem ing ly  com m onsense  a s se r tio n  th a t  th is  is  th e  case , especially  
w h e re  ac tio n s  a re  leg a l b u t  n o t b a se d  on  d u ty  a lone .41
W e seem  left, th e n , w ith  th e  ju s t if ia b le  option  th a t  re a so n  a n d  
th e re b y  m o ra lity  sh o u ld  s im p ly  b e  unconcerned, w ith  a n y th in g  m ore  th a n  th e  
basic  n e e d s  o f h a p p in e ss . N ow  th is  conclu sion  seem s to  be  w a r ra n te d  by th e  
re s t  o f  K a n t’s  w ritin g s , th o u g h  i t  is  in  co n tra d ic tio n  to  h is  b e lie f  in  th e  
“w o rth in e s s” equation ; th u s , w h ile  i t  m a y  v io la te  th e  “le t te r ” o f K a n t’s  project, 
I th in k  i t  is  e n tire ly  w ith in  th e  “sp ir it .”42 T o b eg in  w ith , th e re  is  K a n t’s 
s tro n g  a sse r tio n  th a t  “fo r his own happiness is  a n  e n d  th a t  e v e ry  m a n  h a s  (by 
v ir tu e  o f th e  im p u lse s  o f h is  n a tu re ) , b u t  th is  e n d  can  n e v e r w ith o u t self- 
co n tra d ic tio n  be  re g a rd e d  a s  a  d u ty ... H e n ce  i t  is  se lf-con trad ic to ry  to  say  
th a t  h e  is  under obligation to  p ro m o te  h is  ow n  h a p p in e ss ...”43 T h u s  h a p p i­
n ess  a n d  th e  p u rs u i t  o f h a p p in e ss  is  n o t a  d u ty , th o u g h  i t  is  a n  e n d  t h a t  is  
u n iv e rs a lly  d e sired  by  h u m a n  be ings. O f  co u rse  rea so n  c a n n o t be  u n co n ­
c e rn e d  w ith  th e  im p u lse s  fo r p le a su re , fo r th e  rea so n  th a t  th e  m o ra l law  is  a n  
im p e ra tiv e  fo r u s  is  p rec ise ly  b e ca u se  su c h  im p u lse s  m u s t  b e  overcom e a n d  
p la c e d  in  a  p o sitio n  w h ich  is  seco n d a ry  to  m o ra lity . P e rh a p s  th e  position  is  
b e s t s ta te d  in  “T heory  a n d  P ra c tice ”:
I d id  n o t fa il to re m a rk  th a t  m a n  is n o t ex p ec ted  to  renounce h is  n a tu ra l  end , 
h a p p in ess , w hen  th e  issu e  o f obey ing  h is  d u ty  arises; for h e  c a n n o t do th a t...  
Y e t h e  m u s t com pletely  abstract from  su c h  consid era tio n s  w h e n  th e  com m and  
o f  d u ty  a rises , a n d  he  m u s t n e v e r  m a k e  h a p p in e ss  th e  condition o f  obeying  th e  
law  t h a t  re a so n  p rescribes for h im .44
41 This conclusion is also offered by Andrews Reath in his “Two Conceptions of the Highest 
Good in Kant,” though he presents little by way of defense. He simply states that “no explicit arguments 
are given for taking a proportionality of virtue and happiness, either as an end, or as a way of ordering 
different ends or interests” (p. 611), and concludes that, as such, it “represents a departure from Kant’s 
basic principles” (p. 613).
42 In addition, I think that by weeding out this equation we will actually make Kant’s claim that 
it is a duty to promote the highest good stronger.
43 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 386. Also: Second Critique, “Remark IT’ to “Theorem IV,” Ak.
35-41.
44 “On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, but is of No Practical Use.” Ak. 278-9.
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R eason  m u s t be  concerned  w ith  h a p p in e s s  on ly  in  o rd e r  to  keep  th e  in c e n ­
tiv e s  of p le a su re  from  d e te rm in in g  th e  w ill a n d  to  e n s u re  t h a t  one w ill n o t be  
s tro n g ly  te m p te d  to  v io la te  th e  m o ra l  law ;
it can even be a  duty in certa in  respects to provide for one’s happiness, in part 
because (since it includes skill, health , and riches) it contains m eans to the 
fulfillment of one’s duty an d  in  p a r t  because the  lack of it (e.g., poverty) con­
tains tem ptations to tran sg ress  against duty. B ut to fu rther one’s happiness 
can never be a  direct duty ...45
T h u s , th e  p u r s u i t  o f som e h a p p in e s s  is  necessa ry , b u t  on ly  a s  a n  in d ire c t 
d u ty  a n d  only  in  o rd e r to a v o id  c o n d itio n s  w hich  m ig h t th re a te n  th e  p u re  u se  
o f  o u r  w ill.46
In  ad d itio n , i f  we a g re e  to  a (n y ) ve rs ion  o f th e  “p rin c ip le  o f p u rp o siv e  
m ech an ism s,”47 K a n t  u ses th i s  to  conclude  p rec ise ly  t h a t  h u m a n s  w ere  n o t 
d e s ig n ed  b y  n a tu r e  fo r h a p p in e s s , a n d  th a t  on ly  a  good w ill is  good in  itse lf: 
“i f  t h a t  be ing ’s  p re se rv a tio n , w e lfa re , o r in  a  w ord  i t s  h a p p in e ss , w ere  th e  
r e a l  e n d  of n a tu r e  in  th e  c a se  o f a  b e in g  h a v in g  re a so n  a n d  w ill, th e n  n a tu re  
w o u ld  h av e  h i t  u p o n  a  v e ry  p o o r  a r ra n g e m e n t...”48 K a n t  is  c o n s is te n t in  h is  
w ritin g s  to in d ic a te  th a t  i f  h u m a n s  w e re  d esig n ed  b y  n a tu r e  fo r th e  ach ieve­
m e n t of h a p p in e ss  th ro u g h  re a so n , th e n  w e w ere  p o o rly  d e sig n ed  in d eed . I t  
w o u ld  h av e  b een  m u ch  b e t te r  i f  h a p p in e s s  w ere  a ch iev a b le  th ro u g h  in s tin c t. 
B u t, i f  we a re  c re a te d , a n d  i f  o u r  re a s o n  is  to h a v e  som e p u rp o se , th e n  th is
45 Second Critique, Ak. 93. See also: Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 388, where Kant clearly 
states that such concerns for happiness are “merely a means for removing obstacles to his morality — a 
permitted means...”
46 “An action which is neither commanded nor prohibited is merely allowed... and therefore 
also no duty,” Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 223, Ellington trans. Victoria S. Wike discusses precisely this 
point in her article, “Kant on the Indirect Duty to Pursue Happiness” inAkten des Siebenten Intemation- 
alen Kant-Kongresses, Band II. 1 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1990), 599-611. She concludes, as I do, that 
Kant thought we ought to be concerned with happiness in a minimal sense, but that, “in short, the seeking 
of happiness becomes an indirect duty only because of the relationship of happiness to an end which it 
facilitates and to which we have a direct duty,” (p. 606, italics added for emphasis).
47 On the “principle of purposive mechanism” see: Section One, Chapter Eight.
48 Grundlegung. Ak. 395.
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p u rp o se  can n o t be th e  p u r s u i t  of h a p p in e ss , th o u g h  su ch  a  p u r s u i t  is  p e r ­
m issib le . K a n t even  goes so fa r  as  to s a y  th a t  “h a p p in e ss  c an  ev en  be r e ­
d u ced  to  le ss  th a n  n o th in g , w ith o u t n a tu r e ’s  fa ilin g  th e re b y  in  h e r  p u rp o se  
[th e  “e s ta b lish m e n t o f a  good w ill”].”49 F a r  from  b e in g  a  du ty , h a p p in e s s  is  
b a re ly  a  co n sid era tio n  fo r  th e  p u re  w ill.
W e get a  s im ila r  p ic tu re  o f th is  p o sitio n  o f h a p p in e ss  in  K a n t’s  sp e ­
cific d iscussion  in  th e  Critique o f Practical Reason o f th e  d ifference  b e tw een  
das Gute a n d  das Wohl, w h e re  h e  concludes th a t  w hile  re a so n  h a s  a  n a tu r a l  
in te r e s t  in  h a p p in e ss , “h e  h a s  rea so n  fo r  a  y e t  h ig h e r  pu rp o se , n a m e ly , to  
co n sid er a lso  w h a t is  in  i ts e l f  good o r ev il, w h ich  p u re  a n d  se n su o u s ly  d is in ­
te re s te d  rea so n  a lone  c a n  ju d g e , an d ... to  d is tin g u ish  th is  e s tim a tio n  from  a  
se n su o u s  estim atio n ...”50 I n  th is  section , “T h e  C oncept o f a n  O b jec t o f P u re  
R eason ,” K a n t m ak e s  th e  d iv ision  b e tw ee n  w ell-being  (h ap p in e ss) a n d  th e  
good (th e  m oral) e x trem e . S o m eth in g  w h ich  is  u n p le a sa n t m ay  w e ll be  good, 
su c h  a s  a  n ecessa ry  o p e ra tio n , a n d  v ice -versa . In  fact, K a n t  m a k e s  th e  bo ld  
a sse r tio n  th a t  “th e  concep t o f good a n d  ev il is  n o t d e fined  p r io r  to  th e  m o ra l 
law ...”51 T hus, K a n t w rite s :
Though one m ay laugh  a t the Stoic who in the worst paroxysm of gout cried 
out, “Pain, however thou  torm entest me, I will never adm it th a t thou  a r t  any­
th ing bad...!” he was nevertheless right. He felt it w as an evil, and  he be­
trayed  th a t in his cry; b u t th a t anything [morally] evil attached to him  he had  
no reason to concede...52
T h e  p o in t o f th is  q u o ta tio n , a s  w ell a s  th is  section, is  to  show  th a t  th e  m o ra lly  
good a n d  th e  m ere ly  p le a s a n t  a re  com p lete ly  d isp a ra te  objects o f w illin g , a n d  
th a t  on ly  th e  m orally  good is  a  n e ce ssa ry  a n d  w orthy  object o f th e  w ill o f  r a ­
tio n a l c re a tu re s . C e r ta in ly  one is  a llo w ed  to  seek  h a p p in e ss , b u t  o n ly  i f  i t
49 Ibid., Ak. 396.
50 Second Critique, Ak. 62.
51 Ibid., Ak. 62-3.
52 Ibid., Ak. 60.
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does n o t conflict w ith  th e  m o ra l law ; o th e rw ise  h u m a n s  w ou ld  b e  no b e tte r  
th a n  a n im a ls . K a n t  seem s to  h a v e  done a  m o re  effective th a n  in te n d e d  job of 
s e p a ra tin g  das Gute from  das Wohl.
T h u s , th e  option w hich  seem s le g itim a te ly  le f t open to  u s  a s  ra tio n a l 
c re a tu re s  i s  s im p ly  to  deny  th a t  h a p p in e ss  h a s  a n y th in g  b u t  a  m in im a l p lace 
in  m orality , excep t w here  a  la c k  o f  h a p p in e ss  m ig h t be  a  th r e a t  to  m oral 
w illing.53 I t  seem s th a t  th e  sk e p tic  can  a g re e  to  a ll  o f  th e  fo llow ing po in ts , 
w ith o u t h a v in g  a n y  n eed  fo r G od54: h u m a n s  h a v e  a  n a tu r a l  a n d  n ecessa ry  
in te re s t in  th e  e n d s  of bo th  v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e ss , som e h a p p in e ss  is  neces­
sa ry  i f  h u m a n s  a re  to  beg in  th e  d ifficu lt p ro jec t o f c u ltiv a tin g  th e i r  v irtu e , 
h a p p in e ss  (in  th e  form  o f ta le n ts , riches, etc.) c a n  be  d an g ero u s i f  g iven  to 
persons w ith  a  b a d  (evil) d isposition , rea so n  h a s  a  n e e d  to o rd e r  a ll o f  th e  
ends of th e  w ill, th e  en d  o f h a p p in e ss  a n d  th e  n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s  to w ard  
h a p p in e ss  sure n o t b a d  or evil, a n d  h a p p in e ss  c a n  r ig h tly  be  p u rs u e d  a s  long  
a s  i t  n e ith e r  c o n ta in s  th e  g ro u n d s  for w iltin g  n o r  is  c o n tra ry  i ts e l f  to  th e  
m oral law . I t  seem s th a t  one m ig h t ag ree  to  a l l  th e s e  p rem ise s  a n d  s ti ll  n o t 
believe in  th e  n ecessity  of v ir tu e  a s  w o rth in ess  fo r p ro p o rtio n a te  h ap p in ess ; 
“th e  m a jes ty  o f d u ty  h a s  n o th in g  to  do w ith  th e  en joym en t o f life ...”55 C er­
ta in ly  th e  (K a n tia n )  skep tic  m ig h t say  th a t ,  sp e a k in g  from  com m on-sense, i t  
w ould  be n ice  i f  v ir tu o u s  p e rso n s  w ere re w a rd e d , or a t  le a s t  n o t  seem ingly  
p u n ish e d  o u tr ig h t  b y  n a tu re ; b u t  in  w h a t w ay  w o u ld  such  com m on-sense 
se rve  a s  a n  a rg u m e n t, especially  a n  an a ly tic  o r  sy n th e tic  a priori p roposi­
tion? P e rh a p s  su ch  a  skep tic  m ig h t even b e  a b le  to  ag ree  th a t ,  since  th e re
53 As to the question of what is left of the duty to promote the highest good, this will have to be 
postponed. But as to the question of the “worthiness” equation, I would be glad to know if there exists a 
better argument as to why it is necessary. Perhaps one could be fashioned negatively, from the concept of 
“punishment” instead of reward. The immediate problem with this, of course, is that punishment deals 
only with legality, thus leaving morality out of the question, as well as failing to say anything about posi­
tive reward. Perhaps an analysis of the concept of “worthiness” or “desert” itself might lead to a possible 
defense, but I do not see how.
54 The need for God here would be in reference to the need of proportionate happiness. I will 
argue later that there are other needs for a belief in God.
55 Second Critique, Ak. 88.
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a re  tw o goods in  w hich  h u m a n s  a re  in te re s te d , th e  h ig h e s t good w ould  be 
m ax im a l h a p p in e ss  a n d  m a x im a l v ir tu e . B u t th e  q u estio n  is  one o f th e  link 
b e tw een  th e se  tw o concepts, a n d  th e  sk e p tic  does n o t seem  obliged  to  be lieve  
it.
m.
T he  o th e r  m ajo r p ro b lem  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t good is  one  o f  conceivabil- 
ity , a n d  h a s  p r im a rily  to do w ith  th e  n a tu r e  o f h a p p in e ss  a s  i t  re la te s  to  h u ­
m a n  be ings. In  th is  section, I  a d d re ss  fo u r such  p rob lem s o f conceivab ility . 
T hese  a re  p rob lem s espec ia lly  w ith  th e  “o therw orld ly” h ig h e s t good, b u t  
ov e rlap p in g  p ro b lem s w ith  t h e  “e a r th ly ” fo rm u la tio n  c a n  be  se en  a s  w ell.
A.
In  essence , th e  f ir s t  m a jo r  p ro b lem  is  th is : K a n t c la im s t h a t  a ll  h u ­
m a n  b e in g s d esire  h a p p in e ss , a n d  th a t  w e can  hope th a t  o u r v ir tu o u s  d ispo ­
sitio n  w ill be  re w a rd e d  in  th e  n e x t life . H ow ever, g iven K a n t’s sp lit  b e tw een  
th e  n o u m en a l a n d  p h e n o m e n a l rea lm s , a n d  given th e  u n k n o w ab le  n a tu r e  of 
th e  n e x t life, i t  seem s a t  le a s t  p o ss ib le  t h a t  w e w ill n o t h a v e  th e  re q u is ite  n a ­
tu re  n ecessa ry  for th e  ex p erien ce  o f h a p p in e ss , no r w ould  w e d esire  it. As 
G reene  su m m arize s  th is  p rob lem :
The Summum Bonum a rgum ent rests on the assum ption th a t the happiness 
m an craves now, and will continue to desire after death, is exclusively sen tien t 
in character and  unrelated to his h igher nature  in any in ternal or organic way. 
But he has previously show n th a t m an’s sentient nature  is phenomenal, th a t 
is, temporal, and  not e ternal. He cannot, therefore, consistently m aintain  now 
th a t this phenomenal self will continue after death or th a t in the next life m an 
will continue to desire the happiness which he craves in th is.56
A ccording to  K a n t’s ph ilo sophy , a  p e rso n  h a s  v a lu e  b ecau se  s /h e  is  a  m em b er 
of th e  in te llig ib le  w orld , b e c a u se  o f t h a t  p e rso n ’s in d ep en d en ce  from  th e
56 Greene, “Historical Context,” p. lxiv. See also: Kwang-Sae Lee, “Some Reflections on the 
Idea of the Highest Good as a Regulative Idea of Pure Practical Reason.” pp. 555-6.
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p h e n o m e n a l w o rld  th ro u g h  th e  m o ra l law . A  p e rso n  is  a lso  free  fro m  sp ace  
a n d  tim e, a n d  th u s  is  p ro p e rly  n o u m en a l. T hus, i t  seem s d ifficu lt to  a s s e r t  
t h a t  h u m a n s  w ill d e s ire  h a p p in e s s  in  a  “n o u m en a l” a fte rlife , a n d  se e m s 
u n lik e ly  th a t  th e y  w ou ld  h a v e  th e  sen so ry  a p p a ra tu s  to  e x p erien ce  i t .  S u c h  a  
conclusion , i f  i t  is  to  b e  d ra w n , r e s ts  on  th e  p rem ise  t h a t  h a p p in e s s  c a n n o t b e  
in te llig ib le , t h a t  is , t h a t  K a n t  co n sid e rs  h a p p in e ss  to  b e  a  p h e n o m e n o n  w h ich  
is  p h y s ic a l a n d  s e n s u a l  in  n a tu r e ,  a n d  th e  p rem ise  th a t  th e  n a tu r e  o f  h u m a n  
b e in g s w ill n o t re m a in  th e  s a m e  in  th e  n e x t w orld  a s  i t  i s  i n  th is  w o rld . L e t 
u s  co n sid er th e s e  tw o  p re m ise s .
T he f i r s t  n e ce ssa ry  p re m ise  is  th a t  K a n t co n sid ers  h a p p in e s s  to  b e  a  
p h e n o m e n a l s ta te , a n d  th a t  h a p p in e s s  is  n o t to be  e q u a te d  e ith e r  w ith  con ­
te n tm e n t  w ith  m o ra l w illin g  (“se lf-co n ten tm en t”57) or w ith  com ple te  
in d ep en d en ce  from  se n su o u s  in c lin a tio n s  (“b liss”58). N ow  V ic to ria  S . W ike 
h a s  devo ted  a n  e n tire  book to  th e  s tu d y  o f th e  n a tu re  o f  K a n t’s 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f h a p p in e ss  i n  h e r  exce llen t w ork: Kant on Happiness in 
Ethics,59 so I  n e e d  on ly  re fe r  to  h e r  conclusions re g a rd in g  h a p p in e s s , w h ich  I 
ta k e  to  b e  correct. I n  th e  f i r s t  c h a p te r  o f h e r  book, sh e  e x a m in e s  th e  th re e  
d iffe ren t concep ts o f se lf-c o n ten tm en t, b liss , a n d  h a p p in e ss , conc lud ing :
“K a n t  co n sid ers  h a p p in e ss  to  in v o lv e  a  ph y sica l s ta te  in  th e  n a tu r a l  w orld . 
T h ere  is  a  connec tion  b e tw een  h a p p in e s s  a n d  p lea su re , in c lin a tio n , a n d  
se n sa tio n ... T h is  n o tio n  o f w h a t  h a p p in e ss  is  a n d  w h a t h a p p in e s s  in v o lv es  
t r e a ts  h a p p in e ss  a s  a  se n sib le  s ta te .”60 H ap p in ess , for K a n t  c a n n o t b e  
co n sid ered  a s  e i th e r  th e  sa tis fa c tio n  o f know ing  t h a t  one w ills  so le ly  fro m  th e  
m o ra l la w  o r a s  th e  freedom  fro m  a ll  se n su o u s in c lin a tio n s .61 H a p p in e s s
57 Second Critique, Ak. 117.
58 Ibid., Ak. 118.
59 See also: “Kant on the Indirect Duty to Pursue Happiness,” 599-611. It is a shame that 
Wike, while addressing the question of the highest good in several chapters, never addresses the question 
of virtue as “worthiness to be happy.”
60 Kant on Happiness, p. 13.
61 Ibid.. pp. 21-23.




involves th e  p o s it in g  o f a  m a te r ia l  end, th e  o b ta in in g  o f th a t  end , a n d  a  
p le a su re  w h ich  is  d e riv e d  from  th is  end .62 T he  n a tu re  o f h a p p in e ss , a s  K a n t 
u n d e rs ta n d s  i t ,  is  p h y s ic a l a n d  sensuous in  n a tu re , a n d  is  n o t e i th e r  se lf­
c o n te n tm e n t o r  b liss .
In te re s tin g ly , W ike su b seq u e n tly  d raw s th e  sam e  conclusion  th a t  I 
have , n a m e ly  t h a t  th e re  is  a  p rob lem  w ith  K a n t’s in s is ten ce  th a t  h a p p in e s s  is  
th e  n e ce ssa ry  re w a rd  in  th e  n e x t w orld. W ike w rites  th a t:
if the h ighest good is to be realized out of the world, then  th is definition of 
happiness does not m ake sense. How can we speak of the satisfaction of our 
needs and  inclinations in an  intelligible world? In this case, a  new definition of 
happiness is needed and so happiness in the intelligible world should perhaps 
be understood to be m oral happiness, self-contentment, or bliss.63
H ence, a s  K a n t  h a s  fo rm u la te d  th e  h ig h e s t good, i t  seem s inconceivab le  a s  a n  
object o f hope, a n d  seem s im possib le  for c re a tu re s  o f a  p u re ly  in te llig ib le  n a ­
tu re . T h is  does lea v es  u s , how ever, w ith  th e  possib ility  th a t  w e a re  co n fu sed  
on e ith e r  o f tw o p o in ts : h a p p in e ss  m ay n o t be  w h a t K a n t in te n d s  a s  th e  r e ­
w a rd  in  th e  n e x t  w orld , a n d  o u r ex istence in  th e  n ex t w orld  m ay  n o t  be  a s  
“in te llig ib le” a s  w e h a v e  co n sid ered  i t  here .
T he  f i r s t  p o ss ib ility  I  th in k  is  easily  d ism issed . As W ike p o in ts  ou t, 
K a n t is  n e v e r in c o n s ta n t  in  h is  u se  of th e  te rm  h ap p in ess , a n d  th ro u g h o u t 
h is  w ritin g s  h e  ta k e s  h a p p in e ss  to  be  of a  p h y s ic a l n a tu re . In d eed , th is  is  
w hy h a p p in e ss  is  excluded  from  p u re  m o ra lity  in  th e  f ir s t  p lace, a n d  w h a t 
le a d s  to  th e  d isc u ss io n  o f th e  an tin o m y  of th e  second Critique. A  p a r t ic u la r ly  
good exam ple  o f  th is  is  a  p a ssa g e  in  th e  second  Critique w h ere  h e  d isc u sse s  
se lf-co n ten tm en t, b liss , a n d  h a p p in e ss  a ll w ith in  th re e  p ag es .64 H ere , K a n t 
could  w ell h a v e  u s e d  a n y  of th e se  th re e  concepts as th e  re w a rd  fo r v ir tu e ,
62 Though it may also involve that “consciousness” that one is happy, but this is uncertain. See 
Kant on Happiness, pp. 3-4.
63 Kant on Happiness, p. 25.
64 Second Critique. Ak. 117-119.
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especially  g iven  h is  ex p lic it s ta te m e n t t h a t  a ll in c lin a tio n s , even  good ones, 
a re  “b u rd en so m e.”65 K a n t  could easily  h a v e  in s is ted 66 th a t  w e sh o u ld  h o p e  
for se lf-co n ten tm en t o r b lis s  in  th e  n e x t w orld , lea v in g  h a p p in e ss  to  t h i s  
w orld  alone, b u t  in s te a d  h e  concludes “t h a t  h a p p in e ss , th o u g h  i t  in d e e d  
co n stitu tes  th e  seco n d  e le m e n t of th e  h ig h e s t  good, does so only  a s  th e  
m orally  cond itioned  b u t  n ecessa ry  consequence  o f th e  fo rm er.”67
T h is does le a v e  u s  w ith  th e  possib ility , how ever, t h a t  K a n t does n o t  
in te n d  u s  to  be  p u re ly  n o u m en a l in  th e  “o th e r  w orld;” th is  is  a lso  th e  seco n d  
p rem ise  (above) w e w ish e d  to  exam ine. T h e re  is  som e in d ica tio n  t h a t  K a n t  
m ay  in d eed  believe  t h a t  th e  n ex t w orld  w o u ld  n o t be e n tire ly  in te llig ib le . L e t 
u s  beg in  by  a sk in g , w hy , in  fact, does K a n t  n o t sim ply  hope to  be  re lie v e d  o f  
a ll in c lin a tio n s  a lto g e th e r , a n d  th u s  hope  fo r w h a t he  te rm s  “b liss”? In d e e d , 
i f  we w a n t to  be  m o ra l, a n d  i f  we f in d  all in c lin a tio n s  to  be  “b u rd en so m e ,”68 
why shou ld  w e n o t h o p e  fo r th e  freedom  from  a ll  sensuous in c lin a tio n s?  T h e  
answ er, I th in k , b r in g s  u s  b ack  to K a n t’s  “w o rth in ess” eq u a tio n . In  p a r t ic u ­
lar, beyond th e  n e e d  K a n t  feels for v ir tu e  to  be rew ard ed , K an t  also  w a n ts  
th e  evil p e rso n  to  be  p u n ish e d . P u n ish m e n t, h e  says, is  “m ere  h a rm  in  its e lf ,” 
“involves a  fo rfe itu re  o f  h a p p in e ss  a  le a s t  i n  p a r t ,” a n d  “is  p h y sica l h a rm  
w hich, even  i f  n o t  b o u n d  a s  a  n a tu ra l  consequence  to th e  m ora lly  b ad , o u g h t 
to be b o u n d  to  i t  a s  a  consequence  acco rd ing  to  p rin c ip le s  o f m o ra l le g is la ­
tion .”69 T hus, w e see  b o th  t h a t  evil p e rso n s  o u g h t to  be p u n ish e d  a n d  t h a t  
such  p u n ish m e n t invo lves a  “physica l h a rm .” T h is  seem s to in d ic a te  t h a t  i f  
we ag ree  th a t  n o n -v ir tu o u s  pe rsons o u g h t to  be  p u n ish ed , even  in  th e  a f te r ­
life, th e n  w e c an n o t s im p ly  hope for b liss  fo r everyone; i f  everyone s im p ly
65 Ibid, Ak. 118. Kant seems to reject this notion of “burdensome” inclinations in the Relig­
ion, but he certainly could have alluded to it here, since he brings it up in the middle of this discussion.
66 Though not, perhaps, given his belief in the necessity of reward and punishment; see below.
67 Second Critique, Ak. 119.
68 As I noted above, Kant did not always hold this view. See: Religion, p. 51.
69 All three quotations: second Critique. Ak. 37.




d ied  a n d  w ere  su b seq u en tly  only in te llig ib le  c re a tu re s , th e n  th o se  deserv in g  
of p u n is h m e n t  w ould escape it, n o t to  m e n tio n  th a t  th e re  w o u ld  be no  p ro ­
p o r tio n a te  rew a rd in g  of v ir tu e  w ith  h a p p in e s s . K a n t in s is ts  in  th e  Religion 
t h a t  “n o  re lig io n  can  be conceived o f  w h ic h  invo lves no  b e lie f  in  a  fu tu re  life... 
a n d  th e re fo re  in  a  h eav en  a n d  hell; fo r  th is  b e lie f  au to m a tica lly  o b tru d es  i t ­
se lf  u p o n  everyone by  v ir tu e  o f th e  u n iv e r s a l  m o ra l d isposition ...”70 a n d  
w rite s  in  th e  Metaphysics of Morals t h a t  “th e  b e lie f  in  a  fu tu re  life  does no t, 
s tr ic tly  sp e ak in g , come f ir s t  in  o rd e r  t h a t  p e n a l  ju s tice  m ay  b e  se e n  to  have  
a n  e ffect u p o n  th a t  fu tu re  life; b u t, converse ly , th e  in fe ren ce  to  a  fu tu re  life  is  
d ra w n  fro m  th e  necessity  for p u n is h m e n t .”71 H ence, K a n t in s is ts  t h a t  a ll r e ­
lig ions n e e d  a  b e lie f  in  p u n ish m e n t, a n d  b e ca u se  p u n ish m e n t is  a  p h y sica l 
n e g a tio n  o f h ap p in ess , p u n ish m e n t c o u ld  n o t occur in  a  p u re ly  in te llig ib le  fu ­
tu re  life .72
T h e re  is  fu r th e r  rea so n  to c o n s id e r  th is  possib ility . W h en  K a n t sp e ­
cifically  a d d re sse s  th e  n a tu re  of t im e  a t  th e  “e n d  of th e  w orld ,” h e  seem s to  
in d ic a te  t h a t  o u r ex istence n e c e ss ita te s  e x is tin g  in  tim e . I  w ill on ly  ad d re ss  
th is  p o in t  b riefly , as K a n t’s d iscussion  is  r a th e r  difficult, b u t  th is  d iscussion  
occurs in  “T h e  E n d  of A ll T h ings.”73 H e re , K a n t  is  concerned  w ith  “judgment 
day” a n d  “passing from time to eternity,” a n d  w ith  th e  q u es tio n  of w h a t i t  
m ig h t m e a n  to  h av e  a n  e n d  of tim e. K a n t  a rg u e s , b rin g in g  up  th e  n e e d  for
70 Religion, p. 117.
71 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 490 n. Ellington translation.
72 Victoria Wike, in her article “Another Look at Kant’s Arguments for Immortality,” also 
notes this strain in Kant’s thinking. She then uses this strain in an attempt to prove the necessary (moral) 
belief in an afterlife: “Practical reason requires immortality not because persons need an infinite amount 
of time to become worthy of happiness but because reason requires a reckoning of happiness with worth,” 
(p. 666). I think there are problems with this argument, namely the “worthiness equation” and the need 
of reason to believe “that actions done for the sake of the moral law have consequences” (p. 666), but at 
least Wike recognizes this aspect of Kant’s thinking. See Wike in: Proceedings o f  the Eighth Interna­
tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson 2, pL 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 661- 
668.
73 Immanuel Kant, “The End of All Things,” in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, 
History, and Morals, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1983). 93-105.
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p u n ish m e n t a g a in , t h a t  from  a  p rac tic a l p o in t o f v iew  we c a n n o t b e liev e  in  a  
“monistic v iew  o f  e te rn ity ,”74 fo r th is  w ould  n o t le n d  credence to  re a so n ’s  n o ­
tion  o f “a n  e te rn ity  in  w h ich  th e re  w ill be  consequences g o v e rn ed  by  a  good  o r 
b ad  p rin c ip le  c o m m e n su ra te  w ith  th is  m e r it  o r t h a t  g u ilt.”75
H ow ever, in  a d d itio n , K a n t a rg u e s  t h a t  re a so n  m u s t th in k  o f  i t s e l f  a s  
occurring  in time. T h is  a s se r tio n  is  r a th e r  s u rp r is in g . K a n t g ives u s  tw o  
rea so n s  fo r th is  a s se r tio n . F irs t , p ra c tic a l re a so n  s tr iv e s  to w a rd  a n  end, b u t  
“since w h e re  th e re  is  no  tim e , th e re  c an  a lso  b e  no end,” w e m u s t  re je c t th e  
p ro spec t t h a t  e te rn ity  w o u ld  b e  tim eless , a n d  in s te a d  “th in k  a n  unending  d u ­
ra tio n .”76 Second, K a n t  a rg u e s  th a t  th e  re p re se n ta tio n  of e te rn ity  a s  o u ts id e  
of tim e,
offends the im agination. For then, surely, na tu re  in its en tire ty  will be fixed 
and, as it were, petrified; the las t thought, the  last feeling will come to a  
standstill... For a  being who is able to be conscious of its existence an d  its  ex­
ten t (as duration) only in time, such a life, if  it can be called ano ther life, m ust 
appear the sam e as [this] life’s annihilation, for in order to th ink  its w ay into 
such a sta te , a  being such as ourselves m ust in general th ink  of som ething, bu t 
thinking includes a  [process of] reflection, which can itself only happen  in 
tim e.77
T hus, b ecau se  w e a re  d u ty  b o u n d  to  p u rsu e  a n  e n d  th a t  w e c a n  n e v e r  fu lly  
achieve, a n d  becau se , K a n t  a rg u es, th in k in g  re q u ire s  ex is tence  in  tim e , 
“n o th in g  re m a in s , th e n , fo r rea so n  excep t to  th in k  o f s te ad y  p ro g re ss  to w a rd  
i ts  u ltim a te  p u rp o se  th ro u g h  a  (tem porally) u n e n d in g  p rocess o f  c h an g e , in  
w hich  in s ta n c e  i ts  character... re m a in s  p e rm a n e n tly  th e  sa m e .”78 R e g a rd le s s  
o f th e  p la u s ib ility  o f  th is  a rg u m e n t, i t  does in d ic a te  a n o th e r  re a so n  w h y  K a n t  
m ay  th in k  o f th e  a fte r life  a s  o ccu rring  in  a  no t-w h o lly  in te llig ib le  re a lm .
74 Ibid., Ak. 328.
75 Ibid., Ak. 330.
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T h e re  is  even  a fu r th e r  re a so n  to  consider th is  p o ss ib ility . K a n t in d i­
c a te s  i n  a ll  o f h is  w ritin g s  t h a t  w e cou ld  n ever m e a su re  u p  to  th e  m o ra l law; 
th e  m o ra l la w  d em an d s fu ll subm ission , a n d  i t  is  c le a r  t h a t  ev en  th e  b est of 
u s  h a v e  tra n sg re ss io n s . In d eed , i t  is  th is  p o in t w h ich  le a d s  to  K a n t’s  problem  
(an tin o m y ?) in  th e  Religion b e tw een  fo rg iveness (a to n e m e n t)  a n d  p u n ish ­
m e n t, n e c e s s i ta t in g  a  G od w ho is  “benevo len t,” n o t  m ere ly  ju s t :
I f  now it is adm itted tha t, though indeed all m en are guilty  of sin, some among 
them  m ay be able to achieve m erit, then the verdict of Him who judges from 
love becomes effective. In  the  absence of th is judgm ent [i.e., justice without 
benevolence], only a verdict of rejection could follow, whose inescapable conse­
quence would be the judgment of condemnation...19
T h is  le a d s  to  th e  follow ing co n sid era tio n : p e rh a p s  w e sh o u ld  h o p e  fo r e te rn a l 
“p ro g re s s” to w a rd  p u re  m o ra lity  b ecau se  any  ju d g m e n t w h ic h  w e or God 
co u ld  m a k e  w ith  re g a rd  to  o u r m o ra l s ta tu s  w ould  be  one o f  condem nation , 
s in ce  w e  c a n n o t m a k e  up  for p a s t  tran sg re ss io n s ; th u s , w e sh o u ld  h o p e  for 
p ro g re s s  p rec ise ly  b ecause  w e w ill a lw ay s come u p  s h o r t  o n  a n y  ju d g m e n t 
w h ich  w o u ld  be  “fin a l.” K a n t w rite s  in  th e  second  Critique:
on the basis of his previous progress from the worse to the  m orally better... he 
m ay hope for a further unin terrup ted  continuance of th is  progress... But he 
cannot hope here or a t any foreseeable point of his fu ture existence to be fully 
adequate to God’s will, w ithout indulgence or remission which would not har­
monize w ith justice. This he can do only in the infinity o f his duration which 
God alone can survey.80
H ence , i t  is  p o ss ib le  th a t  w e sh o u ld  on ly  hope for p ro g ress , t h a t  is , hope  for 
a n  e n d u r in g  ex is ten ce  in  tim e , in s te a d  o f hop ing  for a n  e x is te n ce  a p a r t  from  
tim e , fo r  o th e rw ise  w e sh o u ld  rig h tly  be  ju d g ed  in a d e q u a te  to  th e  m o ra l law , 
a n d  th u s  d e se rv in g  o f som e p u n ish m e n t.
79 Religion, p. 137. Kant’s full discussion of the attributes of a judging God: pp. 131-138.
80 Second Critique, Ak. 123-4. Italics added for emphasis. See also: Religion, pp. 60-72 and 
Lectures on Philosophical Philosophy, p. 163.




D e sp ite  th e se  th re e  possib le re a so n s  fo r K a n t to th in k  th a t  th e  n e x t 
w orld  w ou ld  b e  one  in  w hich  we e x is ted  in  tim e  a n d  in  n a tu re , K a n t m ak es 
o th e r  s ta te m e n ts  w h ich  seem  to  in d ic a te  t h a t  th e  n ex t w orld  is  p u re ly  in te l­
lig ib le. O u r  in i t ia l  rea so n  for th in k in g  th is  is , o f course, K a n t’s in s is ten c e  on 
th e  in te llig ib le  n a tu re  o f h u m a n  be ings, a n d  th e i r  be ing  c o n s titu te d  as 
au tonom ous o n ly  a s  th e y  a re  m em bers o f th e  n o u m en a l rea lm . H ow ever, 
th e re  a re  o th e r  re a so n s  to th in k  th is  a s  w ell. I n  th e  Religion K a n t w rites 
t h a t  “rea so n  c a n  n e ith e r  ta k e  a n  in te re s t  in  d rag g in g  along, th ro u g h  e te rn ity , 
a  body...”81 I n  th e  f i r s t  Critique K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  w o rld  o f th e  h ig h e s t 
good “is  in d e e d  a n  in te llig ib le  w orld  only , s ince  th e  sensib le  w o rld  ho lds o u t 
no p rom ise  t h a t  a n y  su ch  system atic  u n i ty  o f e n d s  can  a ris e ...”82 T here  is  
a lso  K a n t’s in s is te n c e  th a t  th e  t ru e  m o ra l c h a ra c te r  o f p e rso n s  is  u n ch an g in g , 
th a t  one’s  p a r tic ip a tio n  in  th e  in te llig ib le  re a lm  is, from  th e  so lu tio n  to th e  
th ird  a n tin o m y  o f th e  f i r s t  Critique, free  from  cau se  a n d  effect, a n d  K a n t’s 
p re s e n ta tio n s  o f im a g es  of a n  e te rn ity  in  w h ich  one’s se lf-co n ten tm en t (or 
lack  thereof), i.e ., so -called  “m oral h a p p in e ss ,” w ou ld  re m a in  in  effect. P e r ­
h a p s  th e  s tro n g e s t  a rg u m e n t is  K a n t’s  a sse r tio n , p a rad o x ica lly  enough  oc­
c u rr in g  a g a in  in  “T h e  E n d  of All T h in g s ,” t h a t
in the  m oral order of purposes, th is end  [of all time] is a t the  same time the 
beginning of the supersensuous survival of these same tem poral beings, conse­
quently th e  beginning of their existence as beings th a t do not stand under 
conditions of time, and thus their beginning as beings whose sta te  is such as to 
allow nothing o ther th an  a moral evaluation of their na ture .83
T h is s ta te m e n t  c e r ta in ly  in d ica tes  a  w holly  su p e rse n su o u s  ex is ten ce  in  th e  
n e x t w orld . H en ce , i f  w e are , m ost im p o rta n tly , in te llig ib le  c re a tu re s , i t
81 Religion, p. 119 n. This is not necessarily a good indication of his views, since this passage 
concerns “the hypothesis of the spirituality of rational world-beings” though Kant does say that “this hy­
pothesis is more congenial to reason” than a “materialism of personality.”
82 First Critique, A814 = B842.
83 “End of All Things.” Ak. 327.
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se em s s tra n g e  to be d en ied  access to  th is  rea lm  o f p u re ly  m o ra l ex istence  a f­
t e r  th e  d e a th  of o u r bodies.
I n  th e  end, th e re  se em s to  b e  no  w ay  to  m a k e  a  conclusion  re g a rd in g  
e i th e r  K a n t’s  opinion on th e  n e x t  life , or th e  n e ce ssa ry  n a tu r e  o f th is  fu tu re  
ex is ten ce . T he  f irs t  seem s im p o ssib le  since K a n t m a k e s  so  m a n y  v a rie d  
s ta te m e n ts  b u t  does n o t d isc u ss  th e  is su e  d irec tly . T h e  second  is  im possib le  
g iv en  th e  d ic ta te s  o f th e  Critique o f Pure Reason t h a t  no  know ledge  of th e  
su p e rse n s ib le  is  possible. N e i th e r  does th e re  seem  a  re so lu tio n  possib le  from  
a  m e re  p ra c tic a l p o in t o f v iew , s in ce  deny ing  a  se n su o u s  a fte rlife  seem s to  
p re c lu d e  th e  possib ility  o f p u n is h m e n t, w hile  th e  a s se r tio n  o f a  sen su o u s a f­
te r life  seem s to  rob u s  o f th e  p o ss ib ility  of ev er p a r t ic ip a tin g  in  a n  ex istence  
w h ic h  w ou ld  be  p u re ly  moral. T h is  is  c e rta in ly  a  p ro b lem  in  K a n t’s  th o u g h t, 
w h ic h  m a y  be  m ore or le ss  se rio u s . A t le a s t  i t  seem s to  force th e  conclusion 
t h a t  th e  h ig h e s t good is  in co n ce iv ab le  in  th e  sense  t h a t  w e c a n n o t im ag in e  
w h a t  th e  n a tu re  of o u r f u tu re  ex is ten ce  m ig h t be, e sp ec ia lly  in  th e  sense  r e ­
q u ire d  fo r a n  experience o f h a p p in e s s  w hich  w ould  a llow  fo r p ro p o rtio n a te  
re w a rd s  o r p u n ish m en ts . N o r  do w e seem  to h a v e  a n y  ra t io n a l  a rg u m e n ts  to 
p re fe r  one  conception to th e  o th e r .
L e t m e m en tion  one  a d d itio n a l p rob lem  w ith  K a n t’s co n sid era tio n s  on 
tim e  a s  th e y  p e r ta in  to th e  h ig h e s t  good. T h is  is  a  p ro b lem  ra is e d  by  Jo h n  R. 
S ilb e r  in  h is  “T he E th ic a l S ig n ifican ce  of K a n t’s Religion.”** T h e  problem  is 
t h a t  w h ile  K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  c h a ra c te r  of one’s d isposition  
(Gesinnung) is  to  re m a in  u n c h a n g in g , “m o ra l vo lition  is  in e lu c ta b ly  tem poral. 
T h e  w ill is  tem p ted  in  tim e , d ec id es in  tim e, and , d e p en d in g  on  i t s  decision, 
fee ls  g u ilty  o r sa tis fied  in  tim e ... K a n t  ag a in  a n d  a g a in  re fe rs  in  tem p o ra l 
te rm s  to  th e  p rob lem s of m o ra l vo lition , im provem ent, a n d  decline .”85 P u t
84 John R. Silber, “The Ethical Significance of Kant’s Religion,” introduction to Religion 
Within the Limits o f  Reason Alone, by Immanuel Kant, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1960), Ixxix-cxxxiv.
85 “Ethical Significance.” pp. xcviii-xcix.
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b lu n tly , w h a t  good is  th e  p h e n o m e n a l w o rld  i f  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f o ne 's  d isposi­
tion  is  a lre a d y  decided  a n d  does n o t  change?  I f  th e re  is  no re a l  p ro g re ss , no 
re a l s tru g g le  in  th is  w orld, th e n  o u r  ex is ten ce  in  i t  seem s p u rp o se le ss . In ­
deed, th e  command  o f th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e  m u s t  ta k e  p lace  i n  a  p h e ­
n o m en a l w orld . S ilb e r  considers th is  su ch  a  p ro b lem  th a t  h e  fee ls o b lig a ted  
to  re c o n s tru c t m u c h  of K a n t’s p h ilo so p h y  re g a rd in g  th e  n o u m e n a l re a lm .86
R
A  seco n d  p rob lem  is  th e  q u e s tio n  o f h o w  to  sq u a re  K a n t’s  tw o  a p p a r­
en tly  co n flic tin g  c la im s th a t  p ro g re ss  is  re q u ire d  a n d  th a t  one’s m o ra l d ispo­
s itio n  re m a in s  u n c h an g in g . O n  th e  one h a n d , w e h a v e  seen  above t h a t  p rog ­
re ss  is  r e q u ire d  o f h u m a n  b e in g s  in  th e ir  m o ra l endeavo r. O n  th e  o th e r  
h a n d , e sp ec ia lly  in  K a n t’s Religion, th e  n a tu r e  o f o u r  (m oral) d isp o sitio n  
seem s u n a b le  to  p ro g ress  fo r tw o re a so n s . T h e  f irs t , a lso  d iscu ssed  above, is  
th a t  o u r m o ra l n a tu r e  is  n o t su p p o sed ly  lo c a te d  in  tim e, u n le s s  w e re je c t 
K a n t’s d iv is io n  o f th e  n o u m en a l a n d  p h e n o m e n a l re a lm  a lto g e th e r. Indeed , 
K a n t even  s ta te s  t h a t  “a good o r a n  ev il d isp o sitio n  a s  a n  in b o rn ... c o n s titu ­
tion ... h a s  n o t  b e e n  acq u ired  in  tim e .”87 T h e  second  reason , m ore im p o r­
ta n tly , is  K a n t’s d e sc rip tio n  o f th e  n a tu r e  o f o u r  d isposition  (Gesinnung). In  
o rd er to  a v o id  th e  p rob lem  o f a t t r ib u t in g  o u r  m o ra l fa ilu re s  m ere ly  to  th e  in ­
fluence  o f n a tu r e ,  w h ich  w ou ld  th e n  re s u l t  in  th e s e  fa ilu re s  n o t b e in g  attrib­
utable to  u s , K a n t  exp licitly  concludes in  th e  Religion88 th a t  ev il in  th e  w orld  
com es from  th e  su b o rd in a tio n  o f th e  m ax im s o f  th e  m o ra l la w  to  th e  m ax im s 
o f h a p p in e ss . N a tu re  is  n o t to  b lam e , b u t  h u m a n s  them se lves, for fre e ly  se t­
tin g  th e  in te r e s ts  o f  h a p p in e ss  above th e  m o ra l law . H ow ever, w h a t  th is  in ­
d ica tes  is  t h a t  th e r e  is  no m idd le  g ro u n d  b e tw ee n  th e  m orally  good a n d  th e
86 See “Ethical Significance,” pp. xcvii-ciii. I do not have space to assess his reconstruction
here.
87 Religion, p. 20.
88 Though this may be implicit as early as the Grundlegung.
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m o ra lly  b a d  p erso n ; e ith e r  th e y  h a v e  w illed  to  w ill in  accord w ith  th e  m o ra l 
law , o r th e y  w illed  to  su b o rd in a te  m o ra l m ax im s to desire . C o m m en ta to rs  
o ften  re fe r  to  th is  as  K a n t’s “rig o rism .” H ence , K a n t w rites th a t  a  p e rso n ’s 
“d isp o sitio n  in  re sp ec t to  th e  m o ra l la w  is  n e v e r  ind iffe ren t, n e v e r  n e ith e r  
good n o r  ev il. N e ith e r  c an  a  m a n  b e  m o ra lly  good in  som e w ays a n d  a t  th e  
sa m e  tim e  m o ra lly  evil in  o th e rs . H is  b e in g  good in  one w ay  means t h a t  h e  
h a s  in c o rp o ra te d  th e  m o ra l la w  in to  h is  m ax im .”89 T hus, w h ile  K a n t  o ften  
ta lk s  a b o u t p ro g re ss  a n d  even  a  r a n g e  o f p o ss ib ilitie s  for m o ra l d isp o sitio n ,90 
i t  se e m s t h a t  o u r  d isposition  is  a lso  i n  som e w ay  rig h tly  co n sid e red  to  be  e i­
th e r  good o r evil, w ith  on ly  a n  “im m e a su ra b le  gulf” in  betw een , fo r  “th e  d is ­
p o sitio n , i.e., th e  u ltim a te  su b jec tiv e  g ro u n d  o f  th e  adoption  of o u r  m ax im s, 
c a n  b e  one  on ly ...”91 T hus, i f  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  ta k e n  to be  th e  re w a rd in g  o f 
p ro p o r tio n a te  h a p p in e ss  to  v ir tu e , a n d  i f  th e re  c an  be only a  good o r a n  ev il 
w ill, th e n  th e r e  seem s to  be  only  a  s e t  a m o u n t o f  h a p p in e ss  for good p e rso n s , 
a n d  a  s e t  a m o u n t o f p u n ish m e n t fo r ev il p e rso n s . K an t’s in s is te n c e  on  
“rig o rism ” o f m o ra l c h a ra c te r  a n d  h is  d e s ire  fo r p ro p o rtio n a te  d eg rees  o f r e ­
w a rd  a n d  p u n is h m e n t seem  to  be  a t  odds w ith  each  o ther. W hile th is  does 
n o t m a k e  th e  h ig h e s t good inconceivab le  per se, i f  we accept K a n t’s  rigo rism , 
i t  c e r ta in ly  s t r a in s  th e  defin itio n  a n d  n o tio n  o f a  h ig h es t good w h ich  is  a  sy s­
te m  o f “p ro p o rtio n a te ” consequences fo r v ir tu e .
89 Religion, p. 20. Italics added for emphasis. See also Kant’s discussion in a footnote to p. S3 
regarding the “immeasurable gulf” between moral goodness and evil.
90 Ibid., pp. 24-27, and “Ethical Significance,” p. cxxvi. This specific range, however, might 
not conflict with an “all or nothing” interpretation of the good will: the individual subject to the “frailty” 
of human nature has already willed to take the moral law into his/her disposition, and although having 
occasional problems, still has a will which is good. Indeed, there does not exist, for Kant, a good person 
who is not in some way frail. Those who have “impurity” of human nature are ultimately evil, for they 
have not willed to take the moral law for their own, and thus are subject to the whims of nature. Thus, 
“perhaps, every time” the person takes the quest for happiness as his or her ultimate disposition, and are 
thus evil. John R Silber., “Ethical Significance,” Ixxix-cxxxiv. Certainly several commentators have ad­
dressed this issue. Henry E. Allison, as a notable example, suggests that these “stages” in the Religion 
can be made coherent with Kant’s rigorism by bringing in the concept of “self-deception;” Henry E. Alli­
son, “Kant’s Doctrine of Radical Evil,” 51-72.
91 Religion, p. 20.
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c
W hile  K a n t  m ay  h a v e  a  w ay to escape th e  above prob lem s, th o u g h  
p e rh a p s  on ly  by  p u t t in g  in c red ib le  s tra in s  on th e  r e s t  o f h is  ph ilo sophy , th e  
n e x t p rob lem  w ith  th e  conceivab ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t good I  ta k e  to  be  severe .
I t  is  th is : in  a ll  o f  K a n t’s w ritin g s , he  m a in ta in s  th a t  i f  w e w ere  to  h a v e  p ro o f 
th a t  a ll  o u r  a c tio n s  w ou ld  be  rew ard ed  w ith  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss  o r  p u n ­
ish m en t, th e n  th e  r e s u l t  w ou ld  b e  th e  d e a th  of m o ra lity , for w e (u ltim ate ly ) 
cou ld  n o t fa il  to  ta k e  c o n sid e ra tio n s  of h a p p in e ss  a s  th e  u ltim a te  in c e n tiv e s  
for ou r m ax im s. I  w ill te rm  th is  th e  “p u p p e t” p rob lem , fo r K a n t w rite s  t h a t  i f  
“God a n d  e te rn ity  in  th e ir  aw fu l m ajes ty  w ould  s ta n d  u n ceasin g ly  befo re  o u r 
eyes,”92 th e n
because the disposition from which action should be done cannot be instilled by 
any command, and because the spur to action would in this case be always 
present and  external, reason would have no need to endeavor to ga ther its 
strength  to resist the inclinations by a vivid idea of the... law. Thus m ost ac­
tions conforming to the law would be done from fear, few would be done from 
hope, none from duty. The m oral worth of action... would not exist a t  all. The 
conduct of m an, so long as his nature rem ained as it now is, would be changed 
into mere m echanism ... as in a puppet show...93
B ecause  w e co u ld  n o t b u t  h e lp  be in fluenced  by  th e  e x te rn a l s itu a tio n  a ro u n d  
u s  a n d  o u r (n a tu ra l  a n d  n o t in tr in s ic a lly  evil) concern  fo r h ap p in ess , i f  we 
could  be conv inced  o f th e  ex is tence  of God, th e  r e s u l t  w ou ld  be r a th e r  
paradox ica l: w ith  th e  p ro o f o f G od (or even God’s  p resen ce) w ould  com e th e  
fac t of God’s r e w a rd  o r p u n ish m e n t, a n d  we w ou ld  be  so (n a tu ra lly ) 
concerned  for o u r  w ell-be ing  t h a t  w e w ould s im p ly  n o t be  able  to  w ill m orally . 
A ll o u r ac tions w o u ld  (p resum ab ly ) be legal, b u t  th e y  cou ld  n o t be  m o ra l 
p rec ise ly  b ecau se  one cou ld  n o t w ill th ese  ac tio n s in  accord  w ith  d u ty  a lone . 
T hus, w ith  th e  know ledge  o f  God, “a ll ou r m o ra lity  w ou ld  b re a k  dow n. In  h is
92 Second Critique, Ak. 147.
93 Ibid.
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every  ac tio n , m a n  w ould re p re se n t G od to  h im s e lf  as a  re w a rd e r  o r av en g er. 
T h is  im a g e  w o u ld  force i ts e lf  in v o lu n ta r ily  on  h is  soul, a n d  h is  hope  fo r 
re w a rd  a n d  fe a r  o f p u n ish m e n t w ou ld  ta k e  th e  p lace  of m o ra l m o tives.”94 
K now ledge o f in ev itab le  consequences fo r m o ra l a n d  im m oral ac tio n s  w ould  
le a d  to  th e  com plete  b reakdow n  o f th e  m o ra l law .95
O bviously , i f  th is  is  tru e , th e n , p a rad o x ica lly , th e  ex is tence  o f  th e  
h ig h e s t good a s  a  p ro p o rtio n a te  re w a rd in g  fo r v ir tu e  w ould  c re a te  th e  dem ise  
o f v ir tu e . O r, m o re  precisely  p u t, existence in  a  w orld  in  w hich  v ir tu e  w as 
know n  to  b e  re w a rd e d  by p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e s s  w ould d estro y  one’s  ab ility  
to  follow  th e  ca teg o rica l im p era tiv e , ev en  th o u g h  a ll  of one’s ac tio n s co u ld  be 
lega l. I f  o n e  e x is te d  in  a  w orld  in  w h ich  one’s v ir tu e  w as v isib ly  re w a rd e d , by 
K a n t’s ow n ad m iss io n , one w ou ld  u l t im a te ly  be  in cap ab le  of w illin g  in  accord  
w ith  th e  m o ra l  law . The only s itu a tio n  in  w h ich  th is  m ig h t n o t h a p p e n  
seem s to  b e  a  s ta te  in  w hich p e rso n s  w e re  already m orally  p erfec t, w illin g  in  
fu ll accord  w ith  th e  m oral law . B u t, a s  w e sa w  above, we m u s t a lw ay s  ju d g e  
ou rse lves to  b e  s h o r t  of th is  id ea l. A nd, w h ile  K a n t  a t  tim es h in ts  t h a t  i t  
m ig h t b e  p o ss ib le  fo r th e  h u m a n  race  to  e v e n tu a lly  achieve th is  s ta te  o f 
m o ra l p e rfe c tio n , th e re  a re  a lso  s ta te m e n ts  b y  K a n t  th a t  w e w ill on ly  b e  ab le  
to  a p p ro x im a te  th is  goal, a n d  n e v e r  re a c h  i t .  T herefo re , w illing  to  e x is t in  a  
s ta te  w h e re  v ir tu e  w as know n to  be  re w a rd e d  b y  (p roportionate) h a p p in e s s  
cou ld  n o t p o ss ib ly  b e  com m anded by  th e  m o ra l law , since i t  w ould  le a d  to  th e  
v e ry  o p p o site  in te n d e d  by th e  m o ra l law , n a m e ly  i ts  own dow nfall. N o r  cou ld  
th is  be  a  s ta te  com m anded  by  re a so n  to  b e  b ro u g h t abou t by  u s . T h u s , th e  
h ig h e s t good is , i n  th is  sense, s im p ly  inconceivab le .
94 Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 121.
95 For further confirmation of Kant’s belief in the “puppet” problem, see: second Critique, Ak. 
38 and 84, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, pp. I l l  and 121, and Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 377-8. 
Such a possibility is also suggested in the Religion in Kant’s discussion of the “ im p u rity ” of the human 
heart (pp. 23-25 and 32-3), in which case mere legality happens to be the easiest and happiest thing to 
will, which leads to what Silber calls “the quiet death (euthanasia) of morality [(Silber himself gets the 
term “euthanasia” from Kant, Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 378)J through his confusion of moral and non- 
moral incentives” (“Ethical Significance.” p. cxxii).
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T h e  f in a l p rob lem  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t  good a s  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss  
re la te s  to  K a n t’s s ta te m e n ts  t h a t  h u m a n  beings a re  sim ply  n o t d e s ig n ed  for 
h a p p in e ss . I  do n o t th in k  t h a t  th i s  p ro b lem  ren d e rs  th e  h ig h e s t good com­
pletely inconceivab le , b u t  I  th in k  i t  m u s t  be  a t  le a s t  a  s tu m b lin g  block. W e 
m ig h t s ta te  th e  p rob lem  as  th is : K a n t  m a in ta in s  n o t only  th a t  n a tu r e  is  of­
te n  u n p re d ic ta b le  co n cern in g  th e  ou tcom e of w illin g, even  w illin g  h a p p in e ss , 
b u t  t h a t  e v en  i f  n a tu r e  w ere  completely cooperative, h u m a n s  w ou ld  s ti ll  n o t 
be  ab le  to  be  h a p p y . K a n t n o te s  t h a t  th e  te rm  "sensuous c o n te n tm e n t,” even  
th o u g h  synonym ous w ith  a  d e fin itio n  o f h a p p in e ss  a s  "co n te n tm e n t w ith  o u r 
ex is ten ce”96 o r a s  "co n ten tm en t w ith  one’s  physical state (freedom  from  evils 
a n d  e n jo y m en t o f e v e r- in c re a s in g  p le a su re )”97 is “im p ro p erly  so ca lled ” a  
“c o n te n tm e n t” b ecau se  “in c lin a tio n s  v a ry ; th ey  grow  w ith  th e  in d u lg e n ce  w e 
allow  th e m , a n d  th e y  leave  b e h in d  a  g re a te r  void th a n  th e  one w e in te n d e d  to  
fill.”98 H u m a n s  a re  never, K a n t se e m s  to  in d ica te , c o n te n t w ith  th e i r  s e n su ­
ous s itu a tio n . In  th e  “Id ea ” K a n t  w rite s  t h a t  “i t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  n a tu r e  is  u t ­
te r ly  u n c o n ce rn e d  th a t  m a n  five w e ll,”99 in  th e  Grundlegung th a t  “th e  concept 
o f h a p p in e s s  is  su c h  a n  in d e te rm in a te  one th a t  even  th o u g h  everyone  w ishes 
to  a t t a in  h a p p in e ss , y e t h e  c a n  n e v e r  sa y  defin ite ly  a n d  c o n s is ten tly  w h a t i t  
is  t h a t  h e  re a lly  w ishes a n d  w ills ,”100 a n d  goes so fa r  in  th e  Critique o f Judg­
ment to  a s s e r t  t h a t  h a p p in e ss  is
an  idea to which he tries to m ake th a t  sta te  adequate under m erely empirical 
conditions (which is impossible)... [S]ince his understanding is tied to imagi­
nation and the senses, he form ulates the  idea so diversely and even changes 
the  concept so often th a t na tu re , even if it  were subjected completely to m an’s
96 Second Critique, Ak. 25.
97 Religion, p. 61.
98 Second Critique, Ak. 118.
99 “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent.” Ak. 20.
100 Grundlegung. Ak. 418.
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choice, still could not possibly adopt a  definite and fixed universal law that 
would [keep] it in harm ony with th a t wavering concept an d  so with the pur­
pose th a t each person chooses to se t himself... [I]t is not his na tu re  to stop 
possessing and enjoying a t  some point and  be satisfied.101
H ence , h u m a n s  a re  n o t d e s ig n e d  fo r h a p p in e ss  n o t on ly  b e c a u se  th e y  h a v e  no 
in s t in c t  fo r  i t, b u t  a lso  b e c a u se  th e y  a re  n e v e r c o n te n t fo r m o re  th a n  m o­
m e n ts  a t  a  tim e  w ith  th e ir  s t a te  o f w ell-being . E v en  i f  n a tu r e  w ere  a lig n ed  
w ith  h u m a n s ’ w ishes, K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  h a p p in e ss  is  too  “w av erin g ” a  
concep t to  a llow  th a t  h u m a n s  w o u ld  be  sa tis f ie d  w ith  th e i r  c o n d itio n  o f w ell­
be in g . A s K a n t su m m arize s : "even  i f  n a tu re  o u ts id e  u s  w e re  u t te r ly  benefi­
cen t, i t s  p u rp o se  w ou ld  n o t b e  ach ieved ... i f  th a t  p u rp o se  a im e d  a t  th e  h a p p i­
n e s s  o f o u r  species, b e ca u se  n a tu r e  w ith in  u s  is  n o t  rec ep tiv e  to  i t .”102
N ow  th is  d o c trin e  a lo n e  m ay  n o t pose  a  se rio u s  th r e a t  to  th e  h ig h e s t 
good, th o u g h  th e  h ig h e s t good se em s sa v e d  only i f  K a n t  b r in g s  in  th e  no tion  
o f God. K a n t  seem s to  in d ic a te  t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  s im p ly  n o t  d e s ig n ed  for 
h a p p in e ss . T h is seem s to  b e  t r u e ,  even  o n  a  m ore m o d est d e fin itio n  o f h a p p i­
n e ss  th a n  K a n t’s  o rig in a l o n e .103 T h e  re s u ltin g  p ro b lem  is  t h a t  h u m a n s  seem  
to b e  in c a p a b le  o f e x p e rien c in g  m u ch  h a p p in e ss , le t  a lo n e  a  c o n tin u a l  s ta te  of 
h a p p in e s s  w h ich  w o u ld  b e  e x a c tly  p ro p o rtio n a te  to  th e i r  v i r tu e . A t le a s t  th is  
sh o u ld  ru le  o u t once a n d  fo r a l l  a n y  n o tio n  th a t  h u m a n s  c o u ld  do th is  fo r one 
a n o th e r .104 B u t, i f  h u m a n s  sire n o t ab le  to  do th is  th em se lv e s , K a n t  m ay  le ­
g itim a te ly  b e  ab le  to  b r in g  in  a  G od w ho can , for K a n t  h a s  a lr e a d y  in s tru c te d  
u s  o f  th e  n e e d  for a  G od w ho c o u ld  u n ite  th e  “cause” o f v ir tu e  w ith  th e  “effect” 
of p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss . So w h ile  a  s in g le  p e rso n  h im /h e rs e lf  cou ld  n o t 
b r in g  a b o u t h is /h e r  ow n h a p p in e s s , even  i f  a ll o f n a tu re  w a s  cooperative ,
101 Critique o f  Judgment, Ak. 430.
102 Ibid.
103 “Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively,... intensively,... and proten- 
sively..." A806 = B834. And: “a rational being’s consciousness of the agreeableness of life which with­
out interruption accompanies his whole existence is happiness,” second Critique, Ak. 22.
104 This, I think, is another reason to reject those commentators, including Silber and Reath. 
who assert that we could bring about the highest good on earth ourselves.





p e rh a p s  K a n t could  a rg u e  th a t  G od w ho is  om n isc ien t, m oral, a n d  all- 
pow erfu l cou ld  know  enough  a b o u t n a tu re  a n d  eac h  in d iv id u a l’s  n eed s  to  be 
ab le  to  re w a rd  th a t  p e rso n  p ropo rtiona lly . K a n t  often  ta lk s  a b o u t th e  im ­
possib ility  of k n o w in g  how  G od m ig h t b r in g  th is  abou t, b u t  t h a t  w e ju s t  h ave  
to  do o u r d u ty  a n d  hope.
H ow ever, i f  w e com bine th is  in c a p a b ility  o f  in d iv id u a ls  to  be  co n tin u ­
ously  h a p p y  w ith  a n o th e r  o f K a n t’s te n e ts , th e  h ig h e s t good seem s to  be 
th re a te n e d  again. T h is  second  te n e t  is  K a n t’s  in d ic a tio n  t h a t  hum an beg in s 
a re  a lso  n o t h a p p y  w ith  w h a t is  g iven  to  th e m , a n d  th a t  th e y  w ill on ly  be 
h a p p y  i f  th ey  b r in g  th e  h a p p in e ss  ab o u t th em se lv e s . H ence, K a n t te lls  u s  in  
one o f th e  n in e  th e s e s  o f th e  “Id e a ” th a t  “Nature has willed that man, entirely 
by himself, produce everything that goes beyond the mechanical organization 
of his animal existence and partake in no other happiness or perfection than 
what he himself, independently o f instinct, can secure through his own rea­
son.”105 H u m a n s , m u ch  to  th e ir  ch ag rin , m u s t  a tte m p t to  f in d  h a p p in e ss  
th ro u g h  reaso n , a  s i tu a tio n  of n a tu re  w h ich  seem s ill-su ited  to  h a p p in e ss  a n d  
c a n  even  le a d  to  a  h a t r e d  o f re a so n .106 K a n t seem s to  in d ic a te  in  th e  second  
Critique t h a t  h a p p in e ss  on ly  occurs w hen  h u m a n s  give a n  ob ject to th e m ­
selves, seek  to b r in g  ab o u t th e  object, a c tu a lly  b r in g  abou t th e  object, a n d  
th e n  see  w h e th e r  th e  object b rin g s  th em  th e  a n tic ip a te d  p le a su re .
T h is p ic tu re  seem s to be  in tu itiv e ly  co rrec t: w hile a t  f i r s t  i t  m ig h t be 
w onderfu l to  h a v e  a n y th in g  w e w a n t g iven  to  u s  w h en ev er w e w a n t it ,  o r 
even  s im p ly  to  receive re w a rd s  fo r w h ich  w e h a v e  n o t w orked, I  th in k  u l t i ­
m a te ly  th is  s i tu a tio n  w ould  n o t b r in g  u s  h a p p in e ss , a s  so m a n y  sto ries , r e ­
p o rts , a n d  even  fo lk  ta le s  seem  to  in d ica te . T h is  seem s to  be w h a t  K a n t in d i­
ca te s  by  w riting :
,os “Idea,” Ak. 19.
106 Grundlegung, Ak. 395-6.
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the determ ining ground o f choice consists in the conception of an object and  its 
relation to the subject, whereby the faculty of desire is determ ined to seek its 
realization. Such a relation to the subject is called pleasure in the reality  of an 
object, and  it m ust be presupposed as the condition of the possibility of the de­
term ination of choice.107
K a n t w rite s  t h a t  “no m an  a sk s , w h en  h e  is  concerned  only  w ith  th e  a g re e ­
ab len ess  o f life , w h e th e r  th e  ideas a re  from  th e  se n se  or th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g ; 
h e  a sk s  on ly  h o w  m uch  a n d  h o w  g re a t  is  th e  p le a su re  w h ich  th e y  w ill a ffo rd  
h im  over th e  lo n g e s t tim e.”108 T h is  seem s to  in d ica te , aga in , t h a t  h u m a n s  
m u s t  fo rm u la te  th e  id ea  o f th e  ob ject t h a t  w ill (perh ap s) m ak e  th e m  
(m om en tarily ) h a p p y , a n d  th e n  t r y  to  b r in g  ab o u t th e  ex istence  of th is  object. 
In  h is  Lectures on Philosophical Theology, K a n t a s se r ts  th a t  “th e  n o v e lis t is  
q u ite  conscious o f th e  fac t t h a t  h e  c a n n o t describe h a p p in e ss  a s  m ere  en- 
jo m en t. R a th e r , i t  is  labor, d ifficu lty , effo rt, th e  p ro spec t of tra n q u ill i ty , a n d  
th e  s tr iv in g  to w a rd  th e  a ch iev e m e n t o f th is  id ea  w hich  is  h a p p in e ss  fo r 
u s ...”109 T h u s, i t  a lso  seem s fro m  K a n t’s  w ritin g s  th a t  w e a re  n o t h a p p y  w ith  
th o se  th in g s  g iv en  to  u s  from  w ith o u t, o r those  (m ate ria l)  th in g s  w h ich  do n o t 
com e a b o u t th ro u g h  re a so n .110
T he  th r e a t  to  the  conce ivab ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t good is  th e  p o ss ib ility  
t h a t  n o t even  G od could  m ak e  u s  h a p p y , even  i f  G od k new  w h a t w ould , in  
fact, m a k e  u s  h a p p y  in  th e  n e c e ssa ry  p ro p o rtio n  to  v ir tu e . I f  h a p p in e ss  fo r 
h u m a n  b e in g s  i s  th e  s tr iv in g  a f te r  a n d  ach iev in g  o f ends w hich  th e y  s e t  
them se lves, a s  K a n t  seem s to  in d ic a te  t h a t  i t  is, th e n  i t  seem s G od c a n n o t 
s im p ly  give a  p e rso n  th e  h a p p in e s s  w h ich  th ey  w ou ld  m erit. I  do n o t  th in k  
w e could  im a g in e  a  w ay for G od to  give u s  h a p p in e ss  w hich  w ould  seem lik e
107 Second Critique, Ak. 21. See also: Ak. 8 n. and Ak. 22.
108 Ibid., Ak. 23. Italics added for emphasis.
109 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 119.
110 See also: Kant’s discussion of “the empty longing... for the golden age” in the “Speculative 
Beginning of Human History.” Ak. 120, as well as his objections to Hobbes’ father-like ruler in “Theory 
and Practice,” Ak. 290-1.




we w ere s tr iv in g  a f te r  i t  a n d  a c h ie v in g  i t  on o u r  ow n w ith o u t a  se rio u s  e n ­
c ro ach m en t on o u r  free  w ill. H en ce , I  th in k  th a t  b e tw een  th e  fa c t th a t ,  a s  
K a n t in d ica te s , h u m a n s  a re  s im p ly  n o t d e s ig n ed  to  en joy  h a p p in e s s  fo r an y  
g re a t le n g th  o f tim e , a n d  th e  fa c t  t h a t  h a p p in e ss  com es from  th e  s tr iv in g  a f­
te r  a n d  ach iev in g  o f c e r ta in  e n d s , I  th in k  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good a s  a  p ro p o r­
tio n a l sy s tem  o f h a p p in e s s  is  inconceivab le , on K a n t’s  ow n te r m s .111
IV.
In  th is  c h a p te r , I  h a v e  t r ie d  to  a rg u e  t h a t  K a n t’s concep tion  o f th e  
h ig h e s t good a s  th e  re w a rd in g  o f  v ir tu e  w ith  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e s s  is  a n  
e n d  w hich  is  inconceivab le . I t  i s  inconceivab le , fo r th e  fo llow ing  re a so n s : 1) 
th e re  a p p e a rs  to  b e  no  n e c e ssa ry  connec tion  b e tw een  th e  d is p a ra te  e le m e n ts  
of v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e ss , 2) w e c a n n o t  conceive (from  a n y  p o in t of view ) o f th e  
n a tu re  of h u m a n  b e in g s in  a  f u tu r e  w orld , o r w h y  h a p p in e s s  w o u ld  b e  d e s ir ­
ab le  in  th is  s ta te , 3) th e  n a tu r e  o f o u r  “c h a ra c te r” le a d s  to  a n  e ith e r /o r  s i tu a ­
tio n  o f b e in g  good o r evil, a n d  t h u s  a llow s o f no  p ro p o rtio n a l re w a rd s  o r p u n ­
ish m en ts , 4) e x is tin g  in  a  w o rld  w h e re  v ir tu e  is  re w a rd e d  w ith  h a p p in e s s  
w ould  le a d  to  a  “p u p p e t” e x is te n c e  a n d  w ou ld  u n d e rm in e  m o ra lity , a n d  5) 
h a p p in e ss  does n o t seem  to be  so m e th in g  w h ich  h u m a n s  a re  d e s ig n ed  to  e n ­
joy, p a r tic u la r ly  in  a n  “a fte r life .” T h e  h ig h e s t good a s  K a n t  h a s  d ep ic ted  it, 
w h ile  h a rm o n iz in g  w ell w ith  th e  r e s t  o f K a n t’s sy s tem , m u s t  u l t im a te ly  b e  
re jec ted  a s  a  concep tion  o f r e w a rd in g  o f v ir tu e  w ith  h a p p in e ss .
S u b seq u en tly , i t  fo llow s t h a t  i t  c an n o t be o u r  duty  to  p ro m o te  o r o u r  
duty  to  b r in g  a b o u t th e  h ig h e s t  good. H ow  a re  w e to  b r in g  a b o u t a n  object 
w h ich  is  inconceivable?  H ow  c o u ld  w e, even  i f  w e co u ld  k n o w  th e  m a x im  
w hich  a n o th e r  is  u s in g  for a n  a c tio n  (w h ich  w e c a n  n e v e r  know ), possib ly
111 Kant does write in a footnote in the Religion (p. 24 n.) about “delight” which one would ex­
perience before one willed it or even knew of its existence, for example, a hitherto unsampled intoxicant. 
Perhaps the highest good could be saved by conceiving of it as each person being (proportionally) re­
warded by continually differing “delights,” but I think this conception would be radically different from 
the highest good as Kant conceives it and I think we would find such a condition eventually unsatisfac­
tory.
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re w a rd  a n o th e r  w ith  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss , given th a t  h u m a n s  a re  no t 
d e s ig n e d  to  en joy  o r  receive h a p p in e ss?  H ow  cou ld  we h a v e  a  d u ty  to  b rin g  
a b o u t a  sy s tem  o f  im m e d ia te  a n d  u n a v o id a b le  consequences fo r v ir tu e  i f  K a n t 
b e liev es  su c h  a  sy s te m  to in e v ita b ly  d e s tro y  th e  v e ry  fo u n d a tio n  o f  m o ra lity  
itse lf?  T h is  h ig h e s t  good sim p ly  c a n n o t b e  th e  object of o u r  w ill.
H ow ever, h a v in g  sa id  th is , l e t  m e  qu ick ly  a d d  th a t  i t  is  o n ly  this v e r­
s io n  o f  th e  h ig h e s t  good w hich  I  th in k  i s  inconceivab le , w h ile  th e r e  is  a n o th e r  
v e rs io n  w h ich  I  th in k  does se rv e  a s  a  n e c e ssa ry  e n d  o f m o ra l w illing . P e r ­
h a p s  I  h a v e  a lr e a d y  given en o u g h  c lu es  a s  to  w h a t  th is  v e rs io n  m ig h t be. I  
in d ic a te d  above t h a t  th e  re a l  p ro b lem  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t good is  K a n t’s neces­
s a ry  in s is te n c e  on  th e  sy n th e tic  a priori co m b in a tio n  of v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e ss , 
fo llow ed  b y  a d d it io n a l  p rob lem s re g a rd in g  th e  fa c t t h a t  h um ans a re  n o t de­
s ig n e d  fo r h a p p in e s s  in  a n  a fte rlife . H ow ever, i f  w e can  se v e r th e  (positive) 
co n n ec tio n  b e tw e e n  v ir tu e  a n d  h a p p in e s s , I  th in k  th e  h ig h e s t good w ill r e ­
m a in  on  firm  foo ting . We h a v e  se en  t h a t  th e re  is  in d ee d  a n  im p o r ta n t  con­
n e c tio n  b e tw ee n  h a p p in e ss  a n d  v ir tu e , b u t  t h a t  th is  connection  is  m ere ly  
n e g a tiv e : “h a p p in e s s  is  m ere ly  a  m e a n s  fo r rem o v in g  obstac les to  [one’s] m o­
r a l i ty  -- a  permitted  m ean s, s ince  no  one  e lse  h a s  a  r ig h t  to re q u ire  o f m e th a t  
I  sac rifice  m y  e n d s  i f  th ese  a re  n o t im m o ra l.”112 H a p p in ess  is  necessary w hen  
i t s  ab sen c e  is  d e tr im e n ta l  to  th e  m o ra l p ro jec t; th is  is  th e  n e g a tiv e  connec­
tio n . T h ese  co n ce rn s  m o tiva te  th e  d u tie s  I  h a v e  re g a rd in g  h a p p in e s s  fo r m y­
s e lf  a n d  o f o th e rs , a s  c la rified  in  th e  Metaphysics o f Morals. A n d  h a p p in e ss  
i s  permitted  w h e n  th e  a g en t p u rs u in g  h a p p in e s s  know s t h a t  th e re  i s  no  con­
flic t b e tw ee n  w h a t  s /h e  is  w illin g  a n d  th e  m o ra l law ; in  th is  case , th e r e  is  no 
connec tion , w h ich  i s  w hy  h a p p in e ss  is  p e rm itte d .
H ence  th e  d u ty  to p rom o te  th e  h ig h e s t  good o u g h t to  be  p r im a rily  
co n ce rn e d  w ith  th e  m o ra l im p ro v em en t o f  a ll  o f h u m a n k in d . W h a t w e a re  
le f t  w ith  a f te r  th e  above an a ly s is  is  th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e ’s  u n re le n tin g
112 Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 388.
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com m and  th a t  each  p e rso n  is  to  im prove h is /h e r  m oral willing As K a n t says 
in  th e  Religion, “th e  f in a l p u rp o se  even  of rea d in g ... ho ly  sc r ip tu re s , or of in ­
v e s tig a tin g  th e ir  co n ten t, is  to  m ak e  m en  b e tte r ... [T]he m o ra l im p ro v em en t 
o f m en ... c o n s titu te s  th e  r e a l  e n d  o f a ll re lig io n  of reason ...”113 T h is  is  th e  
com m and  o f th e  m o ra l law , a n d , according  to  K a n t, a s  f a r  a s  w e c a n  te ll, 
th e re  is  no  re a so n  to  th in k  t h a t  i t s  com m and  c a n n o t be  obeyed. In  add ition , 
how ever, b ecau se  th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e  already com m ands u s  from  a  
s ta n d p o in t o f e x is tin g  w ith  o th e r  h u m a n  b e in g s , th e  m o ra l la w  com m ands u s 
to  a id  th o se  a ro u n d  u s  in  th e i r  m o ra l im p ro v em en t as w ell. T h is , in  m an y  
resp ec ts , is  a  “b ro ad ” d u ty  to w a rd  o thers , s in ce  w e can  h a v e  no  specific com ­
m a n d s  re g a rd in g  how  to  a id  a n o th e r  person . H ow ever, th e re  is  a lso  th e  sp e­
cific d u ty  to  b r in g  a b o u t a  g o v e rn m en t w hich  o p e ra te s  in  acco rd  w ith  rea so n ’s 
conception  o f R igh t. O n ly  a  sy s te m  o f g o v ern m en t w hich  o p e ra te s  w ith in  cer­
ta in  p a ra m e te rs  is  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  freedom  o f a ll hum an b eings. A nd, in  
ad d ition , su ch  a  g o v e rn m en t m u s t  u ltim a te ly  b e  concerned  w ith  th e  in te rn a ­
t io n a l com m unity , a n d  e s ta b lis h  i ts e lf  in  su ch  a  w ay th a t  p e ac e  m ay  be  ob­
ta in e d . P eace  is  n e ce ssa ry  so t h a t  th e  m o ra l p ro jec t m ay  n o t  be  h a m p e re d  by 
o u tsid e  in fluences. H ence, w e m ig h t fo rm u la te  th e  d u ty  to  p ro m o te  th e  h ig h ­
e s t good as: th e  d u ty  to  p ro m o te  v ir tu e  in  a ll  p e rso n s , b o th  b y  c o n ce n tra tin g  
on m o ra l v a lu e s  (a  fu n c tio n  o f “c u ltu re ”)114 a n d  by  e lim in a tin g  a ll  e x te rn a l 
obstacles to  th e  p rom otion  o f v ir tu e . In  th e  fo llow ing c h a p te rs  w e w ill now  
tu r n  o u r focus to  th is  v e rs io n  o f th e  h ig h es t good, d iscu ssin g  th e  m o ra l p ro g ­
re s s  o f th e  h u m a n  race, th e  connec tion  b e tw een  p rog ress  a n d  po litics , a n d  
how  K a n t en v is io n s su c h  m o ra l p rog ress  as occurring .
113 Religion, p. 102.
114 We shall discuss this further below, but let me say at least this to block an early objection. 
Certainly Kant does indicate that it is not possible to make another virtuous. This is why, in the Meta­
physics o f Morals, we have only the duties to increase our own virtue and to help others in their well­
being. But Kant surely also indicates that we can help others to “hear’' the call of the moral law which 
they give to themselves (the incentive stemming from the “ Wille”). Kant writes a great deal both on the 
correct pedagogical method for teaching ethics, as well as the role of “Kultur" in the promotion of the 
virtue of humankind.




M ost K a n t c o m m en ta to rs  s im p ly  igno re  K a n t’s in s is ten ce  t h a t  th e re  
is  a n  im p o r ta n t  connection  b e tw een  m o ra lity  a n d  p o litica l in s titu tio n s . T h a t 
th is  connec tion  receives su c h  a  la c k  o f a tte n tio n  is  p robab ly  d u e  to  one  of 
th re e  rea so n s .
F irs t ,  fo llow ing S c h o p e n h au e r’s cue  a n d  w o rk in g  m ostly  from  th e  
Grundlegung, m a n y  c o m m en ta to rs  s t i l l  co n sid er K a n t’s  e th ics to  b e  e n tire ly  
fo rm al in  n a tu re .  B u t I  h a v e  a rg u e d  th a t  th e  fa c u lty  o f reaso n  is  p rac tica l, 
a n d  K a n t re a so n s  th a t  i t  m u s t  n e ce ssa rily  h a v e  a n  object i f  i t  is  to  w ill, for 
“e th ics  goes b eyond  th is  [R ight] a n d  p rov ides a  matter (an  object o f  free  
choice), a n  e n d  o f p u re  re a so n  t h a t  i t  p re se n ts  a s  a n  e n d  w hich  is  a lso  objec­
tive ly  n ecessa ry , th a t  is , a n  e n d  w hich , a s  fa r  a s  m e n  a re  concerned, i t  is  a  
d u ty  to  h a v e .”1
Second, co m m en ta to rs  be lieve  th a t  in d iv id u a ls  h ave  a  d u ty  to  obey 
th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e , re g a rd le ss  of th e  e x te rn a l  s itu a tio n , th u s  a  d is­
cussion  o f p o litica l in s t i tu t io n s  is  su p e rflu o u s . W h ile  i t  is  c e rta in ly  t ru e  th a t  
p e rso n s  m u s t  obey th e  m o ra l la w  no  m a tte r  w h a t th e i r  condition, th is  cer­
ta in ly  does n o t exclude th e  p o ss ib ility  th a t  w e sh o u ld  t ry  to im prove  condi­
tio n s  so t h a t  m o ra l im p ro v em en t is  m ad e  eas ie r. W e c an  see K a n t’s  concern  
for th is  p ro b lem  in  h is  d iscu ssio n s ab o u t w ar, th e  d u ty  to  prom ote  th e  h a p p i­
n e ss  of o th e rs , n e ce ssa ry  fo rm s o f g o v e rn m en ta l o rg an iza tio n , pedagog ica l
1 Metaphysics o f  Morals. Gregor trans.. Ak. 380.
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m eth o d s, c u ltu re , as  w ell a s  h is  m an y  a s id es . K a n t w as c learly  co n ce rn ed  
w ith  how  to a s s is t m o ra l p ro g ress .
T h ird , co m m en ta to rs  h a v e  a rg u e d  t h a t  o u r  m o ra l d u ty  on ly  co n ce rn s 
o u rse lves, a n d  th a t  b ecau se  w e sh o u ld  (o r c a n  be) concerned  only  w ith  th e  
im p ro v e m e n t o f o u r ow n w ill, th e re  is  no  d u ty  to w a rd  o th ers . Again , I  h a v e  
t r ie d  to  show  t h a t  th is  is  fu n d a m e n ta lly  m is ta k e n . T he q u estio n  o f m o ra lity  
o n ly  com es up  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace  in  re la tio n  to  o u r  invo lvem en t w ith  o th e rs , 
a n d  w e a re  lin k e d  to th e m  th ro u g h  a  m o ra l a n d  n a tu r a l  community. In  a d ­
d itio n , a s  w e can  see e sp ec ia lly  in  th e  Critique o f Judgment a n d  th e  Religion, 
K a n t  a lso  m a in ta in s  t h a t  w e h a v e  a  d u ty  a s  h u m a n  b e ings to  m o ra lly  im ­
p ro v e  o u r  species; o therw ise , w e a re  w ith o u t p u rp o se  a n d  h a v e  no  m o re  w o rth  
them  an im als .
In  th is  c h ap te r , I  w a n t  to  e s ta b lis h  th is  l in k  b e tw een  m o ra lity  a n d  
p o litic s  a s  a  c e r ta in  te n e t  o f K a n t’s ph ilo so p h y . I  h a v e  a rg u e d  th a t  th e re  a re  
tw o loca tions for th e  h ig h e s t good; i f  w e a re  to  ta k e  th is  se riously , th e n  w e 
m u s t  b e  concerned  w ith  th e  q u e s tio n  o f how  th is  h ig h e s t good on  e a r th  is  to 
com e ab o u t. T h is  is  la rg e ly  a  p o litica l q u e s tio n . W e h a v e  a lre ad y  e x a m in e d  
th is  id e a  before, n am e ly  in  o u r  d iscu ss io n s  o f  K a n t’s “Id ea ,” “T h eo ry  a n d  
P ra c tice ,” a n d  th e  Critique o f Judgment. M uch  o f K a n t’s w ritin g  on  th e  
m o ra l im p ro v em en t of h u m a n k in d  is  to  b e  fo u n d  in  h is  po litica l w ritin g s . 
H e re , I  sh a ll  exam ine  K a n t’s p o litica l w ritin g s , an a ly z in g  th em  in  ch rono log i­
c a l o rd er. I  w a n t to  s u b s ta n t ia te  th e  fo llow ing  c la im s th ro u g h o u t th is  c h a p ­
te r :  1) K a n t does posit th e  n e ce ssa ry  b e lie f  in  th e  m o ra l p ro g ress  o f th e  sp e ­
c ies, 2) th is  b e lie f  concerns h is to ry , th o u g h  i t  is  a  b e lie f  b a se d  on m o ra l e n d s  
a n d  is  n o t m e a n t to  be a  (m erely) re g u la tiv e  id e a  fo r th e  s tu d y  o f h is to ry  a s  a  
sc ience, 3) th a t  K a n t co n sid ers  th is  b e lie f  to  b e  n ecessa ry  i f  w e a re  n o t  to  
c o n s id e r  th e  w orld  a n d  a ll  c re a tio n  as  a  m e re  farce , 4) th e  m e a n s  w h ich  n a ­
tu r e  u se s  to  d rive  u s  to w a rd  p e rfec tion  is  “u n so c ia l sociab ility ,” a n d  5) c e r ta in  
p o litic a l o rg an iza tio n s a re  n e ce ssa ry  (b u t n o t su ffic ien t) for m o ra l p ro g re ss  to
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occur. In  th e  la s t  section , I  w ill a lso  d iscuss K a n t’s  seem in g ly  s tra n g e  c la im  
t h a t  n a tu r e  a lone  m u s t  be  th e  g u a ra n to r  of peace. I  w ill a rg u e  t h a t  th is  is  a  
p e rfec tly  u n d e rs ta n d a b le  c la im , a n d  fu r th e rm o re  a  n e c e ssa ry  one, g iven  th e  
re q u is ite  cond itions fo r th e  m o ra l p ro jec t to b e g in  in  e a rn e s t.
n.
A. Speculative Beginning o f Human History(l 786)
In  th is  essay , K a n t u s e s  th e  s to ry  of G en es is  a s  h is  “g u id in g  th re a d ” 
to  p ro d u ce  a  h is to ry  o f th e  b e g in n in g  o f th e  u se  o f re a so n . S h o w in g  t h a t  th is  
is  n o t  m e a n t to  be  u se d  fo r th e  sc ien tific  s tu d y  o f h is to ry  per se, h e  n o te s  th a t  
h is  “sp e cu la tio n s” “c a n n o t co m p are  w ith  th o se  h is to r ie s  th a t ,  a s  a c tu a l  r e ­
p o r ts  w hose  v e rif ica tio n  r e s ts  on  g ro u n d  e n tire ly  d iffe re n t f ro m  th e  m ere  
p h ilo so p h y  o f n a tu re , s e t  o u t th e  v e ry  sam e e v en ts  a n d  a re  to  b e  b e liev ed  a s  
su c h .”2
W h a t in te re s ts  u s  h e re  is  K a n t’s ta lk  o f p ro g ress . K a n t  m a in ta in s  
th a t ,  a s  th e  “fo u r th  s te p ” o f re a so n , h u m a n s  re a liz e d  t h a t  th e y  w ere  “to  be  th e  
t ru e  end of nature”3 A fte r d isc u ss in g  ju s t  how  m u ch  re a so n  in te r fe re s  w ith  
p le a s u re  a n d  h a p p in e s s  (so t h a t  w e a re  n o t c o n fu sed  a n d  w ro n g ly  ta k e  h a p ­
p in e s s  to  be  o u r u ltim a te  end ), K a n t  w rites:
W hether m an has gained or lost as a result of this change [from instinct to 
reason] can no longer be asked, a t least if one looks to the vocation of his spe­
cies, which consists of nothing other than  progress tow ard perfection... [T]his 
p a th  th a t for the species leads to progress from the worse to the  b e tte r does not 
do so for the individual.4
2 “Speculative Beginning,” Ak. 109. At the close of the essay Kant again states that “such a 
picture of man’s history [as we have here] is useful and conducive to his instruction and betterment...” 
(Ak. 123).
3 “Speculative Beginning,” Ak. 114.
4 Ibid.. Ak. 115.




T h is  q u o ta tio n s  confirm s m an y  o f o u r  above po in ts . K a n t a rg u e s  th a t  th e  
h u m a n  rac e  is th e  “end of nature,” b u t  on ly  because  o u r “vocation” is  
“progress to w a rd  perfec tion .” A nd, b e c a u se  K a n t a sse r ts  th a t  “p a ra d is e ” a n d  
“b liss” a re  “a  c rea tio n  o f h is  im a g in a tio n  — w h ere  he  could  d ream  or tr if le  
a w ay  h is  ex is tence  in  peacefu l in a c tiv ity  a n d  p e rm a n e n t peace” a s  w e ll a s  a n  
“im a g in e d  p lace,”5 we a re  c e r ta in  t h a t  “perfec tion” h e re  does n o t m e a n  o u r  
a b ility  to  ach ieve h a p p in e ss , b u t  r a th e r  o u r  m o ra l perfection . A n d  w e se e  
a g a in  t h a t  such  perfec tion  (a t  l e a s t  in  th is  w orld) is  n o t m e a n t fo r th e  in d i ­
v id u a l, b u t  for th e  species.
W e also see  K a n t g iv ing  th e  sa m e  ex p lan a tio n  fo r how  th e  sp ec ies  is  
to  e n g e n d e r  su ch  a  m o ra l p ro g ress io n . K a n t h e re  ta lk s  ab o u t “c u ltu re ” in ­
s te a d  o f “unsoc ia l sociab ility ,”6 b u t  th e  d esc rip tio n  is e sse n tia lly  th e  sa m e . 
K a n t  a s se r ts  th a t  c u ltu re  w ill “p ro g re ss  so a s  to  develop capac itie s  b e lo n g in g  
to  m a n k in d ’s vocation  a s  a  moral sp ec ie s ...”7 a n d  th a t  w hile  n a tu ra l  im p u lse s  
seem  to do n o th in g  b u t  co n tr ib u te  to  vice, su ch  im pu lses
are, in themselves and as n a tu ra l capacities, good and serve a purpose. But 
since these na tu ra l capacities were given m an in his na tu ra l state , they  will 
conflict with culture as it proceeds, ju s t as it will conflict with them  un til a rt so 
perfects itself as to be a second na tu re , which is the final goal of the hum an 
species’ moral vocation.8
A gain , w e see  th a t  n a tu r a l  im p u lse s , w h ile  o ften  lead in g  in d iv id u a ls  to  
t r a n s g re s s  th e  m o ra l law , a lso  se rv e  fo r th e  developm ent of th e ir  cap ac itie s , 
a n d  se rv e  a s  a  s tim u lu s  to  c u ltu re  fo r th e  c o n tin u a l hon in g o f th e  sk ills  n e c ­
e s sa ry  fo r  m o ra l perfection .
s Ibid., Ak. 115.
6 Though Kant did use the term “Kultur” in the “Idea” as well, saying that “the idea of morality 
belongs to culture,” (Ak. 26).
7 “Speculative Beginning,” Ak. 116.
8 Ibid.. Ak. 117.
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We see th is  need  for conflict r e i te r a te d  in  K a n t’s d iscussion  of th e  
s e tt l in g  o f nom ad ic  tr ib e s  in to  fa rm e rs . K a n t  c la im s th a t  th e  b eg in n in g  of 
fa rm in g  n e c e ss ita te d  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  com m un ities , a n d
culture and the beginning of art, o f entertainm ent, as well as o f industrious­
ness... m ust have sprung from this; but above all, some form of civil constitu­
tion and of public justice began... a form of government... From this first, 
crude structure, all human arts, o f which sociability and civil security are the 
m ost worthwhile, could gradually develop... Inequality among men — that 
source of so many evils, but also o f everything good -- also began during this 
period and increased later on .9
H ere  w e see  fa m ilia r  them es; th o u g h  se c u rity  is  n ecessa ry , conflict is  a s  well; 
soc iab ility  is  n ecessa ry  for th e  in te ra c tio n  o f in d iv id u a ls  w h ich  th e re b y  
c au se s  conflict; conflict le a d s  to  th e  h o n in g  o f  re a so n ’s  sk ills ; a n d  governm en t 
is  n e c e ssa ry  a s  a  fo u n d a tio n  for m o ra l im p ro v em en t.
Indeed , w e sh o u ld  ta k e  K a n t’s in s ta n c e  on th e  n ecess ity  o f conflict for 
m o ra l p rom o tion  seriously , fo r h e  goes on  to  p re s e n t  a  case  w h ere  a ll  h e rd s ­
m en  f in a lly  s e t tle d  down, a p p a re n tly  w ith o u t a n y  conflict, le a d in g  to  a  s ta te  
w h ere
a scarcely begun culture [was] abandoned in slavery to a soulless opulence, ac­
companied by all the vices o f m an’s crude state [of existence], and, on the other 
hand, the human race’s irresistible urge to depart from the path marked out 
by nature toward developing its capacities for goodness. And it was thus that 
m an made him self unworthy of existing as a species designated to rule over 
the earth, and not as one designated to five in bovine contentm ent. . .10
9 Ibid., Ak. 119-20.
10 Ibid., Ak. 120. There is a strange tension in  this article between Kant’s statement that “even 
now the danger o f war is the only thing that tempers despotism, because wealth is required if  a  nation is to 
be powerful, and without freedom none o f the industriousness that produces wealth will arise” (Ak. 120), 
and his statement that “one must understand that the greatest evil that can oppress civilized peoples de­
rives from wars, not, indeed, so much from actual present or past wars, as from the never-ending and 
constantly increasing arming for future war,” (Ak. 121). I think this tension is easily explainable, how­
ever, by the fact that, while able to make some contributions to the development o f culture (especially in 
the initial stages), and while a t times being the (perhaps) only thing which keeps the human race from 
stagnating, war is, ultimately, a hindrance to the development of a true morality. This will be discussed 
further in the next chapter.
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H ence, m ere  c o n te n tm e n t w ith  life a n d  lack  o f con flic t a p p a re n tly , for K a n t, 
le a d s  to  a  s ta te  in  w h ic h  m o ra l developm ent does n o t  ta k e  p lac e ,11 a n d  in  
w hich  h u m a n s  a re  a g a in  “u n w o rth y ” o f h a v in g  b e e n  c re a te d , th u s  fo rfe itin g  
th e ir  p lace  a s  th e  “e n d  o f n a tu re .” A nd, a g a in , w e se e  K a n t’s  in s is ten c e  t h a t  
i t  is  n a tu re ’s  p la n  t h a t  th e  h u m a n  race  p ro g ress  m o ra lly .
A fin a l c o n firm a tio n  o f ou r m ajo r concerns i s  K a n t’s  “C onclud ing  R e­
m a rk ” in  w hich  h e  d isc u sse s  th e  fee lin g  o f “g r ie f  t h a t  th e  un reflec tive  do n o t 
know , a  g rie f t h a t  c a n  w ell le a d  to m o ra l ru in a tio n : th is  is  a  d isco n ten ted ­
n e ss  w ith  th e  p ro v id en ce  t h a t  governs th e  e n tire  c o u rse  of th e  w orld.”12 K a n t  
sp e a k s  ab o u t th e  n e c e ssa ry  “hope for so m e th in g  b e t te r ,” a n d  how  “i t  is  o f th e  
g re a te s t  im p o rtan ce ... to be content with providence... so t h a t  w e can  a lw ays 
ta k e  courage u n d e r  o u r  b u rd e n s  and ... fix  o u r  eyes on  t h a t  fa c t a n d  n o t n e ­
glect o u r  own o b lig a tio n  to  c o n trib u te  to  th e  b e t te rm e n t  o f ou rse lves.”13 
C lea rly  i t  is im p o r ta n t  fo r K a n t  to  hope  for (p o s tu la te )  m o ra l im p ro v em en t o f  
th e  species in  th e  w orld , i f  on ly  to  keep  u s  from  a b a n d o n in g  th e  m o ra l p ro j­
ect. A nd, again , K a n t  in s is ts  th a t  “th e  g re a te s t  e v il t h a t  c an  opp ress c iv ilized  
peoples derives from  wars,”14 a n d  h e  also  d isc red its  th e  hope  a n d  th e  “em p ty  
longing ... for th e  golden age...” o r for a  s ta te  l ik e  “Robinson Crusoe,” b ecau se  
su ch  a  w ish  is  “s tim u la te d ...  by  th e  w e a rin ess  t h a t  a  re flec tive  m a n  fee ls r e ­
g a rd in g  th e  c iv ilized  life  w h e n  h e  seeks i ts  w o rth  so le ly  in  enjoyment, a n d  
w h en  rea so n  p e rh a p s  re m in d s  h im  to give h is  life  m e a n in g  th ro u g h  ac tion  h e  
co u n te rac ts  th a t  re m in d e r  by  fa llin g b ack  in to  id le n e s s .”15 A ll th e  com po­
n e n ts  of ou r h y p o th e s is  a re  h e re : p ro g ress  o f th e  h u m a n  species in  th is  w orld
11 This hearkens back to K ant’s discussion o f his disapproval o f the Arcadian shepherd and the 
Tahitian villagers.
12 “Speculative Beginning,” Ak. 120-1.
13 Ibid., Ak. 121.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.. Ak. 122.
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as a  p o s tu la te  o f  re a so n  (a t  le a s t  h e re  for m o tiv a tio n a l reaso n s), th e  u se fu l­
n e ss  o f conflict, w a r  a s  (u ltim ate ly ) a n  im p e d im e n t to  m o ra l developm ent, 
a n d  h u m a n k in d  a s  th e  e n d  o f n a tu re .
R  The End o f All Things (1794)
W e h a v e  b rie f ly  m en tio n ed  th is  e s sa y  befo re , so w e s h a l l  only  sp e n d  a  
l i t t le  tim e  on  i t .  W h ile  K a n t  specifically  is  sp e a k in g  a b o u t th e  p roposed  e n d  
of th e  w orld  w h ich  is  to  h a p p e n  on " ju d g m en t d a y ,” th e re  is  a lso  th e  lu rk in g  
q u e s tio n  a b o u t w h a t  th e  cond ition  o f h u m a n k in d m ig h t be  on  th a t  day, a n d  
th u s  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  p ro g ress . K a n t n o tes  t h a t  th e  id e a  t h a t  a ll  p e rso n s  w ill 
be co n d em n ed  to  h e ll  w o u ld  give “no a d e q u a te  re a so n  to  ju s tify  w hy  in  g en ­
e ra l  p e rso n s  h a d  b e e n  c re a te d ” a n d  th e  id e a  t h a t  G od w ou ld  s im ply  d estroy  
God’s  c re a tio n  “w o u ld  in d ic a te  a  flaw ed  in te llig e n c e .”16 K a n t  concludes t h a t  
we m u s t  th in k  a b o u t o u r  possib le  fu tu re  ex is ten ce , a s  w ell a s  th e  fa te  o f th e  
species in  te rm s  o f  i t s  u se  o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . A ga in , w e see  th e  id ea  th a t  
“re a so n  te lls  th e m  t h a t  th e  d u ra tio n  o f th e  w o rld  h a s  a  w o rth  only in so fa r  a s  
th e  u lt im a te  e n d s  o f  th e  ex is ten ce  o f r a t io n a l  b e in g s  c a n  be m e t w ith in  i t ” a n d  
“i f  th e s e  sh o u ld  n o t  be  a tta in a b le , c rea tio n  i ts e l f  w o u ld  a p p ea r... as p u rp o se ­
less  a s  a  p la y  t h a t  h a s  no  u p sh o t w h a tso ev e r...”17 K a n t sp e a k s  of a  “u n iv e rsa l 
fee lin g  o f n e e d  to  c u lt iv a te  i ts  m o ra l cap ac ity .”18 K a n t  a g a in  affirm s h is  b e lie f  
in  th e  n e e d  n o t to  d o u b t t h a t  p rov idence  h a s  a c tu a lly  p ro v id ed  a  good a r ­
ra n g e m e n t fo r th is  w o rld  a n d  o u r  m o ra l dev e lo p m en t, fo r even  th o u g h  i t  m ay  
n o t seem  th is  w ay,
no m atter how difficult to believe it may be, where it is absolutely impossible 
to see with certainty in advance the result o f  particular m eans that are ac­
cepted on the basis of all human wisdom (which, if  it is to be true of its name, 
m ust proceed solely toward morality), one m ust in a practical way believe in a
16 Immanuel Kant, “The End o f All Things,” Ak. 329.
17 Ibid., Ak. 331.
18 Ibid.. Ak. 336.




concurrence between divine wisdom and the course of nature, if  one is not to 
give up one’s cherished ultim ate purpose.19
A gain , a s  w e sa w  above w ith  “T h e o ry  a n d  P rac tice ,” w h e re  th e  evidence is 
u n c e r ta in , “one  must in  a  p ra c tic a l  w ay  believe” in  p ro v id en ce ’s  gu idance  for 
o u r m o ra l p rog ress .
C  To [ward] Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795)
T h e  follow ing tw o a r tic le s  a re  p e rh a p s  th e  b e s t fo r a  co rrobora tion  of 
m y  th e s is . T h e  f irs t  is  “P e rp e tu a l  P eace ,” in  w hich  K a n t  o u tlin e s  h is  position  
a g a in s t  w a r  a n d  in tro d u ces  w a y s  in  w hich  w a r  c an  be  p re v e n te d . K a n t is  
co n ce rn ed  w ith  “a  c e r ta in  D u tc h  sh o p k eep er’s s ig n ” on  w h ich  “To [ward] P e r ­
p e tu a l  P eace” w as in sc rib ed  o v e r a  p ic tu re  of a  g ra v e y a rd .20 K a n t is  con­
c e rn e d  to show  th a t  p e rp e tu a l  p e a c e  is  no t to be  h a d  o n ly  w ith  d e a th , b u t can  
a n d  m u s t  b e  ach ieved  on e a r th . W hile  th e  f ir s t  h a lf  o f th e  p iece deals  w ith  
th e  specific  a rtic le s  t h a t  g o v e rn m e n ts  ough t to ab ide  b y  in  o rd e r to  e lim in a te  
w ar, th e  la t t e r  section  d ea ls  w ith  th e  lin k  b e tw een  peace , po litics , a n d  m o ra l­
ity .
K a n t te lls  u s  in  th e  l a t e r  p o rtio n  th a t  w a r  is  to  b e  e lim in a te d  for 
moral concerns, no t ju s t  for h a p p in e ss ;  th e  ca tego rica l im p e ra tiv e  “is  th e  
p r in c ip le  o f th e  moral politician ,21 fo r w hom  i t22 is  a  moral task..., a n d  its  
m e th o d  of p u rs u in g  p e rp e tu a l  p e a c e  -- w hich  one  now  d e s ire s  n o t m erely  as a  
p h y s ic a l good, b u t  also as a  c o n d itio n  th a t  a rise s  from  acknow ledg ing  one’s 
d u ty  — is  com plete ly  d is tin c t [b ecau se  i t  is  d e rived  from  th e  m o ra l law
19 Ibid., Ak. 337.
20 Immanuel Kant, “To[ward] Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Ak. 343.
21 Kant makes the distinction in “Perpetual Peace” between “a  moral politician, i.e., one who so 
interprets the principles of political prudence that they can be coherent with morality,” and “a political 
moralist, i.e., one who forges a morality to suit the statesman’s advantage,” (Ak. 372).
22 It is somewhat unclear what “it” refers to in this sentence. It may mean “perpetual peace” or 
"the problem of civil, international and cosmopolitan right.” both of w hich are mentioned before it.
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alone].”23 As h e  w ill exp la in  in  m ore  d e ta il  in  h is  Metaphysics o f Morals,
K a n t a rg u e s  t h a t  th e  n a tu re  o f g o v e rn m e n t is  n ecessa rily  a  q uestion  fo r m o­
ra lity , fo r i t  concerns th e  ac tions o f  free  a g e n ts  in  a  com m unity , a n d  on ly  th e  
m o ra l la w  c a n  give u s  th e  law  for th e  r ig h t  u se  o f freedom . T hus, “a d h e re n c e  
to  p o litica l m ax im s m u s t n o t be  b a s e d  on  th e  b e n efit o r h a p p in e ss  t h a t  each  
n a tio n  a n tic ip a te s ...;  in s tea d , a d h e re n c e  m u s t  derive  from  th e  p u re  concep t o f 
th e  d u ty  o f  r ig h t  (from  th e  ought, w hose  p rin c ip le  is  g iven a priori th o u g h  
p u re  rea so n ), le t  th e  p h y sica l consequences be  w h a t th e y  m ay.”24 I t  is  c le a r  
from  th e  e s sa y  t h a t  p e rp e tu a l peace  is  n e ce ssa ry  n o t only  for th e  sm oo th  
w ork ing  o f a  c o n stitu tio n , b u t, a s  w e sa w  w ith  th e  “Id ea ,” also b ecau se  i t  is  a  
m oral n ecessity .
H en ce , K a n t  gives u s  tw o re a so n s  to  accep t th e  lin k  be tw een  m o ra lity  
an d  po litics: p o litica l o rg an iza tio n s  a re  co n cern ed  w ith  th e  freedom  o f com ­
m u n a l a g e n ts , “th u s , t ru e  po litics c a n n o t p ro g ress  w ith o u t p ay in g  h o m ag e  to  
m orality ,”25 a n d  p e rp e tu a l  peace  is  a  m o ra l goal w hich  can  only  be ach iev ed  if  
th e  n e c e ssa ry  p o litica l o rg an iz a tio n s  a n d  co n s titu tio n s  a re  in  p lace, fo r “a  
people’s good m o ra l condition  is  to  b e  ex p ec ted  on ly  u n d e r  a  good c o n s titu ­
tion .”26 T h u s  i t  is  a  m oral im p e ra tiv e  t h a t  n a tio n s  ev en tu a lly  e n te r  in to  
(cosm opolitan) re la tio n sh ip s  w ith  o n e  a n o th e r  in  o rder to  se ttle  th e ir  d iffe r­
ences by  la w  in s te a d  of w ar, since “re a so n  ab so lu te ly  condem ns w a r a s  a  
m ean s o f d e te rm in in g  th e  r ig h t a n d  m a k e s  se ek in g  th e  s ta te  of peace  a  m a t­
te r  o f u n m it ig a te d  du ty .”27
23 “Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 377. See also: Heinz Wichmann, “Zum Problem des ewigen 
Friedens bei Kant,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt.
2 (Milwaukee: M arquette University Press, 1995), 876; Pierre Laberge, “Von der Garantie des ewigen 
Friedens,” pp. 151 and 153; Otfried Hdffe, “Einleitung: Der Friede — ein vernachlSssigtes Ideal,” pp. 9- 
10, 15, and 21; and Otfried Heffe,“V6lkeibund Oder Weltrepublik,” pp. 112 and 118-9, all in: Immanuel 
Kant: Zum Ewigen Frieden, Otfried Hdffe, ed. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).
24 “Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 379.
25 Ibid., Ak. 380.
26 Ibid., Ak. 366.
2 Ibid.. Ak. 356.





W e ag a in  see K a n t su g g e s tin g  t h a t  b e lie f  in  p rov idence, w h ich  m ig h t 
e s ta b lis h  th e  n ecessa ry  cond itions fo r m o ra l p ro g ress , a n d  th e  b e lie f  in  m ora l 
p ro g re ss  o f h u m a n  beings, a re  be liefs n e c e s s i ta te d  by p ra c tic a l re a so n , a n d  
th u s  se em  to  be  a  type  of p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . K a n t m e n tio n s  p rov i­
dence s e v e ra l t im e s  in  th is  essay , p a r t ic u la r ly  in  h is  in s is ten c e  t h a t  
“p e rp e tu a l  p eace  is  insured (g u a ra n te e d )  b y  n o th in g  less th a n  t h a t  g re a t  a r t ­
i s t  nature...”28 K a n t  w rites  th a t ,  r e g a rd in g  th is  in su ra n c e  b y  n a ­
tu re /p ro v id en ce :
the relationship of objects to and their conformity with the purposes that rea­
son itself sets out for us (the end o f morality) can be represented from a theo­
retical point o f view as a transcendent idea, but from the practical point of 
view  (where, e.g., it is employed in relation to our concept o f duty regarding 
perpetual peace), it is represented as a dogmatic idea and it is here that its 
reality is properly established .29
T hus, i t  is  from  a  p rac tica l p o in t o f v iew  th a t  th e  id ea  o f n a tu r e ’s  g u a ra n te e  
o f p e rp e tu a l  p eace  is  posited , a n d  w h ile  p ro v id en ce  is  c lea rly  th e  m o re  accu­
r a te  te rm  to  u se  fo r a  descrip tion  o f n a tu r e ’s  g u id in g  h an d , K a n t  fee ls  th a t  
“th e  te rm  nature is  le ss  pretentious t h a n  a  te rm  conno ting  t h a t  th e r e  is  a  
providence o f w h ich  we c an  h a v e  cogn itive  know ledge...”30 H e in z  W ichm an  in  
h is  a rtic le , “Z um  P roblem  des ew igen  F r ie d e n s  b e i K a n t,” a lso  a rg u e s  th a t  
su ch  a  g u a ra n te e  m u s t be seen  a s  s te m m in g  from  a  p rac tic a l p o in t  o f view , 
co n clu d in g  th a t :
[perpetual peace] remains therefore as a postulate, which can never be 
proven... The guarantee of peace is a precondition for the possibility, given by
28 Ibid., Ak. 360. Laberge attempts to make a distinction between what Kant means by 
“nature” and “providence” here, but I think that even i f  Laberge is correct (which I do not believe, unless 
it is only the difference between the connotations which these terms conjure up), this distinction does not 
play a significant role in our present concerns.
29 Ibid., Ak. 362. In this essay the term “dogmatic” is not used by Kant in his usual sense, and 
connotes nothing negative, unexamined, or purely transcendent.
30 Ibid.
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practical reason, th a t the concept of Right can be moved completely through 
politics to reality .31
N a tu re ’s  g u a ra n te e  of peace  is  n o t  kn o w n  by  sp e c u la tiv e  rea so n , b u t  is  p os­
ite d  b y  p ra c t ic a l  rea so n .
A nd , a s  K a n t  a rg u e d  in  th e  “Id ea ,” n a tu r e  e n s u re s  p eace  th ro u g h  th e  
a n ta g o n ism  b e tw e e n  in d iv id u a ls . R e g a rd in g  th e  “moral objective” of p e rp e t­
u a l  p e a c e ,32 K a n t  te lls  u s  (as in  th e  “Id e a ”) t h a t  i t  is  b ro u g h t  a b o u t in  th re e  
w ays: th ro u g h  a  p e rfec t in te r n a l  co n s titu tio n , “so lv ab le  ev en  fo r a  people  
co m p rised  of d ev ils  (if on ly  th e y  p o ssess  u n d e rs ta n d in g ) ,”33 th ro u g h  p eace  b e ­
tw e en  n a tio n s , “p ro d u ce d  a n d  se c u re d  by  a n  e q u ilib riu m  o f th e  liv e lie s t com ­
p e tin g  p o w ers ,”34 a n d  fin a lly  th ro u g h  a n  active  d e s ire  to  in te ra c t  w ith  one 
a n o th e r  in  a  co sm opo litan  w hole , fo r “th e  spirit o f trade c a n n o t coexist w ith  
w ar, a n d  so o n e r o r la te r  th is  s p i r i t  d o m in a tes  ev ery  p eo p le .”35 A gain, w e see  
K a n t’s in s is te n c e  on  a  n e c e ssa ry  p o litic a l cond ition  fo r  th e  p rom otion  o f m o­
ra lity , a  co n d itio n  b ro u g h t a b o u t th ro u g h  w a r  a n d  conflic t, w hich , u ltim a te ly , 
e lim in a te s  w a r  fo rev er,36 w h ile  m a in ta in in g  a  sa fe  a r e n a  o f com petition , so 
th a t  in d iv id u a ls  do n o t la p se  in to  a  s ta te  o f “bov ine” ex is ten ce .
K a n t  a lso  m en tio n s  th e  n e ce ss ity  o f b e liev in g  in  a  m o ra l p ro g ress  o f 
th e  species. W hile  th is  is  im p lied , I  th in k , b o th  in  K a n t’s  d iscussion  of h is  
d isa p p ro v a l o f th e  in n k e e p e r’s s ig n , a n d  by  th e  fa c t t h a t  h e  believes
31 “Es [perpetual peace] bleibt jedoch auch hier bei dem Postulat, der Beweis wird wiederum 
nicht angetreten... Das aber ist die Voraussetzung dafur, dafl der von der praktischen Vemunft geforderte 
RechtsbegrifF vollstdndig durch Politik in die Wirklichkeit umgesetzt werden kann,... dann auch den 
Frieden fur immer zu garantieren imstande sind,” (“Zum Problem des ewigen Friedens bei Kant,” p. 876. 
Above translation mine).
32 “Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 365.
33 Ibid., Ak. 366. On the forming of the constitution see: Ak. 365-7.
34 Ibid., Ak. 367.
35 Ibid., Ak. 368.
36 Hdffe considers this to be an advantage in Kant's thinking, namely that he “abandons the 
[impossible] ideal of freedom from all conflict” in favor of an international peace which comes about 
through conflict. See: Hoffe Otfried “Einleitung: Der Friede -- ein vemachlassigtes Ideal.” 18-19.
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p e rp e tu a l  peace  to  be  a  n ecessa ry  m o ra l goal because  i t  a lo n e  can  p rov ide  th e  
fo u n d a tio n  fo r m o ra l im provem en t, h e  a lso  w rites:
the course of world events justifies providence. For the m oral principle in man 
never dies out, and with the continuous progress of culture, reason, which is 
able pragm atically to apply the idea of right in accordance w ith the moral 
principle, grows through its persistence in doing so...37
H e re  a g a in  is  K a n t’s id ea  t h a t  re a so n  w ill a lw ays p ro g ress , a n d  t h a t  i t  w ill 
im p ro v e  w ith  tim e  a n d  w ith  p rac tice . A nd , K a n t concludes t h a t  w h ile  b e lie f  
in  m o ra l p ro g re ss  o f th e  species c a n n o t b e  p ro v en  th eo re tica lly , i t  m u s t  be  
p o s tu la te d  p rac tica lly :
UJt seem s impossible to be able to use a  theodicy to provide any justification 
w hatsoever for creation, namely, th a t  such a race of generally corrupt beings 
should have been put on earth . We will be unavoidably driven to such skepti­
cal conclusions, if we do not assum e th a t  pure principles of right have objective 
reality...38
H e re  w e a lso  see  th e  recu rren ce  o f K a n t’s b e lie f  th a t ,  i f  p e rso n s  w ere  c rea ted , 
th e n  w e c a n  on ly  ju s tify  th e ir  ex is ten ce  th ro u g h  m o ra l rea so n s , a n d  t h a t  w e 
m u s t  a ssu m e  m o ra l p rog ress in  o rd e r  n o t  to  be d riv en  to w a rd  skep tic ism . 
P e rh a p s  th e  fo llow ing quo ta tion  p ro v id es  a n  accep tab le  su m m a ry  of K a n t’s 
position :
na tu re  guarantees perpetual peace by virtue of the m echanism  of m an’s incli­
nations themselves; to be sure, it does not do so with a certain ty  sufficient to 
prophesy it  from the theoretical point of view, bu t we can do so from a  practical 
one, which m akes it our duty to work tow ard bringing about th is goal (which is 
not a  chimerical one).39
37 “Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 380.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.. Ak. 368.
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D. An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing? 
(1798)
T h is  a rtic le , one o f  K a n t’s  la s t  p u b lish e d  w orks, m a k e s  m an y  o f th e  
sam e  a rg u m e n ts  a s  “T h eo ry  a n d  P rac tice ,” th o u g h  w e do e n co u n te r  a  second 
(new ) fo u n d a tio n  on w h ich  K a n t b a s is  h is  p red ic tio n s o f  th e  fu tu re . As w ith  
h is  d iscu ssio n  of M en d e lsso h n  in  “T heory  a n d  P rac tice ,” K a n t  is  concerned  
h e re  w ith  th e  th re e  possib le  fu tu re s  of th e  h u m a n  race : reg re ss io n , s ta g n a ­
tion , a n d  im provem en t. K a n t  m a in ta in s  th a t  w e a re  a s k in g  a  m o ra l q u es­
tion , n o t  one reg a rd in g  th e  science of h is to ry , for in  a s k in g  th e  question , “th e  
im p o r ta n t  th in g  is  no t th e  n a tu r a l  h is to ry  of m an ..., b u t  r a th e r  h is  m o ra l h is ­
to ry  a n d , m ore  precisely , h is  h is to ry  n o t a s  a  species acco rd in g  to  th e  generic  
n o tio n  (singulorum), b u t  a s  th e  to ta lity  o f m en  u n ite d  soc ia lly  on e a r th  a n d  
a p p o rtio n ed  in to  peoples (universorum).”40 S ince K a n t  specifica lly  sp eak s  of 
th e  “to ta l i ty  of m en  (dem Ganzen der gesellschaftlich aufE rden vereinigten),” 
th is  g ives u s  fu r th e r  ev idence  o f a  d u ty  n o t on ly  to  o u rse lv es , b u t  to th e  h u ­
m a n  ra c e  a s  a  whole, a n d  sh o u ld  reca ll u s  to  th e  “sui generis” d u ty  of th e  Re­
ligion*1
K a n t recognizes, i n  a  som ew hat new  ad m iss io n  o f th e  d ifficu lty  of th e  
q u estio n , th a t  a  h is to ry  o f th e  fu tu re  is  m ad e  a ll  th e  m o re  d ifficu lt by th e  fac t 
th a t  w e a re  d ea lin g  w ith  p e rso n s  a s  free  ag en ts , a n d  th u s  o f w hom  “w h a t 
th e y  o u g h t to  do m ay  be d ic ta te d  in  advance, b u t  of w hom  i t  m ay  n o t be  p re ­
d ic ted  w h a t  th e y  w ill do.”42 W h ereas w ith  th e  f irs t  Critique K a n t w as con­
c e rn e d  w ith  th e  possib ility  t h a t  a ll  h u m a n  actions m ig h t one  d ay  be en tire ly  
p red ic tab le , h e re  h e  seem s to  be  concerned  w ith  th e  o pposite  possib ility , 
n a m e ly  th a t  w e m igh t n e v e r  be  ab le  to p red ic t w h a t in d iv id u a ls  a s  freely  
a c tin g  a g e n ts  m ig h t do. K a n t  concludes, a p p a re n tly  fo r se v e ra l reasons , th a t
40 “Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?’ p. 141.
41 See also: “Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?” p. 151.
42 Ibid.. p. 149.




“T h e  P roblem  o f P ro g re ss  I s  N o t to  Be R esolved D irec tly  th ro u g h  E xperi­
ence,”43 i.e., w e c an n o t s im p ly  te ll  from  a n  in v e s tig a tio n  w h e th e r  h u m a n s  a re  
im prov ing  o r w ill im prove  in  th e  fu tu re . H ow ever, K a n t  n o te s  th a t  “if  th e  
course  of h u m a n  a ffa irs  seem s so sense less to  u s, p e rh a p s  i t  lie s  in  a  poor 
choice of p o sitio n  from  w h ich  w e re g a rd  i t ,”44 a n d  th u s  w h ile  w e can n o t say  
fo r c e r ta in  s im p ly  th ro u g h  o b se rv a tio n  th a t  th e  h u m a n  ra c e  is  im prov ing  
m orally , fo r w e a re  d e a lin g  w ith  free  beings, p e rh a p s  w e c a n  f in d  a  clue 
w h ich  w ould  a llow  u s  to  m a k e  a  p red ic tion : “th e re  m u s t  be  som e experience 
in  th e  h u m a n  rac e  w hich , a s  a n  even t, p o in ts  to  th e  d isp o s itio n  a n d  capacity  
o f th e  h u m a n  rac e  to be  th e  c a u se  o f its  ow n ad v an ce  to w a rd  th e  b e tte r ...”45
K a n t f in d s  h is  d u e  in  th e  “mode o f th in k in g  o f  th e  sp e c ta to rs”46 o f th e  
F re n c h  R evo lu tion . T h is  is  s lig h tly  d iffe ren t th a n  th e  e x p la n a tio n  of h u m a n  
p ro g ress  th ro u g h  conflict. K a n t  h e re  no tes th a t  th e  sp e c ta to rs  o f th e  R evolu­
tio n  a re  g rossly  in te re s te d  in  th is  event, ev idenc ing  “a  w ish fu l p a rtic ip a tio n  
th a t  bo rders d o se ly  on  e n th u s ia sm , th e  v e ry  e x p re ss io n  o f  w h ich  is  f ra u g h t 
w ith  danger; th is  sy m p a th y , th e re fo re , can  h a v e  no  o th e r  c a u se  th a n  a  m o ra l 
p red isp o sitio n  in  th e  h u m a n  rac e .”47 K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  sp ec ta to rs  a re  
t ru ly  in te re s te d  in  th is  m o v em en t to w a rd  a  civil a n d  re p u b lic a n  c o n s titu ­
tio n ,46 even  th o u g h  su ch  e n th u s ia s m  m ig h t n o t be  in  t h e i r  b e s t  in te re s t, a n d  
ev en  tho u g h  th e  R evo lu tion  m ig h t n o t succeed. T h u s  K a n t  c o n d u d e s  th a t  
“g en u in e  e n th u s ia sm  a lw ay s  m oves only to w a rd  w h a t i s  id e a l  an d , indeed , to 
w h a t is p u re ly  m oral, su ch  a s  th e  concept o f r ig h t, a n d  i t  c a n n o t be  g rafted  
onto  se lf-in te re s t.”49 I t  is  th e  e n th u s ia sm  itself o f th e  sp e c ta to rs  w hich  K a n t
43 Ibid., p. 149.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 151.
46 Ibid., p. 153.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.. p. 155.




ta k e s  a s  h is  c lue  for th e  m o ra l p ro g re ss  o f h u m a n k in d , th e  d e s ire  o f th e  h u ­
m a n  ra c e  to  h a v e  a ju s t  c o n s titu tio n , one w h ich  th e y  th e m se lv e s  w ould  w ill 
a n d  w h ich  e lim in a te s  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f w ar; th is  “n o t o n ly  p e rm its  people  to  
ho p e  fo r p ro g re ss  to w ard  th e  b e tte r ,  b u t  is  already itself progress in  so f a r  as 
i ts  c a p a c ity  i s  su ffic ien t fo r th e  p re s e n t .”50 T h u s , a s  a n  e x ce llen t su m m ary , 
K a n t m a in ta in s :
Now I claim to be able to predict to the hum an  race -- even w ithout prophetic 
insigh t -  according to the  aspects and om ens of our day, the a tta inm en t of this 
goal. T h a t is, I predict its  progress tow ard the  b e tte r  which, from now on, 
tu rn s  out to be no longer completely retrogressive. For such a  phenomenon in 
h um an  history is not to be forgotten, because it has revealed a  tendency and 
faculty in hum an na tu re  for improvement..., and  one which n a tu re  and free­
dom alone, united in the hum an  race in conformity w ith  inner principles of 
right, could have promised. B ut so far as tim e is concerned, it  can promise th is 
only indefinitely and as a  contingent event.51
S e v e ra l fa m ilia r  th e m e s  a p p e a r  in  th is  e ssay . H e re , p o litic a l o rg an i­
za tio n  is  c le a r ly  a n d  c o n s is te n tly  l in k e d  w ith  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f m o ra l p rog ­
ress . I t  is  a  co n s titu tio n  a n d , specifically , a  re p u b lic a n  c o n s titu tio n  w hich  
allow s fo r th e re  to  be peace  a n d  th e  b e g in n in g s  o f  m o ra l p ro g re ss ; “i t  th u s  e s ­
ta b lish e s  th e  cond ition  w h e reb y  w a r  (the  sou rce  o f a ll  e v il a n d  c o rru p tio n  of 
m orals) is  d e te rred ; an d , a t  le a s t  neg a tiv e ly , p ro g re ss  to w a rd  th e  b e tte r  is  a s ­
s u re d  h u m a n ity  in  sp ite  o f a l l  i t s  in firm ity ...”52 T h is  “P la to n ic  Id e a l 
(respublica noumenon), is  n o t  a n  e m p ty  c h im era , b u t  r a th e r  th e  e te rn a l  n o rm  
for a ll  c iv il o rg an iza tio n  in  g e n e ra l, a n d  a v e rts  a ll  w a r.”53
A lso, a s  in  “T heory  a n d  P rac tice ,” K a n t  a llu d e s  to  th e  fa c t t h a t  p ro g ­
re s s  is  a n  a ssu m p tio n  we c a n  m a k e , re g a rd le ss  o f  w h a t th e  ou tcom e o f th e  
R evo lu tion  w ill be  a n d  even  (som ew hat) re g a rd le ss  o f w h a t  h a p p e n s  in  th e
50 Ibid., p. 153. Italics added for emphasis.
51 Ibid., p. 159.
52 Ibid., p. 155.
53 Ibid.. p. 165.
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fu tu re . T h e  fo rm er is  n o t a  concern  b ecau se  K a n t is  c o n ce rn ed  w ith  th e  w ay  
of th in k in g  o f th e  sp e c ta to rs  o f th e  R evo lu tion , a n d  th is  is  a  ph en o m en o n  
w h ich  is  i ts e lf  “n o t to  b e  fo rg o tten ,” th u s  no  m a tte r  w h a t h a p p e n s , “th a t  
p h ilo so p h ica l p ro p h esy  s ti ll  w o u ld  lose  n o th in g  of i ts  force.”54 T h e  la t te r  is  
n o t a  co n ce rn  because  w e a re  d e a lin g  w ith  free  ag en ts , a n d  i f  th e  h u m a n  race  
seem s to  b e  declin ing ,
if  it  is moving backwards, and  in an  accelerated fall into baseness, a person 
m ay not despair even then  of encountering a juncture (punctum flexus con- 
trarii) where the moral predisposition in our race would be able to turn  anew 
tow ard the better... for [we have seen cases where people]... when things disin­
teg ra te  altogether, know how to adopt a  strengthened motive for m aking them  
even b e tte r th an  they were before th a t  sta te .55
I t  se em s th a t ,  for K an t, w e m u s t  h o ld  on to  th is  th e s is  “p ro v id e d  a t  le a s t  th a t  
th e re  does n o t, by som e chance, occur a  second  epoch of n a tu r a l  revo lu tion  
w h ich  w ill p u s h  aside  th e  h u m a n  ra c e  to  c le a r  th e  s ta g e  fo r o th e r  c re a ­
tu re s ...”56
W e a lso  see  th e  c o n tin u a l th e m e  th a t  th e  a n ti th e t ic a l  h y p o th es is  
w o u ld  b e  “a  su b v ersio n  o f th e  u l t im a te  p u rp o se  of c re a tio n  i ts e lf ,”57 a n d  even 
th e  th e s is  t h a t  th e re  ex is ts  n e i th e r  p ro g re ss  n o r decline  is  s t re n u o u s ly  re ­
jec ted , fo r “i t  is  a  v a in  a ffa ir  to  h a v e  good so a lte rn a te  w ith  e v il t h a t  th e  
w hole tra ff ic  o f ou r species w ith  i ts e l f  on  th is  globe w ould  h a v e  to  be  consid­
e re d  a s  a  m e re  farc ica l com edy, fo r th is  c a n  endow  o u r sp ec ie s  w ith  no  
g re a te r  v a lu e  in  th e  eyes o f re a so n  th a n  th a t  w hich o th e r  a n im al species pos­
sess ...”58
54 Ibid., p. IS9. I pointed out in a footnote in Chapter Ten of Section One above that Peter 
Burg in his book about the French Revolution seems simply wrong to assert that we could have 
(theoretical) knowledge of progress in human history. I take the present discussion to be further refutation 
of Burg’s argument
55 Ibid., p. 149.
56 Ibid., p. 161.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.. p. 147.
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A nd, finally , d e sp ite  K a n t’s  re lia n c e  on th e  a t t i tu d e  o f th e  sp e c ta to rs  
o f th e  R evo lu tion  to  g ro u n d  h is  h y p o th es is , we m ay  s t i l l  ta k e  no te  th a t  th e  
way in  w h ich  persons w ere  le a d  to e n th u s ia sm  fo r su c h  a  rep u b lican  co n sti­
tu tio n  w as th ro u g h  conflict: "a civil socie ty  o rg an ized  conform ably  to  th is  
[P la ton ic] id ea l... can  on ly  b e  p a in fu lly  a cq u ired  a f te r  m u ltifa rio u s  h o s tilitie s  
a n d  w a rs ...”59 Hence, K a n t  concludes a g a in : “h e re , th e re fo re , is  a  p ro p o sitio n  
v a lid  fo r th e  m ost rigo rous theo ry , in  sp ite  o f a ll  sk ep tic s , a n d  no t ju s t  a  w ell- 
m e a n in g  a n d  p rac tica lly  com m endab le  p roposition : th e  h u m a n  race  h a s  a l­
w ay s b e e n  in  progress to w a rd  th e  b e t te r  a n d  w ill c o n tin u e  to  be  so h en ce ­
fo r th .”60
m.
A  second ap p ro ach  to  th e  l in k  b e tw een  m o ra lity  a n d  po litics is  to  be 
h a d  b y  w ay  o f considering  th e  “pu b lic” n a tu re  o f re a so n . T h is  ap p ro ach  is 
fo u n d  p a r tic u la r ly  in  “W h a t is  E n lig h ten m en t? ” a n d  “W h a t is  O rien ta tio n  in  
T h in k in g ? ” W hile m uch  o f  K a n t’s w r it in g s  e m p h asize  th e  n e e d  for freedom  o f 
p u b lic  exp ression , th ese  tw o  a rtic le s  a r t ic u la te  th is  n e e d  th e  m ost c learly .
T h e  l in k  b e tw een  m o ra lity  a n d  p o litica l o rg an iz a tio n s  is  n ecessa ry  h e re , n o t 
for th e  avo idance  o f w ar, b u t  so t h a t  p e rso n s  m ay  d ia logue  w ith  each  o th e r  in  
o rd e r  to  b e t te r  the  u se  o f th e i r  rea so n . W hile  su ch  d ia lo g u e  is  n ecessa ry  for 
rea so n , i t  is  a lso  e sse n tia l fo r an y  a t te m p t  to form  a  m o ra l com m u n ity  as 
such .
A. An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784)61
T h is  is  p e rh a p s  th e  m ost w ell k n o w n  of K a n t’s  p o litica l w ritings, a n d  
i ts  m a in  p o in t  is  th e  n e ed  o f  p e rso n s  to  em erge  from  th e i r  “self-imposed
59 Ibid., p. 165. See also: pp. 165-167 and p. 169. This is also implied in Kant’s discussion of 
Hume, pp. 169-71.
60 Ibid., p. 159.
61 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in Perpetual Peace 
and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral Practice, trans. Ted Humphrey' (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc.. 1983). 41-48. All citations refer to Akademie page numbers.
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immaturity,”62 K a n t  h e re  ca lls  for a ll h u m a n  b e in g s  to  th in k  for them selves, 
to e n lig h ten  th em se lv e s , a n d  “n o th in g  is  re q u ire d  fo r th is  en lig h ten m en t, 
how ever, excep t freedom', a n d  th e  freedom  in  q u e s tio n  is  th e  le a s t  h a rm fu l of 
all, nam ely , th e  freed o m  to u se  rea so n  publicly i n  a ll  m a t te r s .”63 T h is  lead s  
K a n t to h is  fam o u s su p p o r t  o f th e  d ic ta te  o f F re d e r ic k  II , “Argue a s  m uch  as 
you w a n t a n d  a b o u t w h a t you  w an t, but obey? 64 a s  w ell a s  h is  d iv ision  
be tw een  th e  “p r iv a te ” a n d  “public” u se  o f rea so n , w h e re  p e rso n s  m u s t do an d  
tea ch  as th ey  a re  ex p ec ted  in  th e ir  ro les a s  civ il s e rv a n ts  o r re lig io u s  lead e rs  
(“p r iv a te  u se”), w h ile  th e y  sh o u ld  be a llow ed  to  voice th e i r  t r u e  opin ions in  
p r in t, ad d re ssed  to  th e  “literate worldI”65 (“p u b lic  u se ”). K a n t a rg u e s  th a t  th e  
b a n n in g  o f th e  u s e  o f  p u b lic  rea so n  “w ould  be a  c rim e  a g a in s t  h u m a n  n a tu re , 
w hose e sse n tia l d e s tin y  l ie s  p rec ise ly  in  su ch  p ro g re ss  [in  th e  u se  of 
reason],”66 a n d  “to  re n o u n c e  i t  [en ligh tenm en t] fo r  h im se lf, or, even  m ore, for 
su b seq u e n t g e n e ra tio n s , is  to  v io la te  a n d  tra m p le  m a n ’s d iv in e  r ig h ts  
underfoo t.”67 E sse n tia lly , K a n t a rg u es  t h a t  i t  is  u p  to  th e  g o v ern m en ts  to  
allow  th e ir  c itiz e n s  (or, in  th is  case, sub jects) to  h a v e  freedom  o f relig ion  as 
w ell as freedom  to  c ritic ize  (in  p rin t)  th e ir  g o v e rn m en t. K a n t  m ak e s  th e  ta c it 
a ssu m p tio n s b o th  t h a t  e n lig h te n m e n t is  i ts e lf  so m e th in g  to  be  desired , a n d  
th a t  a  governm en t (k ing ) w hich  allow s i ts  c itizen s  (sub jects) freedom  of 
th o u g h t w ill be  re sp e c te d  a n d  obeyed; in  th is  re sp ec t, th e  n e x t e ssay  m ay  be 
a n  im provem ent, so le t  u s  tu r n  to it.
62 Ibid., Ak. 35.
63 Ibid., Ak. 36.
64 Ibid., Ak. 37.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., Ak. 39.
67 Ibid.. Ak. 40.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I307
B. What is Orientation in Thinking? (1786)6*
T h is  a rtic le  w as w ritte n  by  K a n t  d u r in g  th e  Jaco b i-M en d e lsso h n  co n ­
tro v e rsy  over L essings’ a lleged  S p inoz ism , a n d  c o n c e rn s  b o th  th e  connec tion  
b e tw e e n  rea so n  a n d  m o ra lity  as w ell a s  th e  p u b lic  u s e  o f  rea so n . K a n t’s  g e n ­
e ra l  a im  h e re  is b a s ica lly  a  re ite ra tio n  o f  h is  co n c lu s io n s  in  th e  f ir s t  a n d  sec­
o n d  Critique, from  th e  perspec tive  o f th e  q u e s tio n  o f  h o w  w e a re  to o r ie n t 
o u rse lv es  in  th in k in g . H e  concludes th a t ,  w h ile  r e a s o n  is  p ra c tic a l a n d  i t  h a s  
a  “n e e d ” to  a ssu m e  th e  possib ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good  s in c e  “i t  is  n o t ju s t  a  
m a t te r  o f in d iffe rence  w h e th e r  one w ish e s  to  m a k e  [such] a  defin itive  ju d g ­
m e n t...”,69 su ch  a  b e lie f  is  only a  "postulate o f r e a s o n ”70 a n d  is  b a sed  so lely  o n  
re a s o n ’s p ra c tic a l n eed s, n o t a  “basic  p rin c ip le  o f  z e a lo try .”71 T hough  i t  m ay  
be im p o r ta n t  to n o te  t h a t  th is  is  a n o th e r  o f  K a n t’s  d e fe n se s  o f th e  h ig h e s t 
good, w h a t  in te re s ts  u s  h e re  is  th e  l in k  b e tw ee n  m o ra l i ty  a n d  politics.
H a v in g  d e fen d ed  th e  n e ed  to  o r ie n t  o u rse lv e s  m o ra lly  a n d  ra tio n a lly  
in  o u r  th in k in g , K a n t goes on to a rg u e  t h a t  th is  c a n  o n ly  b e  ach ieved  u n d e r  
c e r ta in  e x te rn a l cond itions. K a n t m a k e s  th e  fo llow ing  b o ld  asse rtion :
We do adm ittedly say that, w hereas a higher au tho rity  m ay deprive us of free­
dom of speech or of writing, it cannot deprive u s  of freedom of thought. B ut 
how much and how accurately would we think if  we did no t think, so to speak, 
in  community with others to whom we communicate ou r thoughts and who 
communicate their thoughts to us!72
H e re  K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  ou r ab ility  to  th in k  a n d  re a s o n  is  d irec tly  h in d e re d  
by  a  s i tu a t io n  w h ere  th e  governm en t w o u ld  c e n su re  free d o m  o f speech.
68 Immanuel Kant, “What is Orientation in Thinking?” in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans 
Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 237-249.
69 Ibid., p. 240.
70 Ibid.. p. 245.
71 Ibid., p. 238.
2 Ibid.. p. 247.
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M o ra lity , a s  we h a v e  seen , com es from  th e  p ro p e r  u se  of re a so n , a n d  is n o t 
s im p ly  a  m o ra l fee ling .
H ence, w h ile  every  p e rso n  h a s  im m e d ia te  access to  th e  m o ra l law  
w ith o u t sch o la rly  in te rp re ta t io n , th e re  a re  (a t  le a s t)  th re e  im p o r ta n t  rea so n s  
w h y  re a so n  needs to  be  exercised . F irs t, a s  K a n t  te lls  us in  th e  Grundlegung, 
“o rd in a ry  u n d e rs ta n d in g ” is  ab le  to  be  m o ra l a n d  “innocence is  in d e e d  a  glo­
r io u s  th in g ; b u t  u n fo r tu n a te ly , i t  does n o t keep  v e ry  well a n d  is  e a s ily  le d  
a s tra y . C o n seq u en tly , ev en  w isdom  -  w h ich  co n s is ts  m ore in  d o ing  a n d  n o t 
d o in g  th a n  in  k n o w in g  — n e e d s  science... in  o rd e r  th a t  w isdom ’s  p recep ts  m ay  
g a in  accep tan ce  a n d  p e rm a n e n c e .”73 Second, g iv en  th a t  c e r ta in  po litica l 
s t ru c tu re s  a re  n e c e ssa ry  fo r th e  m o ra l p ro jec t, a n d  given t h a t  th e  ac tu a l 
m a n ife s ta tio n  of su c h  sa tis fa c to ry  s tru c tu re s  in  th e  w orld is  a  m a t te r  for em ­
p ir ic a l so lu tio n s , w e m u s t  b e  ab le  to  d ia logue  w ith  one a n o th e r  in  o rd er to  
com e u p  w ith  th e  b e s t  g o v e rn m e n ta l s tru c tu re s . T h ird , th e re  a re  m an y  m o ra l 
p ro b lem s in  th e  w orld  w h ich  a re  d ifficu lt to  solve, a n d  K a n t g ives u s  a  m y r­
ia d  o f su c h  “c asu is tic a l” ex am p les  in  th e  Metaphysics of Morals.1* T h e  m o ra l 
la w  is  s in g u la r , b u t  o u r  choice o f how  w e a re  b e s t  to  m a n ife s t th e  m o ra l la w  
in  o u r  d a ily  lives c a n  be a n sw e re d  in  m an y  d iffe ren t, th o u g h  leg itim a te , 
w ays, fo r “th e  m ax im s o f a g e n ts  m ay  be v e ry  d iffe ren t w ith  r e g a rd  to  th e  
sam e  la w s .”75 T h u s, th e  exerc ise  o f rea so n  is  n e c e ssa ry  for m o ra l im prove­
m e n t, a n d  th is  exerc ise  c a n n o t ta k e  p lace  w ith o u t public  d ia logue .
K a n t  be lieves t h a t  e n lig h ten m en t, t h a t  is , th e  ab ility  to  th in k  for 
o n e se lf  in  accordance  w ith  th e  n a tu r a l  c o n s tra in ts  o f reason , is  n e ce ssa ry  for 
th e  m o ra l p ro ject, b e ca u se  m o ra lity  is  t ie d  so in tr ic a te ly  to re a so n . W ithou t
73 Grundlegung, Ak. 405. Recall also Kant’s discussion of “wisdom” in the second Critique.
74 There is also a fourth important reason for this, though we can only anticipate it, which is the 
need for us to find a “pure religious faith” which would allow the entire world to come together in a king­
dom of God; however, this cannot come about on its own, and will require finding an “ecclesiastical faith” 
which would be acceptable to all and which could act as “vehicle.” For more on this, see the next chapter.
75 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 225. Ellington translation. See also Ak. 397. 433 n.. and “The 
Diadactics of Ethics.”
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freedom  of ex p ress io n , K a n t be lieves th e re  to  be no freedom  of th o u g h t. 
W ith o u t freedom  o f th o u g h t, th e re  is  no  im provem en t of reaso n , a n d  th u s , no 
im p ro v em en t o f  m o ra lity . P e rh a p s  th is  re m a rk  of R eiss’ re g a rd in g  K a n t’s e s­
sa y  is  a p p ro p ria te :
The essay th u s  shows how, in K ant’s view, epistemology and ethics are closely 
interlinked w ith  politics as well as how, in his opinion, rational inquiry and 
moral conduct can be practiced properly only in a society governed according to 
principles of politics based on the Idea of freedom. In o ther words, K ant’s th e ­
ory of politics, as th is essay shows, is not an  unim portant appendix to his criti­
cal philosophy, b u t a  necessary consequence of it.76
IV.
In  th is  c h a p te r , I  h a v e  a rg u e d  t h a t  th e re  is  a n  im p o r ta n t  l in k  b e ­
tw een  po litica l o rg a n iz a tio n s  a n d  m orality . T h ro u g h o u t th is  w ork  I  h a v e  a lso  
a rg u e d  th a t  m o ra l p ro g re ss  is  in flu en ced  by  e x te rn a l cond itions, a n d  t h a t  i t  is  
a  d u ty  to try  to  b r in g  a b o u t th o se  e x te rn a l cond itions w h ich  w ou ld  a llow  fo r 
th e  m o ra lity  o f a ll  to  p ro g ress  u n h in d e re d . T h e  m a in  cond ition  w h ich  K a n t  
a s se r ts  to  be th e  m o s t d e tr im e n ta l  to m o ra lity  is  w ar. N ow  K a n t h a s  a s s e r te d  
t h a t  i t  w ill be  n a tu r e  a n d  n o t in d iv id u a ls  a s  m o ra l ag en ts  w h ich  w ill be  th e  
g u a ra n to r  of p e rp e tu a l  peace. K a n t also a s s e r ts  th a t  su ch  peace  w ill com e 
a b o u t regardless o f  th e  w ills  o f in d iv id u a ls , t h a t  is, re g a rd le ss  o f m o ra l i n ­
te n t. W hy sh o u ld  th is  be?
K a n t’s th in k in g , I  believe, can  b e  sp e lle d  ou t a s  follow s. To b eg in  
w ith , m oral p ro g re s s  is  a  n e ce ssa ry  p o s tu la te  o f p rac tica l rea so n , i.e ., i t  is  
n ecessa ry  to  b e liev e  t h a t  h u m a n s  a re  in d e e d  p ro g ress in g  in  o rd e r to  av o id  a  
con trad ic tion  w ith in  p ra c tic a l re a so n .77 T herefo re , th o se  s tru c tu re s  w h ich
76 p. 236. Hans Reiss, “Introduction to What is Orientation in Thinking?” in Kant: Political 
Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 235-6. For 
more on the relationship between reason and freedom see: Onora O’Neill, “Reason and Politics in the 
Kantian Enterprise,” in Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Howard Williams (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press), 15-80, and “Vindicating Reason.” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul 
Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 280-308.
7 For more on this contradiction, see Chapter Five below.
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w ould  allow  fo r su c h  m o ra l p rogress to occur m u s t  b e  th o u g h t to be  possib le  
them se lves. N ow  K a n t  a rg u e s  th a t  bo th  a  p e rfe c t e x te rn a l  a n d  in te rn a l  con­
s ti tu t io n  a re  n e c e ssa ry  befo re  m oral p ro g ress  c a n  b eg in  in  e a rn e s t.78 T hus, 
w e see  a rg u m e n ts  t h a t  b o th  of th ese  c o n s titu tio n s  a re  in d e e d  possible, b o th  
th e  “P la to n ic  Id e a l” o f a  perfec tly  fu n c tio n in g  g o v e rn m e n t a s  w ell a s  a  fed ­
e ra tio n  o f so v e re ig n  n a tio n -s ta te s  w hich  a re  d ev o ted  to  peace. H ow ever, a s  
we sa w  w ith  “Is  th e  H u m a n  Race C o n sta n tly  P ro g re ss in g ?”, K a n t know s fu ll  
w ell t h a t  w e a re  d e a lin g  w ith  a  h is to ry  of a  sp ec ie s  w h ich  is  free, a n d  th u s  
w hich  w ou ld  be  f re e  a t  a n y  p o in t to  ch an g e  th e i r  m in d s  a b o u t an  issu e . T h is  
la s t  p o in t is  c ru c ia l to  u n d e rs ta n d in g  K a n t’s n e e d  o f n a tu r e  a s  th e  g u a ra n to r  
o f peace, for i f  p eace  w ere  n o t som ehow  g u a ra n te e d  by  n a tu re , th e n  th e re  
w ould  always be  th e  th r e a t  of w ar, fo r h u m a n s  a re  free  to  a c t as th e y  see  fit, 
a n d  a  c o n tin u a l th r e a t  o f w a r  is p rec ise ly  th e  con d itio n  w h ich  K a n t is  con­
c e rn ed  to  e lim in a te . O n  th e  one h a n d , th e  a c t  o f  w a r  is  a  v o lu n ta ry  ac t 
com m itted  by  h u m a n  b e in g s , a n d  th u s  seem s to  concern  on ly  a  m oral p ro b ­
lem , i.e ., th a t  once ev ery o n e  a t  som e tim e d ec id ed  or w illed  th e re  to  be  no 
m ore w ar, th e  p ro b lem  o f w a r  w ould be solved. B u t, on  th e  o th er h a n d , p re ­
cisely b ecau se  w a r  is  a  free act, we a re  a w a re  th a t ,  w ith o u t som e e x te rn a l 
g u a ra n te e  of peace , th e re  w ould a lw ays be  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f som eone c h a n g ­
in g  th e ir  m in d s  a b o u t th e  peace, a n d  th e  w o rld  b e in g  p lu n g e d  in to  w a r  a g a in . 
T hus, i f  K a n t cou ld  n o t  give u s som e in d ic a tio n  a b o u t how  peace m ig h t be 
ach ieved  perpetually, th e n  w e w ould n ev e r e sca p e  a  “s ta te  o f in te rn a tio n a l 
n a tu re ,” a n d  w e s h o u ld  th e n  h ave  rea so n  to  d o u b t t h a t  c o n tin u a l m o ra l im ­
p ro v em en t is  possib le . B u t  how  can  n a tu re  g u a ra n te e  th is?
L e t u s  b e g in  a n  a n sw e r to th is  q u es tio n  by  e x a m in in g  K a n t’s 
co n tro v e rsia l c la im  in  “P e rp e tu a l  P eace” t h a t  “th e  p ro b lem  o f o rg an iz in g  a  
n a tio n  is  so lvab le  e v en  fo r a  people com prised  o f  dev ils ( if  on ly  th ey  possess
8 1 will argue for this further in the next chapter.




u n d e rs ta n d in g ) .”79 W e h av e  seen  in  th e  f i r s t  a n d  second  Critique a s  w e ll a s  
in  h is  p o litica l w ritin g s  th a t  K a n t b e liev es  th e  p ro b lem  of a  successfu l 
p o litica l o rg an iza tio n  “m u s t be  solvable.”60 T h e  p rob lem , as K a n t d escrib es it, 
is  how  to  organ ize  a  group of r a t io n a l  b e in g s  to  b e h a v e  in  accord w ith  R ig h t, 
“th o u g h  each  is  sec re tly  in c lin ed  to  e x e m p t h im s e lf  from  such  law s.”81 K a n t  
a s s e r ts  t h a t  th e  so lu tion  to  th is  p ro b lem
does not require the moral im provem ent of m an, it requires only th a t we know 
how to apply the mechanism of na tu re  to m en so as to organize the conflict of 
hostile attitudes present in a people in  such a  way th a t they m ust compel one 
another to subm it to coercive law s and  th u s  to en ter into a state  of peace, 
where laws have power.82
As e a r ly  a s  th e  f ir s t  Critique, K a n t a s s e r ts  t h a t  “th e  m ore  leg isla tion  a n d  
g o v e rn m e n t a re  b ro u g h t in to  h a rm o n y  w ith  th e  above id e a  [of th e  id e a l con­
s titu tio n ]  th e  r a r e r  w ould  p u n ish m e n ts  becom e, a n d  i t  is  therefo re  q u ite  r a ­
tio n a l to  m a in ta in ... t h a t  in  a  p e rfe c t s t a te  no  p u n ish m e n ts  w h a tso ev er w ou ld  
be  re q u ire d ,”83 w ith  th e  obvious im p lica tio n  b e in g  t h a t  th e re  w ould  be no  
p u n is h m e n ts  b ecause  no one w ou ld  t r a n s g re s s  th e  p rin c ip le s  o f R igh t.
T h o u g h  K a n t believes th a t  th e  co rrec t fo rm  o f g o v e rn m en t can  only be  con­
ceived  on  th e  b asis  o f th e  m o ra l law , h e  does n o t be lieve  th a t  such  a  govern ­
m e n t c a n  only  come ab o u t th ro u g h  a d h e re n c e  to  th e  m o ra l law . K a n t c a n n o t 
r ig h tly  b e  accused  o f th in k in g  too m u c h  o f  h u m a n  n a tu re , for th ro u g h o u t h is  
p o litica l w ritin g s , h e  in s is ts  th a t  R ig h t w ill em erg e  p rec ise ly  from  h u m a n s ’ 
te n d e n c ie s  o f se lf-inc lina tion ; th is  is  th e  p r im a ry  th r u s t  b eh in d  a ll o f “T h eo ry  
a n d  P ra c tice .”
79 “Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 366. This passage has received a good deal of commentary, espe­




83 First Critique. A317 = B373.
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W h at a llow s fo r  a  so lu tio n  to th e  p rob lem  of a  p e rfe c t co n stitu tio n ?  
T hough  K a n t does n o t a rg u e  fo r i t  explicitly , a  p ro p e r d e fen se  w ould  lik e ly  
concern  th e  c la u se  “i f  o n ly  th e y  possess u n d e rs ta n d in g .” W h a t th is  suggests , 
g iven th a t  K a n t c o n tin u a lly  em p h asizes  th a t  (po litical a s  w e ll a s  m oral) p ro g ­
re ss  com es a b o u t th ro u g h  se lf-in te re s ted  ag en ts , is  th a t  th e  m o re  a  n a tio n  
ap p ro x im ates  th e  fo rm  o f  R ig h t, th e  m ore a ll  se lf- in te re s te d  a g e n ts  w ill see  
a n  a d v a n ta g e  to  su ch  a n  o rg an iza tio n , as long as th ey  a re  n o t  com pletely  i r ­
ra tio n a l. T h is  l a s t  c la u se  is  in te n d e d  to  ru le  o u t th o se  in d iv id u a ls  who, 
th o u g h  th e y  w ou ld  recogn ize  a  s itu a tio n  as b e in g  a d v an tag e o u s , w ould e n ­
d a n g e r th e  s i tu a t io n  a n y w a y . T h u s , som eone w ith o u t u n d e rs ta n d in g , som e­
one re a lly  ir ra t io n a l , m ig h t  jeo p a rd ize  h is /h e r  ow n a d v a n ta g e o u s  s itu a tio n  
even  th o u g h  th in k in g  s a id  s i tu a tio n  h e lp fu l to  p rom o te  h is /h e r  ow n h a p p i­
ness .84 B a rr in g  su ch  a n  occurrence, i f  K a n t is  co rrec t in  h is  an a ly s is , even  
com pletely  s e lf - in te re s te d  a g e n ts  w ould  p re fe r  a n d  u p h o ld  a  S ta te  based  on  
R ig h t becau se  th e y  w o u ld  co rrec tly  u n d e rs ta n d  i t  to  be  th e  m o s t a d v a n ta ­
geous fo r th em .
O bviously , th e  q u e s tio n  a rise s  a s  to w h e th e r  su ch  “dev il” agen ts 
rea lly  w ould  be lieve  t h a t  a  s ta te  o f R igh t w ould  b e  a d v a n ta g e o u s  to  them , 
a n d  in  h is  a rtic le , “A  C o n s titu tio n  for a  R ace o f D evils,” W illiam  C lohesy a r ­
gues th a t  th e y  w ould .85 C lohesy  a sk s  th e  question , “W h at s o r t  o f governm en t 
w ould  a r ro g a n t a n d  c y n ic a l dev ils  form  am ong  them selves?”86 a n d  con tends 
th a t  i t  w ou ld  be a  re p u b lic a n  fo rm  of governm ent. C lohesy concludes:
84 This is consistent with Kant’s examination of evil in the Religion. There, the truly wicked 
person is just that individual who, while still hearing the call of the moral law, subjugates it to a general 
maxim whereby the agent’s own happiness is of the highest value. Thus, the moral law is not trans­
gressed simply for the sake of transgressing it, but rather for the sake of happiness. Thus, the “devil” as 
long as s/he had understanding, would be willing to maximize his/her own happiness, and thus act in ac­
cord with Right (though not will in accord with the moral law).
85 William Clohesy, “A Constitution for a Race of Devils,” in Proceedings o f the Eighth Inter­
national Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 
733-41. See also: Peter Laberge, “Von der Garantie des ewiges Friedens,” pp. 162-3, and Otfried HOfFe, 
Den Staat braucht selbst ein Volk von Teufeln: philosophische Versuche zur Rechts (Stuttgart: Reclam. 
1988).
86 "Constitution for a Race of Devils." p. 738.
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fearful of one another, unwilling and unable to take upon them selves the task 
of assuring  good government, they m ight well decide th a t  such a rule of law 
would best protect th e ir in terests while allowing m any unsavory private pur­
suits and  associations. T hat is, they would accept a  rule of law grounded in 
practical reason because their prudential calculations would suggest th a t it 
would b e tte r  suit their in terests than  any other system . T h a t is, the devils 
would be persuaded by their understanding to accept a  system  despite the fact 
th a t it w as derived from the m oral reason of a ju s t lawgiver.87
T h u s  C lohesy  a rg u e s  th a t  dev ils w ould  desire  a  re p u b lic a n  form  o f govern­
m en t, one w h ic h  recognized  th e  r ig h ts  of in d iv id u a ls  w h ile  s t i l l  e s ta b lish in g  a  
sy stem  w h ich  w ould  lim it th e  possib ility  of one p a r ty  g a in in g  th e  u p p e r  h a n d  
o f se lf-in te re s t, because i t  w ou ld  b e s t sa feg u a rd  th e ir  ow n in te re s ts . A nd 
C lohesy b r in g s  u p  th e  im p o r ta n t  p o in t th a t  th is  n e c e ssa rily  re q u ire s  
“u n d e rs ta n d in g 7’ on th e  p a r t  o f th e  devils to recognize  t h a t  th is  is  in d ee d  the  
b e s t  s itu a tio n  fo r them ; a n  i r r a t io n a l  devil w ho m isc o n s tru e d  th e  s itu a tio n  
m ig h t n o t b e  w illing  to a g re e  to  th e  te rm s o f th is  c o n tra c tu a l  governm ent.
T h is  p rob lem  aside, th e re  seem s to  be no prima facie re a s o n  to  th in k  th a t  
K a n t is  w ro n g  in  h is b e lie f  t h a t  a  rep u b lican  n a tio n a l c o n s titu tio n  c a n  arise  
in  w hich  a g e n ts  w ill w illing ly  p a rtic ip a te  even  i f  on ly  th ro u g h  se lf-in te re s ted  
m otives.88
L e t u s  r e tu rn  to  th e  q u estio n  of p e rp e tu a l peace  g u a ra n te e d  by 
n a tu re  a lone. W e have a lre a d y  seen  how  K a n t describes  th is  g u a ra n te e  in  
th e  “Id ea ,” n a m e ly  th a t  th e  u n so c ia l sociab ility  o f h u m a n  b e in g s  w ill le a d  
th em  to im p ro v e  them selves, a n d  “unconsciously  p ro ceed  to w a rd  a n  unknow n 
n a tu r a l  en d , a s  i f  follow ing a  g u id in g  th rea d ... p ro m o tin g ]  a n  e n d  th e y  w ould 
se t  l it t le  s to re  by , even i f  th e y  w ere  aw are  of i t .”89 H e re  K a n t  ta lk s  ab o u t “th e
87 Ibid., p. 739.
88 Such an argument is similar to Rawl’s take on the ‘Veil of ignorance” method of thinking 
about government.
89 “Perpetual Peace." Ak. 17.
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in ev itab le  outcom e”90 o f p ro g ress  a n d  a  s ta te  o f peace  w hich  — “p a rt ia l ly  
th ro u g h  th e  b e s t p o ss ib le  in te r n a l  o rgan iza tion ..., p a r tia lly  th ro u g h  com m on 
e x te rn a l a g re em e n t a n d  leg is la tio n  -  a  s ta te  s im ila r  to a  c iv il com m onw ealth  
is  e s ta b lish e d  a n d  c a n  m a in ta in  its e lf  automatically.”91 B ecau se  th is  is  
g u a ra n te e d  by  a  p la n  o f n a tu re ,  K a n t ev en  s ta te s  in  a  foo tno te  t h a t  “th e  ro le  
o f m an  is  th u s  q u ite  a rtif ic ia l.”92 We see  th is  a g a in  in  “T h eo ry  a n d  P rac tice ,” 
w here  K a n t m ak e s  th e  bo ld  s ta te m e n t th a t ,  re g a rd in g  “e te rn a l  p ro g ress ,”
one soon sees th a t  th is im m easurably d istan t result depends not so much on 
w hat we do... nor on w hat method we adopt so as to bring it about; instead, it 
depends on w hat hum an nature does in and with us so as to compel us onto a 
path that we ourselves would not readily follow. Only from nature , or ra th e r 
only from providence..., can we anticipate a result th a t will affect the whole 
and, as a consequence, the  parts.93
T hus, in  a ll  o f  K a n t’s po litica l w ritin g s ,94 i t  is  n a tu re  a n d  th e  self- 
in te re s te d  n a tu re  o f  in d iv id u a ls  w hich a llow  fo r th e  g u a ra n te e  o f  peace, n o t  
m ere  m o ra l w illing , a n d  th e  re a so n  for th is  n e ed  seem s m o st l ik e ly  to  be  th e  
n ecessity  o f se cu rin g  a  p e rp e tu a l  peace in  th e  face  o f h u m a n  freed o m .95 
T h ro u g h  w a r a n d  u n so c ia l sociability , h u m a n s  f in a lly  com e to  re je c t v iolence 
a n d  w ar, fin a lly  e n te r in g  in to  a  rep u b lican  c o n stitu tio n  a n d  a n  in te rn a t io n a l
90 Ibid., Ak. 24.
91 Ibid., Ak. 25.
92 Ibid., Ak. 24 n.
93 “Theory and Practice,” Ak. 310.
94 This is true even of the “Idea.” See: Ak. 23n. and Ak. 25.
95 Thus, I think that Aleksander Bobko in his article, “The Problem of Evil and the Idea of 
Eternal Peace in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant” in Proceedings o f  the Eighth International Kant 
Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, p t 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), pp. 857-863, has 
simply misunderstood the nature of perpetual peace as it relates to moral issues. Bobko asks, “What char­
acter then has the foundation which makes the basis for Kant's project of eternal peace? The answer to 
this question lies in the way we understand and solve the problem of evil,” (p. 862). Bobko concludes that 
the foundation for perpetual peace is the elimination of evil (and thus is a problem solved by the estab­
lishment of a moral community). But this seems completely wrong, for evil is the subordination of the 
moral law to the principle of happiness, and as such it is totally compatible with Right and with peace. 
Kant insists that peace is not a matter of morality, but only a matter of behavior, i.e., a question not of 
virtue but of Right. Thus, we simply do not require the elimination of evil for the establishment of peace.
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fed era tio n , even  i f  from  e n tire ly  se lf-in te re s ted  m o tives. I  th in k  th a t  K a n t 
be lieves such  a  g u a ra n te e  to  b e  n ecessa ry  because , a s  n a tu r a l  c re a tu re s , h u ­
m a n s  a lw ays d e s ire  to  e x em p t th em se lv es from  c o n s tra in ts  w h ich  re s tr ic t  
h a p p in e ss  (n am e ly  R igh t) a n d  m a n ife s t a  p ro p e n s ity  to w a rd s  violence. In d i­
v id u a ls  m u s t be utterly convinced t h a t  w a r is  u n d e s ira b le , conv inced  beyond  
a  m ere  in te lle c tu a l belief, a s  i t  w ere.
T h is  is , o f  course , n o t  to  sa y  th a t  w e a re  h e lp le s s  to  p rom o te  su c h  a  
s itu a tio n ; in  fac t, I  h a v e  t r ie d  to  a rg u e  th a t  w e h a v e  a  d u ty  to  do so. K a n t 
also  p rov ides u s  w ith  th e  n e c e ssa ry  room  fo r th is  in te rp re ta t io n , w ritin g  th a t  
peace  d epends “n o t  so m u ch ” on  u s , and , s ta tin g  in  “P e rp e tu a l  P eace ,” th a t  
ev en  th o u g h  n a tu r e  “does i t  [b rings abou t peace] h e rse lf , w h e th e r  or n o t we 
w ill i t ,”96 g o v e rn m en t “is  a  moral task..., a n d  i ts  m e th o d  o f p u rs u in g  p e rp e t­
u a l  peace... is  com plete ly  d is t in c t  [from  m ere ly  e m p iric a l co n sid era tio n s].”97
K an t, how ever, in s is ts  th a t  to  try  to  w ork  fo r p eace  d irec tly  a n d  b y  
co n sid erin g  i t  a s  a  “m ere  technical task” is  in e ffe c tu a l. H e  c la im s th a t  peace  
“re q u ire s  co n sid erab le  n a tu r a l  know ledge so t h a t  one  c a n  u se  n a tu r e ’s 
m ech an ism  to a t ta in  th e  d e s ire d  end ; ye t i t  is  u n c e r ta in  how  th is  m ech an ism  
w ill fu n c tio n  a s  f a r  a s  i ts  con seq u en ces for p e rp e tu a l  p eace  a re  concerned ; 
a n d  th is  is  so in  a ll  th re e  a re a s  o f pub lic  r ig h t.”98 T h u s  H offe w rite s  th a t  “for 
concrete , p o litica l ju d g m e n ts , a  p h ilo so p h er is  no  m o re  co m p e ten t th a n  a n y  
o th e r  w ell in fo rm e d  a n d  th in k in g  citizen . K a n t  does w e ll to  le a v e  su ch  ju d g ­
m e n ts  to  p o litica l re p re s e n ta tiv e s  a n d  specia lized  adv ice  to  law y ers .”99 K a n t 
is  h e re  u rg in g  so m e th in g  w h ich  is  analogous to  h is  w rit in g s  a b o u t h a p p in e ss ,
96 “Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 365.
97 Ibid., Ak. 377. This is why, to repeat a point, I think that Susanne Weiper is wrong in her 
insistence in “Eine Idee zwischen Politik and Moral: Der Friedensgedanke bei Kant and Scheler” that the 
ends of nature and the ends of human beings should be considered as an antinomy, and, for the same rea­
sons, Eckart von Sydow, in his “Der Gedanke des Ideal-Reichs bei Kant.”
98 Ibid., Ak. 377. See also: Religion, pp. 113, 123-4, and 130 n.
99 Otfried H6flfe, "Einleitung: Der Friede — ein vemachlSssigtes Ideal.” pp. 8-9. translation
mine.
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i.e ., w e k n o w  w h a t i t  is  o u r  d u ty  to do, b u t, conversely , w e a re  q u ite  u n ce r­
t a i n  a b o u t bow  to  b r in g  a b o u t a n  e n d  w h ich  belongs to  a n  u n sp ec ified  con­
c ep t. H a p p in e ss  a n d  p eace  a re  a lik e  in  t h a t  th e y  a re  " ideas” a n d  th e ir  sp e ­
c ific  c o n te n t is  u n k n o w n  to  u s; i t  is  u n c e r ta in  exactly how  to  b r in g  ab o u t a  
s i tu a t io n  in  th e  n a tu r a l  w o rld  in  w h ich  ev e ry  n a tio n  cou ld  w o rk  to g e th e r  to 
e n s u re  p eace . T hus, re a so n  "cau tio n s  u s  n o t to  em ploy p o w er in  d irec t p u r ­
s u i t  o f  i t  (peace], b u t  r a th e r  to  a p p ro a c h  i t  in d ire c tly  th ro u g h  th o se  conditions 
p r e s e n te d  b y  favo rab le  c irc u m sta n ce s ... [T ]he less  i t  m ak e s  co n d u ct depend  
on  th e  p ro p o sed  end ... th e  m o re  c o n d u c t w ill in  g e n e ra l h a rm o n iz e  w ith  m o­
ra l i ty .”100 W h a t th is  show s is  th a t ,  u ltim a te ly , th e  m o ra l la w  com m ands w h a t 
i t  a lw a y s  h a s : obey th e  ca teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e  a n d  ac t in  acco rd  b o th  w ith  
R ig h t a n d  w ith  v ir tu e . W e m ay  n o t k n o w  exac tly  how  to  fo rm  a n  in te rn a ­
tio n a l  fed e ra tio n  o f in d e p e n d e n t s ta te s ,101 b u t  w e know  th a t  w e m u s t e s ta b ­
l is h  a n  in te rn a l  c o n s titu tio n  in  accord  w ith  R ig h t a s  w ell a s  o rg an ize  o u r n a ­
tio n  in to  a  R epublic  so t h a t  a  co sm o p o litan  w orld  can  be m ore  eas ily  e s ta b ­
l is h e d  a n d  w a r  can  be avoided . K eep  in  m in d  th a t  th e  u ltim a te  hope  is n o t 
s im p ly  p eace , b u t to  “tra n s fo rm  a  pathologically enforced  a g re e m e n t in to  a  
so c ie ty  a n d , finally , in to  a  moral w hole .”102
L e t m e p a u se  a  m o m en t a n d  in c lu d e  som e re le v a n t o b se rv a tio n s from  
J e a n n e  S ch u le r, since  h e r  a rtic le , “R e aso n ab le  H ope: K a n t a s  a  C ritica l 
T h in k e r ,” n ice ly  a d d re sse s  th is  p ro b lem  b e tw ee n  h is to rica lly  s itu a te d , con­
c re te  p o litic a l n eed s  a n d  K a n t’s  v is io n  o f a  u to p ia n  fu tu re .103 S c h u le r  ag rees
100 “Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 378.
101 Though if Hdffe is correct in his arguments concerning the formation of a “Minimalstaat,” 
and I think that he is, we may have more specific content than originally thought See: Otfried Hdffe, 
“Eine Weltrepublik als Minimalstaat: Zur Theorie internationaler politischer Gerechtigkeit,” in Zum 
ewigen Frieden, eds. Reinhard Merkel and Roland Wittmann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966), 154-171, and 
Hdffe, “Vdlkerbund oder Weltrepublik.”
102 “Idea,” Ak. 21.
103 Jeanne Schuler, “Reasonable Hope: Kant as Critical Theorist,” in Proceedings o f the 
Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pt. 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press. 1995). 901-7.
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t h a t  p ro g ress  in  h isto ry  concerns “a  le a rn in g  process w hich lead s ... to in s t i ­
tu tio n s  a n d  policies req u ire d  fo r h u m a n  m o ra l developm ent,”104 a n d  th u s  th a t  
p o litic a l in s titu tio n s  a re  n e ce ssa ry  b u t  n o t su ffic ien t for m o ra l p ro g ress , since  
“a  c a lc u la te d  peace  fa lls  sh o r t  o f e n lig h te n e d  cu ltu re ... As h is to ry  m oves from  
h o t  to  cold w ar, so peace b o m  o f p ru d e n c e  evolves tow ard  m o ra lity .”105 B u t  in  
a d d itio n  to  th is  im p o rta n t p o in t, sh e  a lso  d iscusses th e  in te rp la y  b e tw e e n  th e  
env isioned , m o ra l en d  on  one h a n d , a n d  th e  h is to rica lly  s itu a te d , concre te  
ta s k s  on  th e  o th e r. As sh e  describes i t ,  th e re  ex is ts  a  d ialectic  b e tw ee n  th e  
u to p ia n  e n d  a n d  th e  h is to rica l p rocess:
the first provides a yardstick and  direction; the second probes actual tenden­
cies toward the ideal. Both offer perspectives on human nature in  term s of its 
realization and  its fumbling formation... Im m anent analysis w ithout utopia is 
blind. Utopia without im m anent analysis is em pty.106
In  th is  respec t, th en , i t  is  w ell t h a t  K a n t  in s is te d  upon th e  n e ed  o f  each  side  
o f th is  d ialectic , fo r n o t only  w ou ld  a  p u re  u to p ia  be  ra th e r  fan c ifu l w h ile  
p u re  po litics w ou ld  be w ith o u t R ig h t, b u t  a lso  th e  “end  o f h is to ry ” w o u ld  h a v e  
b e en  e ith e r  com pletely  non -defm ab le , or, conversely , m uch  too specifica lly  
defined .
T h e re  is  also  no rea so n  to  th in k  t h a t  a n  en lig h ten ed  ru le r  co u ld  n o t 
h e lp  sp e ed  th is  process along. R ecall, fo r in s ta n c e , th a t  K a n t in s is ts  th a t  
c h a n g e s  in  co n stitu tio n s , w hile  n ecessa ry , sh o u ld  be done slowly, so a s  n o t to 
c h an g e  too m u ch  too fa s t  a n d  th u s  r i s k  reb e llio n .107 D ue to K a n t’s  a rg u m e n ts  
in  th e  f i r s t  sec tion  of th e  Metaphysics of Morals t h a t  th e  ru le r  or r u le r s  m u s t  
h a v e  com plete  executive pow er, c o n s titu tio n a l change  m u s t come fro m  th e  
top  dow n; le a rn e d  people h av e  a  r ig h t  a n d  p e rh a p s  a  du ty  to p u b lis h  th e ir
104 Ibid., p . 912.
105 Ibid., p. 904.
106 Ibid., p. 906.
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reco m m en d atio n s fo r c h an g es , b u t  u ltim a te ly  som e sovereign  m u s t ta k e  r e ­
sp o n sib ility  fo r sen sib le  a n d  tim e ly  reform s. T h u s  C lohesy  w rite s  th a t
although citizens and  officials need not be m otivated by moral reason in their 
political action, reform will be best furthered by those who recognize its moral 
import. These m oral reform ers should be the  ru lers themselves who a ttem pt 
gradually to change th e ir regimes by preparing th e ir subjects to become citi­
zens. They should be the well-born, accustomed to participation in public af­
fairs, who recognize the plight of the “great m asses” for the injustice th a t it 
is.108
G o v ern m en t is  u ltim a te ly  co n ce rn ed  w ith  th e  r ig h ts  o f p e rsons, w ith  in d i­
v id u a ls  as e n d s  in  th em se lv e s . T h e  ru le r  w ho w ish e s  to  fu r th e r  th e  c a u se  of 
R ig h t m u s t h a v e  a n  eye to  th e  n a tu re  of th e  m o ra l la w  a n d  of h u m a n  b e in g s  
in  bo th  th e ir  m o ra l a n d  e m p iric a l n a tu re s . As K a n t  m a in ta in s , “po litics says, 
‘B e  ye w ise a s  s e rp e n ts ,’ to  w h ich  m o ra lity  ad d s... ‘a n d  in n o cen t as doves’.”109 
C lohesy  no tes  t h a t  “th e  fo u n d in g  of good g o v e rn m en t h a s  a lw ays b een  re c ­
ogn ized  as one o f th e  g re a te s t  o f h u m a n  accom plishm en ts. T he  w isdom  a n d  
lea d e rsh ip  n e ed e d  to  b r in g  to g e th e r  frac tious, fr ig h te n e d , a n d  n eed fu l peop le  
h a s  b e en  h e ld  as a lm o s t d iv in e .”110
T he ex istence  o f o u r  ow n co u n try  a n d  c o n s titu tio n  sh o u ld  be a  p r im e  
exam ple: w h a t w ou ld  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  look l ik e  w ith o u t people lik e  F r a n k ­
lin , A dam s, Je ffe rso n , M ad ison , o r H am ilton?  A nd, a s  a  rep u b lic  d raw s i ts  
p o w er from  th e  peop le  a s  th e y  give th e  la w  to  th em se lv es , th e  c o n tin u ed  
m a in te n a n c e  a n d  im p ro v e m e n t o f th e  rep u b lic  w ill fa ll  u p o n  th e  sh o u ld e rs  o f 
a ll, a n d  th e ir  a b ility  to  w o rk  to g e th e r  to  fo rm  n ew  id e a s  a n d  reco m m en d a ­
tio n s . A s w e n o te d  above, so lu tio n s  to  p a r t ic u la r  p rob lem s, e n d in g  poverty , 
fo r exam ple, w ill re q u ire  e m p iric a l so lu tions, a n d  w h ile  th e  m o ra l la w  is  th e  
fo u n d a tio n  fo r su ch  m ax im s, th e  m ax im s th em se lv e s  m u s t  ta k e  a  p a r t ic u la r
108 “A Constitution for a Race of Devils,” p. 737.
109 “To[ward]Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 370.
110 “Reasonable Hope.” pp. 738-9.
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form . T h e  fo rm  th e y  sh o u ld  ta k e  w ill b e  u p  to  u s to decide, a n d  th e  com m u­
n ity  to  e n a c t.
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Chapter Four 
The Five Stages of Moral Progress
L
In  th is  c h a p te r  I  w a n t  to  d iscuss K a n t’s v is io n  o f h o w  th e  m oral im ­
p ro v e m e n t o f th e  h u m a n  sp ec ie s  is  to  p rogress. I  b e liev e  t h a t  K a n t h a s  in  
m in d  five d is tin c t s ta g e s  fo r  th e  h u m a n  race , b e g in n in g  w ith  a  s ta te  o f n a tu re  
a n d  le a d in g  up  to th e  m o ra l K ingdom  of God. I t  se em s t h a t  th e  f irs t a n d  la s t  
s ta g e  e x is t in d ep e n d en tly , w h ile  th e  m idd le  th re e  s ta g e s  a p p e a r  to develop a t  
th e  sa m e  tim e . I  w ill t r y  to  sp e ll o u t th e  n a tu re , th e  n e c e s s i ta te d  du ties, a n d  
th e  d a n g e rs  in h e re n t  in  e a c h  o f th e  five s tag es . B ecau se  K a n t  does n o t sp e a k  
sp ec ifica lly  o f th e re  b e in g  five  s ta g e s  or w h a t th e  exc lu sive  c h a ra c te ris tic s  of 
e a c h  s ta g e  m ig h t be, I  w ill do m y  b e s t  to m ak e  a n  o th e rw ise  con fusing  c h a r ­
a c te r iz a tio n  d e a r ,  p e rh a p s  u n n a tu ra l ly  so.
II.
A. State o f Nature
T h is  is  th e  b e g in n in g  s ta te  o f h u m a n  ex istence , a n d  one ou t o f w hich  
w e h a v e  a lre ad y  p a sse d , i f  w e w e re  ever re a lly  in  it. T h is  i s  H obbes’ s ta te  of 
n a tu r e  w h e re  th e re  is  no  la w , no  R igh t, a n d  no  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  in d iv id u a ls . 
T h is  is  th e  o rig in a l co n d itio n  w h ich  gives r is e  to K a n t’s  a g re e m e n t w ith  
H o b b es  t h a t  e n te r in g  in to  a  c iv il society  is  a  m a tte r  o f  c o n tra c t. T he p r im a ry  
d u ty  o f p e rso n s  in  th is  s ta te  is  s im p ly  to leav e  it, a n d  e n te r  in to  civil society. 
T h e re  a re  ( a t  least) th re e  re a s o n s  fo r th is . F irs t, as  d isc u sse d  before, i t  w ou ld  
b e  obv iously  im possib le  to  a c t m o ra lly  for a n y  le n g th  o f  tim e  in  a  society 
devo id  o f a n y  secu ritie s. Second , a n d  re la ted ly , w e a re  co m m an d ed  to a c t in
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accord  w ith  th e  m oral law , a n d  th is  m ea n s  no t only a tte m p tin g  to will 
m orally , b u t  also m ean s th a t  w e m u s t b eh av e  in  accord w ith  R igh t, for only 
th e  p r in c ip le s  of R ig h t c an  in s t ru c t  u s  on th e  correct m a n ife s ta tio n  of 
freedom . T h ird , w e m u s t e n te r  in to  a  society  in  o rd er to  s t im u la te  an d  
im prove  o u r  ta le n ts  of sk ill a n d  o f d isc ip line . W ithou t a  c iv il society, we 
w ould  b e  te m p te d  to  rem a in  h u n te r s  a n d  g a th e re rs , to  be R obinson  Crusoe, 
o r s im p ly  to  b e  con ten t. C o n ten tm en t, how ever, p laces u s  b a c k  on  th e  level of 
o th e r  a n im a ls , a n d  c an n o t be  c o n s is te n t w ith  our f in a l e n d  a s  m o ra l agen ts. 
T h u s, w e m u s t  leave th is  s ta te  o f  n a tu re , a s  we a lread y  h a v e , in  o rder to 
e n te r  in to  a  society.
R  National/Internal Constitution
K a n t  m ak es i t  c lea r th a t  th is  s ta g e  a n d  th e  n e x t a re  codependen t 
upon  e a c h  o th er, fo r a  pe rfec t in te rn a l  a n d  ex te rn a l c o n s titu tio n  a re  both  
n e c e ssa ry  to  sa fe g u a rd  each  o th e r . O rig in a lly , how ever, th is  s ta g e  beg ins 
(a n d  p e rh a p s  for a  long  tim e  c o n tin u es) w ith  som e type o f in te r n a l  co n stitu ­
tion , w h ile  th e re  re m a in s  a  s ta te  o f n a tu r e  betw een  n a tio n s . T h is  ex ternal, 
in te rn a t io n a l  s ta te  of n a tu re  c o n tin u es  to  th re a te n  each  n a tio n ’s in te rn a l  
com position  because  of a c tu a l w a rs  a s  w ell a s  th e  m e n ta l a n d  f in a n cial r e ­
sou rces d ra in e d  th ro u g h  th e  p re p a ra tio n  o f w ar. W hile w e a re  a lw ays com­
m a n d e d  to  w ill in  accord w ith  a ll  a sp ec ts  o f th e  m oral law , th e  focus a n d  th e  
e m p h a s is  a t  th is  s tage , i f  only fo r th e  sa k e  o f clarification , is  on  R ight.
T h e  m ost u rg e n t concern  is  to  e s ta b lish  a  rep u b lica n  form  of govern­
m e n t so t h a t  in te rn a tio n a l  peace  c a n  be  prom oted . As w e h a v e  seen , K a n t 
in s is ts  t h a t  a  rep u b lican  form  o f g o v e rn m en t h a s  th e  b e s t ch an c e  fo r p rom ot­
in g  p eace , s in ce  th e  people o u g h t to  be c o n su lted  before a  w a r  w ould  be pos­
s ib le .1 I f  w orld ly  s itu a tio n s  c an  effect th e  ab ility  o f p e rso n s  to ta k e  on th e
1 Though I think Kant is ultimately correct in this belief, there are possible objections to this:
1) that nations with republican governments have a history of war equal to those without a republican
government, 2) that the people are not, in fact directly consulted regarding the decision to go to war, and
3) that many wars are fought not for monetary gain, as Kant seems to emphasize, but instead fought for 
revenge, prestige, or a host of other possibilities. On these objections see (respectively): Michael W.
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m o ra l pro ject in  e a rn e s t, th e n  K a n t seem s r ig h t  to  u rg e  th a t  ou r im m ed ia te  
co n cern s ough t to be  w ith  co n tro lling  th is  s i tu a tio n . W ar, a s  th e  la rg e s t 
th r e a t  to  m orality  by  fa r , m u s t  be e lim in a ted . C u ltu re , b o th  as sk ill, th e  
a b ility  to  se t a n d  p u r s u e  en d s, a s  w ell a s  d isc ip line , th e  a b ility  to  c o n s is ten tly  
choose m o ra l ends, is  u ltim a te ly  th re a te n e d  a n d  h a m p e re d  by  w a r a n d  th e  
p re p a ra tio n  for w a r.2 Y et, c u ltu re  p lay s  a n  e s se n tia l  ro le  in  th e  p ro g ress io n  
o f  th e  h u m a n  species. I t  is  c u ltu re  w hich  allow s u s  to  c o n tin u e  to  develop o u r  
ta le n ts  in  a  s ta te  o f conflic t w ith o u t b e in g  in  a  s ta te  o f w a r. T he fo rm atio n  o f 
a  rep u b lic  co n tin u a lly  ap p ro x im a tin g  a  p e rfec t c o n s titu tio n  is  n ecessa ry  fo r 
th e  sa fe g u a rd in g  of c u ltu re  a n d  for th e  e lim in a tio n  o f w a r. In  o th e r  w ords, 
K a n t  believes th a t  a  c e r ta in  type  o f in te rn a l  c o n s titu tio n  is  n ecessa ry  before  
a n  e x te rn a l  one can  be  c rea ted , hence, in  th e  in te re s t  o f e lim in a tin g  w ar, w e 
m u s t  c re a te  th is  re p u b lic a n  form  o f g o v ern m en t to  p u rs u e  peace.
In  add ition  to  th is  r a th e r  n e g a tiv e  need , th e re  a re  also  sev e ra l p o si­
t iv e  a sp ec ts  to th e  re p u b lic a n  system  o f g o v ernm en t. O n e  is  th e  sim p le  fac t 
t h a t  K a n t  believes th is  to  be  th e  only  o rg an iz a tio n  for free ly  w illing  a g en ts  
t h a t  is  possib ly  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  m o ra l law , a n d  h e n ce  w e h av e  th e  m o ra l 
d u ty  to  prom ote  th is  o rg an iza tio n . K a n t’s  v e ry  d e fin itio n  o f R ig h t is: “A ny 
a c tio n  is  right i f  i t  c a n  coex ist w ith  everyone’s  freedom  in  accordance w ith  a  
u n iv e rs a l  law , or i f  on  i t s  m ax im  th e  freedom  of choice o f each  can  coexist 
w ith  everyone’s freedom  in  accordance w ith  a  u n iv e rs a l law ,”3 th u s  n o t on ly  
m u s t  I  a c t in  accord w ith  R ig h t, b u t I  am  also  a llow ed  to  coerce o th e rs  in to  
th is  sy s tem  of R ig h t.4 T h e  c a ll to R ig h t is  “b a se d  on ev ery o n e’s consciousness
Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983): 205-35 
and 323-53; Otfried HOffe, “Ausblick: Die Vereinten Nationen im Lichte Kants,” in Immanuel Kant: 
Zum ewigen Frieden, ed. Otfried HOffe (Berlin: Akedemie Verlag, 1995), 254-56; and Susanne Weiper, 
“Eine Idee zwischen Politik and Moral: Der Friedensgedanke bei Kant and Scheler,” p. 914.
2 Cf.. “Idea,” Ak. 27.
3 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 230. Gregor trans.
4 Cf., Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 230-33.
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o f o b lig a tio n  in  acco rdance  w ith  a  law .”5 S u ch  a  c o n s titu tio n  is  also n ecessi­
t a te d  b ecau se  th e  m o ra l la w  is  c o n s titu te d  su c h  t h a t  th e  in d iv id u a l m u s t  re p ­
r e s e n t  g iv ing  law s to h im /h e rse lf , re p re se n tin g  th e  law  n o t a s  som eth ing  
w h ic h  is  foreign  to  h im /h e rse lf , th u s  th e  law s o f th e  S ta te  m u s t  be such  th a t  
th e y  cou ld  be ag re ed  to  by  a ll  p e rso n s  a n d  n o t s im p ly  b e  a rb itra ry .6
In  ad d itio n , a  re p u b lic a n  c o n s titu tio n  seem s s im p ly  to  be  m ost desir­
able, m o ra l is su e s  a s id e . U n le ss  one  is  p a r t  o f th e  ru l in g  o r  pow erfu l c lass, a  
c o n s titu tio n  w h ich  is  in  acco rd  w ith  E ig h t w ill le a d  to  a  sy s te m  o f govern­
m e n t  w h ich  is  m o st r e p re s e n ta t iv e  o f th e  r ig h ts 7 a n d  d e s ire s  o f h u m an  be­
in g s . T h is  is  th e  th in k in g  b e h in d  th e  c o n s titu tio n  w h ich  is  possib le  fo r a  race  
o f  dev ils . W e w ill a lw ay s b e  m oved  to w a rd  a  re p u b lic a n  co n stitu tio n , fo r o u r 
n a tu r e  a s  m oral p e rso n s , a s  w ell a s  h u m a n  b e in g s , w ill u rg e  u s  to s triv e  for 
th is  goal, th u s  " n a tu re  a n d  freed o m  alone” gu id e  u s  to  th is  end .
A nd, in  ad d itio n , th e re  is  a n o th e r  su g g e s tio n  from  K a n t  a s  to w hy 
su c h  a  c o n s titu tio n  is  to  b e  s tr iv e d  for, k eep in g  in  m in d  o u r  f in a l  m oral end . 
T h is  is  fo u n d  in  th e  “Id e a ” w h e re  K a n t, sp e a k in g  a b o u t th e  n e e d  to m ove o u t 
o f th e  s ta te  of n a tu re , u se s  th e  fo llow ing analogy:
I t is ju st as w ith trees in a  forest, which need each other, for in seeking to take 
the a ir and sunlight from the others, each obtains a beautiful, straight shape, 
while those th a t grow in  freedom and separate  from one another branch out 
randomly, and  are stun ted , bent, and twisted. All the culture and a r t  th a t 
adorn man, as well as the  m ost beautiful social order, are fruits of unsociable­
ness th a t is forced to discipline itself and thus through an  imposed a rt to de­
velop nature’s seed completely.8
5 Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 232.
6 Cf., “Idea,” Ak. 23, “Theory and Practice,” Ak. 289 ff„ and “To[ward] Perpetual Peace," Ak.
379.
71 think that there is a possible non-moral use of this term, and I understand “rights” here in 
that respect.
8 “Idea.” Ak. 22.
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H e re  a g a in  w e see  K a n t’s  n o tio n  o f an tag o n ism  w ith o u t v io lence , conflict 
w ith o u t w a r. A  c o n s titu tio n  in  accord  w ith  R ig h t is  d e s ira b le  b ecau se  i t  
a llow s fo r t h a t  s i tu a t io n  in  w h ich  each  p e rso n  c a n  m ax im ize  th e i r  freedom  
w ith o u t v io la tin g  th e  freed o m  of o th e rs . A n d  th is  s i tu a t io n  is  d e s irab le  
b e ca u se  i t  f u r th e r s  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f c u ltu re , w h ich , in  tu r n ,  fu r th e r s  th e  
m o ra l en d .9
W hile  I  th in k  th e  e m p h a s is  a t  th is  s ta g e  m u s t  be  o n  R ig h t, su re ly  w e 
m u s t  a lso  c o n tin u e  to  t r y  to  p u r s u e  those  a d d itio n a l d u tie s  o f v ir tu e . W e 
o u g h t to  t ry  to  p ro m o te  th e  h a p p in e s s  of o th e rs  a s  w e ll a s  w o rk  on  ou r ow n 
m o ra l w illing . W e a lso  o u g h t to  w o rk  on th o se  e x te rn a l  c o n s tra in ts  w hich 
m ig h t h in d e r  o th e rs  b o th  from  b e h a v in g  a n d  w illin g  in  acco rd  w ith  th e  m o ra l 
law ; th u s , w e o u g h t to  t r y  to  e lim in a te  poverty  a n d  to  focus on  th e  develop­
m e n t  o f c u ltu re . H ow ever, th e  p ro b lem  w ith  th is , a s  I  h a v e  a rg u e d , is  th a t ,  
acco rd ing  to  K a n t, w a r  w ill c o n tin u a lly  th re a te n  su c h  p ro jec ts  a s  long  a s  i t  
re m a in s  a  th re a t .  T h u s , le t  u s  sa v e  a  d iscussion  o f su c h  p o s itiv e  d u tie s  for 
th e  sec tion  on  c u ltu re  a n d  ecc le s ias tic a l fa ith  below .
C  Federation o f Nations
O u r d u tie s  h e re  a re  b a s ic a lly  o u tlin ed  b y  K a n t  in  “To [w ard] 
P e rp e tu a l  P eace .” O n  th e  n e g a tiv e  side, i t  is  th e  d u ty  of ev e ry  n a tio n  to  e n te r  
in to  a n  o rg an iz a tio n  of a l l  n a tio n s , “a n  en d u rin g , e v e r e x p a n d in g  federation 
t h a t  p re v e n ts  w a r  a n d  c u rb s  th e  ten d en cy  of t h a t  h o s tile  in c lin a tio n  to defy 
th e  law ...”10 K a n t  in s is ts  t h a t  n a tio n s  canno t give u p  th e ir  in d ep e n d en c e  a n d
9 There is one further suggestion made by Kant, but I am uncertain as to its exact nature or 
forcefulness. This is the suggestion in “To[ward] Perpetual Peace,” especially at Ak. 354, 356-7, and 379, 
that because of the analogy between persons moving from a state of nature into civil society and nations 
moving from the international state of nature into a federation of nations, States would have to be republi­
can in form because that is the only way they would be autonomous. It is clear in this essay that Kant 
believes that nations cannot give up their constitutions and their independence, and that the federation 
cannot be ruled by a single nation. Thus, the suggestion is something to the effect that because the fed­
eration must consist of independent nation-states along the analogy of a nation organized in accord with 
Right, each nation must be free and autonomous, and the only condition under which this is possible is if 
each nation has a republican constitution.
10 "To[ward] Perpetual Peace.” Ak. 357.
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e n te r  in to  one g ia n t a n d  d esp o tic  w o rld -n a tio n .11 T he  fed e ra tio n  m u s t keep 
e a c h  n a tio n  as in d e p e n d e n t. K a n t’s suggestion  seem s to  be  n o t only  th a t  a  
w o rld  ru le d  by a  sing le  d ic ta to r  w ould  be f r a u g h t  w ith  too m uch  peril, b u t  
a lso  th a t ,  in  th e  sa m e  w ay  t h a t  in d iv id u a l p e rso n s  c a n n o t be  a sk ed  to  give up  
a l l  o f  th e i r  freedom , no n a tio n  c a n  be  a sk ed  to  g ive u p  i ts  r ig h t  to  se lf  r u le .12 
T h u s , th e  fed e ra tio n  “does n o t  se e k  an y  pow er o f th e  so rt p ossessed  by 
n a tio n s , b u t  only  th e  m a in te n a n c e  a n d  secu rity  o f  each  n a tio n ’s ow n freedom , 
a s  w e ll a s  th a t  o f th e  o th e r  n a tio n s  lea g u ed  w ith  it... [T ]his idea of 
federalism  sh o u ld  e v e n tu a lly  in c lu d e  a ll n a tio n s  a n d  th u s  le a d  to  p e rp e tu a l 
p e ac e .”13 I t  is a lso  th e  (n eg a tiv e ) d u ty  o f each  n a tio n  n o t to  engage in  those  
p ra c tic e s , such  a s  s ta n d in g  a rm ies , a ssa ss in a tio n , o r n a tio n a l  deb t, w hich  
m ig h t provoke n a tio n s  to  e n g a g e  in  w ar. E ach  n a tio n  m u s t  do a s  m uch  as 
p o ss ib le  to  e n su re  th a t  w a r  w ill b e  fo rever e lim in a te d .
H ow ever, a s  O tfr ie d  H dffe p o in ts  o u t in  se v e ra l a rtic le s ,14 K a n t’s  po­
s it io n  re g a rd in g  th e  fe d e ra tio n  o f n a tio n s  is  com p lica ted  a n d  even  co n trad ic ­
to ry . O n  th e  one h a n d , a s  m e n tio n e d  above, K a n t  m ak es  th e  analogy  b e ­
tw e e n  th e  n eed  o f in d iv id u a ls  to  m ove ou t o f a  s ta te  o f n a tu re  a n d  th e  n e e d  o f 
n a tio n s  to  move o u t of a n  ( in te rn a tio n a l)  s ta te  o f n a tu re . T hus, som e consti­
tu t io n  is  needed  to  p ro m o te  p e ac e  be tw een  n a tio n s . O n th e  o th e r h a n d , K a n t 
is  c o n ce rn ed  to p ro tec t th e  so v e re ig n ty  of each  in d iv id u a l n a tio n , in  th e  sam e 
w a y  t h a t  th e  sovere ign ty  o f e v e ry  in d iv id u a l o u g h t to  b e  p ro tec ted  w ith in  a  
n a tio n . H ow ever, K a n t ta k e s  th is  p ro tec tion  to th e  ex trem e, m a in ta in in g  
t h a t  th e  re la tio n sh ip  m u s t  b e  “a  fed e ra tio n  of nations, b u t  i t  m u s t n o t be  a
11 Cf., “Theory and Practice,” Ak. 310-11, and “To[ward] Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 354 ff.
12 Kant often uses the analogy between individual persons leaving a state of nature, and sepa­
rate nations leaving an international state of nature.
13 “To[ward] Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 356.
14 Otfried Hdffe, “Eine Weltrepublik als Minimalstaat: Zur Theorie intemationaler politischer 
Gerechtigkeit,” pp. 154-171; “Volkerbund oder Weltrepublik.” pp. 109-132; and Vernunft undRecht 
(1996). Chapter 5.
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n a tio n  co n sis tin g  of n a tio n s .”15 H e  a lso  a sse rts  th a t  n a tio n s  w ill n o t w a n t to 
e n te r  in to  a
nation of peoples... because it does not conform to their idea of the  right of na­
tions... so (if everything is not to be lost) in place of the positive idea of a world 
republic they pu t only th e  negative surrogate of an  enduring, ever expanding 
federation... though there  will alw ays be constant danger of th e ir breaking 
loose.16
T h u s , th e re  is  a  ten s io n , i f  n o t  a  co n trad ic tio n , in  K a n t’s  e x tre m e  p ro tec tion  
o f  th e  n a tio n -s ta te  w hich  is  n o t  e q u a lly  ap p lied  in  th is  an a lo g y  to  th e  in d i­
v id u a l.
H ence, Hofife p o in ts  o u t  t h a t  th e re  is  a  con trad ic tion : i f  w e follow  the  
a n a lo g y  l in k in g  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  n a tio n s  “th e  V o lk e rs taa t [w orld  repub lic] 
a n d  n o t th e  V o lkerbund  [fed e ra tio n ] seem s to [logically] follow .”17 I t  seem s 
in a d e q u a te  for K a n t to in s i s t  t h a t  n a tio n s  ough t to be ab le  to  a rb i t r a r i ly  en ­
t e r  a n d  ex it th is  fed e ra tio n  o f  n a tio n s , i.e., th is  e s ta b lish m e n t o f a  V o lker­
b u n d  w h ich  is a  m ere  “n e g a tiv e  su rro g a te ,” for w ith o u t a n y  p o w e r to  enforce 
a  p e ac e fu l u n ion , such  a  sc en a rio  le a d s  on ly  to a  tem p o ra ry  p e a c e  l ik e  th e  
“h o u se  o f Sw ift.”18 J u s t  a s  in d iv id u a ls  m u s t re lin q u ish  som e o f  th e i r  freedom  
in  o rd e r  to  e n te r  in to  a  leg a l society , n a tio n s  ough t to e n te r  in to  a  re la tio n ­
sh ip  w ith  one a n o th e r  in  w h ic h  th e y  c a n n o t sim ply  choose to  b re a k  th e  law s 
a n d  lea v e  th e  u n io n  w h e n ev e r th e y  w ish . K a n t is  n o t ta k in g  h is  a n a lo g y  se­
rio u s ly  enough , a n d  sh o u ld  re q u ire  n a tio n s  to u ndergo  th e  sa m e  sacrifices as 
in d iv id u a ls  in  o rd e r  to leav e  th e  s ta te  o f (in te rn a tio n a l)  n a tu re .
B u t how  c an  K a n t r e q u ire  t h a t  n a tio n s  leave  th e  s ta te  o f n a tu r e  
w ith o u t v io la tin g  th e ir  so v e re ig n ty  a n d  w ith o u t fo u n d in g  a  w o rld  despotism ?
15 “To[ward] Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 354. “...ein Volkerbund, der aber gleichwohl kein 
Volkerstaat [1st]...”
16 Ibid., Ak. 357.
17 HOffe, “Volkerbund oder Weltrepublik?” p. 113. All translations of HOffe are my own.
18 "Theory and Practice.” Ak. 312.
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HofFe’s so lu tion  is  a n  in s ig h tfu l, a n d  I  th in k  correct, a n s w e r  to  th is  p rob lem . 
S in ce  “a ll” th a t  is  re q u ire d  from  a n  in te rn a tio n a l  o rg a n iz a tio n  of n a tio n s  is 
th e  se c u r in g  of (p e rp e tu a l)  p eace , a  V o lk e rs taa t cou ld  b e  fo u n d ed  w hose on ly  
m iss io n  w a s  “th e  co o rd in a tio n  an d , above all, v io len t-free  so lu tio n  to  conflicts 
[be tw een  n a tio n s]”19 a n d  “a  w ell d e fin ed  and , a t  th e  sa m e  tim e , a s su re d  leg a l 
p ro te c tio n  (Rechtsschutzes) [for a ll  in d iv id u a l n a tio n s ] .”20 In  o th e r  w ords, th e  
job  o f th e  w orld  o rg a n iz a tio n  w o u ld  be  th e  se cu rin g  o f so v e re ig n ty  fo r each  
in d iv id u a l n a tio n . A n y th in g  above a n d  beyond  th is  p ro tec tio n , how ever, 
“w o u ld  v io la te  th e  n a tu r a l  r ig h t  (Menschenrecht) o f  n a tio n s , th e  n a tio n ’s r ig h t  
to  (p o litica l a n d  c u ltu ra l)  se lf-d e te rm in a tio n .”21 In  th is  m a n n e r , th e  sover­
e ig n ty  o f each  n a tio n  is  p ro te c te d  w h ile  peace  is  p ro m o ted . U s in g  th e  a n a l­
ogy b e tw ee n  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  n a tio n s , H offe a rg u e s  t h a t  th e re  m u s t be  som e 
o fficial pow er to enforce  th e  so v e re ig n ty  o f each  n a tio n , to  p ro tec t i t  from  e n ­
c ro a c h m e n ts  from  o th e r  n a tio n s ; a  m ere  v o lu n ta ry  o rg a n iz a tio n  w ith  no  offi­
c ia l  p o w er o r an  o rg a n iz a tio n  n o t fo rm ed  in  accord  w ith  R ig h t w ill s im p ly  n o t 
su ffice . T h u s, g iven  th e  r e s t  o f  K a n t’s p o litica l w ritin g s , i t  seem s H offe is 
r ig h t  to  a rg u e  for th is  s tro n g e r  n e e d  for a  n a tio n  o f n a tio n s .
H ow ever, a n  a d d itio n a l com m en t m ay be im p o r ta n t  h e re , n am e ly  to  
n o te  t h a t  Hoffe h im se lf  seem s n o t  to  go fa r  enough  re g a rd in g  th e  n ecessity  of 
th is  re q u ire m e n t fo r th e  fo rm a tio n  o f a  V o lk e rs taa t. H e  a s s e r ts  th a t , b ecau se  
w e m u s t  accep t th e  r ig h t  o f se lf-d e te rm in a tio n  of a ll  n a tio n s  a s  so 
fu n d a m e n ta l , “one m ay  n o t force a n  in d iv id u a l n a tio n  in to  jo in in g  a  
fe d e ra tio n  o f n a tio n s  n o r  force i t s  conversion  in to  a  re p u b lic a n  form  o f 
g o v e rn m e n t.”22 Y et th is  does n o t  h a rm o n ize  w ith  th e  an a lo g y . I f  w e consider 
th e  co n d itio n  of in d iv id u a ls  w ith in  a  n a tio n , su re ly  th e  S ta te  h a s  n o t on ly  th e  
r ig h t, b u t  also  th e  re q u ire m e n t (in  accord  w ith  R igh t) to  force people in to  a
19 “Eine Weltrepublik as Minimalstaat,” p. 162.
20 Ibid., p. 163.
21 HOfife, “Volkerbund oder Weltrepublik?” p. 117.
22 Ibid.. pp. 117-8.




leg a l o rg an iz a tio n , a n d  to  force th e m  to  behave  accord ing ly . As H offe  h im sp lf 
w rites : “th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t of a  d e fin ite  society is  a  d u ty ... [and] c e r ta in ly  
p re s e n ts  a  c a teg o rica l im p e ra tiv e  o f  R ig h t.”23 T ho u g h  th e  in d iv id u a l r e ta in s  
h is /h e r  in d iv id u a l r ig h ts  a t  a ll t im e s  (or a t  le a s t  o u g h t to) a n d  r e m a in s  th e  
u ltim a te  fo u n d a tio n  fo r a n y  n a tio n a l  o rg an iza tio n , t h a t  in d iv id u a l does n o t 
re se rv e  th e  r ig h t  to  e x e m p t h im /h e rs e lf  from  th a t  n a tio n . H ence, k e e p in g  
w ith  th e  an a logy , i t  se e m s  th a t  a n  in te rn a t io n a l  o rg an iz a tio n  w o u ld  in d e e d  
h av e  th e  r ig h t  to  fo rce  n a tio n s  in to  a  fed e ra tio n  o f n a tio n s , a  V o lk e rs ta a t  a n d  
n o t a  m ere  V o lk e rb u n d . G iven  th e  re q u ire m e n t o f R ig h t t h a t  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  
in d iv id u a l n a tio n s  o u g h t to  leav e  th e i r  s ta te  o f n a tu re , a  V o lk e rs ta a t o u g h t to 
h a v e  som e r ig h t  to  a t  l e a s t  p u t  p r e s s u re  on  o th e r n a tio n s  to jo in  th is  
o rg an iza tio n , e sp ec ia lly  since  i ts  o n ly  pow er w ould  be  to  p ro tec t th e  
so v e re ig n ty  o f e ac h  n a t io n .24
M oving  to  m o re  p o sitiv e  c o n s id e ra tio n s  c o n ce rn in g  th is  t h i r d  s ta g e  of 
m o ra l p ro g ress , K a n t  in d ic a te s  t h a t  n a tio n s  sh o u ld  t r y  to  p rom o te  in te ra c tio n  
b e tw een  th e  peo p le  o f  d iffe ren t n a tio n s , especially  w ith  a n  eye to  p ro m o tin g  
tra d e .25 K a n t  m a k e s  th e  d is tin c tio n  in  “To[w ard] P e rp e tu a l  P eace” n o t  only  
b e tw een  a  n a tio n a l  a n d  in te rn a t io n a l  co n stitu tio n , b u t  also  b e tw e e n  “one  con­
fo rm ing  to  th e  rights o f nations in  re la tio n  to one a n o th e r ... [and] o n e  con­
fo rm ing  to  th e  rights o f world citizenship, so fa r  a s  m en  a n d  n a tio n s  s ta n d  in  
m u tu a lly  in f lu e n tia l  re la tio n s  a s  c itiz e n s  o f a  u n iv e rsa l n a tio n  of m e n .”26 
W hile  th e  fo rm er se em s to  concern  th e  w ork  of th e  fe d e ra tio n  to p re v e n t  w ar,
23 p. 25. In: Otfried HSffe, “Einleitung: Der Friede — ein vemachlassigtes Ideal.”
24 In a private discussion with HdfFe (Tubingen, Deutschland, November 1996), he admitted 
that this was indeed a problem, and indicated that what he should have stated more clearly in these arti­
cles is not that a Volkerstaat could not try to compel other nations to join the federation, but only that they 
could not use violence in order to do so. HOfife said he would deal with this in a forthcoming book. It 
remains unclear, however, just how far a Volkerstaat could use its power in order to compel other nations 
to join i t  Economic sanctions? Mere political pressure?
25 There remains the possibility that this is merely a negative duty, since trade is only one 
means among many for the elimination of war. However, I think that Kant would insist on the interaction 
of individuals for the mere sake of promoting cosmopolitanism, thus as a (positive) end itself.
26 “To[ward] Perpetual Peace.” Ak. 348 n.
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th e  la t te r  se em s to be concerned  w ith  “u n iv e rs a l hospitality ”2~ T hus, th is  
la t te r  d u ty  is  n o t a  d u ty  b e tw een  n a tio n s , b u t  in s te a d  b e tw ee n  th e  in d iv id u a l 
a n d  fo re ign  p e rso n s  or n a tio n s . T h u s, K a n t  co n sid ers  i t  a  m a tte r  even  o f 
R igh t fo r in d iv id u a ls  to  be  a llow ed  to  v is it  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  peacefully .
T h e re  seem  to b e  (a t  le a s t)  fo u r rea so n s  w h y  th is  second  d u ty  m ig h t 
be n ecessa ry . T he f i r s t  re a so n  is  th a t  i t  is  n e ce ssa ry  to  b o ls te r  trad e , a  device 
w hich c o n tr ib u te s  to peace .28 Second, “b ecau se  a ... com m u n ity  w idely  p r e ­
vails am o n g  th e  E a r th ’s peop les, a  tra n sg re s s io n  o f r ig h ts  in  one p lace  in  th e  
w orld is  fe lt  everywhere”29 T h is  a p p e a rs  to  in d ic a te  th e  p ra g m a tic  co n sid ­
e ra tio n  t h a t  w e  ough t to  t r e a t  fo re ig n e rs  in  accord  w ith  R ig h t so n o t a s  to  
th re a te n  re la tio n s  b e tw een  n a tio n s . T h ird , i t  is  s im p ly  a  m a tte r  o f R ig h t to 
t r e a t  a ll  p e rs o n s  in  th is  m a n n e r . F o u rth , i f  w e a re  to  ta k e  K a n t’s in s is ten c e  
o f th e  d u ty  to  e s ta b lish  a  k ingdom  o f  G od on e a r th , c le a r ly  w e h av e  to be  ab le  
to in te ra c t w ith  each  o th e r  in  te rm s  of cosm opo litan  (weltbiirgerlich) c itizens, 
in d iv id u a ls  w ho, w hile  a lw ay s be long ing  to  som e S ta te  o r o ther, w ill h a v e  to 
in te ra c t in  o rd e r  to active ly  p rom ote  a  m o ra l w orld . W hile  th is  fo u rth  re a so n  
w ill le a d  u s  in to  th e  n e x t s ta g e  o f m o ra l developm en t, a t  th is  s tag e  w e c a n  
th in k  o f th is  d u ty  tow ards cosm opo litan ism  a s  th e  d u ty  to  t r e a t  p e rso n s  from  
d ifferen t n a tio n s  in  accord  w ith  R igh t, a g a in  s tre s s in g  a t  th is  s tag e  p o litica l 
a n d  e x te rn a l d u tie s  over th o se  o f v ir tu e .
B efore  m oving on  to  th e  n e x t s ta g e  o f m o ra l developm en t, le t u s  a d ­
d ress th e  fo llow ing  q u estio n  for th e  la s t  tim e: Is  a  s ta te  o f p e rp e tu a l p eace  a  
moral cond ition?  I h a v e  t r ie d  to  a rg u e  in  sec tions above  t h a t  i t  is not. K a n t  
in s is ts  a g a in  a n d  again  t h a t  w a r w ill e v e n tu a lly  b e  e lim in a te d  th ro u g h  n a ­
tu re  alone, a n d  th a t  w e w ill e n te r  in to  a  fed e ra tio n  e v en  i f  w e a re  n o t w illin g
27 Ibid., Ak. 357.
28 Cf., ~To[ward] Perpetual Peace.” Ak. 359 and 368.
29 ~To[ward] Perpetual Peace." Ak. 360.
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to  do so.30 F rom  th e  f irs t  to th e  la s t  o f K a n t’s  a rtic le s  on peace a n d  po litics, 
h e  h o ld s  th a t  obedience to th e  la w s  of R ig h t “e v en tu a lly ... w ill also e x te n d  to 
n a tio n s  in  th e ir  e x te rn a l re la tio n s  to w a rd  one  a n o th e r  up  to th e  re a liz a tio n  of 
th e  cosm opolitan  society, w ith o u t th e  m o ra l fo u n d a tio n  in  m a n k in d h a v in g  to 
b e  e n la rg e d  in  th e  le a s t...”31 P eace  w ill be  a ch iev e d  th ro u g h  se lf-in te re s t. 
Y ovel com es to  e x ac tly  th e  sam e  conclusion  in  h is  Kant and the Philosophy of 
History w ritin g , am o n g  o th e r th in g s , th a t :
na tu re  cannot produce the goal of history. I t  reaches only as far as the  stage of 
culture. As such, it  can produce the political facet of the highest good, b u t even 
here it is only a  sufficient, not a  necessary condition. As for the ethical com­
m unity, the core of the historical ideal... n a tu re  can only prepare the external 
ground for it  by ensuring a political order, guaranteeing life and  property, re­
fining the b ru tish  instincts. But it cannot bring about the system of ethical 
dispositions itself.32
W olfgang  R od a rg u e s  fo r th e  sam e  conclusion , m a in ta in in g  th a t ,  b e ca u se  th e  
o rg an iz a tio n  o f a l l  n a tio n s  in  accord  w ith  R ig h t “is  n o t th e  la s t  goal, b u t  i ts e lf  
o n ly  a  m ean s, th is  show s, th ere fo re , t h a t  a cco rd in g  to  K an t, th e  f in a l goa l of 
h is to ry  ex is ts  in  th e  m o ra liz in g  o f h u m a n k in d , w h ich  shou ld  follow from  
th e i r  c iv ilization  a n d  c u ltu ra liz a tio n .”33 L ew is W h ite  B eck w rite s  t h a t  
“m o ra lity  is  n o t a  p ro d u c t of n a tu re , b u t  o f a  n e w  b eg in n in g w hich, n e v e r th e ­
le ss , p resu p p o se s  th e  n a tu ra l  p rocesses le a d in g  up  to  civ ilization ,”34 a n d  th a t
30 Pierre Leberge has worked out a very detailed version of how nature secures such peace even 
though we do not wish it, focusing particularly on war, differences in speech and religion, and trade. See: 
“Von der Garantie des ewigen Friedens,” pp. 149-170.
31 “Is the Human Race Improving?” p. 167. Notice, however, that such phrasing does leave 
room for the possibility of our helping this peace along, for the thrust here, like all of Kant’s writings on 
this issue, is that peace will occur whether or not we will it. Thus, it is possible that we do indeed will it, 
and perhaps can help to further i t
32 p. 196. Yirmiahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy o f  History. Yovel’s section, “Rational 
History Versus Natural Dialectic” is absolutely clear on this point.
33 p. 140. Wolfgang Red, “Die Rolle transzendentaler Prinzipien in Moral und Politik.” 
Translation mine.
34 pp. 198-9. Lewis White Beck. Essays on Kant and Hume (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1978).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
m oral p ro g ress  “is  not a n  e v e n t occu rrin g  u n d e r  th e  m ech an ism  o f  n a tu r e .”35 
F ina lly , J e a n n e  S c h u le r  sim p ly  n o te s  th a t  “a  c a lc u la te d  peace  fa l ls  s h o r t  of 
e n lig h te n e d  c u ltu re . C o rd ia l t r a d e  re la tio n s  [for exam ple] d isc o u rag e  J a p a n  
b a sh in g  b u t  do n o t c o n s titu te  m u tu a l  resp ec t.”36 T h e re  a re  n u m e ro u s  h in ts  
th ro u g h o u t K a n t’s w ritin g s  w h ich  in d ic a te  t h a t  p e ac e  is  a  n e c e ssa ry  p re c u r­
so r to  m o ra l im p ro v em en t, b u t  t h a t  i t  is  n o t i ts e l f  m o ra l.
In  a d d itio n  to  th e  m a n y  q u o ta tio n s  I  h a v e  c ite d  above, l e t  m e  offer a  
few  m ore in  o rd e r  to  secu re  th is  a rg u m e n t. In  th e  f if th  “T h es is” o f  th e  “Id ea ,” 
re g a rd in g  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f “a  p e rfec tly  rightful civil constitution,” K a n t 
w rite s  t h a t  “on ly  by  so lv ing  a n d  co m p le tin g  i t  c a n  n a tu re  f u l f i l l  h e r  o th e r  ob­
jec tives w ith  o u r  species,”37 th u s  g iv in g  u s  th e  c lu e  t h a t  i t  is  m o ra lity , n o t 
peace, w hich  is  th e  f in a l  e n d  o f n a tu r e  a n d  w h ich  w ill occur a f te r  th e  e s ta b ­
lish m e n t o f peace. In  th e  “E n d  o f  A ll T h in g s ,” K a n t  ad d re sses  a  s im ila r  
them e, a n d  g ives u s  som e in d ic a tio n  o f s e p a ra te  s ta g e s  of p ro g ress :
In the n a tu ra l progress of the hum an  race, ta len ts, skills, and tastes... become 
cultured before m orality develops, and this s ta te  is precisely the  m ost burden­
some and dangerous one possible for morality... However, h u m a n it y ’s  moral 
capacity..., which always lags behind, will som eday overtake them  (as one may 
hope to occur under a  wise world ruler), though in  its hasty course it becomes 
tangled in itself and often stum bles...38
I  ta k e  K a n t’s d iscussion  o f w ell-being , bo th  in  th e s e  sections a n d  in  h is  
d iscussion  of A rc ad ian  sh e p h e rd s  a n d  th e  T a h i t ia n  is lan d s , to in d ic a te  th a t  
peace  is  m ere  w ell-be ing  a n d  m e re  w ell-being  is  o n ly  “g litte r in g  m ise ry ” i f  i t  
is  n o t “g ra f te d  on to  m o ra lity .”39 I n  “T heory  a n d  P rac tice ,” ta lk in g  a b o u t how  
la te r  g e n e ra tio n s  w ill e v e n tu a lly  d isco n tin u e  w a r  fo r m ere ly  f in a n cia l
35 Ibid., p. 201.
36 p. 904. Jeanne Schuler, “Reasonable Hope: Kant as Critical Theorist,” 901-907.
37 “Idea.” Ak. 22.
38 “End of All Things,” Ak. 332. Compare with “Idea.” Ak. 26.
39 “Idea.” Ak. 26.




rea so n s , K a n t  w r ite s  t h a t  “succeed ing  g e n e ra tio n s  (u n b u rd e n e d  by  d eb ts  th e y  
th em se lv e s  h a v e  n o t  in cu rre d ) w ill be  a b le  e v e n  in  a  m o ra l sense  to m ak e  
ev e r m ore  p ro g re ss  to w a rd s  b e tte r in g  th e m se lv e s . A n d  th e y  w ill do th is  n o t 
a s  a  r e s u l t  o f a n y  love  o f  th e ir  a n c e s to rs  fo r  th e m , b u t  r a th e r  solely  by  v ir tu e  
of... self-love.”40 I n  “P e rp e tu a l  P e a ce ” K a n t  w r ite s  exp licitly : “a  good n a tio n a l  
c o n s itu tio n 41 c a n n o t b e  expected  to  a r is e  f ro m  m o ra lity , b u t, ra th e r , q u ite  th e  
opposite, a  p eop le ’s  good, m ora l co n d itio n  is  to  b e  ex p ec ted  only u n d e r  a  good 
c o n s titu tio n .”42
H ence , g iv en  th e  overw helm ing  n u m b e r  o f q u o ta tio n s  w hich  a t te s t  to 
K a n t’s in s is te n c e  t h a t  h u m a n s  w ill b e  b ro u g h t  to  p eace  m ere ly  th ro u g h  th e i r  
se lf- in te re s te d  n a tu r e ,  g iven  h is  a s se r tio n s  t h a t  w a r  is  th e  la rg e s t h in d ra n c e  
to  m o ra lity , g iven  t h a t  m e re  w ell-be ing  is  o f te n  a t  c ro ss-pu rposes w ith  m o ra l­
ity , a n d  g iven  th e s e  h in t s  th a t  m o ra lity  is  a  p ro je c t w h ich  m u s t occur a f te r  
peace, I  th in k  w e c a n  conclude t h a t  p eace  is  a  n e c e ssa ry  b u t  su re ly  n o t su ff i­
c ie n t co nd ition  fo r m o ra l  p ro g ress .43
D. Culture and Ecclesiastical Faith
A s re la tio n s  a m o n g  n a tio n s  im p ro v e  a n d  th e  p ro sp ec ts  fo r a  
p e rm a n e n t  p eace  in c re a s e , espec ially  s h o u ld  th e  tim e  com e w here  a ll n a tio n s
40 “Theory and Practice,” Ak. 311.
41 Misspelling occurs in translation.
42 “To[ward] Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 366. Thus, the dilemma which Aleksander Bobko presents 
in his article “The Problem of Evil and the Idea of Eternal Peace” is a false one, and his conclusions are 
flawed. Bobko’s argument is this: Kant, in the first two books of the Religion, concludes that the reasons 
for the existence of evil must ultimately remain a mystery, and thus evil is an “invisible enemy.” Thus, 
humankind as a whole is helpless in the face of evil. Bobko then concludes that Kant is wrong to think in 
“To [ward] Perpetual Peace” that peace can be achieved through reason, for we are helpless to overcome 
evil. This conclusion is based on the assumption that peace and evil cannot co-exist. But this assumption 
is wrong, for peace has to do with external action, while evil concerns non-adherence to moral maxims. 
Hence, the conflict Bobko presents is a false one, and his conclusion that “Kant, fascinated by rationality 
and motivated by dreams of eternal peace, seems to forget about the radical evil of human nature de­
scribed earlier” (p. 862) is wrong. See: Aleksander Bobko, “The Problem of Evil and the Idea of Eternal 
Peace in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant,” pp. 857-863.
43 Since the next section deals with a similar issue, it will offer even further evidence for this
claim.
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w ould  fin a lly  jo in  to g e th e r  in  one o rg an iza tio n , in  every  n a tio n  th e  focus can  
now  sh if t  to w a rd  th e  im p ro v em en t o f m o ra lity . T he  p ro m o tio n  o f m o ra lity  
w ill no  lo n g er be h in d e re d  b y  w a r  or th e  p re p a ra tio n  for w a r . M oney can  
a g a in  be u se d  for ed u ca tio n . T he  p e rfec t o r in c re a s in g ly  p e rfe c t c o n s titu tio n  
of each  n a tio n  w ill a llo w  fo r free  com petition , b o th  am o n g  in d iv id u a ls  a s  w ell 
a s  n a tio n s , i.e., a n  a n ta g o n is m  w hich  w ill fo s te r  ta le n ts  w ith o u t le a d in g  to 
w ar. W hile  th e re  e x is ts  th e  d a n g e r  th a t  in d iv id u a ls  w ill s lip  in to  a  s ta te  of 
w ell-being, u n co n ce rn e d  w ith  b e tte r in g  th em se lv es  m orally , th e  s ta g e  is  se t 
for re a l  m o ra l p ro g re ss  to  beg in , a n d  K a n t g ives u s  m a n y  d iffe ren t w ays in  
w hich  to  focus on  th is  p ro jec t.
1 .
T he f ir s t  w a y  t h a t  m o ra l p ro g ress  is  p ro m o ted  is  sp e lle d  o u t in  som e 
d e ta il  in  th e  second  p a r t  o f th e  Metaphysics of Morals, n a m e ly  th e  “E lem en ts  
of V irtu e .” T hese  c o n s is t o f th e  d u tie s  to w a rd  o n ese lf a n d  to w a rd  o th ers . T he 
fo rm er se t  o f o v e ra rch in g  d u tie s  concerns se v e ra l specific d u tie s . T he  f i r s t  is  
to  avoid  th e  vices o f “se lf-m u rd e r, th e  u n n a tu r a l  u se  w h ich  an y o n e  m ak es of 
h is  se x u a l in c lin a tio n , a n d  th e  im m o d era te  en joym en t of food  a n d  dr in k  th a t  
w eak en s one’s c ap ac ity  to  u se  h is  pow ers p u rp o siv e ly .”44 T h e  second  in c lu d es 
te llin g  th e  t ru th ,  k e e p in g  o ne’s self-esteem , a n d  m o ra l se lf-know ledge.45 
K a n t considers th e se  f i r s t  a n d  second se ts  o f d u tie s  to  be  “sub jec tive” d u ­
tie s :46 th e  f i r s t  concerns a  p e rso n  co n sid ered  a s  a n  “a n im a l b e in g ,” a n d  th u s  
concerns th e  n e ed  to  k eep  o n e se lf  a n d  th e  species a live, w h ile  th e  second con­
cern s a  p e rso n  “c o n s id e re d  on ly  a s  a  m o ra l b e in g ,” a n d  seem s to  concern  th e  
p re se rv a tio n  o f th e  fo u n d a tio n  for th e  p o ss ib ility  o f m o ra l w illing . T he th ird  
a n d  fo u rth  se t o f d u tie s  co n ce rn  th e  p rom o tion  o f ta le n ts , th e  th ir d  b e in g  th e
44 Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 420. All following quotations of the Metaphysics o f Morals 
come from the Ellington translation.
45 Ibid., Ak. 429-442.
46 Kant's division between “objective” and “subjective.” and “formal” and “material” is rather 
confusing, if it is even coherent, but this division itself is not important to our discussion.
.I
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“d u ty  to  h im se lf  to develop a n d  in c re ase  h is  n a tu r a l  perfection , t h a t  is, for 
p ra g m a tic  rea so n s ,”47 w h ile  th e  fo u r th  is  th e  “d u ty  to  h im se lf  to  h e ig h te n  h is  
m o ra l p erfec tion , th a t  is, fo r p u re ly  m o ra l re a so n s .”48 T hese  la s t  tw o  d u tie s  
c o rre sp o n d  n ice ly  w ith  K a n t’s  o th e r  d iscu ssio n s o f cu ltu re , h en ce  l e t  u s  sav e  a 
d iscu ssio n  o f th e m  for th e  m om ent.
T h e  second  o v e ra rch in g  s e t  o f d u tie s  in  th e  Metaphysics o f Morals 
co n ce rn  d u tie s  to  o th ers .49 O ne ty p e  o f d u ty  is  m ere ly  negative , “e x p re sse d  
o n ly  in d ire c tly  (by fo rb idd ing  i ts  opposite),”50 a n d  co nsists  in  th e  s t r ic t  d u ty  to 
r e f ra in  from  a n y  action  w h ich  w ou ld  v io la te  th e  re sp ec t w hich  is  n e ce ssa r ily  
g iv en  to  o th e r  h u m a n  be ings. T h e  o th e r  ty p e  of d u ty  K a n t spe lls  o u t  in  ex ­
tre m e ly  positive  an d  active  te rm s . O u r c h ie f  d u ty  to w a rd  o th e rs  is  love, b u t  
K a n t  in s is ts  t h a t  th is  “is  n o t u n d e rs to o d  h e re  a s  a  fee ling ,”51 b u t  in s te a d  “th e  
love o f  m a n k in d  (ph ilan th ropy ) is  h e re  th o u g h t o f a s  p rac tic a l a n d , conse­
q u e n tly ..., i t  m u s t  be p laced  in  active  benevo lence, a n d  th u s  co n ce rn s th e  
m ax im  of ac tio n s ,”52 a n d  “can  a lso  be e x p re sse d  a s  th e  d u ty  to  m a k e  th e  en d s 
o f o th e rs  (as lo n g  as th ey  a re  n o t im m oral) m y  ow n.”53 P e rh a p s  th e  b e s t 
su m m a ry  g iven  by  K a n t is:
One soon sees th a t w hat is m eant here is not mere well-wishing, which is, 
strictly speaking, a mere com plaisant regard  for the welfare of every o ther per­
son w ithout one’s having to contribute anything to it..., but, ra ther, an  active 
practical benevolence, which m akes the welfare and happiness of o thers one’s 
end...54
47 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 444.
48 Ibid., Ak. 446.
49 We have already discussed these duties in Chapter One above.
50 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 464-5.
51 Ibid., Ak. 449.
52 Ibid., Ak. 450.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.. Ak. 452.
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K a n t em p h a size s  th e  n e e d  for active d u ties , n o t m e re  w ell-w ish ing , a n d  th e  
d u ty  n o t to  do a n y th in g  w hich  w ould  le a d  a n o th e r  to  lo ss  o f se lf-esteem  as  
w ell a s  th e  d u ty  to  h e lp  o th e rs  bo th  m e n ta lly  a n d  m a te r ia lly . Specifically, 
th e se  positive  d u tie s  sire beneficence, g ra titu d e , a n d  sy m p a th e tic  fee ling .55
2 .
A  second  m a in  w ay  th a t  K a n t spe lls  o u t h o w  w e a re  to  p rom ote  m o ra l 
p ro g ress  is  th o u g h  h is  m a n y  d iscussion  o f c u ltu re . T h e  th e m e  of c u ltu re  r u n s  
th ro u g h o u t a ll  o f  K a n t’s  w ritings, b u t  l e t  u s  h e re  o n ly  e x am in e  th e  “Id ea ” a n d  
th e  Critique o f Judgment. W e h av e  a lre ad y  se en  a  p a r t  o f K a n t’s d iscussion  
in  th e  “Id ea ” s u r ro u n d in g  c u ltu re  w ith  h is  ta lk  o f th e  im p ro v em en t o f “a ll  o f  a  
c re a tu re ’s n a tu r a l  c ap ac itie s .” W e h av e  se en  how  K a n t  describes “th e  f i r s t  
t ru e  s te p s  from  b a rb a r is m  to cu ltu re , in  w h ich  th e  u n iq u e  social w o rth  of 
m a n  consists ,” a n d  h ow  “a ll m an ’s ta le n ts  a re  g ra d u a lly  developed, h is  ta s te  
is  c u ltu red , a n d  th ro u g h  p rogressive  e n lig h te n m e n t h e  b eg in s to e s ta b lish  a  
w ay  o f th in k in g  t h a t  c a n  in  tim e tran sfo rm  th e  c ru d e  n a tu r a l  capacity  fo r 
m o ra l d isc rim in a tio n  in to  defin ite  p rac tic a l p r in c ip le s ...”56 N ow  K a n t gives 
u s  se v e ra l d iffe re n t w a rn in g s  in  th e  “Id ea ,” r e i te r a te d  in  o th e r  w ritings , t h a t  
c u ltu re  is  th e  m a in  m ech an ism  for avo id ing  th e  o th e rw ise  d angerous s ta te  o f  
w h a t m ig h t be  te rm e d  “w ell-being” or “c o n te n tm e n t.” A fte r d iscussing  cu l­
tu re , K a n t gives u s  h is  d iscussion  of th e  A rcad ian  sh e p h e rd , a n d  th e n  w rite s  
th a t
m an wills concord; b u t nature better knows w hat is good for the species: she 
wills discord. He wills to live comfortably and  p leasantly ; bu t nature wills th a t  
he should be plunged from laziness and inactive comfort into work and h a rd ­
ship, so th a t he will in tu rn  seek by his own cleverness to pull himself up from 
them .57
ss Ibid., Ak. 452-8.
56 “Idea,” Ak. 21.
57 Ibid.
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K a n t w a rn s  th a t  a  s ta te  in  w h ich  w e  a re  concerned  on ly  w ith  h a p p in e ss  is  
“th e  h a r s h e s t  o f evils, w hich  p a s s  i n  d isg u ise  as e x te rn a l  w e ll-b e in g ,”58 con­
t in u in g  o n  to  give u s  h is  s ta te m e n t  a b o u t “g litte r in g  m ise ry .” A s I h a v e  p e r ­
h a p s  d isc u sse d  th is  su b jec t en o u g h , I  w ill leav e  i t  be. B u t  K a n t’s p o in t is  
c lear: c u ltu re  does n o t p rom o te  h a p p in e s s  a n d  w ell-being ; i t  w o rk s  to w ard  
th e  d ev e lo p m e n t of a ll o f one’s c a p a c itie s , b o th  p ra g m a tic  a n d  m o ra l, so t h a t  
h u m a n s  w ill co n tin u e  to  exercise  t h e i r  w ill a n d  n o t b e  lu l le d  in to  com pla­
cency.
T h is  m essage  is  re in fo rced  in  th e  Critique o f Judgment, w h ere  K a n t’s 
d iscu ss io n  o f c u ltu re  resem b les  th e  “Id e a ” a n d  p a ra lle ls  th e  p o sitiv e  d u tie s  to  
o n e se lf  fo u n d  in  th e  Metaphysics o f  Morals. R ecall t h a t  K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  
“p ro d u c in g  in  a  ra tio n a l b e in g  a n  a p t i tu d e  fo r p u rp o ses  g e n e ra lly  (hence [in a  
w ay t h a t  leaves] th a t  b e in g  free) i s  culture,” a n d  t h a t  c u ltu re , a s  n a tu re ’s p e ­
n u lt im a te  pu rpose , p rom otes “m a n ’s  a p t i tu d e  in  g e n e ra l fo r  s e t t in g  h im se lf  
p u rp o se s ...”59 I t  is in te re s tin g  to  n o te  th a t ,  in  k e ep in g  w ith  th e  “Id e a ,” K a n t 
a s s e r ts  t h a t  “i t  is  h a rd  to  develop s k i l l  in  th e  h u m a n  sp ec ies  ex cep t by  m e a n s  
o f in e q u a li ty  am ong people,” a n d  m a in ta in s  th a t  i t  is  su c h  in e q u a li ty  th a t  
“...h as  to  do w ith  th e  deve lopm en t o f  m a n ’s n a tu r a l  p re d isp o s itio n s , a n d  [so] 
n a tu r e  s t i l l  ach ieves i ts  ow n p u rp o se , e v en  i f  th a t  p u rp o se  i s  n o t  o u rs .”60
W hile  th e  c u ltu re  o f ski]] a llo w s fo r th e  p rom otion  o f  o u r  w illing  in  
g e n e ra l, o u r  ab ility  to  conceive o f a n  e n d  a n d  to  follow th ro u g h  w ith  ou r 
a tte m p ts  to  secu re  it, K a n t a lso  w r i te s  o f  th e  c u ltu re  o f d isc ip lin e . T he 
c u ltu re  o f sk ill  does n o t te ll  u s  w h ich  e n d s  to  choose, a n d  th is  le a d s  u s  to  th e  
c u ltu re  o f  d iscip line, th e  n e e d  “to  a s s i s t  th e  will in  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  a n d  
se lec tio n  o f i ts  p u rposes.”61 K a n t e x p la in s  t h a t  d isc ip line  “is  n e g a tiv e  a n d  
c o n s is ts  in  th e  lib e ra tio n  of th e  w ill f ro m  th e  despo tism  o f d e s ire s , despo tism
58 Ibid., Ak. 26.
59 Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak. 431.
60 Ibid., Ak. 432.
61 Ibid.






th a t  r iv e ts  u s  to c e r ta in  n a tu r a l  th in g s ...”62 T hus, w h ile  th e  c u ltu re  o f sk ill 
a llow s u s  to  im prove th e  fo rm u la tio n  a n d  p u rs u i t  o f  e n d s  g en era lly , th e  
c u ltu re  o f d isc ip line  se em s to  b e  th a t  w hich  a id s  u s  i n  f i lte r in g  o u t th e  ca ll of 
o u r a n im a l in c lin a tio n s  so  t h a t  w e can  be b e tte r  tu n e d  to  th e  m o ra l law . T he 
tools o f  th is  c u ltu re  K a n t  id e n tif ie s  w ith  educa tion , th e  f in e  a r ts ,  a n d  science, 
for “th e y  m a k e  g re a t h e a d w a y  a g a in s t th e  ty ra n n y  o f one’s  p ro p en s ity  to  th e  
sen ses, a n d  so p re p a re  h im  fo r  a  sovereign ty  in  w h ich  re a so n  a lone  is  to  
d o m in a te .”63 T h u s c u ltu re  fo rces u s  n ev er to  be m e re ly  com placen t, a n d  
develops w ith in  u s  th o se  co n d itio n s  by w hich  we c o u ld  im p ro v e  o u r m orality , 
sh o u ld  w e so choose.
W e sh o u ld  b rie fly  n o te  t h a t  K a n t’s  c h a ra c te r iz a tio n  o f c u ltu re  a g a in  
forces u s  to  conceive o f n a tu r e  a s  b rin g in g  u s  to a  s ta te  in  w h ich  w e could 
im prove  o u r  m orality , w ith o u t c u ltu re  a c tu a lly  m o ra lly  im p ro v in g  us. In  
o th e r  w ords, n a tu re  p ro v id es  fo r those  fo u n d a tio n s w h ich  a re  n ecessa ry  for 
m o ra l im p ro v em en t b u t  w h ic h  a re  no t them se lves m o ra l im provem en t. O u r 
o rig in a l in d ica tio n  o f th is  is  to  be  h a d  from  K a n t’s  fra m e w o rk  fo r h is  d iscus­
sion  o f c u ltu re , nam ely  h is  se a rc h  for som eth ing  “w h ic h  n a tu r e  c an  accom­
p lish  w ith  a  view  to th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  ou tside  o f n a tu r e .” H e re  K a n t is  look­
in g  fo r w h a t  n a tu re  i ts e lf  c a n  do, n o t w h a t h u m a n  b e in g s  co n sid ered  as r a ­
tio n a l a g e n ts  can  do. B u t l e t  u s  look a t  th e  tw o a sp e c ts  o f c u ltu re . C learly  
th e  c u ltu re  o f sk ill does n o t  p ro m o te  m ora lity  alone, fo r  i t  i s  th e  p rom otion  of 
se t t in g  a n d  p u rsu in g  any e n d  w hatsoever. K a n t d esc rib es  th is  a s  som eth ing  
“n a tu re  herself*  accom plishes, w ith  or w ith o u t o u r conscious co n trib u tio n s . 
T h u s, c u ltu re  can  p re p a re  u s  fo r m ora lity  w ith o u t in c re a s in g  m orality .
W hile  a t  f irs t  g lan ce  i t  m ig h t a p p e a r th a t  th e  c u ltu re  o f d iscip line 
w ou ld  n e ce ssa rily  d irec tly  p ro m o te  m orality , K a n t in s is ts  t h a t  “in  th is  re g a rd  
too w e f in d  nature a c tin g  p u rp o siv e ly ,”64 a n d  th a t  th e  a r t s  a n d  sciences
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.. Ak. 433. Italics added for emphasis.
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“...m ak e  m an , n o t indeed  m o ra lly  b e tte r  fo r [life in] society, b u t  s till  civilized 
for i t .”65 In d eed , K a n t says q u ite  c lea rly  th a t  “n a tu re  p u rsu e s  th e  p u rp o se  of 
m a k in g  room  for th e  developm en t o f o u r  h u m an ity ,”66 no t th a t  i t  p rom otes 
such  m o ra l developm ent itse lf . T h u s, a g a in , I  th in k  w e o u g h t to  conclude 
th a t  n a tu r e  p rov ides th e  fo u n d a tio n  fo r  m o ra lity  w ith o u t a d d in g  d irec tly  to 
m o ra lity .
N ow , w hile  c u ltu re  does n o t d irec tly  p rom ote  m o ra lity , th e  tw o divi­
sions o f c u ltu re  do le n d  th em se lv es  to  b e t te r  m oral cu ltiv a tio n , a n d  th u s  we 
a re  b ro u g h t b a c k  to th e  Metaphysics o f Morals. To beg in  w ith , a s  p o in te d  o u t 
before, th e re  is  th e  d irec t co m p ariso n  b e tw een  K a n t’s  d iscussion  of c u ltu re  in  
th e  th i r d  Critique a n d  h is  d iscu ssio n  o f  th e  d u tie s  to  ou rse lves. O n  th e  one 
h a n d , th e  c u ltu re  of “sk ill” sh o u ld  be co m p ared  w ith  th e  “d u ty  to  h im se lf  to 
develop a n d  in c re ase  h is  n a tu r a l  pe rfec tion , th a t  is, fo r p ra g m a tic  rea so n s .” 
T h is m irro rs  K a n t’s s ta te m e n t a b o u t sk ill, fo r th is  d u ty  of “p e rfec tio n ” is  “to 
c u ltiv a te  h is  n a tu r a l  pow ers (of th e  sp ir i t ,  o f th e  m ind , a n d  o f th e  body) as a 
m ean s to  a ll  k in d s  of possib le  e n d s . M a n  ow es i t  to h im se lf  (as  a n  in te l l i ­
gence) n o t  to  le t  h is  n a tu r a l  p red isp o s itio n s  a n d  cap ac itie s  0which his reason 
can use some day) rem a in  u n u se d , a n d  n o t leave  th em , as i t  w ere, to  r u s t .”67
O n  th e  o th e r h a n d , th e  c u ltu re  o f “d isc ip line” from  th e  th ir d  Critique 
is  a lso  p a r t  o f th e  du ty  in  th e  Metaphysics of Morals to in c re a se  one’s perfec­
tion . W h ile  K a n t  a rgues th a t  th e  c u ltu re  o f “sk ill” is  th e  c u ltiv a tio n  o f th e  
m ean s o f  p ro m o tin g  a n y  e n d  w h a tso ev e r, K a n t s ta te s  th a t  w e o u g h t to  c u lti­
v a te  su c h  sk ills  so th a t  th ey  m ig h t be u se d  by  rea so n  for m o ra l p u rp o ses , “for 
a p a r t  from  th e  necessity  of se lf-p re se rv a tio n , w hich  in  i ts e lf  c a n  e s ta b lish  no 
du ty , m a n  ow es i t  to h im se lf  to  b e  a  u se fu l m em ber o f th e  w orld ...”68 T h is  is,
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., Ak. 444. Italics added for emphasis.
68 Ibid., Ak. 445-6. This is, in addition, further proof that Kant is concerned with the duty to 
promote a highest social good.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
o f course, n o t th e  only  a sp e c t o f p e rso n a l perfection , h e n ce  th e re  is  also th e  
“d u ty  to h im se lf  to  h e ig h te n  h is  m o ra l perfection , t h a t  is , fo r  p u re ly  m oral 
rea so n s .”69 K a n t p ro v id es  u s  v e ry  l i t t le  in  w ay  of e x p la n a tio n  o f th is  du ty , 
b u t  th is  is  for th e  obv ious re a so n  th a t  th is  d u ty  concerns fu ll  a d h e ren c e  to  th e  
m o ra l law  a n d  a ll  i ts  e n d s . T h u s , th is  du ty  com m ands u s  to  “B e holy” a n d  
consists  “in  a tta in in g  t h e  co m p le ten ess  of one’s  m o ra l e n d ...”70 H ence, we 
h a v e  a  d u ty  to  c u ltiv a te  o u r  w illin g  o f a ll ends, w h ich  is  a s s is te d  by  c u ltu re , 
b u t  also th e  d u ty  to  c u lt iv a te  o u r  p u re ly  m ora l ends.
3.
T h is le a d s  u s  to  th e  th i r d  m a in  type of p rom o tion  o f  m o ra lity , the  
pedagog ical concern. T h is  is  d isc u sse d  p rim arily  in  th e  “M ethodo logy  of P u re  
P ra c tica l R eason” in  th e  second  Critique, a n d  in  th e  “M ethodo logy  o f E th ics” 
in  th e  Metaphysics o f Morals, b u t  is  touched  u p o n  in  m a n y  o f K a n t’s w ritings. 
In  th e  Metaphysics of Morals, K a n t  gives a  ve ry  specific  m e th o d  fo r 
“teach in g ” m orality , a s  i t  w ere , w h ich  m u st concern  i ts e l f  o n ly  w ith  a ttu n in g  
th e  in d iv id u a l to th e  c a ll  o f  th e  m o ra l law  w hile  in tro d u c in g  n o  o th e r  consid­
e ra tio n s . W hile th e  in f lu e n c e  o f th e  m oral law  is  c e r ta in ly  in n a te ,  “v irtu e  
m u s t  be acq u ired  (an d  i s  n o t in n a te ) ...  for one c a n n o t s tra ig h tw a y  do w h a t­
ev er h e  w ills i f  h e  h a s  n o t  t r ie d  a n d  exercised  h is  p ow ers b e fo re h a n d .”71 S e n ­
su o u s in c lin a tio n s  w eigh  h e a v ily  on  each  in d iv id u a l, a n d  th e y  m u s t  be  over­
come, or a t  le a s t s u b o rd in a te d  to  th e  m oral law . T h u s, “v ir tu e  c an  a n d  m u st 
be  ta u g h t,”72 since i t  is  o u r  d u ty  to  w ill m orally  a n d  to  h e lp  o th e rs  do th is  a s  
w ell. K a n t recom m ends a  tw ofo ld  app roach  to  te a c h in g  v ir tu e . F irs t , u s in g  a  
m o ra l “catechism,” th e  te a c h e r  a sk s  questions of th e  p u p ils  w h ich  m ak e  th e  
p u p ils  look “in sid e” th e m se lv e s  a n d  to  th e  m o ra l la w  fo r th e  a n sw ers; “th e
69 Ibid., Ak. 446.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., Ak. 477.
72 Ibid. We must take this expression with a note of caution, since it cannot, according to Kant, 
be taught per se.
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te a c h e r  se ek s  in  h is  p u p il’s  re a so n  w h a t  h e  w a n ts  to te a c h  h im ; a n d  i f  p e r ­
h a p s  th e  s tu d e n t does n o t know  th e  a n sw e r  to  th e  question , th e n  (d irec tin g  
h is  s tu d e n t’s reason ) h e  su g g es ts  i t  to  h im ,”73 K a n t  h a s  g iven  u s  a n  ex am p le  
o f su ch  a  p ro ced u re  in  h is  “F ra g m e n ts  o f  a  M o ra l C a tech ism .”74 H e  u se s  th e  
an a lo g y  o f th e  te a c h e r  a s  “m idw ife  fo r th e  p u p il’s th o u g h ts .”75 K a n t  a d d s  t h a t  
c a su is tic a l q u estio n s a re  a lso  im p o r ta n t, “g e n e ra lly  sh a rp e n in g  t h e  u n d e r ­
s ta n d in g  o f th e  young” a s  w ell a s  e n liv e n in g  th e i r  m o ra l in te r e s t .76
A fte r su ch  a  ca tech ism , K a n t  a d v ise s  t h a t  b o th  th e  s tu d e n t  a n d  th e  
te a c h e r  en g ag e  each  o th e r  in  “S ocra tic  d ia lo g u e ,” e lic itin g  h e lp  fro m  each  
o th e r . T h e  on ly  exam ple  K a n t  g ives u s  seem s to  be  from  th e  se co n d  Critique 
w h e re  K a n t  ta lk s  a b o u t how  m u ch  peop le  lik e  to  a rg u e  a b o u t th e  m o ra lity  o f 
o th e rs .77 K a n t  u rg es  t h a t  in  a ll  su ch  te a c h in g s , w e o u g h t n o t a p p e a l  to  a n y  
a d v a n ta g e  w hich  m ig h t be  h a d  th ro u g h  m o ra l w illing , b u t  r a th e r  s im p ly  a p ­
p e a l to  w h a t  rea so n  o u g h t to do, in d e p e n d e n t o f a n y  m itig a tin g  c irc u m ­
sta n ce s . T h u s, K a n t su m m arizes:
the exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind, giv­
ing a far stronger incentive to effectuate even that legality and to bring for­
ward more powerful resolves to prefer the law to everything else merely out of 
respect for it, than all allurements arising from enjoyment and everything 
which may be counted as happiness or from al threats of pain and harm.78
K a n t gives u s  tw o a d d itio n a l reco m m en d a tio n s  for su c h  pedagogy , 
n am ely , “th e  ex p e rim e n ta l (techn ical) m e a n s  fo r th e  c u ltiv a tio n  o f  v ir tu e  
[w hich] is  th e  good exam ple  o f th e  te a c h e r  h im s e lf  (h is ow n co n d u c t b e in g
73 Ibid., Ak. 480.
74 Ibid., Ak. 480 ff.
75 Ibid., Ak. 478.
76 Ibid., Ak. 484.
77 Ibid., Ak. 153 ff.
8 Second Critique. Ak. 151-2.
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ex em p la ry ) a n d  th e  ad m o n ito ry  exam ple  of o th e r  peop le .”79 T h u s, th e  p u p il 
c an  le a rn  from  im ita tin g  th e  te a c h e r , o r by  ex am in in g  “b io g rap h ie s  of a n c ie n t 
a n d  m o d e m  tim es.”80 K a n t  m a k e s  tw o w a rn in g s  fo r each , how ever. 
R e g a rd in g  th e  firs t, h e  w a rn s  a g a in s t  “h a b itu a tio n ” w h ich  “is  th e  
e s ta b lis h m e n t of a  firm  in c lin a tio n  b y  i ts  m ore fre q u e n t g ra tif ic a tio n  a n d  
w ith o u t th e  u se  of a n y  m ax im s; su c h  h a b itu a tio n  is  a  m ec h an ism  of sense  
r a th e r  th a n  a  p rin c ip le  o f th o u g h t...”81 As such , h a b itu a t io n  seem s to be 
h e lp fu l on ly  a s  a  fo u n d a tio n  u p o n  w h ich  to im prove. O th e rw ise , i t  is  sim p ly  
a  w a y  o f ac ting , a n d  th u s  m a y  le a d  one a s tra y  from  w illin g  in  accord w ith  
m a x im s .82 R eg ard in g  th e  second, K a n t  w a rn s  t h a t  th e  e x am p le s  g iven sh o u ld  
n o t b e  “nob le  (su p er-m erito rio u s) ac tio n s” for su ch  “ro m an tic ” ch a rac te rs , 
“w h ile  p r id in g  them selves o n  th e ir  fee ling  o f t ra n s c e n d e n t  g rea tn ess , re le a se  
th e m se lv e s  from  observ ing  th e  com m on a n d  ev ery d ay  re sp o n s ib ility  a s  p e tty  
a n d  in s ig n if ic a n t.”83 K a n t’s  c o n s is te n t them e is  t h a t  v ir tu e  is  to  be  ta u g h t by  
a p p e a lin g  d irec tly  to  th e  c a ll o f th e  m o ra l law  in  each  in d iv id u a l, w ith o u t 
m ix in g  in cen tiv es .
4.
A  fo u r th  type  of p ro m o tio n  of v ir tu e  com es from  th e  e x am in a tio n  of 
b e a u ty . T h is  is  ag a in  fo u n d  in  m o st o f K a n t’s w ritin g s , b u t  is  p a rtic u la rly  o f 
focus in  th e  Critique o f Judgment. As th e  l in k  b e tw een  b e a u ty  a n d  m ora lity  
h a s  b e e n  d iscussed  by  m a n y  co m m en ta to rs , m u ch  m ore a d e q u a te ly  th a n  w e 
h a v e  sp a ce  for here , I  sh a ll  on ly  m en tio n  it. In  essence, th e  l in k  is  a  re s u lt  of 
th e  fa c t  t h a t  w e m u s t ju d g e  n a tu r e  a s  i f  i t  h a d  b e en  c re a te d . T h is  lead s  to 
th re e  d iffe re n t co n sid era tio n s, a ll  o f  w hich  le n d  th em se lv e s  to  m orality . T he  
f i r s t  co n s id e ra tio n  is  th a t  ob jects o f b eau ty , th o se  objects w h ich  w e judge  to
79 Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 479.
80 Second Critique, Ak. 154.
81 Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 479.
82 Ibid., Ak. 407. See also Ak. 383-4.
83 Second Critique. Ak. 155.
i
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be b e a u tifu l a s  i f  b e au ty  w ere  a  p red ica te , seem  to h a v e  b een  d esig n ed  
espec ia lly  for u s , especially  fo r th e  in te rp la y  be tw een  im a g in a tio n  a n d  
u n d e rs ta n d in g .84 T h is le a d s  to  th e  second co n sid era tio n , n a m e ly  th e  
p o ss ib ility  th a t  n a tu re  m ig h t b e  responsive  to  m o ra l c o n sid e ra tio n s , a n d  th u s  
m ay  u ltim a te ly  a ss is t  in  o u r m o ra l p ro ject. S im ila rly , th e  th ird  con sid era tio n  
com es from  th e  n ecessity  o f v iew in g  a ll  o f n a tu re  a s  a  system , a n d  th u s  th e  
p o ss ib ility  th a t  n a tu re  w as c re a te d  fo r u s, t h a t  h u m a n  b e in g s  a re  th e  
u ltim a te  en d  o f n a tu re  w h ile  m o ra lity  is  th e  f in a l e n d  o f  c rea tio n . T h u s, for 
(a t  le a s t)  th e se  th re e  rea so n s , a n  in te re s t  in  b e a u ty  m a y  h e lp  to  fo s te r  m oral 
p ro g re ss .85
5.
F ina lly , h a d  K a n t n o t w r it te n  th e  Religion Within the Limits o f Rea­
son Alone, we m ig h t w ell th in k  th a t  th is  l is t  covered  a ll  of th e  w ay s in  w hich 
a  m o ra l w orld  c a n  be p rom oted . H ow ever, in  th e  Religion, K a n t in tro d u ces  a  
v e ry  d iffe ren t d iscussion , rev o lv in g  a ro u n d  w h a t h e  te rm s  th e  “e th ic a l com­
m o n w ea lth ” a n d  “ecc lesias tica l fa i th .” T his, th en , concerns a  f if th  ty p e  of 
p rom otion . L e t u s  beg in  by  lo o k in g  a t  th e  e th ica l com m onw ealth .
I f  th e re  re m a in e d  a n y  d o u b ts  th a t  K a n t b e liev ed  th e re  to  b e  tw o lo­
c a tio n s  fo r th e  h ig h e s t good, th e  Religion (alone) o u g h t to  convince u s . In  
th is  w ork, K a n t c learly  d iscu sses  tw o “k ingdom s of God”: a n  a fte rlife , lead in g  
K a n t  to  th e  p rob lem  (an tinom y) o f p u n ish m e n t a n d  a to n e m e n t, a n d  a  un ion  
o f p e rso n s  in  th is  w orld  in to  a n  “in v is ib le  chu rch .” R e g a rd in g  th e  la t te r ,
K a n t  offers se v e ra l exp licit s ta te m e n ts , in c lu d in g  th e  fam o u s “sui generis” 
one, s ta t in g  o u r d u ty  to  form  “a  u n io n  o f such  in d iv id u a ls  in to  a  w hole  to w ard
84 This was discussed in Section One, Chapter Seven.
85 There is, in addition, Kant's suggestion in the second Critique (Ak. 159-160) and his dis­
cussion in the third Critique that there is something in the contemplation of beauty itself which inherently 
promotes morality. Kant proposes that, because objects of beauty stimulate the free play between the 
faculties of the imagination and understanding, such free play Anthers our moral abilities. The beautiful 
also has the feature that we make a (subjective) universal judgment, just as we make (objective) universal 
moral judgments. See especially Kant’s discussion "On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality.” in the third 
Critique.
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th e  sa m e  goal — in to  a  sy s tem  o f w ell-d isposed  m en , in  w h ich  a n d  th ro u g h  
w hose  u n ity  a lo n e  th e  h ig h e s t  m o ra l good c an  com e to  p a s s  —. . . a  whole, a s  a  
u n iv e rs a l rep u b lic  b a sed  on  la w s  o f v irtu e ...”86 K a n t em p h a size s  bo th  th e  fac t 
th a t  " th e  h ig h e s t  m o ra l good c a n n o t be  ach ieved  m ere ly  b y  th e  ex ertio n s of a  
s in g le  in d iv id u a l to w a rd  h is  ow n m o ra l perfection ,”87 th u s  ree m p h as iz in g  th e  
n e e d  fo r  th e  in d iv id u a l to  w o rk  w ith  a n d  for th e  com m unity , a n d  th e  fact th a t  
re lig io n  is  a  m a t te r  o f action , i.e ., a g a in , no t a  m a tte r  o f m e re  w ell-w ish ing  or 
o f p ra y in g , b u t  a  question  o f ac tiv e ly  p ro m o tin g  v ir tu e , fo r “th e  m ax im  o f ac­
tion, w h ich  in  re lig ious fa i th  (b e in g  p rac tica l) is  th e  cond ition , m u s t  ta k e  th e  
lead , a n d  th e  m ax im  of knowledge, or th eo re tica l fa ith , m u s t  m ere ly  b rin g  
a b o u t th e  s tre n g th e n in g  a n d  co n su m m atio n  o f th e  m ax im  o f ac tio n .”88 K a n t 
g ives u s  im ag es  o f a n  “e th ic a l com m onw ealth ,” a  “kingdom  o f G od on  e a r th ,” 
th e  “w orld ’s h ig h e s t good,” a n d  a  “c h u rc h  inv is ib le” w ith  a  “m o ra l re lig ion .” 
T he  u n d e rly in g  th em e  re m a in s  th e  sam e: w e a re  to  “leave [our] Ethical State 
of Nature” in  o rd e r  to jo in  a  com m onw ealth  w hich  w ou ld  b a se  i ts e l f  on m ora l 
p rin c ip le s  a lone .89
W h a t is  em phasized , how ever, is  th e  n ecess ity  o f co m b in in g  in to  
g ro u p s of in d iv id u a ls  fo r th e  p ro m o tio n  of a  m o ra l w orld , a n d  th is  lead s to  a  
d iscu ssio n  of c h u rc h  a n d  ecc le s ias tica l fa ith . N ow  K a n t a s s e r ts  t h a t  th e  
c h u rc h  in v is ib le  is  b a se d  on re a so n  a lone , a n d  th u s  is  b a se d  on  a  “p u re  re lig ­
ious f a i th .” S u ch  tru e  a n d  d e s ire d  fa i th  is  no d iffe ren t from  ad h eren ce  to  th e  
m o ra l la w  itse lf . T he  p rob lem , how ever, is  th a t  th e  c h u rc h  in v is ib le , th e  e th i­
ca l com m onw ealth , c an n o t m a n ife s t  i ts e lf  w ith o u t a  “v isib le  c h u rc h ,” i.e., 
som e p h e n o m e n a l m an ife s ta tio n  o r o th e r. T h e  ch u rc h  in v is ib le  is  “a  m ere  
id ea ... a n  id e a  se rv in g  a ll  a s  th e  a rch e ty p e  of w h a t is  to  b e  e s ta b lish e d  by
86 Religion, p. 89.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., p. 109. See also: pp. 92. 95. and 123.
89 Ibid.. p. 88.
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m en ,”90 w h ile  th e  “visible church is  th e  a c tu a l u n ion o f m en  in to  a  w hole 
w h ich  h a rm o n ize s  w ith  t h a t  id e a l.”91 F u r th e r ,  w e a lso  face th e  p rob lem  th a t ,  
w h ile  p u re  re lig ious f a i th  is  th e  u ltim a te  e n d , i t  too i s  n o t to  be  fo u n d  w ith o u t 
f i r s t  m a n ife s tin g  i ts e lf  i n  som e p h e n o m e n a l fo rm  o r o th e r . T h u s, a  
“h is to rica l” o r “ecc le sias tica l” f a i th  is  th e  “v eh ic le” fo r p u re  fa ith . H ence, 
w h e rea s  “p u re  moral le g is la tio n , th ro u g h  w h ich  th e  w ill o f God is  p rim or- 
d ia lly  en g ra v ed  in  o u r  h e a r ts ,  is  n o t only  th e  in e lu c ta b le  condition  o f a ll  t r u e  
re lig io n  w h a tso ev e r b u t  is  a lso  t h a t  w hich  re a lly  c o n s titu te s  su ch  re lig io n ,”92 
“a  chu rch , on th e  o th e r  h a n d , a s  th e  u n io n  o f m a n y  m e n  w ith  su c h  d isposi­
t io n s  in to  a  m o ra l com m onw ealth , req u ire s  a  public  covenan t, a  c e r ta in  ec­
c le s ia s tic a l fo rm  d e p e n d e n t u p o n  th e  co n d itio n s o f  experience .”93 As w ith  a n y  
id e a l  of rea so n , th a t  w h ich  re m a in s  p e rfec t a s  a n  a rc h e ty p e  can  on ly  b e  a p ­
p ro x im a te d  in  experience .
T h u s  w e h a v e  r a th e r  a  s tra n g e  s itu a tio n : a lth o u g h  rea so n  g ives th e  
m o ra l law  to  itse lf, a n d  th u s  k n o w s fu ll w ell h o w  i t  o u g h t to  act, “m en  a re  
conscious o f th e ir  in a b il i ty  to  k n o w  su p e rse n s ib le  th in g s ,”94 and , “by  re a so n  o f  
a  p e c u lia r  w e ak n e ss  o f h u m a n  n a tu re ,”95 in d iv id u a ls  h a v e  a lw ays a tta c h e d  
th em se lv es  to  som e p a r t ic u la r  h is to ric a l (ecc lesias tica l) fa i th  or o th er. K a n t 
w rite s  th a t  w h ile  “in  m e n ’s  s tr iv in g  to w ard s  a n  e th ic a l  com m onw ealth , ec­
c le s ia s tic a l fa i th  th u s  n a tu r a l ly  p recedes p u re  re lig io u s  fa ith ,”96 “m orally , th is  
o rd e r  o u g h t to  be  rev e rse d .”97 T h u s, ecc lesias tica l f a i th  rem a in s  a n d  m ay  a l­
w ay s re m a in  th e  veh ic le  fo r p u re  fa ith . As su ch , K a n t  recognizes th a t  “i t  is
90 Ibid., p. 92.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 95.
93 Ibid., p. 96.
94 Ibid., p. 94.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 97.
97 Ibid., p. 97 n.
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a lso  p o ss ib le  th a t  th e  u n io n  o f m en  in to  one re lig ion  can n o t fea s ib ly  be 
b ro u g h t a b o u t o r m ad e  ab id in g  w ith o u t a  ho ly  book a n d  a n  ecc le s ia s tic a l 
f a i th  b a s e d  u p o n  it .”98 H ence, th o u g h  w e w ish  to  s tr iv e  to w a rd  a  m o re  “p u re” 
fa i th ,  w e a re  b e s t a d v ised  to do so w ith in  th e  b o u n d a rie s  o f a n  “ecc lesiastica l” 
fa i th , n o t  e n g e n d e rin g  a  rev o lu tio n ,99 b u t  sim p ly  w ork ing  w ith in  e x is tin g  
s t ru c tu re s  to  in te rp re t  su c h  fa i th  a s  c losely  a s  possib le  to one b a s e d  on  th e  
m o ra l law . T h e  object is  n o t th e  e lim in a tio n  of ecc lesiastical fa i th , “n o t th a t  
i t  i s  to  c ea se  (for a s  a  veh ic le  i t  m a y  p e rh a p s  a lw ays be u se fu l a n d  n ecessary ) 
b u t  t h a t  i t  b e  ab le  to  cease; w h ereb y  is  in d ic a te d  m ere ly  th e  in n e r  s ta b ili ty  of 
th e  p u re  m o ra l fa ith .”100 K a n t’s e m p h a s is  is  n o t on  th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f h is to r i­
c a l f a i th ,  b u t  on  th e  b r in g in g  o f su c h  f a i th  in  lin e  w ith  th e  m o ra l law .
T h e re  is  no re a so n  to th in k  e v en  th a t  m a n y  d iffe ren t f a i th s  cou ld  not 
be c o n s is te n t  w ith  a  p u re  m o ra l re lig io n , a s  lo n g  a s  th e y  rea liz e  t h a t  th e re  is 
o n ly  one  re lig io n  a n d  a s  lo n g  a s  th e y  s tr iv e  fo r th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  a  m ora l 
co m m u n ity . K a n t h a s  a s se r te d  in  m a n y  o f h is  w ritin g s  th a t  th e  m o ra l law  
a w a k e n s  th e  id e a  of God, a n d  th a t  p e rso n s  h a v e  found  m a n y  d iffe re n t w ays 
of r e la t in g  to  th is  G od th ro u g h o u t h is to ry . As rea so n  becom es s tro n g e r, how ­
ev er, th is  re la tio n sh ip  to  G od m oves f a r th e r  aw ay  from  a  w o rsh ip  o f ido ls  
(an c ien ts ) , a  w orsh ip  o f m ere  law s (Ju d a ism ), a n d  a  w orship  o f th e  G od-M an 
(C h ris tia n ity ) , a n d  fin a lly  m ore closely  a p p ro x im ate s  n o t a  w o rsh ip , b u t  
r a th e r  p ra c tic a l actions w hich  a re  in  accord  w ith  th e  m ora l law . A s such , i t  is 
th e  t a s k  o f th e  p h ilo so p h er (and , p e rh a p s , th e  e n lig h ten e d  clergy) n o t  so 
m u c h  to  e lim in a te  th e se  fa i th s  a s  to  r e in te rp re t  th e m  in  accord w ith  th e  
m o ra l law , th o u g h  “fre q u e n tly  th is  in te rp re ta t io n  m ay, in  th e  l ig h t  o f th e  tex t 
(of re v e la tio n ), a p p e a r  fo rced  — [and] i t  m ay  o ften  rea lly  be  forced .”101
98 Ibid., p. 123.
99 Ibid., pp. 112-3.
100 Ibid., p. 126 n.
101 Ibid., p. 101. This need for interpretation leads Kant to his defense of the necessary place of 
the philosophy faculty in comparison to the theological faculty in the first part of his Conflict o f the Fac­
ulties.




I w ish  to exam ine one p a r t ic u la r  p a ssa g e  before m ov ing  on , in  o rder 
to  g e t a  b e tte r  idea  of th is  f if th  w ay  in  w hich  m o ra l p rog ress c a n  b e  prom oted . 
K a n t  w rite s , reg a rd in g  th o se  w ho  a re  a t tu n e d  on ly  to a  h is to r ic a l f a i th  in ­
s te a d  o f a  ra tio n a l religion:
Thus it happens th a t m en will regard neither union into a church, nor agree­
m ent w ith respect to the form which it is to take, nor yet public institutions, as 
in themselves necessary for the  promotion of the  moral elem ent in religion, bu t 
only, as they say, for the service of their God, through ceremonies, confessions 
of faith  in revealed laws, and  observance of the ordinances requisite to the 
form o the church (which is itself, after all, only a means). All these obser­
vances are a t bottom morally indifferent actions...102
K a n t  seem s to  be  in d ica tin g  t h a t  w e h a v e  th re e  du ties , a ll  of w h ich  a re  
“n e c e ssa ry  fo r th e  p rom otion o f  th e  m o ra l e le m e n t”: to u n ify  to g e th e r  in to  a  
c h u rc h , to  a g re e  to a  sing le  fo rm  of ch u rch , i.e ., n o t f ig h t ab o u t th e  em pirica l 
fo rm  w h ich  a n  inv isib le  ch u rch  is  to  ta k e , a n d  to  form  public in s t i tu t io n s . 
T h ese  th re e  d u tie s  reflect th e  n e c e ss ity  o f u n ify in g  in  o rd er to  p ro m o te  a  
m o ra l w orld , a  social good. T h ey  a lso  reflec t K a n t’s l is t  o f fou r 
“re q u ire m e n ts” of th e  “tru e  (v isib le) c h u rch .”103 T h u s, R e a th  seem s correct in  
sa y in g  t h a t  w e m u st
act on the duty to promote the  H ighest Good by working, collectively with oth­
ers, to restructure existing social institutions in  accordance w ith m oral princi­
ples... [Also,] some system of social institu tions is needed as a  stabilizing force 
— both as a  source of moral education, bu t also to provide background condi­
tions th a t  are conducive to m oral conduct and  the m aintenance of the moral 
disposition on the part of individuals.104
K a n t’s p a ssa g e  is  also in te re s tin g  b e ca u se  i t  in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  f a u l t  o f  those  
o f a  m ere  h is to ric a l fa ith  is  n o t so  m u ch  in  w h a t th e y  do, b u t  how  th e y
102 Ibid., p. 97.
103 Ibid.. p. 92-3.
104 Andrews Reath. "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant.” p. 617.
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“re g a rd ” th e  n ecessa ry  m o ra l d u tie s . K a n t seem s to in d ic a te , aga in , t h a t  re f­
o rm a tio n  o f th e  chu rch  is  a  m a tte r  o f a  d iffe ren t focus, n o t  o f  e lim in a tio n  or 
rev o lu tio n . T h e  “observances” o f cerem onies, confessions, e tc . a re  m orally  in­
different, n o t b a d , th o u g h  th e y  te n d  to  sh if t  th e  focus a w a y  from  w here  i t  
sh o u ld  be, n am ely , ad h eren ce  to  th e  m o ra l law  a n d  th e  fo rm a tio n  of a  u n iv e r­
s a l  ch u rch .
T h u s, th e  fifth  m ea n s  o f p ro m o tin g  m o ra l p ro g ress , accord ing  to K an t, 
i s  th e  d u ty  to  com e to g e th e r a s  in d iv id u a ls  fo r th e  ex p re ss  p u rp o se  of a t ­
te m p tin g  to  u n ify  in to  a n  e th ic a l com m onw ealth , fo rm in g  “v is ib le  ch u rch es” 
a n d  "public in s t itu tio n s” fo r th e  b e tte rm e n t of h u m a n k in d a n d  th e  m u tu a l 
s u p p o r t  o f th e  m o ra l law .
E. The Highest Good on Earth
R eg ard less  of th e  n a m e  th a t  w e give to it, th e  f in a l  s ta g e  o f m oral 
p ro g re ss  is  a n  id e a  of rea so n  w h ich  w e can  only a lw ays ap p ro x im a te . K a n t 
sp e lls  o u t th is  f in a l  s ta te  in  m a n y  d iffe ren t w ays in  d if fe re n t w ritin g s , b u t  i t  
r e m a in s  e sse n tia lly  th e  sam e, n am ely , a  s ta te  in  w hich  m a x im a l v ir tu e  a n d  
m a x im a l (allow able) h a p p in e ss  coincide. As I  h av e  d isc u sse d  i t  so often  a n d  
u n d e r  so m a n y  d iffe ren t topics, le t  m e offer only  a  few  c u rso ry  re m a rk s  a s  to 
i t s  n a tu re .
T he  m o st d e ta iled  descrip tio n  of th is  f in a l id e a l s ta te  w h ich  K a n t 
o ffers is  in  th e  Religion. F u n d a m e n ta lly , th is  w ould  be “a n  ethico-civil s ta te  
[Zustand]... in  w h ich  th ey  [all people] a re  u n ite d  u n d e r  non-coercive  law s, 
i.e., laws of virtue a lone.”105 T h is  w orld  w ould  be one in  w h ic h  every  perso n  
a c te d  in  accord  w ith  m o ra l law s, each  g iv ing  th e  m o ra l la w  to  h im  or h e rse lf. 
A ll a c tio n s  a n d  in te n ts  w ould  be u n iv ersa lizab le . A  p le a s a n t  descrip tion  of 
th is  goal is  “th e  e s ta b lish m e n t a n d  sp re a d  of a  society in  acco rd an ce  w ith , 
a n d  fo r th e  sa k e  of, th e  law s o f v ir tu e , a  society  w hose ta s k  a n d  d u ty  i t  is
105 Religion, p. 87.




ra tio n a lly  to im p re ss  th e s e  la w s  in  all th e ir  scope upon  th e  e n tire  h u m a n  
race .”106 T h is  is  la rg e r  th a n  a n y  p o litica l com m onw ealth  co u ld  be, s in ce  i t  is  
to  e x p a n d  to th e  e n t i r e  w o rld  a n d  u n ite  i t ,  a  u n ifica tio n  w h ich  w ould  be  
a g a in s t R ig h t i f  i t  w e re  a t te m p te d  for go v ern m en ts . T h e  Religion e m p h a s iz e s  
th e  n e e d  fo r a  public  ack n o w led g m en t o f th e  m o ra l law , a n d  th u s  “a n  e th ic a l 
com m onw ealth  m u s t  r e s t  o n  public [bu t non-coercive] la w s  a n d  possess  a  
c o n s titu tio n  b a se d  on  th e s e  law s ...”107 H ence, w hile  w e c a n n o t coerce an y o n e  
to  be  m oral, w e m u s t  m a k e  th e  m o ra l la w  pub lic , a n d  th u s  e re c t a  “c h u rc h .”
A s e x p la in e d  above, th e  goal is  a n  “in v is ib le” c h u rc h  w h ich  m u s t, 
how ever, be  m a n ife s te d  in  som e em p irica l fo rm . T he  id e a l is  “th e  u n io n  o f a ll  
th e  r ig h te o u s  u n d e r  d ire c t a n d  m o ra l d iv in e  w o rld -g o v em m en t,”108 w h ile  th e  
a c tu a l “v isib le” c h u rc h  “is  t h a t  w hich  e x h ib its  th e  (m oral) k ingdom  o f G od on 
e a r th  so f a r  a s  i t  c a n  b e  b ro u g h t  to  p a ss  by  m en .”109 K a n t  g ives u s  fo u r c h a r ­
a c te ris tic s  o f th e  id e a l ch u rc h : i t  m u s t in c lu d e  a ll  p e rso n s, th o u g h  “v a ria n c e  
in  u n e s se n tia l  o p in io n s” is  accep tab le ; i t  m u s t  h a v e  “no m o tiv a tin g  force 
o th e r  th a n  moral ones;” i t  m u s t  be  free  from  c o n s tra in t a n d  n o t c o n s tra in  
o thers; a n d  i t  m u s t  h a v e  a n  e sse n tia lly  u n c h an g e ab le  c o n s titu tio n , a  s e t  o f “a  
priori... s e ttle d  p rin c ip le s .”110 K a n t a s se r ts  t h a t  su ch  a  c o n s titu tio n  does n o t 
resem b le  a  po litica l c o n s titu tio n , for i t  “is  n e ith e r  monarchical (u n d e r a  pope 
o r p a tr ia rc h ) , n o r  aristocratic (u n d e r  b ishops a n d  p re la te s) , n o r  demo­
cratic...”111 A gain  i t  is  a  c o n s titu tio n  w hich  a id s  p e rso n s in  th e i r  u n d e rs ta n d ­
in g  of a n d  com pliance  to  th e  m o ra l law , b u t  w h ich  can  h a v e  n o  coercive 
pow er. T h u s, th e  c o n s titu tio n  “could  b e s t o f a ll  b e  lik e n e d  to  th a t  of a  h o u se ­
h o ld  (fam ily) u n d e r  a  com m on, th o u g h  in v is ib le , m o ra l F a th e r . . .” w h ere  th e
106 Ibid., p. 86.
107 Ibid., p. 88.
108 Ibid., p. 92.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., p. 93.
1,1 Ibid.
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fam ily  m e m b e rs  “accordingly  h o n o r th e  F a th e r .. .  a n d  so e n te r  w ith  one  a n ­
o th e r  in to  a  v o lu n ta ry , u n iv ersa l, a n d  e n d u rin g  u n io n  of h e a r ts .”112
K a n t  c a u tio n s  u s, how ever, th a t  th e  u l t im a te  form  of su c h  a  s ta te  
m u s t  n e c e ssa r ily  re m a in  a  m y ste ry  fo r u s . T h is  se em s to be for th r e e  r e a ­
sons. T h e  f i r s t  r e s ts  o n  K a n t’s a sse r tio n  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  of “B ook T h re e ” 
th a t
envy, the  lu st for power, greed, and the m alignant inclinations bound up with 
these, besiege his nature, contented w ithin itself, as soon as he is among men. 
A nd it is not even necessary to assum e th a t these are  men sunk in  evil and ex­
am ples to lead him astray; it suffices th a t they are  a t  hand, th a t they  surround 
him, and  th a t  they are men, for them  m utually to corrupt each o ther’s predis­
positions and m ake one another evil.113
H e re  w e  see  R o u sse a u ’s in fluence  once m ore, a s  K a n t  considers h u m a n  b e ­
in g s  to  b e  re la tiv e ly  c o n te n t w ith  th e ir  w orld ly  s i tu a t io n  u n til  th e y  com pare  
th e m se lv e s  w ith  o th e rs . T hus, K a n t  be lieves t h a t  a  re a l  obstacle  to  th e  for­
m a tio n  o f  a  c h u rc h  is  th e  fac t t h a t  in d iv id u a ls  becom e envious and. g reedy  
sim p ly  b y  com ing  in to  co n tac t w ith  o th e r  in d iv id u a ls . How is  th is  to  b e  over­
come? K a n t  concludes, q u ite  sim ply , t h a t  th e  so lu tio n  is  up to God. K a n t 
m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  d u ty  to form  a n  e th ic a l co m m u n ity  “w ill re q u ire  th e  p re ­
su p p o s itio n  o f a n o th e r  id ea , nam ely , t h a t  o f a  h ig h e r  m ora l B e in g  th ro u g h  
w hose u n iv e r s a l  d isp e n sa tio n  th e  forces o f s e p a ra te  in d iv id u a ls , in su ff ic ien t 
in  th em se lv e s , a re  u n i te d  for a  com m on en d .”114 K a n t  a sse r ts  t h a t  w h ile  
“m a n  is  n o t  e n ti t le d  on  th is  accoun t to  be  id le  in  th is  b u s in e ss  a n d  to  le t  
P ro v id en ce  ru le , a s  th o u g h  each  cou ld  ap p ly  h im s e lf  exclusively  to  h is  ow n 
p r iv a te  m o ra l a ffa irs  a n d  re lin q u ish  to  a  h ig h e r  w isdom  a ll th e  a ffa irs  o f th e  
h u m a n  ra c e ...”,115 w e s t i l l  h av e  no  id e a  h ow  G od m ig h t be  ab le  to  so lve  th e
112 ibid.
113 Ibid., p . 85.
114 Ibid., p. 89. See also p. 130.
115 Ibid.. p. 92.
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problem  o f  su ch  an  ad v e rse  in fluence, a n d  th u s  canno t a c tu a lly  p ic tu re  th e  
fina l s ta te .
T h e  second re a so n  fo r th e  m y s te ry  o f th e  fu tu re  s ta te  is  founded  u p o n  
the  p o ss ib ility  of a  n ew  ecc lesiastica l fa i th . A t th is  tim e, K a n t  thinks th a t  
the  b e s t w ay  fo r us to  w o rk  to w ard  a  m o ra l relig ion  is  to  u se  th e  (C hristian ) 
sc rip tu re s  a n d  in te rp re t  th e m  in  acco rdance  w ith  th e  m o ra l la w .116 H ow ever, 
because m o ra l relig ion  a lw ay s  rem ains th e  sam e  w hile  th e  veh ic le  for su ch  a  
relig ion  cou ld  tak e  m a n y  form s, th e re  re m a in s  th e  p o ss ib ility  th a t  C h r is tia n ­
ity  could  b e  rep laced  by  a n o th e r  ecc les ias tica l fa ith . K a n t’s g en e ra l th em e  
about th e  necessity  to  in te rp re t  an y  f a i th  to  m ak e  i t  h a rm o n ize  w ith  th e  
m oral la w  le a d s  d irectly  to  th is  conclusion . I n  ta lk in g  a b o u t th e  p rog ress to ­
w ard  a  w o rk in g  e th ica l c o n s titu tio n , K a n t  in d ica te s  th e  p o ssib ility  of 
“revo lu tions w hich  m ig h t h a s te n  th is  p ro g re s s” though  “th e y  re s t  in  th e  
h a n d s  o f P rov idence  a n d  c a n n o t be u s h e re d  in  according  to  p la n  w ithou t 
dam age to  freedom .”117 T h e  n e ed  fo r a n  em p irica l m a n ife s ta tio n  of th e  in ­
visible c h u rc h  leads to  th e  in a b ility  to  s a y  fo r c e rta in  how  th is  fu tu re  ch u rch  
w ill be  co n stitu ted .
F in a lly , m oving aw ay  from  th e  Religion, th e re  is  th e  v e ry  basic  p ro b ­
lem  of th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f peace. H ow  w ill n a tio n s  u ltim a te ly  be ab le  to  e n ­
te r  in to  a  fed e ra tio n  w ith  o n e  an o th e r?  H ow  w ill governm en ts a n d  o th e r so­
cial in s t i tu t io n s  solve th e  p rob lem s o f p o v erty , education , a n d  c u ltu ra l re ­
form s? H ow  w ill w ar u ltim a te ly  be a v e rted ?  H ow  w ill th e  p a r tic u la r  co n sti­
tu tio n  of a  n a tio n  be d ra f te d  a n d  how  w ill th e  governm en t opera te?  As A n­
drew s R e a th  sum m arizes:
[the highest good on earth] is an ideal by which to guide our conduct. I t tells 
us to aim  a t bringing about a world in  which individuals can develop a  morally 
good character, and have the ability and  m eans to achieve their permissible 
ends. Further concrete guidance would follow from determining w hat
116 See Kant’s discussion, Religion, p. 121-6.
11 Religion. p. 113.
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arrangem ent of social institutions is needed for the  realization of these ends, 
and how to best bring these arrangem ents into existence.118
T h ese  a re  ju s t  a  few  o f m an y  g ra n d  qu estio n s w h ich  h a v e  y e t to  be  w orked  
ou t, a n d  w hose e m p iric a l so lu tion  w e c an n o t y e t d e te rm in e  w ith  a n y  h ig h  de­
g ree  o f c e rta in ty .
P h ilip  R ossi in  h is  a rtic le , “T he  Social A u th o r ity  of R eason : T h e  T ru e  
C h u rc h ’ as th e  L ocus fo r M ora l P rog ress ,”119 fa u l ts  K a n t  for n o t b e in g  m ore 
specific w ith  r e g a rd  to  th is  la s t  po in t. R ossi w rite s  t h a t  K a n t “p ro v id es  n e i­
th e r  a  specific l i s t  n o r  a  sy s tem atica lly  d e ta ile d  acc o u n t of th e  k in d s  o f e x te r­
n a l  conduct or soc ia l p rac tices  th a t  a re  n o t th e m se lv e s  d irec tly  su b je c t to  co­
erc ive  pow er...”,120 a n d  th a t  w h ile  K a n t does give u s  som e n e g a tiv e  re q u ire ­
m e n ts  for such  in s t i tu t io n s  (freedom  of speech  b u t  no  coercive pow er) a n d  a  
l is t  o f fo u r re q u ire m e n ts  for a  m o ra l relig ion  in  th e  Religion (p re se n te d  
above), “n e ith e r  o f th e s e  m odels th u s  p rovides a n  acco u n t of th e  concre te  in ­
s ti tu tio n s  a n d  so c ia l p rac tices  th a t  w ould  en ab le  a  society  [to fo rm  in to  a n  
e th ic a l com m onw ealth ].”121
Rossi’s ob jec tions seem  p a r t ly  tru e , a n d  p a r t ly  false . W hile  i t  m ay  be 
t ru e  t h a t  K a n t does n o t p re se n t a  “specific l is t” o f th o se  social p ra c tic e s  w hich  
su p p o rt m o ra l w illing , I  h av e  tr ie d  to  show  in  p a r t  fo u r  above t h a t  h e  does 
in d e e d  provide u s  w ith  sev e ra l exam ples. K a n t’s m a n y  w ritin g s  a b o u t 
c u ltu re  a n d  h is  sec tio n  on  “M ethodology” in  th e  Metaphysics of Morals seem s 
p a r tic u la r ly  im p o r ta n t. I  h av e  tr ie d  to  o u tlin e  m a n y  o f  th e se  ex am p les  above. 
W ith  re g a rd  to th e  a c tu a l social in s titu tio n s  th em se lv es , w hile  c e r ta in ly  i t  is 
t ru e  t h a t  K a n t does n o t even give u s  specific e x am p le s  o f w h a t su c h
118 Reath, “Two Conceptions,” p. 608.
119 Philip Rossi, “The Social Authority of Reason: The ‘True Church’ as the Locus for Moral 
Progress, in Proceedings o f  the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 2, pL 2 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 679-685.
120 Ibid., p. 684.
121 Ibid.
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in s t i tu t io n s  m ig h t be, how  can  th is  be  a  fa u lt?  I f  a n y th in g, su c h  re s t r a in t  
show s K a n t’s r e a l  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  d ifficu lt p rob lem s in v o lv ed  in  
b r in g in g  a b o u t a  h ig h es t good on  e a r th .  As w e sa w  w ith  o u r e x a m in a tio n  of 
“W h a t is  E n lig h ten m en t? ” a n d  “W h a t is  O rie n ta tio n  in  T h in k in g ?” in  
C h a p te r  T h re e  above, i t  seem s im p o ssib le  to  s a y  w h a t form  m o ra l, ra t io n a l  
th in k in g  w ill t a k e  in  th e  c e n tu r ie s  to  com e, fo r i t  seem s th e re  is  n o  e te rn a l  
fo u n d a tio n  o r  a lg o rith m  for su ch  th in k in g . B u t, th is  aside, i t  a lso  seem s 
im p o ssib le  to  s a y  w ith  an y  deg ree  o f c e r ta in ty  w h a t  an y  social in s t i tu t io n  
m ig h t lo o k  l ik e  in  th e  fu tu re . T he  concre te  so lu tio n s  to  th e  p ro b lem s o f 
m o ra lity  a n d  w ell-being  a re  lik e ly  to  ta k e  m a n y  fo rm s. H ence, in s te a d  of 
f a u l t in g  K a n t  fo r n o t be ing  m ore  specific, I  th in k  w e ou g h t to  c re d it  h im  for 
h is  r e s t r a in t .
H en ce , fo r th e se  fou r m a in  rea so n s , th e  ex ac t conditions o f th e  e n d  of 
m o ra l p ro g re s s  on  e a r th  re m a in  a  m y s te ry  to  u s , th o u g h  reaso n  g ives u s  a  
g e n e ra l o u tlin e . W e can  im ag ine , b u t  on ly  im a g in e , w h a t su ch  a  w o rld  w ou ld  
look lik e , a  w o rld  o f in te rn a tio n a l p eace  a n d  a  w orld-w ide m o ra l com m unity . 
In  th e  e n d , a s  K a n t  h a s  ad v ised  u s  a ll  a long , w e  c a n  only do o u r d u ty , fay ing  
to  im p ro v e  o u rse lv es  an d  o u r co m m u n ity , h o p in g  th a t  God a n d  p rov idence  
w ill see  to  th e  re s t; “therefo re , w e s h a ll  se ek  to  e s ta b lis h  th e  g ro u n d s  of th a t  
p o ss ib ility  p r im a r ily  w ith  re sp ec t to  w h a t  is  im m e d ia te ly  in  o u r pow er, a n d  
se c o n d a rily  in  t h a t  w hich is  beyond  o u r  pow er b u t  w hich  rea so n  h o ld s  ou t to  
u s  a s  th e  su p p le m e n t to ou r im p o ten ce  to  [rea lize] th e  possib ility  o f  th e  h ig h ­
e s t  good, w h ich  is  n ecessa ry  acco rd ing  to  p ra c tic a l  p rin c ip les .”122
m.
I  w a n t  to  m ak e  one com m en t befo re  m o v in g  on  to th e  n e x t c h a p te r .
O n  th e  o n e  h a n d , th is  d iscussion  re g a rd in g  th e  five  s ta g es  of m o ra l p ro g ress  
is  im p o r ta n t  b ecau se  i t  is  new  to  K a n t ia n  sc h o la rsh ip . G iven th a t  l i t t le  h a s  
b e en  w r i t te n  on  K a n t’s b e lie f in  m o ra l p ro g ress , i t  is  n o t su rp r is in g  th a t  th is
Second Critique. Ak. 119.
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is su e  h a s  n o t b een  ra is e d  before. T h is  d e ta ile d  d iscu ss io n  h e lp s  to fu r th e r  
em p h asize  th is  s t r a in  o f th o u g h t K a n t’s  ph ilo sophy , a n d  a lso  h e lp s  to  b rin g  
to g e th e r  se v e ra l seem ing ly  u n re la te d  a sp ec ts  o f  h is  p h ilo so p h ica l w ritings . I 
hope  th a t  i t  g ives fu r th e r  c redence  to  th e  h y p o th es is  t h a t  m o ra l p rogress, 
po litics, a n d  th e  h ig h e s t good a re  in ex tric a b ly  in te r tw in e d  for K an t.
O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , I  ta k e  th is  d iscussion  to  b e  e x tre m e ly  im p o rta n t 
for anyone  in te re s te d  in  ap p ly in g  K a n t’s  m o ra l th e o ry  to  p rac tice , a n d  for 
anyone  co n ce rn ed  w ith  ta k in g  th e  K a n tia n  p ro jec t se r io u s ly . I f  w e a re  in te r ­
e s te d  to  ta k e  K a n t’s  m o ra l th eo ry  to  h e a r t ,  a n d  i f  m y  in te rp re ta t io n  of K a n t’s 
positio n  re g a rd in g  th e se  five s te p s  o f m o ra l p ro g re ss  is  co rrec t, th e n  th e  m a ­
te r ia l  invo lved  in  th is  c h a p te r  c a n  se rv e  a s  a  gu ide  to  a c tio n  in  th e  w orld. 
O bviously , w e a re  lo ca ted  som ew here  in  th e  m id d le  th r e e  s ta g e s  o f p rogress. 
T h is  d iscussion  is  r ich  w ith  advice a n d  p o ss ib ilitie s  w h ich  c an  be  fu r th e r  ex­
p lo red  a n d  an a ly zed . K a n t’s w ritin g s  on  R ig h t a n d  th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f pow ers 
coincide on  m a n y  levels w ith  o u r ow n sy s tem  o f g o v e rn m e n t. H is  v isions 
a b o u t th e  n e c e ssa ry  rep u b lica n  n a tu r e  o f a  su ccessfu l c o n s titu tio n  seem s to 
h a v e  b een  b o m  o u t in  th e  l a s t  tw o h u n d re d  y e a rs . W rite rs  lik e  O tfried  Hoffe 
h a v e  u se d  K a n t’s  th eo ry  o f in te rn a t io n a l  re la tio n s  a s  a  fo u n d a tio n  for a n  
a n a ly s is  o f th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s . T h ese  a re  b u t  som e w a y s  in  w hich  K a n t’s 
w ritin g s  c an  be  u tiliz e d  a s  a  w ay  o f a p p ro a ch in g  im p o r ta n t  issu e s  in  today’s 
society.
In  ad d itio n , th e  five w ays in  w h ich  m o ra l p ro g re s s  c an  be  p rom oted  
w h ich  I o u tlin e d  in  p a r t  T>” a lone  p rov ide  ex trem e ly  r ic h  m a te r ia l  for fu r th e r  
exp lo ra tion . T h is  m a te r ia l  h a s  gone re la tiv e ly  u n e x p lo re d . C ould  we ta k e  
K a n t’s  su g g estio n s  to  h e a r t?  I f  w e be lieved  m o ra l p ro g re s s  to  be  possib le, a n d  
th a t  w e h a d  a  d u ty  to  p rom ote  it, a re  K a n t’s su g g e s tio n s  th e  b e s t possib le  for 
p ro m o tin g  m o ra l p rog ress?  W h a t so r t o f n a tio n a l  a n d  in te rn a t io n a l  
o rg an iz a tio n s  cou ld  b e  e s ta b lish e d  to  h e lp  th is  p rocess?  W h a t so r t of m oral 
a n d  re lig ious te a ch in g s  cou ld  be endo rsed?  H ow  m ig h t w e go ab o u t fo rm ing
Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
to g e th e r  a s  a  cosm opolitan  whole o r e th ica l com m onw ealth? I h o p e  th a t  
d iscu ssio n  m ig h t open  up  a  horizon  fo r d ia logue ab o u t th e se  q u estio n s .
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Chapter Five 
Importance of the Highest Good
L
I h a v e  a rg u e d  above th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  th e  n ecessa ry  object of 
m ora l w illing . In  th is  c h ap te r , m y in te r e s t  co n cern s w h y  K a n t th in k s  t h a t  we 
m u st believe in  i ts  possibility. In  C h a p te r  O n e  above, a s  in  m uch  o f th e  l i t ­
e ra tu re , th e  d eb a te  seldom  a d d re sse s  K a n t’s ow n w ritin g s  on w hy h e  th o u g h t 
b e lie f in  th e  h ig h e s t good to  be  necessa ry ; u s u a l ly  a tta c k s  a n d  defenses o f th e  
h ig h e s t good concern  w h e th e r  i t  is  possible to  accep t th is  concept, d ea lin g  
w ith  i ts  coherence a n d  i ts  co m p a tib ility  w ith  th e  r e s t  o f K a n t’s philosophy . 
H ow ever, th ro u g h o u t h is  w ritin g s , K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e re  is  no objective 
n eed  to  believe in  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good; r a th e r ,  th is  is  a  sub jec­
tive need , a n d  one th a t  c a n n o t be  com m anded . W h at, th e n , is  th e  n a tu re  of 
th is  need , a n d  how  c an  th e  h ig h e s t good be  ju s t if ie d  a s  a n  object o f fa ith ?  
A no ther w ay  to a d d re ss  th is  q u e s tio n  is  to  a sk , W h a t w o u ld  h a p p e n  to  th e  
m oral law  (an d  m orality ) i f  th e  h ig h e s t good w ere  b e liev ed  to  be impossible? 
A ccordingly, th is  is  a lso  th e  q u estio n  o f w h y  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p rac tic a l reaso n  
a re  needed , for th e y  a re  p o s tu la te d  p rec ise ly  in  o rd e r  to  secu re  th e  possib ility  
o f th e  h ig h e s t good. S tra n g e ly , th o u g h  su c h  a  ju s tif ic a tio n  seem s to  be o f ex­
trem e  im p o rtan ce  to  K a n t’s ph ilo soph ica l p ro jec t, K a n t  m ak e s  a  re la tiv e ly  
lim ite d  n u m b er o f re m a rk s  to  offer su ch  a  ju s tif ic a tio n , a n d  th e re  h a s  been  
litt le  com m en ta ry  in  th e  secondary  l i te ra tu re .
I  w ill a rg u e  th a t  th e re  seem  to be s ix  d iffe re n t ju s tif ic a tio n s  w hich  
K a n t gives for a  b e lie f  in  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good. F ou r o f th e se  
seem  to  be a t  le a s t  recognized  in  one w ay  o r sm other in  th e  l ite ra tu re . T he
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o th e r  tw o ju s tif ic a tio n s  I  h a v e  n o t e n c o u n te re d  in  th e  l i te ra tu re , n o r  does 
K a n t sp e ll th em  o u t specifically  in  con n ec tio n  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t good. K a n t 
does n o t seem  to h a v e  s e t t le d  on  a n y  one  o f th e se , a n d  w e e n co u n te r r e a s s e r ­
tio n s  o f each  th ro u g h o u t a ll  o f  K a n t 's  w ritin g s . In  th e  f i r s t  section , I  sh a ll  
look a t  fo u r ju s tif ic a tio n s  w h ich  a re  l ik e ly  to  be  m ore w ell know n, b e g in n in g  
w ith  th e  m ost s tr in g e n t o f  th e s e  c la im s a b o u t th e  h ig h e s t good, w o rk in g  
th ro u g h  to  th e  w eak est. In te re s tin g ly , th is  is  th e  sam e o rd e r in  w h ich  th e se  
ju s tif ic a tio n s  f ir s t  occur in  K a n t 's  w ritin g s . I n  th e  la s t  section , I w ill e n d  
w ith  w h a t I  ta k e  to  be  tw o  r a th e r  d if fe re n t ju s tif ic a tio n s . I  w ill a rg u e  th a t  
th e  la s t  is  p e rh a p s  th e  b e s t  ju s tif ic a tio n  p o ss ib le .1
II. Traditional Defenses
A. Rejection o f the Moral Law: Consequences and Inattainability
K a n t’s m ost e m p h a tic  s ta te m e n ts  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r 
th e  h ig h e s t  good a re  t h a t  th e  m o ra l la w  w o u ld  h a v e  to  b e  re jec ted  i f  th e  h ig h ­
e s t  good w ere  n o t possib le . T h e re  seem  to  be  tw o d iffe ren t a rg u m e n ts  for 
th is , co rresp o n d in g  to  th e  f i r s t  a n d  seco n d  Critique. T he  f i r s t  seem s to  con­
c e rn  th e  a p p ro p ria te  consequences o f  m o ra l o r im m o ra l w illing . K a n t  w rite s  
th a t :
reason finds itself constrained to assum e [God and immortality]; otherw ise it 
would have to regard the m oral laws as em pty figments of the brain , since 
w ithout this postulate the necessary consequence which it itself connects w ith 
these laws could not follow. Hence also everyone regards the m oral laws as 
commands; and this the  moral laws could not be if they did not connect a priori 
suitable consequences w ith their rules, and  thus carry w ith them  promises and 
threats.2
1 The sixth justification concerns an earthly highest good, and it is perhaps for this reason that 
it has been overlooked by commentators.
2 First Critique, A811-12 = B839-40.
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T h is  a rg u m e n t seem s to s ta te  th a t  th e  m o ra l law  w ou ld  h av e  to be re je c te d  if  
th e  h ig h e s t  good w ere  n o t possib le  b e c a u se  1) i t  is  th e  h ig h e s t good w h ich  
a llo w s th e  l in k in g  o f rew ard s  a n d  p u n is h m e n ts  w ith  th e  co rresp o n d in g  type  
o f w illin g ,3 a n d  2) rew ard s  a n d  p u n is h m e n ts  a re  p a r t  a n d  p a rce l w ith  th e  
m o ra l  la w  b e c a u se  consequences a re  n e c e ssa ry  for th e  m o ra l law  to 
co m m an d . I n  o th e r  w ords, i t  seem s K a n t  w a n ts  to  a rg u e  th a t  th e  m o ra l 
law (s) w o u ld  h a v e  to  be deem ed  “e m p ty  fig m e n ts  o f th e  b ra in ” i f  th e  h ig h e s t  
good w ere  n o t  possib le  because  th e  m o ra l la w  d e m a n d s  “h a p p in e ss ... in  exact 
p ro p o rtio n  w ith ... m ora lity ...”4
N ow , a s  I  h a v e  in te rp re te d  it ,  th is  f i r s t  a rg u m e n t seem s too s tro n g  to 
su cceed .5 K a n t  w ou ld  re jec t th is  lin e  o f  a rg u m e n ta tio n  in  th e  second  Cri­
tique. I n  th e  seco n d  Critique, K a n t n o te s  t h a t  th e  m o ra l law  com m ands 
s im p ly  b e c a u se  o f th e  form  of th e  law , a n d  say s  n o th in g  ab o u t n e c e ssa ry  con­
se q u en c es . T h u s , i f  no  re w a rd  cam e fro m  m o ra l w illing , th is  w ould  n o t co u n t 
a g a in s t  th e  m o ra l law . I f  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e s s  in  acco rd  w ith  v ir tu e  w as 
n o t p o ss ib le , th e  m o ra l law  w ould  s t i l l  c o m m a n d.
T h e  seco n d  a rg u m e n t K a n t m a k e s  fo r a  possib le  re jection  o f th e  
m o ra l la w  fo llow ing  from  th e  re jec tion  o f  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f  th e  h ig h e s t good 
occu rs p r im a r ily  in  th e  Critique o f Practical Reason. H e re  K a n t re a so n s  th a t  
i f  th e  m o ra l la w  d ic ta te s  th a t  w e m u s t  ach iev e  th e  h ig h e s t  good, th e n  e ith e r  
th is  e n d  is  p ossib le , or th e  m o ra l law  is  fa lse :
Since, now, the furthering of the h ighest good, which contains this connection 
[of happiness to morality] in its concept, is an  a priori necessary object of our 
will and  is inseparably related to the m oral law, the impossibility of the  high­
e s t good m ust prove the falsity of the m oral law also. If, therefore, the  highest
3 A810-11 =B838-9.
4 A814 = B842.
5 I may have interpreted it wrongly; it could be that Kant is really concerned here with a ques­
tion of motivation, since at A813 = B841 we have his statement that “without a God and... a world in­
visible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admira­
tion, but not springs of purpose and action.” This argument, of course, is rejected by Kant in the Critique 
o f Practical Reason because “pure” reason can be "practical” and thus provide its own motivation.
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good is impossible according to practical rules, then  the moral law which com­
m ands th a t it be furthered m ust be fantastic, directed to empty im aginary 
ends, and  consequently inherently false.6
T h u s , i f  th e  m o ra l law  com m ands u s  to w a rd  en d s w h ich  w e know  for c e r ta in  
a re  im p o ssib le , th e n  i t  m u s t  be  re jec ted . Indeed , th is  m u s t  be  o f p a r tic u la r  
co n ce rn  fo r K a n t since h e  h a s  a lre a d y  g iven  u s  m a n y  s ta te m e n ts  re g a rd in g  
b o th  th e  c o rru p te d  n a tu r e  o f p e rso n s a n d  th e  m o ra l u n resp o n siv en ess  of n a ­
tu re . H en ce , th e  m o ra l la w  m ig h t seem  q u ite  f a n ta s t ic a l  in  i ts  dem ands, 
g iven  th e  n a tu r e  of in d iv id u a ls  a n d  th e  w orld  a s  K a n t  h a s  a lre ad y  p re se n te d  
th em , o r  a s  m o st people o rd in a r ily  p e rh a p s  view  th em .
A  few  pages la te r ,  K a n t gives u s  a  s im ila r  a rg u m e n t, th o u g h  a d d re ss ­
in g  o n ly  a  concern  ab o u t im m o rta lity . H ere , h e  seem s concerned  w ith  two 
p o ss ib ilitie s :
W ithout it [“the thesis of... an infinite progress tow ard complete fitness to the  
m oral law”], either the  moral law is completely degraded from its holiness, by 
being m ade out as lenient (indulgent) and thus com pliant to our convenience, 
or its ceill and its dem ands are stra ined  to an unattainab le  destination, i.e., a  
hoped-for complete a tta inm en t of holiness of will, and  are lost in fanatical 
theosophical dreams which completely contradict our knowledge of ourselves. 
In  either case, we are only hindered in the unceasing striving toward the p re­
cise and  persistent obedience to a command of reason which is stem , unindul- 
gent, tru ly  commanding, really and  not ju st ideally possible.7
I f  im m o rta lity  n o t a ssu m e d  to  be possib le , th e n  th e re  seem  to be  two 
p o ss ib ilitie s . F irs t , i f  in d iv id u a ls  d id  n o t h av e  th e  re q u is ite  tim e  necessa ry  
fo r m o ra l p ro g ress , th e n  th e  m o ra l la w  cou ld  co m m an d  only  so m eth in g  less 
th a n  co m p le te  m o ra l p e rfec tio n  of th e  in d iv id u a l, a n d  w ou ld  th u s  be 
‘le n ie n t .” T h e  second po ss ib ility  seem s to  be  th a t  i f  th e  m o ra l law  is too 
s tr in g e n t, a n d  com m ands so m e th in g  w h ich  we cou ld  n o t possib ly  a tta in , th e n  
i t  is  “s t r a in e d  to  a n  u n a tta in a b le  d e s tin a tio n .” In  th e  f i r s t  case , th e  m o ra l
6 Second Critique, Ak. 113-4.
' Ibid.. Ak. 122-3. Italics added for emphasis.
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law  m u s t be  re je c te d  since i t  does n o t com m and , b u t  seem s m ere ly  to 
recom m end, w h ile  in  th e  second  case , i t  is  re je c ted  because  i t  com m ands 
som eth ing  w h ich  c a n n o t be  achieved. W hile  th is  c ita tio n  d e a ls  w ith  a  
question  o f m o tiv a tio n ,8 i t  a lso  show s t h a t  th e  im possib ility  o f  o ne  aspec t of 
th e  h ig h e s t good le a d s  to  a  fu ll re jec tion  o f th e  m o ra l law .
W hile  su c h  s ta te m e n ts  occur p r im a rily  in  th e  Critique o f Practical 
Reason, w e see  so m e th in g  s im ila r  even  in  “P e rp e tu a l  P eace ,” w h e re  K a n t 
w rites th a t
m orality is in itself practical, for it is the totality  of unconditionally binding 
laws according to which we ought to act, and  once one has acknowledged the 
authority  of its concept of duty, it would be u tterly  absurd to continue wanting 
to say th a t  one cannot do his duty. For if th a t  were so, then  th is  concept would 
disappear from m orality 0ultra posse nemo obligatur)...9
W hile th is  p a s sa g e  im p lie s  th a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good m u st be  re je c te d  a s  a n  ob­
ject o f d u ty  i f  i t  i s  im possib le , th e  rev e rse  o f th is  seem s e as ily  in fe rre d , since 
K an t c la im s t h a t  i t  is  a  d u ty  com m anded  b y  th e  m oral law , a n d  h en ce  i f  i t  is  
im possible, th e n  th e  m o ra l law  m u s t also  be  fa lse .
T he  im m e d ia te  objection to th e se  s tro n g  fo rm u la tio n s o f  th e  problem  
of ju s tif ic a tio n  seem s to  be  th a t  i t  is  n o t a  d u ty  to  achieve th e  h ig h e s t  good, 
only to  strive fo r it .  T h is  is  S ilber’s a rg u m e n t, d iscussed  above in  C h a p te r  
O ne. T hus, th e  m o ra l law  only  com m ands u s  to  p u rsu e  th e  h ig h e s t  good, a n d  
th is  is  in d e e d  so m e th in g  w h ich  we can  do. T herefo re , even  i f  th e  h ig h e s t 
good can n o t, in  fac t, b e  achieved, i t  does n o t  in v a lid a te  th e  m o ra l law .
A  second  objection to  th is  s tro n g  p o s itio n  m ig h t be  one sim ila r  to 
Lew is W hite  B eck’s o rig in a l objection, n a m e ly  t h a t  th e  m o ra l la w  sim ply  
deals w ith  one’s  ow n  w illing , a n d  say s n o th in g  w ith  re g a rd  to  h a p p in e ss , e i­
th e r  of o n ese lf  o r  o f o th e rs . I  h ave  tr ie d  to  a rg u e  in  C h a p te r O n e  t h a t  th is  is
8 We will deal with the question of motivation below.
9 ”To[ward] Perpetual Peace.” Ak. 370.
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n o t e n tire ly  tru e , since  w e a re  d e a lin g  w ith  a  m o ra l la w  w h ich  commands, 
a n d  su ch  a  law  a lre a d y  d e a ls  w ith  h u m a n  b e in g s  a s  b o th  c re a tu re s  a n d  r a ­
t io n a l  ag en ts .
H ow ever, p e rh a p s  B eck’s concern  w ith  p u re  w illin g  m a y  le a d  u s  to  a  
th i r d  objection to  K a n t’s  s tro n g  ju s tif ica tio n . T h is  w o u ld  b e  t h a t  th e  m ora l 
la w  com m ands m o ra l w illin g  re g a rd le ss  o f th e  outcom e o f  su c h  w illing , a n  
a rg u m e n t w h ich  K a n t m a k e s  in  th e  Grundlegung a n d  th e  Critique o f Practi­
cal Reason. T h e  m o ra l la w  m u s t  n o t be fo u n d ed  on  th e  ou tcom e o f a c tio n s .10 
I t  is  r a th e r  su rp r is in g , th e n , t h a t  th e  b est a rg u m e n t a g a in s t  h is  ow n o rig in a l 
ju s tif ic a tio n  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good com es n o t from  e ith e r  o f  th e s e  tw o w orks, b u t  
in s te a d  from  th e  Critique o f Judgment. H ere , K a n t  spec ifica lly  ra is e s  th e  
q u e s tio n  of w h e th e r  a  p e rso n  w ho can n o t be lieve  in  G od w o u ld  th e n  be re ­
le a s e d  from  th e  m o ra l law , a n d  concludes t h a t  a ll  t h a t  w e
would have to give up is our aiming a t th a t final purpose th a t we are to 
achieve in the world...; every rational being would still have to cognize him self 
as strictly bound by w hat m orality prescribes, because the  m oral laws are for­
m al and command unconditionally, w ithout regard to purposes (which are a 
m atte r of volition)... Fulfillm ent of duty consists in  th e  form of the earnest 
will, not in the  in term ediate causes [responsible] for success.11
I n  o th e r  w ords, K a n t  seem s r ig h t  to  a rg u e  th a t  th e  m o ra l  la w  is  concerned  
w ith  th e  co m m an d  to  w ill in  acco rd  w ith  reaso n , a n d  th e re b y  w ith  m orality , 
a n d  th is  co m m and  com es from  th e  p u re  form  o f th e  w ill. T h e  success o f th e  
h ig h e s t  good is  on  p a r  w ith  o th e r  consequences o f m o ra l w illing , th u s  I  m u s t 
te l l  th e  t r u th  re g a rd le ss  o f  w h e th e r  th e  outcom e w ill b e  b e n e fic ia l o r not. 
W hile  I  h a v e  a rg u e d  th a t  th e  n a tu r a l  (necessary) object o f su c h  w illin g  is  th e  
h ig h e s t  good, i t  a lso  seem s re a so n a b le  to say  th a t  th e  a t ta in m e n t  o f th is
10 Although I have tried to argue that it is not thereby unconcerned with this outcome. This is 
the point in the last chapter about the interest of reason.
1 ‘ Critique o f  Judgment. Ak. 451. See also especially the “Preface to the First Edition” of the 
Religion within the Limits o f  Reason Alone.
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object c a n n o t be  com m anded . O f a ll  o f  K a n t’s ju s tif ic a tio n s  fo r th e  h ig h es t 
good, th is  o n e  m u s t be  re je c te d  o u tr ig h t.
B. A conflict within reason would occur
C e rta in ly , how ever, K a n t  is  r ig h t  to  recognize som e s o r t  o f  ten s io n  
w h ich  w o u ld  occur i f  th e  h ig h e s t  good w ere th o u g h t to  be  im p o ssib le . I f  th e  
fo reg o in g  a n a ly se s  h a v e  b e e n  co rrec t, th e n  th e  m o ra l c re a tu re  n a tu ra lly  w ills 
t h a t  th e  h ig h e s t  good sh o u ld  com e ab o u t, a n d  n a tu ra lly  does w h a t  s/he  c a n  to 
fu r th e r  t h a t  s ta te .  T he  h ig h e s t  good is  th e  n e ce ssa ry  object o f th e  m o ra l w ill. 
H ence , th e r e  w o u ld  be som e te n s io n  w ith in  a n  a g e n t w ho h e e d e d  th e  ca ll o f 
th e  m o ra l law , y e t a lso  b e liev e d  t h a t  no  h ig h e s t good w as p o ss ib le , th a t  h u ­
m a n k in d  w a s  s im p ly  n o t c a p a b le  o f  p ro g ress . B u t w e h a v e  a lso  se e n  th a t  th is  
te n s io n  c a n n o t  sim p ly  r e s u l t  in  th e  re jec tion  of th e  m o ra l law ; w e a re  obli­
g a te d  to  w ill m o ra lly  r e g a rd le s s  o f  th e  consequences. So w h a t  is  th e  n a tu re  
o f th is  te n s io n ?
K a n t  in d ic a te s  in  a  few  p la c e s  th a t  w e a re  p e rh a p s  b e s t  to  th in k  of 
th is  te n s io n  a lo n g  th e  l in e s  o f  a  m e re  inconsistency . T h is  does n o t  a p p e a r  to  
be  a  v ic ious o r ev en  p e rh a p s  illo g ica l inconsistency . T h e re  c a n  be  no  duty to  
be lieve  in  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c t ic a l  rea so n , for “fa i th  th a t  i s  co m m an d ed  is  
a n  a b su rd ity ,”12 so b e lie f  is  n o t  com m anded . A nd, a s  lo n g  a s  th e  a g e n t con­
t in u e s  to  do h is /h e r  du ty , th e n  th e r e  i s  no  d irec t conflict w ith  th e  m o ra l law . 
In d eed , th e  a ssu m p tio n  is  m a d e  b e ca u se  o f a  n e ed  o f p ra c tic a l  re a so n , w hich  
is  u l t im a te ly  co n cern ed  w ith  w illin g  a n d  actions, a n d  th e re fo re  i f  th e  a g en t 
c o n tin u e s  to  w ill a n d  a c t in  acco rd an ce  w ith  th e  m o ra l law , th e r e  is  no  v io la­
tio n  o f d u ty .
Y e t th e re  does seem  to  b e  som e k in d  o f in co n sis ten cy  in  th e  w illing  of 
a n  object a n d  n o t  b e liev in g  in  th e  p o ss ib ility  of i ts  a t ta in m e n t .  P e rh a p s  i t  is  
b e s t  th o u g h t o f  a s  a  psycho log ical inconsis tency , o r a s  a  con flic t w ith in  th e  
“in te re s t” o f re a so n . K a n t a s se r ts :
12 Second Critique. Ak. 144.
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No, my conviction is not logical, b u t moral certainty; and  since it rests on 
subjective ground (of the moral sentim ent), I m ust not even say, ‘It is morally 
certa in  th a t  there is a God, etc.’, b u t ‘I  am  morally certain, etc.’ In other 
words, belief in a God and in ano ther world is... interwoven with my moral 
sen tim en t...13
T h e  p ro b le m  is  th a t ,  a s  K a n t e x p la in s  i t ,  “once a n  e n d  is  accep ted , th e  cond i­
tio n s  o f  i t s  a t ta in m e n t  a re  h y p o th e tica lly  n ecessa ry ... [T]t i s  sufficien t, ab so ­
lu te ly  a n d  fo r everyone, i f  I  know  w ith  c e r ta in ty  th a t  no  one  c an  h av e  k n o w l­
edge o f  a n y  o th e r  conditions w h ich  le a d  to  th e  p roposed  en d .”14 R eason  h a s  
s e t  i t s e l f  th e  e n d  o f b rin g in g  a b o u t th e  h ig h e s t  good. T h ere fo re  i t  m u st con­
s id e r  th o se  m e a n s  w hich  a re  n e c e ssa ry  fo r i ts  ex istence  to b e  possib le. T h u s, 
w h ile  b e lie f  in  th e se  p o s tu la te s  “is  i t s e l f  n o t com m anded ,” K a n t  h a s  a rg u e d  
a ll a lo n g  t h a t  “i t  r a th e r  sp rin g s  from  th e  m o ra l d isposition  itse lf .”15
So, w ith  th e  case  of a  p e rso n  w ho  be lieves in  th e  v a lid ity  o f th e  m o ra l 
la w  b u t  n o t  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l re a so n , th e re  w ould  n ecessa rily  be  a  
te n s io n  w ith in  rea so n  itse lf. P ra c tic a l re a s o n  is  th e  c re a to r  o f th e  p o s tu la te s , 
w h ich  a re  n e e d e d  to achieve i ts  en d s, y e t  th e  p e rso n  w ould  re je c t these  v e ry  
sam e  p o s tu la te s  w hile  s ti ll  ack n o w led g in g  th e  m oral law . I t  seem s th a t  K a n t 
d id  n o t  b e liev e  th is  to be  vicious, on ly  t h a t  th e  p o s tu la te s  sh o u ld  be believed  
“from  a  p ra c t ic a l  p o in t o f view , i.e., so t h a t  h e  c a n  a t  le a s t  fo rm  a  concept of 
th e  p o ss ib ility  o f [achieving] th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  th a t  is  m o ra lly  p resc rib ed  to  
h im ...”16 U n fo rtu n a te ly , K a n t te lls  u s  n o th in g  a s  to th e  specific n a tu re  o f th is  
ten s io n .
H ow ever, th e re  is  one specific re a so n  to  ta k e  th is  te n s io n  seriously . 
K a n t w r i te s  in  d iffe ren t p laces th a t  th e  id e a  o f  a  God could  n o t h a v e  a risen  in  
h is to ry  w ith o u t th e  developm ent o f p ra c tic a l  reason . W e u n d e rs ta n d  th e
13 A829 = B857.
14 A823-4 = B851-2.
15 Second Critique, Ak. 146. See also: Ak 12n.
16 Third Critique, Ak. 453.
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concep t o f G od today  a s  in c lu d in g  om niscience, om nipotence, etc., b u t  K a n t 
b e liev es t h a t  th ese  a t t r ib u te s  w ere  n o t  a lw ays a tt r ib u te d  to  God. K a n t h a s  
a lso  a rg u e d  th a t  th e  n o tio n  o f G od does n o t a rise  from  th e o re tic a l reaso n in g , 
fo r ev en  n a tu r e  a s  te leo log ica lly  conceived  does n o t le a d  to  th e  concept o f a  
m o ra l a u th o r  of th e  w orld , b u t  a t  m o st to  a n  “architect.”11 T h u s, K a n t a rg u e s  
t h a t  w h en , a t  som e p o in t in  th e  p a s t ,
people had  progressed fa r enough in their inquiries to deal philosophically even 
w ith  m oral subjects, about which other peoples had never done more than  talk, 
they found for the first tim e a new need, a practical need which gave them  the 
definite concept of the F irs t Being. In this, speculative reason was only a spec­
tator, or a t best it had  the  m erit of embellishing a concept which did not grow 
on its own ground...18
T h e  concep t o f God as  w e n o w  u n d e rs ta n d  i t  w as n o t a lw ay s  th e  sam e  a s  i t  is  
to d ay . I t  took  tim e to  develop , tim e  w hich  p rac tica l re a so n  n e ed e d  in  o rd er to  
becom e m o re  m a tu re . T h e o re tic a l re a so n  c an n o t t ru ly  la y  c la im  to  any  p ro o f 
fo r th e  ex is tence  o f God, n o r , i t  seem s, can  i t  lay  c la im  to  th e  g en esis  of th e  
concep t o f  God. I t  seem s lik e ly  t h a t  th e  sam e sto ry  cou ld  b e  to ld  ab o u t th e  
h ig h e s t  good a n d  th e  (positive) n a tu r e  of freedom , th o u g h  p e rh a p s  we h av e  
a lw ay s  fe lt  th e  n eed  for im m o rta lity .
T h is  o ugh t to  le a d  u s  to  th e  co n sid era tio n  th a t  i t  seem s r a th e r  
in co n g ru o u s  for rea so n  to  re je c t a  p o s tu la te  w hich h a d  a r is e n  becau se  o f i ts  
ow n n eed s . T he  p o s tu la te  a n d  n a tu r e  of God, (positive) freedom , a n d  th e  
h ig h e s t  good a ll  a rose  th ro u g h  n e e d s  of a  m a tu r in g  p ra c tic a l rea so n . T hey  
w ere  n e e d e d  for rea so n  to  p re s e n t  a n  accoun t to  i ts e lf  o f h o w  i ts  n a tu r a l  a n d  
n e c e ssa ry  e n d  m ig h t be  ach ieved ; “i t  w ould  be  p rac tica lly  im possib le  to s tr iv e  
fo r th e  object o f a concept, w h ich , a t  bo ttom , w ould be e m p ty  a n d  w ith o u t a n  
ob ject.”19 O ne  a rg u m e n t h e re , th e n , seem s to  be th a t  th e re  w ou ld  n o t h av e
17 A627=B655.
18 Second Critique, Ak. 140.
19 Ibid.. Ak. 143. See also: third Critique. Ak. 454.
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b e e n  th e  no tio n  of a  G od o r h ig h e s t  good to  deny  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace  i f  i t  w ere  
n o t a  n e ce ssa ry  n e ed  o f  p ra c tic a l  rea so n . T he  n e e d  o f  re a so n  “h a s  i ts  g ro u n d  
ob jectively  in  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  th in g s  a s  th ey  m u s t  b e  u n iv e rsa lly  ju d g e d  by 
p u re  re a so n  a n d  is  n o t b a se d  on  in c lin a tio n ... T h is  is , th e re fo re , a n  
ab so lu te ly  n ecessa ry  n eed ...”20 T h ese  concepts w o u ld  h a v e  b e en  e n tire ly  
e m p ty  to  beg in  w ith  h a d  n o t th e y  b e en  a  n e ed  o f re a so n . F o r re a so n  i ts e lf  to  
re je c t th e m  seem s to  b e  in c o n s is te n t, th o u g h  p e rh a p s  th is  specific defense 
co u ld  be  re p u d ia te d  i f  one re je c te d  K a n t’s b e lie f  t h a t  th e  concep ts o f God a n d  
im m o rta lity  a ro se  th ro u g h  n e e d s  o f p rac tic a l rea so n .
R e tu rn in g  to  th e  m o re  g e n e ra l defense for th e  h ig h e s t  good concern­
in g  th e  “ten s io n ” w h ich  w o u ld  e n su e , w hy sh o u ld  re a s o n  w ish  to  re jec t th e se  
p o s tu la te s?  I t  c an n o t be  th a t  re a s o n  feels i ts e lf  s tro n g  en o u g h  to  c re a te  th e  
h ig h e s t  good on i ts  ow n, fo r w e  o u g h t to  be w ell v e rs e d  in  exam ples o f m oral 
a c tio n s  le a d in g  to  u n d e s ire d  re s u l ts ;  w e a re  n o t th e  m a s te r s  o f a  n a tu re  
w h ich  is  u n resp o n siv e  to  m o ra l n e e d s .21 So p ra c tic a l re a so n  o u g h t n o t to  r e ­
je c t  th em . B u t p e rh a p s , w h ile  p ra c tic a l rea so n  gave  r is e  to  th e se  concepts, 
sp e cu la tiv e  rea so n  w ou ld  f in d  som e rea so n  to  re jec t th em ; b u t  th is  is  also n o t 
possib le . W h a t a rg u m e n ts  co u ld  th e o re tic a l re a so n  f in d  to  re jec t th e se  p o s tu ­
la te s?  God, freedom , a n d  im m o ra lity  a re  n o t ob jects o f poss ib le  experience, so 
i t  is  n o t  possib le  to  h a v e  som e ex p erien ce  w hich  w o u ld  d isp rove  th e i r  ex is­
ten ce . K a n t  h a s  c le a re d  th e  w a y  fo r a ll  th re e  w ith  th e  f i r s t  C ritiq u e . T he 
o n ly  re m a in in g  objection co u ld  b e  b a se d  on th e  a lle g e d  la c k  o f m o ra l p ro g ress  
in  h u m a n  h is to ry . B u t th is  too  is  so m e th in g  w h ich  i t  seem s im possib le  to 
p ro v e  o r d isp rove th ro u g h  ex p erien ce , th o u g h  K a n t h a s ,  a s  w e h a v e  seen , 
g iven  th e  sk ep tic  p le n ty  o f re a so n s  to  th in k  th a t  w e c a n  f in d  c lues to  th e  
ra c e ’s  p ro g ress . G iven th a t  K a n t  h a s  a lread y  conceded  t h a t  th e se  a re  no t 
su p p o sed  to  be  objects w hose  e x is te n c e  we could  k n o w  th eo re tica lly , a n d  a re
20 Ibid.
21 For more on this, see the following chapter.
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m ere  p o s tu la te s , th e re  seem s no  re a s o n  to  deny  p ra c tic a l re a so n  th e  objects of 
i t s  need . B u t  th is  b r in g s  u s  to  th e  n e x t  section.
C There is no reason not to believe, while there is a reason to believe
T h is  p o in t  is  a  re la tiv e ly  s im p le  one, a n d  sh o u ld  b e  obv ious from  a ll 
o f K a n t’s  w rit in g s . I n  essence, th is  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r b e lie f  in  th e  p o s tu la te s  
m ig h t b e  s u m m a r iz e d  by  K a n t’s  a s s e r tio n  th a t ,  “th e  a ssu m p tio n  o f  i t s  p o ss i­
b ility  is  n o t a t  a ll  in  n e e d  of a  co m m an d , fo r th e o re tic a l re a so n  h a s  n o th in g  to 
sa y  a g a in s t  i t . ”22 K a n t’s  p o in t is  s im p le : th ese  p o s tu la te s  a re  fo r  th e  u se  of 
p ra c tic a l r e a s o n  a lo n e , a n d  a re  n o t  in te n d e d  to  be  th e o re tic a l p ro o fs  o f th e  
ex is tence  o f th e s e  ob jects, “b u t  on ly  fo r  th e  sa k e  o f a  p ra c tic a lly  n e c e ssa ry  end  
o f th e  p u re  r a t io n a l  w ill, w hich  does n o t  h e re  choose b u t  r a th e r  obeys a n  in ­
exorab le  c o m m a n d  o f  re a so n  W23 T h u s , b ecause  p ra c tic a l re a so n  “tu r n s  th e
scale” in  fa v o r  o f  th e i r  u se ,24 a n d  b e c a u se  th e re  is  no  re a so n  fo rb id d in g  th e ir  
u se , w e o u g h t to  fee l f re e  to  do so. H en ce , b e tw een  “p u re ” a n d  “p ra c tic a l” re a ­
son, “i t  is  n o t  a  q u e s tio n  of w h ich  m u s t  y ield , for one does n o t n e c e ssa r ily  
conflict w ith  th e  o th e r .”25 T he  on ly  con flic t w hich  seem s to  e x is t  is  th e  con­
flic t w h ich  w o u ld  ta k e  p lace  w ith in  re a s o n  i ts e lf  i f  i t  a tte m p te d  to  deny th e  
poss ib ility  o f  th e s e  p o s tu la te s . H en ce , K a n t  w rites , fo r ex am p le , t h a t  th e  
d u ty  to  s tr iv e  fo r  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  “b a se d  on a n  apod ic tic  law ... w h ich  is  in ­
d e p e n d e n t o f  th e s e  p resu p p o sitio n s , a n d  th u s  n eed s  no  fu r th e r  s u p p o r t  from  
th eo re tic a l o p in io n s  on  th e  in n e r  c h a ra c te r  o f th in g s , on  th e  se c re t f in a l  e n d  
o f th e  w o rld  o rd e r , o r  on  a  ru le r  p re s id in g  over it ...”26
T h e  Critique o f Judgment g ives u s  even  fu r th e r  re a so n  fo r  th is  ty p e  
of ju s tif ic a tio n . I n  fac t, th e  conclu sion  o f  th is  Critique is  n o t o n ly  t h a t  i t  is
22 Second Critique, Ak. 144.
23 Ibid., Ak. 143.
24 Ibid., Ak. 145.
25 Ibid., Ak. 120.
26 Ibid., Ak. 142-3.
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p e rm iss ib le  fo r u s  to th in k  th a t  th e re  is  a  G od a n d  th a t  n a tu r e  o p era tes  
teleo log ically , b u t th a t  w e need to  th in k  th is ,  a n d  w e n e e d  to  th in k  i t  in  th e  
in te re s ts  o f theoretical reaso n . T h u s , p ra c tic a l reaso n  is  n o t  m ere ly  a llow ed 
to  p o s tu la te  th e  existence o f G od a n d  teleology, as i f  i t  w e re  a t  odds w ith  
sp e cu la tiv e  rea so n  over th is  is su e , b u t  th e re  is  now  a  h a rm o n y  o f rea so n  con­
c e rn in g  th e s e  issues:
if we combine our cognition of physical purposes w ith th a t  of the m oral pur­
pose, then, because of pure reason’s m axim  to strive to unify principles as 
m uch as we can, physical purposes are  very important, since they support the 
practical reality of the idea of God by the  reality th a t from a  theoretical point 
of view it already has for judgm ent.27
W hile  th is  concerns sp ecu la tiv e  re a so n , g iv in g  u s only a  regulative idea , a n d  
th u s  c a n n o t provide a n y  s e p a ra te  confirmation of th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p rac tica l 
rea so n , su c h  a  conclusion c e r ta in ly  le n d s  su p p o rt to  th e  ty p e  o f ju s tif ic a tio n  
w e a re  co n cern ed  w ith  in  h e re . A s w e  sa w  in  Section  O ne  above, th e re  Eire 
th re e  re a so n s  w hy th e  conclusions o f  th e  th i r d  Critique le a d  to  a  connection  
b e tw een  m o ra lity  and  th e  n a tu r a l  w o rld  a n d  h en ce  God. T h e  n e e d  for ju d g ­
m e n t to  th in k  in  term s o f a  m o ra l a u th o r  o f th e  w orld  le n d s  fu r th e r  su p p o rt 
to  th e  p o ss ib ility  of th e  re sp o n siv en e ss  o f  n a tu r e  to th e  n e e d s  of m orality . 
T h u s, conflic t c rea ted  th ro u g h  th e  re je c tio n  o f  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p rac tic a l r e a ­
son  seem  n o t .only u nnecessa ry , b u t  a lso  u n w a rra n te d .
D. Motivation
D esp ite  th e  fac t th a t  K a n t in s is ts  t h a t  no m a te r ia l  c a n  be th e  fo u n ­
d a tio n  o f th e  m o ra l law , a n d  th u s  th e  h ig h e s t  good c an n o t b e  th e  d e te rm in in g  
g ro u n d  o f th e  m oral w ill, K a n t is  s u re ly  n o t  u n co n cern ed  w ith  th e  q u estio n  of 
m o tiv a tio n . I  add ressed  th is  is su e  in  C h a p te r  F o u r of S ec tion  O ne above, 
w h e re  I  d iscu ssed  K an t’s concern  w ith  “in flu e n ce ” o f th e  w ill, a s  w ell as in
27 Third Critique. Ak. 456. See also: Ak. 453.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
367
th o se  p laces w here  I  ta lk e d  a b o u t th e  re la tio n sh ip  o f b o th  h a p p in e ss  a n d  
po litics to  m orality . K a n t  does th in k  th a t  th e  w ill i s  in flu e n c e d  by o u ts id e  
fac to rs, a n d  such  in flu e n ce s  can  le a d  th e  w ill a s tr a y .28 I f  w e a d d  th is  to  th e  
fac t th a t  reason  h a s  a n  in te r e s t  in  th e  outcom e o f o u r  w illin g  a n d  th a t  th e  
h ig h e s t good is  th e  n a tu r a l  ob jec t o f m oral w i l l i n g , th e  r e s u l t  is  th a t  b e lie f  in  
th e  h ig h e s t good is  n e c e ssa ry  i f  w e a re  n o t to  lose  f a i th  in  th e  m oral law . A nd 
th is  is  a  question  of m o tiv a tio n .
K a n t p re s e n ts  u s  w ith  m a n y  q u o ta tio n s re g a rd in g  th is  re la tio n sh ip , 
m a n y  o f w hich  (u n su rp ris in g ly )  com e from  h is  p o litic a l w ritin g s . H ere  a re  
b u t  a  few  o f th e  m an y  p o ss ib le  c ita tions:
[With the impossibility of the postulates] we are only hindered in the unceas­
ing striving toward the  precise and persistent obedience to a  command of rea­
son which is stern, unindulgent, truly commanding, really and not ju s t ideally 
possible.29
A need of pure practical reason, on the other hand, is based on a duty to make 
something (the highest good) the object of my will so as to promote it w ith all 
my strength.30
And so practical reason gives us a pure m oral basis for assum ing th is cause 
(since we can do so w ithout contradiction), even if only for the sake of avoiding 
the risk of [having to] regard  th a t  striving as wholly futile in its effects and of 
therefore allowing it to flag.31
[A person m ust postu late  these notions if] he does not w ant his respect for the 
m oral law, by which th is law  directly inspires him to obey it, to be weakened, 
as would result from the nullity  of the one ideal final purpose th a t is adequate 
to th is respect’s high dem and (such weakening of his respect would inevitably 
im pair his m oral a ttitude)...32
The reflective person feels a grief th a t the unreflective do not know, a  grief 
th a t can well lead to  m oral ruination: this is a  discontentedness w ith the
28 They would not necessarily lead the will astray, of course, but a “weak will” might thereby be 
misguided.
29 Second Critique, Ak. 123.
30 Ibid., Ak. 142.
31 Third Critique. Ak. 446.
32 Ibid.. Ak. 453.
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providence th a t governs the entire course of the  world... It is of the greatest 
importance... to be content with providence... so th a t  we can always take cour­
age under our burdens...33
T he  u n d e rly in g  th em e  to  a ll  o f  K a n t’s a s se r tio n s  is  c lear, n a m e ly  t h a t  
p ra c tic a l re a so n  is  n o t in s u la te d  from  e x te rn a l  in flu e n ce s , a n d  th a t  th e  
p o s tu la te s  a re  n e ce ssa ry  in  o rd er for p ra c tic a l r e a s o n  to  se cu re  i ts  e ffo rts  in  
b rin g in g  a b o u t th e  h ig h e s t good. C e rta in ly  m a n y  p eo p le  m ig h t be te m p te d  to 
give up  h o p e  in  th e  ach iev ab ility  of th e  h ig h e s t  good, i f  th e y  h av e  n o t a lre a d y  
g iven  u p , i f  th e y  tru ly  b e lieved  th a t  h u m a n k in d  w a s  n o t  ab le  to  be im proved . 
T he m o ra l la w  i ts e l f  cou ld  be  th re a te n e d  i f  a  p e rs o n  w ere  com pletely  
convinced o f  th e  im p o ssib ility  of th e  h ig h e s t good. K a n t  is  w e ll a w are  th a t  
th e  ca ll o f th e  m o ra l la w  is  a lre ad y  im p ed ed  by  th e  e n tic e m e n ts  of h a p p in e ss , 
a n d  a  d isb e lie f  in  th e  p o s tu la te s  c e rta in ly  w ou ld  n o t  h e lp  m a tte rs  any . 
C e rta in ly  i t  ta k e s  g re a t  m o tiva tion  to  a tte m p t to  c o n s is te n tly  w ill in  accord  
w ith  th e  m o ra l law , a n d  th e  possib ility  t h a t  a ll  su c h  w illin g  w ould  com e to  
n a u g h t w ou ld  u n d e rm in e  som e o f th a t  im p o r ta n t  m o tiv a tio n .
HL Additional Defenses
T he  above fo u r ju s tif ic a tio n s  for th e  n e e d  o f  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l 
rea so n  a n d  th e  b e lie f  in  th e  possib ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good a re  r a th e r  exp lic it 
in  K a n t’s w ritin g s , d e a lin g  explicitly  w ith  su ch  ob jects. A s fo r th e  f i r s t  ju s t i ­
fication , i t  seem s to  be  too strong , a n d  is  la te r  re je c te d  by  K a n t  h im self. T he  
second  seem s accep tab le , b u t  given th e  r a th e r  am b ig u o u s  n a tu r e  of th e  con­
flic t invo lved , p e rh a p s  i t  is  n o t p a rtic u la rly  p e rs u a s iv e . H ow ever, I  th in k  
som e ty p e  o f con flic t w ou ld  re s u lt  from  fo llow ing th e  m o ra l la w  w hile  re je c t­
in g  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t good. T he  th ir d  ju s tif ic a tio n , w hile  p e rh a p s  
seem in g  r a th e r  tr iv ia l  a t  f i r s t  glance, I  th in k  is  r a th e r  s tro n g . I f  we accep t 
K a n t’s a s se r tio n  t h a t  p ra c tic a l rea so n  does in d e e d  h a v e  a  n e e d  to  a s s e r t  th e  
p o s tu la te s , th e n  i t  c a n  offer u p  a defense  a g a in s t  th e  p e rso n  w ho sim p ly  fe lt
33 “Speculative Beginning of Human History.” Ak. 120-1.
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a m b iv a le n t re g a rd in g  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  h ig h e s t good. In  o rd e r  to  p rove  
th e  im p o ss ib ility  o f th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l re a so n  a n d  th e  h ig h e s t  good, 
one w o u ld  h a v e  to  re ly  on  th e o re tic a l rea so n . H ow ever, K a n t  h a s  a lre a d y  s e t  
th e  fo u n d a tio n  fo r th e  im p o ssib ility  o f su ch  a n  a rg u m e n t. In  a d d itio n , K a n t  
offers som e good in d ic a tio n s  t h a t  th e re  is  a  h in t  o f m o ra l p ro g re s s  in  h is to ry  
a n d  t h a t  w e o u g h t to  t h in k  o f n a tu re  a s  h a v in g  b e en  d e s ig n e d  b y  a  m o ra l 
a u th o r . I f  th is  is  t ru e , th e n  th e re  is  s im p ly  no re a so n  not to  b e lieve  in  th e  
p o s tu la te s , th o u g h  w e c a n n o t com m and  th e ir  belief. I n  fac t, i t  w o u ld  seem  
r a th e r  i r r a t io n a l  to  p o s it  th e i r  im p o ssib ility  g iven  t h a t  th e re  seem s no  a d e ­
q u a te  fo u n d a tio n  to  do so. F in a lly , re g a rd in g  th e  fo u r th  ju s tif ic a tio n , w h ile  i t  
seem s so m e w h a t w eak , i t  su re ly  m u s t  be  accep tab le . I t s  re je c tio n  w o u ld  i n ­
volve p o s it in g  th e  a b ility  o f  th e  p e rso n  to  be  com plete ly  u n in f lu e n c e d  by  
h is /h e r  se n su o u s  n a tu re ,  a n  a b ility  w h ich  seem s d o u b tfu l, o r by  som ehow  
p ro v in g  t h a t  b e lie f  in  th e  p o s tu la te s  w o u ld  b e  s im p ly  in c o n se q u e n tia l.
T h e re  a re  tw o m o re  defenses, how ever, w h ich  se em  a p p ro p r ia te . N e i­
th e r  o f th e m  n a m e  th e  h ig h e s t  good per se, a lth o u g h  th e  seco n d  d e a ls  d irec tly  
w ith  th e  “u ltim a te ” a n d  “f in a l  p u rp o se  o f c re a tio n ” a n d  th e re b y  w ith  th e  
h ig h e s t  good. I  h a v e  fo u n d  n o th in g  in  th e  seco n d ary  l i te r a tu r e  l in k in g  th e m  
d irec tly  w ith  th e  p ro b lem  o f  ju s tify in g  a  b e lie f  in  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p ra c tic a l 
rea so n .
K The Moral Politician and the Political Moralist
I  ta k e  m y  c lu e  a s  to  th is  ju s tif ic a tio n  from  K a n t’s  d is tin c tio n  b e tw ee n  
th e  “m o ra l p o litic ia n ” a n d  th e  “p o litica l m o ra lis t” in  “T o[w ard ] P e rp e tu a l  
P eace .” R eca ll t h a t  th e  m o ra l p o litic ian  is  th e  official w ho ta k e s  th e  m o ra l 
la w  a s  h is /h e r  u l t im a te  p r in c ip le  for a ll  ac tio n  a n d  le g is la tio n . T h e  p o litic a l 
m o ra lis t  i s  th e  p e rso n  w ho  a tte m p ts  to  m ak e  h e r /h e r  ac tio n s  a n d  leg is la tio n  
seem  m o ra l, a p p e a lin g  to  R ig h t to  ju s tify  o th erw ise  im m o ra l a n d  ev en  ille g a l 
ac tions . N ow  K a n t  m a k e s  th e  fo llow ing p o in t re g a rd in g  th e s e  tw o w ays to  
r u n  a  g o v ern m en t:
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the moralizing politician attem pts, on the pretex t th a t hum an natu re  is not 
capable of a tta in ing  the good as prescribed in the idea of reason, to extenuate 
political principles th a t a re  contrary to right, and  thus these principles make 
progress impossible and perpe tuate  the violation of right.34
H ere , K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  p o litica l m o ra lis t w ou ld  gu ide  th e  go v ern m en t 
in  su ch  a  w ay  th a t  p ro g ress  w o u ld  b e  im possib le  a n d  R ig h t w o u ld  be  v io la ted . 
W hy m ig h t th is  be  so? B ecau se  th e  po litica l m o ra lis t  h a s  a lre a d y  decided  
th a t  m o ra l p ro g ress  is  n o t p o ss ib le , a n d  th u s  (w rongly) feels t h a t  s /h e  is  u n ­
d er no ob liga tion  to  a tte m p t to  g u id e  th e  com m onw ealth  to w a rd  a  b e tte r  con­
s titu tio n . W h a t is  im p o r ta n t  to  n o te  h e re  is  t h a t  b y  m a k in g  su c h  a n  a s ­
sum ption , K a n t be lieves th e  n a tu r a l  consequence  w ill be to  a c tu a lly  make 
p rog ress im possib le , th o u g h  p re su m a b ly  on ly  fo r  th e  tim e  b e in g . B y en ac tin g  
law s th a t  a re  c o n tra ry  to  R ig h t, a n d  by  ig n o rin g  th e  ca ll o f th e  m o ra l law , th e  
po litica l m o ra lis t fa ils  to  b r in g  a b o u t those  s i tu a tio n s  w hich  a re  n ecessa ry  for 
R igh t a n d  fo r th e  m o ra l p ro jec t.
In  fact, i f  w e a llow ed  e i th e r  p o litic ian  h is /h e r  b e lie f in  th e  im possib il­
ity  o f p ro g ress , th e n  w h a t ju s tif ic a tio n  could  p o ss ib ly  be g iven  fo r fay ing  to be 
a  m o ra l po litic ian?  O n e  fo u n d a tio n 35 for th e  m o ra l p o litic ian  i s  th e  no tion  
th a t  m o ra lity  a n d  po litics a re  n o t incom patib le , a n d  th a t  g u id in g  a  govern­
m en t in  te rm s  o f R ig h t is  a c tu a lly  th e  b est w ay  to  leg is la te . T h is  w as th e  
conclusion  of “T h eo ry  a n d  P ra c tic e .” As K a n t a rg u e s  in  “T o[w ard] P e rp e tu a l  
Peace”:
Solving the  first problem, namely, the problem th a t  political prudence pro­
poses, requires considerable n a tu ra l knowledge so th a t one can use na tu re’s 
m echanism to a tta in  the desired end; yet it is uncertain how this mechanism 
will function as far as its consequences for perpetual peace are  concerned... By 
contrast, the solution to the  second problem, the problem of political wisdom 
[i.e., the bringing politics in  line with morality] impresses itself on us, as it
34 “Tofward] Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 373.
35 The second foundation is the moral law itself.
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were, for it obviously puts all artificiality to sham e, and leads directly to the 
end.36
K a n t’s p o in t h e re  is  th a t  i t  seem s im possib le  to  con tro l n a tu re  en o u g h  to  be 
ab le  to  le g is la te  h a p p in e ss , w h ile  i t  seem s a  r u le r  cou ld  w ill to  b r in g  
leg is la tio n  in to  accord  w ith  R ig h t. B u t i f  n a tu r e  is  s im p ly  u n resp o n siv e  to 
m o ra l co n sid era tio n s , a n d  th e re b y  u n re sp o n siv e  to  th e  a tte m p t to  b r in g  th e  
com m onw ealth  in  lin e  w ith  m o ra lity  a n d  R ig h t, th e n  w h a t ju s tif ic a tio n  cou ld  
be g iven  fo r th e  m o ra l po litic ian?  A t le a s t  th e  p o litic a l m o ra lis t cou ld  p o in t to  
som e h a p p in e s s  w h ich  w ould h a v e  b e en  o b ta in e d , even  i f  h is /h e r  ow n. B u t 
th e  m o ra l p o litic ian  w ould h a v e  n o th in g  to  p o in t  to  a n d  lit tle  ju s tif ic a tio n  for 
ru lin g  in  a  w ay  th a t  is  no t lik e ly  to  sa tis fy  th e  im m e d ia te  desires o f th e  ru led . 
S /he  cou ld  in d e e d  p o in t to th e  m o ra l law , b u t  i f  n a tu r e  is  th o u g h t to  b e  
u n resp o n siv e , th e n  i t  is  like ly  t h a t  th is  defense  w o u ld  n o t convince th e  
c o n s titu en ts .
H ence , h e re  is  an o th e r  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r th e  b e lie f  in  th e  p ro g re ss  of 
th e  h u m a n  species, fo r w ith o u t i t ,  K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  p o litic ian s w ill n o t 
s te e r  th e  g o v e rn m en t in  d irec tions n e ce ssa ry  fo r  im p ro v ed  c o n stitu tio n s . T he 
im p lica tio n s a re  obvious. I f  th e  p o litic ian  does n o t  e n a c t law s in  accord  w ith  
R ig h t (because  s /h e  h a s  a lread y  a ssu m e d  no  p ro g re ss  to  be  possib le), th e n  th e  
c o n s titu tio n s  a re  n o t im proved, th e  s tru c tu re  o f  th e  com m onw ealth  is  n o t 
b ro u g h t in to  accord  w ith  R ight, a n d  th e  fo u n d a tio n  o f social in s t itu t io n s  is  
n o t la id  fo r th e  b eg in n in g s of t r u e  m o ra l p ro g ress . C learly , w e m u s t ta k e  th is  
to  be  a  m ere ly  tem p o ra ry  se tback , since  w e h a v e  a lre a d y  a rg u ed  fo r th e  u l t i ­
m a te  n ecess ity  o f m o ra l p rog ress. N o n e th e less , th is  seem s to be  a n  im p o r ta n t  
ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r b e lie f  in  th e  h ig h e s t  good, fo r w ith o u t it, po litica l m o ra lis ts  
w ou ld  fee l no  n e e d  to  e n ac t th e  leg is la tio n  n e c e ssa ry  for m oving th e  S ta te  
c loser to  R igh t.
36 'To[ward]Perpetual Peace.” Ak. 377-8.
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Also, i t  se em s th a t  th e re  w o u ld  lik e ly  be a  d a n g e ro u s  s p ira l  w hich 
w ou ld  develop u n d e r  th ese  c irc u m sta n ce s . I f  th e  p o litic ian  w ere  convinced of 
th e  im possib ility  o f  p rog ress a n d  chose  to  e n a c t leg is la tio n  w h ich  is  co n tra ry  
to  R ig h t, th e n  th e  r e s u l t  is  a  s t ru c tu re  o f  a  com m onw ealth  w h ich  is  like ly  to 
be  p ro n e  to in ju s tic e , violence, a n d  w a r. I f  th is  is  th e  re s u lt ,  th e n  in d iv id u a ls  
a re  a lso  likely  to  becom e in c re a s in g ly  d e sp o n d e n t re g a rd in g  th e  p ro sp ec ts  for 
b e tte rm e n t o f th e  h u m a n  race . L ook ing  a ro u n d , in d iv id u a ls  see  on ly  
c o u n te rex am p les  o f  m oral p ro g ress . H ence , th e y  too lose  f a i th  in  th e  h ig h es t 
good. G iven su c h  a  po litica l c lim a te , i t  is  lik e ly  t h a t  th e  n e x t ru le r  w ill also 
h a v e  lo st fa ith , a n d  beg in  to  e n a c t  d e fic ien t leg is la tio n . H ence , th e  sp ira l.37 
W ith o u t th e  b e lie f  in  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f p ro g ress , i t  w ou ld  becom e in c reas in g ly  
d ifficu lt to p ro m o te  th o se  s tru c tu re s  w h ich  a llow  fo r th e  m o ra l p ro jec t to be 
ta k e n  up  in  full.
C oupled w ith  a  rejection  o f th e  m o ra l law , su c h  a  s i tu a t io n  w ould  be 
d e v asta tin g . K a n t  w rites:
To be sure, if ne ither freedom nor the  moral law th a t is based  on it  exist, and if 
everything th a t  happens or can  happen is m ere m echanism  of nature, then 
politics (as the a r t  of using th a t m echanism  to govern men) would be the whole 
of practical wisdom, and the concept of right would be a contentless thought.38
I f  th e  m oral law  is  re jected , th e n  th e re  c a n  be  no  a p p e a l to  R ig h t. A t th is  
p o in t, th e  only g u id in g  p rin c ip le  a v a ila b le  w o u ld  b e  w h a t  is a n d  n o t w h a t 
ought to  be. In  o th e r  w ords, ru le r s  w o u ld  be fo rced  to  look on ly  a t  h is to rica l 
exam p les for h e lp  in  d ra ftin g  le g is la tio n , a n d  w o u ld  h a v e  no  o th e r  leg itim a te  
in te re s ts  th a n  h a p p in e ss . S u ch  a  s i tu a t io n  w ou ld  obviously  b e  v e ry  
d estru c tiv e  for m o ra lity . I f  b e lie f  in  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  b e tte rm e n t  o f 
h u m a n k in d  is  a lso  re jec ted , th e  c u l tu r a l  s i tu a tio n  w o u ld  be  d e v a s ta tin g . N ot 
only  w ould  R ig h t p la y  no p a r t  in  p o litic a l decisions, b u t  th e re  w ou ld  be  no
37 Perhaps this is one additional reason for Kant’s support of the French Revolution.
38 'To[ward]Perpetual Peace,” Ak. 372.
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m o tiv a tio n  to  a tte m p t to  im prove th e  s i tu a tio n  o f th e  m em b ers  o f th e  
com m onw ealth . I f  a  r u le r  w as im m o ra l a n d  re je c te d  th e  poss ib ility  o f 
p ro g re s s , s /h e  cou ld  fee l free  to p u rs u e  p e rs o n a l  h a p p in e s s  o r n a tio n a l  g lory  
a t  a n y  expense . I t  se em s like ly  th a t  K a n t’s  “P re l im in a ry  A rticles fo r 
P e rp e tu a l  P eace  A m ong  N a tio n s” w ou ld  n o t b e  a d h e re d  to . T he s i tu a tio n  
w o u ld  n o t im prove u n t i l  t h a t  p o in t a t  w h ich  r u le r s  b e liev ed  th a t  th e  re w a rd s  
o f  con flic t w ere  u ltim a te ly  n o t w orth  th e  e x p e n d itu re . I t  w ou ld  ta k e  a  lo n g  
t im e  before  a n y th in g  l ik e  a  p erfec t in te rn a l  o r e x te rn a l  c o n s titu tio n  w o u ld  
com e to  p a ss .
F. No Final Purpose
T im e a n d  tim e  a g a in , K a n t a rg u e s  t h a t  i f  th e  h ig h e s t  good is  u n a t ­
ta in a b le , th e n  th e  w o rld  c an n o t h av e  p u rp o se  o r  m e a n in g . T h is is  la rg e ly  
s e e n  in  th e  th ird  Critique. I f  th e  ex is tence  o f h u m a n s  a s  m o ra l a g e n ts  is  n o t 
th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  o f c re a tio n , “th e n  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  th e  w o rld  is  e i th e r  b a se d  
on  n o  p u rp o se  a t  a ll  in  th e  cause , o r only on  p u rp o s e s  w ith o u t a  f in a l  p u r ­
p o se .”39 T h is  is  K a n t’s  conclusion  from  th e  “d o w n w a rd ” p ro o f o f th e  l in k  b e ­
tw e e n  n a tu r e  a n d  m o ra lity  in  th e  Critique o f Judgment. K a n t’s  b e lie f  is  t h a t  
i f  m o ra l  w illin g  is  u n a b le  to  be  perfected , th e n  re a s o n  is  on ly  (som ew hat) ef­
fec tive  a t  p u rsu in g  h a p p in e ss , a n d  th u s  is  re d u c e d  to  th e  lev e l of every  o th e r  
a n im a l; “i t  is  only in so fa r  a s  we s tr iv e  to w a rd  t h a t  p u rp o se  [i.e., m o ra lity ], 
t h a t  w e m a y  ju d g e  o u rse lv es  as conform ing  to  th e  f in a l  p u rp o se  o f a n  in te l l i ­
g e n t w o rld  cau se  (if th e r e  b e  such  a  cause ).”40 M e c h a n ic a l n a tu re  i ts e l f  is  
w ith o u t v a lu e  i f  i t  c a n n o t be  sy s tem atized  b y  th e  ra t io n a l , m o ra l a g en t, “...for 
i f  in d e e d  c re a tio n  h a s  a  f in a l  purpose , th e n  w e h a v e  to  conceive o f i t  a s  h a r ­
m o n iz in g  w ith  th e  m o ra l f in a l  pu rp o se  ([since] o n ly  th e  m o ra l f in a l p u rp o se  
m a k e s  th e  concept o f a[ny] p u rp o se  [of c rea tio n ] p o ss ib le ).”41 B ut, g iven  m y
39 Third Critique, Ak. 450.
40 Ibid., Ak. 446.
41 Ibid.. Ak. 453.
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a rg u m e n ts  a s  to th e  p ro p e r  n a tu re  o f th e  h ig h e s t good,42 th e  f in a l p u rpose  o f 
c rea tio n  a s  th e  c o n tin u a l im p ro v em en t o f rea so n  is  s im p ly  th e  h ig h e s t good 
u n d e r  a  d iffe ren t n a m e . T h u s, K a n t be lieves th a t  i f  th e  h ig h e s t  good is n o t 
possib le , a t  le a s t  a s  a n  object o f c o n tin u a l p rogress, th e n  a l l  th e  m em bers o f 
th e  w o rld  h a v e  no p u rp o se :
I t  cannot satisfy reason th a t the ultim ate fined purpose for which the world 
and m an him self are there and were created is so th a t [mem can] enjoy [the 
world], or so th a t  [he canj behold, contemplate, and adm ire [it] (which, if th a t 
is eill we do, is also nothing more th an  enjoyment of a particu lar kind). For 
reason presupposes a  personal value, one th a t mem can only give himself, as 
the condition under which edone he and his existence cem be [al final purpose.43
T h e  consequence  o f th is  su pposition  is  th a t  b e lie f  in  th e  possib ility  o f 
th e  h ig h e s t good a n d  th o se  p o s tu la te s  n ecessa ry  for i ts  co n d itio n  a re  neces­
sa ry  b ecau se  w ith o u t th em , o u r own re a so n  a n d  h u m a n i ty  becom e w orth less. 
I f  th e  h ig h e s t good is  im possib le , we a re  red u ced  to th e  lev e l o f an im als. 
W ith o u t th e  p o ss ib ility  o f a  m o ra l end , “th e  m o ra l law  is  com plete ly  d eg rad ed  
from  i ts  h o lin e ss .”44
T he  d e g ra d a tio n  o f h u m a n k in d  w h ich  w ould re s u l t  from  th e  
im possib ility  of th e  h ig h e s t  good is  a  th e m e  w hich  ru n s  th ro u g h o u t K a n t’s 
po litica l w ritin g s  as w ell. In  “Is  th e  H u m a n  R ace Im prov ing?” w e fin d  th e  
th em e  th a t  a  n e g a tiv e  a n sw e r to  th is  q u estio n  w ould  be  “a  su b v ers io n  of th e  
u ltim a te  p u rp o se  of c re a tio n  itse lf ,”45 a n d  even  th e  h y p o th es is  o f  h u m a n  
s ta g n a tio n  is  s tre n u o u s ly  re jec ted , for “i t  is  a  v a in  a f f a i r  to  h a v e  good so 
a lte rn a te  w ith  ev il t h a t  th e  w hole traffic  o f o u r species w ith  i ts e l f  on th is  
globe w ou ld  h a v e  to b e  co n sid e red  as a  m ere  farc ica l com edy, fo r th is  can  
endow  o u r species w ith  no  g re a te r  v a lu e  in  th e  eyes o f re a so n  th a n  th a t
42 See Section Two, Chapter One and Two above.
43 Third Critique, Ak. 477.
44 Second Critique, Ak. 122.
45 "Is the Human Race Improving?” p. 161.
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w hich  o th e r  a n im a l species possess...”46 W e h a v e  a lread y  seen  K a n t’s 
s ta te m e n t  from  “T heory  a n d  P rac tice” t h a t  “a llow ing  vice to  m o u n t u p o n  
en d le ss  vice in  th e  rea l w orld ... so th a t  in  d a y s  to  come th e re  can  b e  p le n ty  to 
p u n is h  is, to  s a y  th e  least, c o n tra ry  to  o u r concep tion  of th e  m o ra lity  o f a  w ise 
c re a to r  a n d  governor of th e  w orld .”47 In  “T h e  E n d  o f All T h in g s” K a n t  a s se r ts  
th a t  i f  th e  h ig h e s t  good “sh o u ld  n o t be  a tta in a b le , c rea tio n  i ts e lf  w o u ld  
a p p ea r... a s  p u rp o se less  a s  a  p la y  th a t  h a s  no  u p sh o t w hatsoever...”48 T h e  
th e m e  is  c lear, n am e ly  t h a t  w ith o u t th e  a b ility  o f h u m a n  be ings to  im p ro v e  
th em se lv es  m orally , bo th  th e y  a n d  w orld  w ill lo se  a n y  claim  to  m e a n in g  or 
v a lu e .
I  th in k  t h a t  th is  is  a  p a r tic u la r ly  s tro n g  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r th e  n e ce ss ity  
o f a  b e lie f  in  th e  h ig h es t good a n d  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p rac tica l rea so n . S u ch  a  
b e lie f  c an n o t be  com m anded; “one m u s t in  a  p ra c tic a l w ay believe in  a  
concu rrence  b e tw ee n  d iv ine w isdom  a n d  th e  cou rse  of n a tu re , i f  one is  n o t to 
give up  one’s c h e rish e d  u ltim a te  p u rp o se .”49 I ts  re jection  m ig h t n o t r e s u l t  in  
a  conflict w ith in  reaso n  itse lf. H ow ever, th e  re jec tion  of th e  p o ss ib ility  o f 
m o ra l p ro g ress  w ould  n ecessa rily  low er h u m a n k in d ’s se lf-estim ation . T he  
re s u l ts  could  ra n g e  from  th e  m in im al, m ere ly  a  le ssen ed  desire  to  fo llow  th e  
com m ands of th e  m oral law  in  a ll  c ircu m stan ces , to  th e  m ax im al, a  com plete  
re jec tion  of th e  m o ra l law  due  to  i ts  p re sc rib in g  a  necessa ry  co n d itio n  w h ich  
is  th o u g h t to  be  im possible. B u t one th in g  is  c e r ta in : th e  re jection  o f  th e
46 Ibid., p. 147.
47 “Theory and Practice,” Ak. 308.
48 “End o f All Things,” Ak. 331.
49 Ibid.. Ak. 337.
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h ig h e s t good ru n s  co u n te r to  r a t io n a l  se lf-esteem , a  se lf-esteem  w hich  we a re  
com m a n d ed  (Metaphysics o f Morals) to keep  in ta c t.
.1
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Chapter Six 
Is the Existence of God a Necessary Postulate?
L
In  C h a p te r  Tw o above, I  a rg u e d  th a t  th e r e  i s  no  rea so n  to  be lieve  in  a  
“w o rth in e ss  e q u a tio n ,” i.e ., th e re  seem s to  be  n o  le g itim a te  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r 
K a n t’s  a s se r tio n  th a t  v i r tu e  o u g h t to be  re w a rd e d  b y  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p i­
n ess. I  a rg u e d  th a t  w e o u g h t to  th in k  o f m o ra lity  a s  u n co n ce rn ed  w ith  a n y ­
th in g  b u t  m in im a l h a p p in e s s .
H ow ever, in  m o s t o f K a n t’s  w ritin g s , h is  a rg u m e n ts  for th e  m o ra l 
p ro o f o f th e  ex is tence  o f  G od a re  p rem ise d  on ex ac tly  th is  po in t; K a n t  a rg u e s  
th a t  a  b e lie f  in  God is  n e c e ss ita te d  because  v ir tu e  o u g h t to  be  p ro p o rtio n a te ly  
rew ard ed , a n d  b e ca u se  h u m a n  be in g s a re  u n a b le  to  b r in g  th is  a b o u t th e m ­
selves. H a v in g  re je c te d  th e  “w o rth in ess  e q u a tio n ” does th e re  re m a in  a  n e e d  
for th e  ex is ten ce  o f G od  a s  a  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l reaso n ?
In  th is  c h a p te r , I  w ill a rg u e  th a t  th is  n e e d  re m a in s , a n d  t h a t  w e c a n  
ju s tify  i t  from  th e  p o in t  o f v iew  o f an  “e a r th ly ” h ig h e s t  good. In  sh o rt, th e  
ex is tence  o f G od n e e d s  to  be  p o s tu la te d  fo r tw o rea so n s . T he  f i r s t  is  t h a t  su ch  
a  b e lie f  is  n e ce ssa ry  i f  d is p a ra te  in d iv id u a ls  a re  to  fo rm  to g e th e r  in to  a n  e th i­
cal c o m m un ity , a  m a n ife s ta t io n  o f th e  in v is ib le  c h u rc h . T h is  a rg u m e n t h a s  
b een  s e t  fo r th  by  S h a ro n  A nderson-G old  and , to  som e e x te n t, P h ilip  J .  R ossi.
I  w ill ex am in e  th e ir  d e fense , a g re e in g  w ith  i ts  n ecessity , b u t  re je c tin g  i t  a s  a  
com plete  so lu tio n  to  K a n t’s p rob lem  of ev il a n d  th e  p rob lem  of th e  a t t a in m ent, 
of th e  h ig h e s t  good. T h e  second  reaso n  fo r th e  n e e d  o f th is  p o s tu la te  o u g h t to  
be  r a th e r  obvious a t  th i s  p o in t in  th e  p re s e n t  w ork , n a m e ly  th e  n e ce ss ity  of 
n a tu re  to  be  resp o n siv e  to  th e  n eed s  of m o ra lity . T h e  m an ife s ta tio n  of th e
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h ig h e s t  good in  th e  w orld, th e  cu lm in a tio n  o f m o ra l p ro g re ss , is  a  m an ife s ta ­
tio n  w h ich  ta k e s  p lace in  n a tu re .  G overnm en ta l, social, a n d  re lig ious o rgan i­
z a tio n s  m u s t  com e up  w ith  em p irica l so lu tio n s  to  e m p iric a l p rob lem s, an d  
t h a t  r e q u ire s  a  know ledge o f n a tu re  as w ell a s  a  n a tu re  w h ich  is  responsive 
to  so lu tio n s . T h e  outcom es o f  m o ra l w illing  o u g h t to  b e  th o se  w h ich  a re  re ­
flec tive  o f o u r  in te n tio n s . F o r  th e se  rea so n s  th e re  is  a  n e e d  to  p o s tu la te  a  
m o ra l a u th o r .
EL Anderson-Gold’s and Rossi's Ethical Commonwealth
A nderson-G old  ta k e s  a s  h e r  s ta r t in g  p o in t for th is  a rg u m e n t K a n t’s 
d iscu ss io n  o f  th e  prob lem  o f jea lo u sy  a n d  r iv a lry  in  books O n e  a n d  T h ree  of 
th e  Religion. I n  Book T h ree , K a n t m a in ta in s  t h a t  in d iv id u a ls  h a v e  th e  du ty  
to m ove b ey o n d  an “e th ica l s ta te  o f n a tu re ” in to  a n  “e th ic a l com m unity” 
w h e re  each  p e rso n  w ould  su p p o r t th e  m o ra l en d eav o rs  o f  o th e rs . H ow ever, 
s ta n d in g  in  th e  w ay  of th is  u n ifica tio n  is  th e  com plica tion  th a t ,  w h e reas  in ­
d iv id u a ls ’ “n e e d s  a re  b u t  few  a n d  h is  fram e  o f m in d  in  p ro v id in g  for th em  is 
te m p e ra te  a n d  tra n q u il,”1 in d iv id u a ls  becom e jea lo u s  w h e n  in  th e  com pany of 
o th ers :
He [any individual] is poor (or considers him self so) only in his anxiety lest 
o ther m en consider him poor... Envy, the lu st for power, greed, and the malig­
n a n t inclinations bound up w ith these, besiege his nature , contented within it­
self, as soon as he is among men. And it is not even necessary to assume th a t 
these are  m en sunk in evil...; it suffices th a t they are a t  hand... for them mu­
tually  to corrupt each o ther’s predispositions and  make one another evil.2
H e re  w e  c a n  c lea rly  see R o u sseau ’s  in fluence  on  K an t. N a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s 
a re , in  th em se lv es , good,3 b u t  w h en  in d iv id u a ls  com e in to  c o n ta c t w ith
1 Religion, p. 85.
2 Ibid., p. 85.
3 We receive a precise statement of this in on page 51 of the Religion, though this fact is one of 
the basic arguments of the Religion.
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o th e rs , “w e ju d g e  ourselves h a p p y  o r u n h a p p y  on ly  by  m ak ing  a  com parison  
w ith  o th e rs .”4
A nderson-G old  m oves h o rn  th e s e  p a ssa g e s  to  a s se r t th a t  th is  is  
K a n t’s  g e n e ra l so lu tion  to th e  q u e s tio n  o f th e  ex is tence  of rad ica l ev il in  h u ­
m a n  n a tu r e .  S h e  w rites th a t  “th e  p re fe ren c e  w e d isp lay  for th e se  ‘acq u ired  
d e s ire s ’ [i.e., a  good in  com parison  to  som eth ing ] is  th e  very  fo rm u la  o f th e  
p ro p e n s ity  to  ev il w hich... is ... ‘ro o te d  in ’ o u r  h u m a n ity ,”5 a n d  th a t  “n a tu re  
p e r  se  is  no  lo n g er th e  ta rg e te d  c u lp r i t  a n d  th e  h in d ra n c e s  to  th e  re a liz a tio n  
o f th e  h ig h e s t  good are  loca ted  in  th e  n e x u s  o f h u m a n  re la tio n sh ip s .”6 T h u s , 
acco rd in g  to  A nderson-G old, ev il r e s u l ts  from  “th e  exercice7 of re a so n  a n d  
specifica lly  a  rea so n  w hich com pares ,”8 t h a t  is , ev il re su lts  from  th e  n a tu r a l  
d ish a rm o n y  w h ich  we feel w hen , in  o u r a sso c ia tio n s w ith  o thers, w e fee l in ­
a d e q u a te  o r u n h a p p y  because  of o u r  com parison  to  o thers . T hus, “th e  p ro ­
p e n s ity  to  evil, th en , is n o t so m e th in g  t h a t  is  s im p ly  ‘w ith in  m e’ a n d  ‘w ith in  
you’ b u t  so m e th in g  th a t  o p e ra tes  between u s .”9
M oving  to  a  m ore in -d e p th  e x p la n a tio n , A nderson-G old a rg u e s  th a t  
th e  so u rce  o f ev il is  no t sim ply  self-love, b u t  in s te a d  a rise s  from  a n  in co rrec t 
concep tion  o f ourselves a s  e sse n tia lly  u n c o n n ec te d  to  o thers. S he  a rg u e s  t h a t  
i t  is  th e  “m a n n e r  in  w hich th e  se lf  i s  conceived  t h a t  th e  co rrup tion  o f th e  w ill 
ta k e s  p lac e  a n d  ev il a rises .”10 In  essen ce , ra d ic a l ev il in  h u m an  n a tu re  is  a 
re s u lt  o f  a n  im p ro p er w ay o f th in k in g  o f o u r  re la tio n sh ip  to o thers:
4 Ibid., p. 22.
5 Anderson-Gold, “God and Community: An Inquiry into the Religious Implications of the 
Highest Good,” p. 124.
6 “God and Community,” p. 127.
7 Misprint occurs in original.
8 Anderson-Gold, “Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth: The Highest Good as a Social Goal,” p. 26.
9 “God and Community,” p. 125.
10 "Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth.” p. 27.
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It is not the mere force of the external world or the raw attractiveness of ob­
jects th a t underlies the subversion of the moral law... It is reason which be­
stows upon us our social nature  and  leads us to “compare” ourselves w ith o th ­
ers... The propensity to evil is identified with the principle of self-love, not in­
sofar as the self is a physical being w ith m aterial needs, bu t insofar as the self 
is a  social being who refuses to recognize the intrinsic value of o thers.11
A ccord ing  to  th is  p ic tu re , in d iv id u a ls , in  th e  u se  o f th e ir  “co m p ara tiv e  r e a ­
son ,” th in k  o f o th e rs  as m ere ly  m e a n s  th ro u g h  w h ich  th ey  (them selves) can  
o b ta in  h a p p in e ss . T h is  com portm en t, how ever, m isco n s tru es  th e  e s se n tia l  
fac t t h a t  “au tonom y , th e  a ffirm a tio n  o f th e  se lf  a s  a n  end, c an  on ly  b e  ex­
p re s se d  th ro u g h  th e  k ingdom  of e n d s ,”12 a n d  th u s  overlooks th e  w ay  in  w hich  
each  in d iv id u a l re lie s  upon  o th e r  m o ra l a g en ts  fo r th e  rea liza tio n  o f th e ir  
ow n au to n o m y  a n d  th e  re a liz a tio n  o f  th e  h ig h e s t good. K a n t em p h a size s  th e  
n e ce ssa ry  (m oral) connection  b e tw een  in d iv id u a ls , a n d  th e  fac t t h a t  “th e  id e a  
o f a  ‘m o ra l life’ m u s t  inc lude  n o t on ly  th e  u n ific a tio n  o f a ll o f one’s ‘ow n’ 
ac ts /m ax im s b u t  a lso  a n  e sse n tia l  re fe ren c in g  o f th e s e  to th e  ac ts /m ax im s o f 
o th e r  m o ra l su b jec ts .”13
T h u s, in  h e r  la te r  w ritin g s ,14 A nderson-G old  a rg u es  th a t  b e lie f  in  God 
becom es n e c e ssa ry  in  o rd er fo r u s  to  overcom e th is  “e th ica l s ta te  o f n a tu r e .” 
E sse n tia lly , in  o rd e r  for u s  to  overcom e th e  p rob lem s o f jea lo u sy  a n d  r iv a lry  
w h ich  occur in  o u r  in te ra c tio n s  w ith  o th e rs , we re q u ire  a  w ay  o f u n ify in g  
ou rse lv es in to  a  w hole. T h is  u n ifica tio n , A nderson-G old  a rg u es, c an  on ly  be 
h a d  th ro u g h  a n  e th ic a l com m unity , a n d  on ly  th ro u g h  God as  a  sym bol o f 
u n ifica tio n ; “b u t  each  [ind iv idual] b e in g  in su ffic ien t to  s ta n d  a s su ra n c e  for 
h is  p led g e  m u s t  th in k  or p resu p p o se  th e  ex is ten ce  o f a  perfect m o ra l b e in g  
through whom w e a re  b o u n d  each  to  each .”15 I f  w e h a v e  no p o in t fo r
11 Ibid., pp. 27-8.
12 Ibid., p. 27.
13 “God and Community,” p. 123.
14 In “Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth” Anderson-Gold seems content to have the idea of an 
ethical commonwealth (the highest good) itself be the point of unification. See: pp. 30-32.
15 “God and Community.” p. 128.
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u n ifica tio n , w e w ill co n tin u e  to  act a t  odds w ith  e a c h  o th e r, and , as K a n t 
say s, in d iv id u a ls  w ill a c t “ju s t  a s  th o u g h  th e y  w e re  instruments of evil.”16 I f  
w e a re  to  u n i te  in to  a  sing le , m oral co m m u n ity  fo r  th e  p u rp o se  of p rom o ting  
th e  h ig h e s t  good, th e n  th e  id e a  of God a s  m o ra l g o v e rn o r is  necessary  fo r u s  
to  overcom e o u r  n a tu r a l  d is tan c e  b e tw een  one  a n o th e r .
T h is  id e a  co n ce rn in g  th e  n eed  o f G od a s  a  sym bol fo r social u n ifica ­
tio n  is  su p p o r te d  b y  R ossi a s  well. Rossi, l ik e  A nderson -G o ld , em phasizes th e  
n e c e ssa ry  soc ia l co m p o n en t o f m oral m ax im s. H e  focuses on  th e  “w orld  con­
s tru c tin g ” n a tu r e  o f  re a so n  a n d , a s  I  d iscu ssed  ab o v e ,17 a g re e s  th a t  th e  n eces­
s a ry  object o f m o ra l w illin g  is  th e  co n stru c tio n  o f  th e  h ig h e s t  good on e a r th . 
H e  is  in te re s te d  in  m o v in g  beyond  th e  “‘tex tb o o k  picture*” w hich  “h a s  th e  
a g e n t in  lo fty  a n d  lo n e ly  m o ra l so litude” a n d  w h ich  “fa ils  to  cap tu re ... th e  fa c t 
t h a t  K a n t  q u ite  c le a r ly  a lso  ch arac te rize s ... [m o ra l w illing ] a s  an  in tro d u c tio n  
in to  a  ‘re a lm ’ o r ‘w o rld ’, i.e ., in to  a  connec ted  a n d  o rd e re d  to ta lity  or re la tio n s  
to  th e  m o ra l a g en cy  o f a ll  o th e rs  who c o n s titu te  th e  h u m an  m o ra l com m u­
n ity .”18 W e h a v e  a  d u ty , R ossi a rgues, n o t on ly  to  b r in g  o u r w ill in to  accord 
w ith  th e  m o ra l law , b u t  a lso  to  p rom ote  a n  e th ic a l  co m m u n ity  for a ll h u m a n  
be ings . In  th is  re sp ec t, G od is  th e  a p p ro p ria te  sy m b o l fo r m o ra l p ersons be­
cau se
the m oral fu tu re  pictured under the form of com m unity through the represen­
tation  of the h ighest good stands in need of a fu tu re  ground for its completion, 
which m ust also serve as ground for confidence th a t  our own present moral 
endeavors, trunca ted  though they m ay be, nonetheless will effect the a tta in ­
m ent of th a t  fu ture. God is the effective symbol for the  attainm ent of th a t fu­
ture: represen ting  him as the ground for ordering hum an moral purposes in
16 Religion, p. 88.
17 Section Two, Chapter One.
18 Philip Rossi, “Kant as a Christian Philosopher: Hope and the Symbols of Christian Faith,” p.
28 .
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harm ony through all tim e and a t any moment of tim e provides surety suffi­
cient for the satisfaction of reason’s in terest.19
R o ssi is  n o t  c lea r in  a n y  o f  h is  a rtic le s  a s  to  w h e th e r  th e  “h a rm o n io u s  o rd e r­
in g  o f  m o ra l p u rp o ses”20 fu n c tio n s  a s  a n  an a lo g y  b e tw ee n  G od a n d  one’s own 
o rd e r in g  o f p u rp o ses or som ehow  b e tw een  G od a n d  th e  a b ility  o f a n  e th ica l 
co m m o n w ealth  to  o rd er th e i r  co llective a n d  a t  tim e s  d is p a ra te  p u rp o ses to  
m o ra l co n sid era tio n s .21 H ow ever, w h a t R ossi m a k e s  m a n ife s t  is  th e  l im ita ­
tio n s  o f o u r  ab ility  to  u n i te  w ith  o th e rs  in  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f th e  h ig h es t 
good, a n d , to  th is  e x ten t, G od  becom es a n  a p p ro p r ia te  sym bol for m o ra l com ­
p o r tm e n t.
m . Problems with Anderson-Gold’s and Rossi’s commentary
I n  g en era l, th e  is s u e s  w h ich  A nderson-G old  a n d  R ossi h av e  b ro u g h t 
to  th e  a tte n tio n  of K a n tia n  sch o la rsh ip  a re  ex trem e ly  im p o rta n t. T h e ir  in s is ­
te n c e  on  th e  “social” n a tu r e  o f m o ra l w illing  a n d  th e i r  a rg u m e n ts  a s  to th e  
h ig h e s t  good a s  th e  n e c e ssa ry  object o f m o ra l w illin g  h a v e  allow ed  u s  to  m ove 
b e y o n d  th e  “textbook” p ic tu re  o f th e  so lita ry  a n d  u n c o n ce rn e d  m o ra l ag en t.
I n  a ccep tin g  th e ir  p ic tu re  o f  th e  m o ra l ag en t, i t  a llow s u s  to  m ove on to m ore  
in te re s t in g  a n d , I  believe, im p o r ta n t  q uestions . H ow ever, I  th in k  th a t  th e ir  
specific  a rg u m e n ts  a s  to  th e  n a tu r e  of evil a n d  th e  n e e d  fo r a  b e lie f  in  God 
a re  in co rrec t.
A ccording to m y in te rp re ta t io n  of K a n t’s Religion, A nderson-G old  h a s  
v a s t ly  m isco n s tru e d  th e  so u rce  a n d  n a tu re  o f ev il a s  K a n t  sp e lls  i t  out. O n 
th e  one  h a n d , K a n t e lim in a te s  n a tu r e  or n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s  a s  th e  possib le
19 Rossi, “Kant’s Doctrine of Hope: Reason’s Interest and the Things of Faith,” p. 237. For 
this need of God as symbol, see also Rossi’s: “Kant as Christian Philosopher,” pp. 28-29 and “Autonomy 
and Community: the Social Character of Kant’s ‘Moral Faith’,” p. 171.
20 “Kant’s Doctrine of Hope,” p. 28.
21 In this respect, Rossi’s later article, “The Final End of All Things: The Highest Good as the 
Unity of Nature and Freedom,” brings this tension to the fore (pp. 148-151), and thus the lack of clarity 
may simply be inherent in Kant’s formulation. Also, however, at times Rossi claims that God is necessary 
simply because of the need to apportion happiness to virtue.
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source. I f  n a tu re  w ere th e  cau se  o f  ra d ic a l evil, th e n  w e w ou ld  n o t be  r e ­
sp o n sib le  fo r o u r  evil. Evil, th e n , j u s t  a s  in  th e  Critique o f Practical Reason, 
r e s u lts  from  th e  su b o rd in a tio n  of th e  m o ra l law  to sen su o u s  inc lina tions ,' “th e  
p roposition , M an  is  evil, can  m e a n  only, H e  is  conscious o f th e  m o ra l la w  b u t 
h a s  n e v e r th e le s s  adop ted  in to  h is  m ax im  th e  (occasional) d e v ia tio n  th e re ­
from .”22 M ore specifically, g iven  K a n t’s focus in  th e  Religion o n  o u r  
“c h a ra c te r” (Gesinnung), evil is  th e  su b su m p tio n  of individual m ax im s to  a  
w illfu lly  chosen  o vera rch ing  m ax im  w h ich  su b o rd in a te s  th e  m o ra l la w  to 
n a tu r a l  in c lin a tio n s . K a n t n o tes  t h a t  a ll  h u m a n  be in g s a lw ay s h a v e  tw o in ­
cen tiv es  o p e ra tin g  on o u r will, t h a t  is, m o ra l a n d  sen su o u s  in cen tiv e s ,
hence the distinction between a good m an and one who is evil cannot he in the 
difference between the incentives which they adopt into the ir maxim  (not in 
the content of the maxim), b u t ra th e r  m ust depend upon subordination (the 
form of the  maxim), i.e., which of the two incentives he makes the condition of 
the other.73
T h u s, in  th e  case  o f evil, we w illfu lly  choose to ac t a s  i f  s e n su o u s  in c lin a ­
tio n s  co n tro lle d  us.
O n  th e  o th e r  h an d , how ever, w h ile  th is  is  K a n t’s  acco u n t o f th e  n a ­
tu re  o f evil, h e  u ltim a te ly  concludes t h a t  why w e sh o u ld  choose one  o v e ra rch ­
in g  m ax im  over th e  o th e r w ill forever remain a mystery. K a n t  s ta te s  th is  very  
c learly :
the rational origin of this perversion of our will whereby it m akes lower incen­
tives suprem e among its maxims, th a t is, of the propensity to evil, rem ains in­
scrutable to us... Evil could have sprung only from the morally-evil (not from 
mere lim itations in our nature); and  yet the original predisposition... is a  pre­
disposition to good; there is then  for us no conceivable ground from which the 
m oral evil in us could originally have come.24
22 Religion, p. 27.
23 Ibid., p. 31.
24 Ibid., p. 38.
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K a n t’s  conclusion  follow s from  h is  an a ly s is  o f w h a t i t  w o u ld  m ea n  fo r h u m an  
b e in g s  to  h a v e  a  p ro p en s ity  to w a rd  evil. I f  w e a re  re sp o n s ib le  fo r evil, th en  
n a tu r e  c a n n o t be  i ts  cau se . A n d  i f  su c h  resp o n sib ility  is  a  free  choice o f th e  
w ill, th e n  w e m u s t h a v e  m ad e  th is  choice ou rse lves. Y et, p rec ise ly  because  
w e c a n  n e v e r  h av e  access to  th e  g ro u n d s o f o u r  freedom  in  g en era l, t h a t  is, 
access to  how  freedom  i ts e lf  is  p ossib le , w e c an  n e v e r  k n o w  w hy  w e h a v e  th is  
“p ro p e n s ity  o f th e  w ill w h ich  be longs to i t  by n a tu r e  (a lth o u g h  a c tu a lly  th e  
d isp o sitio n  is  g ro u n d ed  in  freedom ).”25 In  sh o rt, “th e  su b jec tiv e  g ro u n d  or 
c a u se  o f th is  adop tion  c a n n o t fu r th e r  be know n...”26 “fo r i t  is  a  q u estio n  
w holly  tra n sc e n d in g  th e  sp e cu la tiv e  capacity  o f o u r re a so n .”27
T h u s , i f  w e a re  co n ce rn ed  w ith  K a n t’s  so lu tio n  to  th e  p rob lem  of evil, 
A nderson-G old  c a n n o t b e  co rrec t in  h e r  in te rp re ta tio n . W h erea s  th e  problem  
of je a lo u sy  a n d  r iv a lry  is  c e r ta in ly  a  h in d ra n c e  to  m o ra lity , i t  c a n n o t b e  the 
p ro b lem  o f evil. I f  K a n t is  co rrect, th e n  i t  c an n o t be  th e  case  t h a t  ra d ic a l evil 
red u c es  to  th e  p a r t ic u la r  s i tu a tio n  o f h u m a n  be in g s com ing  in to  c o n tac t w ith  
one  a n o th e r  w hich  su b se q u e n tly  som ehow  causes th e  su b o rd in a tio n  o f m oral 
in c lin a tio n s  to se n su o u s  in c lin a tio n s . O n th e  one h a n d , w e c a n  s t i l l  question  
why i t  is  th e  case t h a t  su ch  c o n tac t le a d s  u s  to  th is  su b o rd in a tio n , a n d  th e  
a n sw e r  to  th is  q u estio n  h a s  to  do w ith  a  free  choice an d , u ltim a te ly , th e  
g ro u n d s  o f a n y  free  choice m u s t re m a in  a  m ystery . O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , th is  
c a n n o t be  th e  only c ircu m stan ce  w h ich  gives r ise  to  th e  p ro b lem  o f evil. I t  
seem s c o u n te r in tu itiv e  to  K a n t’s p o sitio n  to say  th a t  i f  th is  one  s itu a tio n  
co u ld  (hypo thetica lly ) be  rem oved , th e n  th e re  w ou ld  no  lo n g e r be  evil. K a n t’s 
so lu tio n  to  th e  p rob lem  o f ra d ic a l ev il is  to  p o in t to  a  f re e  choice w h ich  can  
n e v e r  be  w itnessed , n o t s im p ly  to  sa y  th a t  ev il is  a  p ro d u c t o f a  s e lf  w hich
25 Ibid., p. 21.
26 Ibid., p. 20.
27 Ibid.. p. 108
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fee ls in a d e q u a te  o r u n h a p p y  w h en  i t  com pares i ts  (sen su o u s) s ta n d in g  to 
o th e rs .
T h e re  a re  sev era l a d d itio n a l p o in ts  w hich  c an  be m a d e  to  s u p p o r t m y 
a rg u m e n t. T h e  f i r s t  is  s im p ly  to  e x a m in e  th e  p a r t  o f th e  Religion in  w hich  
th e  ta lk  o f  “co m p ara tiv e” re a so n  o rig in a te s . In  th is  sec tion  o f  Book O ne, th e  
ev ils  o f  je a lo u sy  a n d  r iv a lry  a re  on ly  tw o m a in  “s te m s” o f m a n y  v ices. O n  th e  
one  h a n d , K a n t  n o te s  th a t  je a lo u sy  a n d  r iv a lry  a re  in d e e d  “in c lin a tio n s .”28 
B u t, i f  th e s e  a re  in d e e d  inclinations, th is  a lre ad y  in d ic a te s  t h a t  th e y  c an n o t 
b e  th e  so u rce  of evil. E v il c a n n o t b e  re d u c e d  to  a n  in c lin a tio n , for, a s  K a n t 
m a k e s  c le a r, w e a lw ays h a v e  tw o c o m p e tin g  in c lin a tio n s  (m o ra l a n d  s e n s u ­
ous), a n d  th e  p u zz le  is  to d iscover w h y  i t  is  th a t  w e w illfu lly  choose (a s  a  
“d isp o sitio n ”) to  follow  one se t  a s  o p p o sed  to  th e  o th e r. T h is  c a n n o t b e  th e  
sou rce  o f ra d ic a l  evil. O n th e  o th e r  h a n d , K a n t s ta te s  v e ry  ex p lic itly  t h a t  
“n a tu re ,  in d e e d , w a n te d  to u se  th e  id e a  o f  such  r iv a lry  (which in itself does 
not exclude mutual love) on ly  a s  a  s p u r  to  c u ltu re .”29 W h a t th is  in d ic a te s  is  
t h a t  th e s e  in c lin a tio n s , lik e  a ll  s e n su o u s  in c lin a tio n s , a re  n o t  in  th em se lv es  
ev il. I t  is  o n ly  th e  su b o rd in a tio n  w h ic h  is  evil. In d eed , su c h  in c lin a tio n s  as a  
“s p u r  to  c u ltu re ” c a n  be ex trem ely  u se fu l in  th e  ad v an ce  o f o u r  m o ra l p ro ject.
T h is  la s t  q u o ta tio n  re g a rd in g  c u ltu re  le a d s  m e to th e  second  p o in t 
w h ich  s u p p o r ts  m y  in te rp re ta tio n  o f K a n t. P u t  sim ply , A n d erson -G o ld ’s ac­
c o u n t w o u ld  e lim in a te  cu ltu re , w h ich , a s  I  h av e  a rg u e d  e x te n s iv e ly  above, is  
a  n e c e ssa ry  co n d itio n  of m o ra l p ro g re ss . S h e  w rite s  t h a t  th e  e th ic a l com ­
m u n ity , w h ic h  is  re q u ire d  by  u s  to  p ro m o te , “e n ta ils  m in im a lly  th e  a b a n ­
d o n m e n t o f  ag g ress iv e  a n d  com petitive  a tt i tu d e s  to w a rd  o th e rs , a n d  m a x i­
m a lly  th e  ad o p tio n  o f cooperative  a n d  su p p o rtiv e  n e tw o rk s .”30 Now, w h ile  I
28 The full passage reads: “vices, however, which really do not sprout of themselves from na­
ture as their root; rather are they inclinations, aroused in us by the anxious endeavors of others to attain a 
hated superiority over us...” Ibid., p. 22.
29 Ibid.. p. 22. Italics added for emphasis.
30 “Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth.” p. 30.
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ag ree  w ith  th e  la te r  h a lf  o f t h a t  s ta te m e n t, I  th in k  w e m u s t re je c t th e  f irs t 
h a lf. F o r  w h ile  i t  c e r ta in ly  m u s t  be  a d m itte d  th a t  i t  is  n e ce ssa ry  fo r u s  to 
jo in  to g e th e r  in  th e  p u rs u i t  o f  m o ra l p ro g ress , K a n t m ak es  i t  v e ry  c le a r  th a t  
w e m u s t  in d e e d  rem a in  an ta g o n is tic . I  ta k e  th is  to  be p rec ise ly  w h a t  h e  
m e a n s  b y  h is  s ta te m e n t t h a t  r iv a lry  "does n o t exclude m u tu a l  love” a n d  is  a  
“s p u r  to  c u ltu re .” O n  A nderson-G old’s  m odel, we seem  to  r u n  in to  a n  ex trem e 
leve l o f coo p era tio n  w hich, i f  i t  w ere  ach ievab le , w ou ld  m e a n  th e  d e a th  o f cul­
tu re  a n d  th e  life  o f th e  A rcad ian  sh e p h e rd .
A  th i r d  p o in t o f co n ten tio n  is  s im p ly  to  n o te  K a n t’s s ta te m e n t  th a t  
ra d ic a l ev il is  a n  “inv is ib le” enem y, th u s  im p ly in g  th a t  we c a n n o t h a v e  a n  
ex p erien ce  o f i ts  source. C o n cern in g  th e  source o f ra d ic a l evil, K a n t  w rite s  
t h a t  “i t  is  n o t  s u rp r is in g  th a t  a n  A postle  re p re se n ts  th is  invisible enem y, who 
is  know n  o n ly  th ro u g h  h is  o p e ra tio n s  u p o n  u s  a n d  w ho d estro y s  b asic  p r in ­
ciples, a s  b e in g  o u ts id e  u s an d , in d e e d , a s  a n  evil sp irit”31 In  a  foo tno te  on 
th is  p a g e  h e  ad d s, ag a in , t h a t  “re a so n ’s ab ility  to  m a s te r  a ll  oppo sin g  m o ti­
v a tin g  fo rces th ro u g h  th e  b a re  id e a  o f  a  la w  is  u t te r ly  in exp licab le ; it is also 
inconceivable, therefore, how  th e  m o tiv a tin g  forces o f th e  se n su o u s  n a tu re  
sh o u ld  b e  a b le  to  g a in  th e  a sce n d an c y  over a  rea so n  w hich  co m m an d s w ith  
su ch  a u th o r i ty .”32 I ta k e  th is  a ll  to  in d ic a te  th a t  th e  source o f ev il h a s  to  do 
w ith  a n  u t te r ly  u n k n o w ab le  d isp o sitio n  o f th e  w ill to  su b o rd in a te  m o ra l 
m ax im s, a n d  is  no t, th ere fo re , th e  r e s u l t  o f “com paring  re a so n ’s” in te ra c tio n  
w ith  o th e r  in d iv id u a ls .
F in a lly , a s  a  la s t  co u n te rex a m p le  to  A nderson-G old’s  p o sitio n , K a n t’s 
claim  th a t  th is  su b o rd in a tio n  o f th e  m o ra l la w  does n o t occur in  t im e  show s 
th a t  ev il c a n n o t be  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  th e  experience  o f in te ra c tin g  w ith  o thers . 
K a n t m a in ta in s  in  sev era l sec tions o f B ook O ne th a t  th is  free  d e te rm in a tio n  
of th e  w ill occurs “n o t in  tim e  b u t  m e re ly  in  ra t io n a l  re p re se n ta tio n ...  [an d
31 Religion, p. 52.
32 Ibid.. p. 52 n. Italics added for emphasis.
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h]ence  i t  is  also a  co n trad ic tio n  to seek  th e  te m p o ra l o rig in  o f m an ’s m o ra l 
c h a ra c te r .”33 T h u s K a n t a rg u e s  th a t  th e re  m u s t  b e  tw o se n se s  of th e  w ord  
“ac t” w h e n  we ta lk  ab o u t th is  one ac t w h e re in  w e choose a  sing le  overarch ing  
m axim :
The term “act” can apply in general to th a t exercise of freedom whereby the 
supreme maxim... is adopted by the will, but also to the exercise of freedom 
whereby the actions them selves (considered m aterially...) are performed in ac­
cordance with that maxim. The propensity to evil, then, is an act in the first 
sense... The former is intelligible action, cognizable by m eans of pure reason 
alone, apart from every temporal condition; the latter is sensible action, em ­
pirical, given in tim e ...34
T h u s, accord ing  to K a n t, th is  free ly  chosen , o v e ra rc h in g  m ax im  w hich gu ides 
a ll  ac tio n  a n d  is  e q u iv a le n t to  c h a ra c te r  (Gesinnung) is  n o t a n  even t w hich  
ta k e s  p lace  in  tim e, th o u g h  th is  p rov ides th e  g ro u n d  fo r a ll  in d iv id u a l 
(phenom enal) acts o f w illing . T herefore , a g a in , I  do n o t th in k  th e  source of 
ev il can  b e  a ttr ib u te d  to  o u r em p irica l d e a lin g s  w ith  o th e rs  a s  A nderson-G old 
w ould  h a v e  i t .35
F in a lly , th en , one m ig h t be concerned  w ith  how  i t  is  t h a t  I  in te rp re t  
K a n t’s s tro n g  re m a rk s  concern ing  th e  “ev il” w h ich  occurs in  th e  in te rac tio n  of 
in d iv id u a ls . To beg in  w ith , n o te  th a t  K a n t w r ite s  t h a t  w h e n  th e  in d iv id u a l 
“looks a ro u n d  for th e  cau se s  a n d  c ircu m stan ces  w h ich  expose h im  to th is  
d a n g e r  a n d  keep h im  in  it, he can easily convince himself t h a t  h e  is  sub jec t to 
th e s e  n o t  because  o f h is  ow n g ross n a tu re ...  b u t  b e ca u se  o f m an k in d to  w hom  
h e  is  r e la te d  a n d  b o u n d .”36 A lready  I  ta k e  th is  to  b e  a  good in d ica tio n  th a t
33 Ibid., p. 35.
34 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
35 Let me simply mention one additional problem with Anderson-Gold’s argument Kant 
writes that the proposition “He is evil by nature, means but this, that evil can be predicated of man as a 
species; not that such a quality can be inferred from the concept of his species (that is, of man in general) - 
- for then it would be necessary...” (Religion, p. 27). Anderson-Gold’s account would seem to violate 
Kant’s prohibition, because it puts the cause of evil as a necessary condition of an individual simply by 
means of being a human being.
36 Religion. p. 85. Italics added for emphasis.
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th is  is  n o t, in  fac t, th e  sou rce  o f evil. Now, c e r ta in ly  su ch  in te ra c tio n s  do 
p rov ide  a n  occasion  fo r ev il, b u t  a s  K a n t w rite s  in  a n  e a r l ie r  section , “th o se  
in c lin a tio n s  m ere ly  m ak e  d ifficu lt th e  execution o f  th e  good m ax im  w h ich  op­
poses th em ; w h e re a s  g e n u in e  ev il consists  in  th is , t h a t  a  m a n  does n o t  will to 
w ith s ta n d  th o se  in c lin a tio n s  w h e n  th e y  tem p t h im  to  tra n sg re s s ...”37 U lti­
m a te ly  w h a t I  ta k e  K a n t  to  b e  sa y in g  in  th e se  p a ssa g e s  is  t h a t  th e  in a b il i ty  o f 
in d iv id u a ls  to  com e to g e th e r  b ecau se  o f jea lo u sy  a n d  r iv a lry  is  c e rta in ly  a  
h in d ra n c e  to th e  m o ra l p ro jec t, b u t  i t  is  no t th e  source o f evil. K a n t is  in d i­
c a tin g  th e  n e ce ss ity  a n d  th e  d ifficu lty  involved in  e s ta b lish in g  th e  e th ic a l 
com m onw ealth  o r  “k in g d o m  o f G od o n  e a r th .” A nd, w h ile  w e re m a in  in  th e  
e th ic a l s ta te  o f n a tu re ,  w e a re  n o t  ab le  to  su p p o rt each  o th e rs ’ s tru g g le s  
a g a in s t  th e  in v is ib le  en em y  o f evil. H e  w rites  t h a t  only  w ith  th e  e s ta b lis h ­
m e n t o f a  society  “in  accordance  w ith , a n d  fo r th e  sa k e  of, th e  law s o f  v ir tu e ,” 
“only  th u s  can  w e h o p e  fo r a  v ic to ry  o f  th e  good over th e  ev il p rin c ip le .”38 I 
consider i t  v ery  te l l in g  th a t  K a n t  does n o t w rite  t h a t  “on ly  th u s  can  w e 
achieve a  v icto ry ,” b u t  w rite s  on ly  t h a t  we could  th e n  “hope” fo r a  victory; th e  
im p lica tio n  is  t h a t  th e  e lim in a tio n  o f jea lo u sy  a n d  r iv a lry  is  n o t in  i ts e l f  th e  
so lu tio n  to  th e  p ro b lem  o f ev il, b u t  on ly  a  f irs t, th o u g h  c ruc ia l, s tep .
IV. Four Reasons for God as a Necessary Postulate
W e a re  le f t, th e re fo re , w ith  o u r  o rig ina l problem : is  G od a  n e ce ssa ry  
p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l rea so n ?  I  h a v e  a rg u e d  t h a t  God’s ex is ten ce  c a n n o t be  
p o s tu la te d  to  re w a rd  v ir tu e  w ith  h a p p in e ss . A nd, i f  m y in te rp re ta t io n  is  co r­
rect, th e n  God’s ex is ten ce  c a n n o t be  p o s tu la te d  in  o rd e r to  overcom e evil.
E v il is  a  re s u lt  o f  o u r  ow n choosing , a n d  we c a n n o t hope to  be  sa v ed  by  G od 
from  th is  choice. W hile  A nderson -G o ld  m ay h a v e  g iven  u s  good re a so n s  a s  to  
w hy w e m u s t m ove o u t of o u r  e th ic a l s ta te  o f n a tu r e  in  o rd e r  to  form  a n  e th i­
cal com m onw ealth , sh e  h a s  u ltim a te ly  given u s  no  conv incing  rea so n  w hy
37 Ibid., p. 51 n.
38 Ibid.. p. 86.
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b e lie f in  G od is  th e  on ly  m e a n s  w e h a v e  o f u n i t in g  to g e th e r .39 T h u s, A nder- 
son-G old h a s  n o t g iv en  u s  a  c le a r  re a so n  fo r th e  n e e d  o f th is  p o s tu la te . A nd, 
w hile  R ossi’s a rtic le s  h a v e  th e  m a k in g  o f  a n  a rg u m e n t, th e y  do n o t p rov ide  
a n y th in g  m ore  th a n  re a s o n s  a s  to w hy  G od i s  a n  a p p ro p r ia te  symbol for 
m o ra l w illing . P e rh a p s  th is  i s  due  to  th e  fa c t  t h a t  R ossi is  n o t  d irec tly  a d ­
d ress in g  God’s e x is ten ce  a s  a  p o s tu la te . D e sp ite  th e  rea so n s , w e s ti ll  do n o t  
h av e  a  decisive a rg u m e n t a s  to  th e  n e e d  fo r su c h  a  p o s tu la te .
B u t su re ly  th e s e  tw o  w rite rs  a re  c o rre c t to  n o te  th e  e sse n tia lly  soc ia l 
a n d  w orld ly  n a tu r e  o f  m o ra l w illing . M ore  ex ac tly , th e y  a re  r ig h t  to  n o te  t h a t  
th e  effects of m o ra l w illin g  co n cern  a  g iven  soc ie ty  in  tim e, a n d  th u s  th e se  
effects a re  to  b e  m e t w ith  in  h is to ry . T h e  h ig h e s t  good, th e y  a rg u e , is  a  goal 
w hich  concerns th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f a  m o ra l co m m u n ity  o f ra t io n a l  a g e n ts  on 
e a r th . B u t, p rec ise ly  b e c a u se  rea so n  does h a v e  a n  in te re s t  in  i ts  effects, th e re  
a re  im p o rta n t fe a tu re s  c o n ce rn in g  th e  ou tcom e o f  th is  w illin g  w h ich  a re  b e ­
yond  re a so n ’s im m e d ia te  co n tro l. I f  G od’s e x is te n c e  is  a  n e ce ssa ry  p o s tu la te , 
i t  m u s t be th is  f e a tu re  o f th e  m o ra l p ro jec t w h ic h  m a n d a te s  i t s  a ssu m p tio n .
I  th in k  th e re  a re  fo u r  specific re a so n s  fo r th e  n e c e ssa ry  p o s tu la te  o f 
G o d s  ex istence . In  g e n e ra l, w e  n e ed  th is  p o s tu la te  b ecau se  o f tw o fac ts, 
d iscussed  a t  le n g th  above. T h e  f ir s t  is  t h a t  m o ra l w illin g  c a n  b e  in flu en ced  
by  ex te rn a l, e m p iric a l s i tu a tio n s . O n  th e  n e g a tiv e  side , w h ile  d ifficu lt 
s itu a tio n s  do n o t p re c lu d e  m o ra l w illin g, th e y  m a y  m a k e  i ts  execu tion  m ore 
d ifficult. O n  th e  p o s itiv e  s id e , c u ltu re  a d v a n c e s  s i tu a tio n s  w h ich  prom ote  
m o ra l w illing . T he  se co n d  g e n e ra l fa c t i s  t h a t  m o ra l w illing  does a im  a t  
c e r ta in  h is to ric a l effects, b u t  th e s e  effects a re  u ltim a te ly  b eyond  o u r con tro l. 
T he  e s ta b lish m e n t o f p a r t ic u la r  social, p o litica l, ed u ca tio n a l, a n d  re lig ious 
in s titu tio n s  is  a n  e m p ir ic a l p ro b lem  w ith  m a n y  p o ss ib le  so lu tio n s . In  
add ition , w e a re  o ften  m e t  w ith  ex am p les  w h e n  o u r  sim ple , ev ery d ay
39 Indeed, as noted above, in her first article on this matter, Anderson-Gold altogether leaves 
out this need of belief in God, relying only on the idea of an ethical commonwealth to unite our disparate 
interests.
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a tte m p ts  a t  favorab le  ou tcom es of m o ra l w illin g a re  m e t w ith  
d isa p p o in tm en ts  for a n y  n u m b e r o f rea so n s .
O bviously th e s e  tw o fac ts  a re  co n n ec ted  a n d  in te r tw in e d , th o u g h  for 
th e  p u rp o se s  of ex p lan a tio n , I  w ill t ry  to  s e p a ra te  th e m  a n d  m ake  th e m  m ore  
d is tin c t th a n  they  p e rh a p s  a re . T hus, g iv en  th e se  tw o em p irica l fac to rs  in ­
vo lved  in  m o ra l w illing, w e req u ire  a  n a tu r e ,  in c lu d in g  a  human  n a tu re , t h a t  
is  resp o n siv e  to m ora l n eed s . In  th e  la s t  section , I  w ill a d d re ss  th e  connec­
tio n  b e tw een  a  m orally  resp o n siv e  n a tu r e  a n d  God qua m o ra l a u th o r  o f th is  
n a tu re , b u t  fo r th e  p u rp o se  o f th is  sec tion , I  w ill s im p ly  e q u a te  th e  tw o. L e t 
m e th e n  p re s e n t  th e  fo u r  specific rea so n s  fo r th e  n e ce ss ity  o f  th e  p o s tu la te  of 
G od’s  ex istence . I  w ill k eep  th e se  e x p la n a tio n s  brief, a s  th e y  can  la rg e ly  be 
in fe r re d  from  m y d iscu ssio n s above.
A. Empirical influences
A s I h a v e  a rg u e d  a t  le n g th  above, m o ra l w illin g  c a n  be  effected  b y  ex­
te rn a l, em p irica l facto rs. O n  th e  “n e g a tiv e ” side, som e s itu a tio n s  can  m a k e  
th e  ex ecu tio n  of m oral w illin g  m ore d ifficu lt. T here  seem  to  be  th re e  d e fin i­
tiv e  cases w h ere  th is  is  t ru e :  poverty , w a r, a n d  n o n -rep u b lica n  sy stem s o f 
g o v e rn m e n t (p a rticu la rly  th o se  w hich  re s t r ic t  th e  “p r iv a te ” u se  of rea so n ). In  
e x trem e  cases of th e se  in s ta n c e s , basic  m o ra l w illing  becom es n early  im p o s­
sib le  b e ca u se  o f ce rta in  n e e d s  su rro u n d in g  se n su o u s in c lin a tio n s . In  le s s  ex ­
tre m e  cases, w e are a t  le a s t  te m p te d  to  forgo m o ra l w illing . O n th e  “p o s itiv e ” 
side , c u ltu re , u n d e rs to o d  b road ly , p ro m o tes  m o ra l w illin g  in  genera l, th ro u g h  
a n ta g o n ism , th e  cu ltu re  o f sk ill, a n d  th e  c u ltu re  o f d isc ip lin e . As K a n t  p o in ts  
o u t in  “W h a t is  E n lig h ten m en t? ” we sh o u ld  a lso  consider th e  need  of re a so n  
to  p e rfe c t i ts e lf  th ro u g h  p u b lic  d ialogue, a  fac to r w h ich  c a n  b e  m ore o r  le ss  
r e s tr ic te d  by  po litical in s t itu t io n s . E a c h  o f  th e se  fac to rs  in flu en ces  m o ra l 
w illing .
I t  sh o u ld  p e rh a p s  be  n o ted  th a t  th is  p ic tu re  o f th e  a b ility  o f th e  w ill 
to  be  in f lu e n ce d  by e m p iric a l c ircu m stan ces  gives u s  a  v e ry  s tro n g  re a so n  to
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believe  th a t  th e  m o ra l d e stin y  o f e a c h  in d iv id u a l is  ac tu a lly  in te r tw in e d  w ith  
th e  d e s tin y  o f o th e rs . T h is  concep tion  m a y  be ev en  s tro n g e r  th a n  A nderson- 
G old a n d  Rossi h a v e  u n d e rs to o d  i t ,  fo r i f  fac to rs  su c h  a s  p o litica l in s t i tu tio n s  
a n d  soc ia l u n so c iab ility  p lay  a  k e y  ro le  in  th e  fo rm atio n  o f o u r  m o ra l ab ili­
tie s , th e n  ou r ow n m o ra l c a p a b ilitie s  a re  c o n tin g en t u p o n  a  c e r ta in  leve l o f 
society  a ro u n d  u s . W h ereas I  m a y  w ell b e  ab le  to  ach ieve  th e  p ro p e r  m o ra l 
c h a ra c te r  (Gesinnung) th ro u g h  th e  ad o p tio n  o f th e  p ro p e r  o v e ra rch in g  
m ax im , i t  m ay  be  th e  case  th a t  I  c a n n o t ach ieve  som e lev e ls  o f m o ra l p e rfec ­
tio n  th ro u g h  th e  sh e e r  force o f m y  w ill. W e sh a ll  see  th is  fu r th e r  in  “B” b e ­
low. I n  add ition , i t  sh o u ld  be re m e m b e re d  th a t  w e a re  a ll  v u ln e ra b le  to  a  
“f ra il ty ”40 of th e  w ill, a n d  w e a ll  m a k e  poor ju d g m e n ts  re g a rd in g  m o ra l m a t­
te rs . I n  a ll th e se  resp ec ts , m o ra l w illin g  is  connec ted  w ith  e m p iric a l s i tu a ­
tions.
T hus, th e  ex is tence  o f G od a s  th e  m o ra l a u th o r  o f th e  w orld  is  a  
n e c e ssa ry  p o s tu la te  b ecau se  th e s e  fac to rs  a re  la rg e ly  beyond  o u r  d irec t 
con tro l, y e t a re  n e c e ssa ry  for m o ra l p ro g ress . I f  i t  is  t ru e  t h a t  co rrec t m o ra l 
w illin g  is  connected  w ith  em p irica l fac to rs , a n d  th a t  w e do n o t co n tro l a ll  of 
th e se  fac to rs, th e n  w e  m u s t b e liev e  th a t ,  e v en tu a lly , n a tu r e  w ill be  
resp o n siv e  to m ora l n eed s . O n o n e  h a n d , th is  is  a  q u es tio n  c o n ce rn in g  n a tu re  
in  g e n e ra l. C an we so lve th e  p ro b lem s o f poverty? W ill d ro u g h t, fam in e , 
floods, a n d  e a r th q u a k e s  in c re a s in g ly  d e v a s ta te  p o p u la tio n s?  H ow  lo n g  w ill 
th e  h u m a n  species b e  allow ed to  in h a b i t  th e  e a r th ?  W ill c ru c ia l m o ra l 
le a d e rs  live  or die? O r, c o n sid erin g  th e  o th e r  ex trem e , one w h ich  is  a n  ever- 
in c re a s in g  d an g er in  th e se  tim es i n  f irs t-w o rld  n a tio n s , w ill w e be  lu lle d  in to  
a  s ta te  o f com placency? W ill we, in  effect, d isco n tin u e  th e  u se  o f o u r rea so n  
to  becom e A rcad ian  sh ep h erd s?  N a tu re  m u s t  w a lk  th e  n a rro w  lin e  b e tw een  
w a r  a n d  com placency, a lw ays p u s h in g  h u m a n  be in g s to  a n ta g o n ism  b u t  n o t 
p u s h in g  th em  to a n n ih ila tio n . O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  c o n s titu tio n  of
40 Religion, p. 24.
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n e c e ssa ry  em p irica l fac to rs  is  m ore often  th a n  n o t a  q u e s tio n  ab o u t th e  
n a tu r a l ,  em p irica l s id e  o f h u m a n  beings. W ill h u m a n  n a tu re  ev er b e  ab le  to 
r e l in q u is h  i t s  th ir s t  fo r w a r?  W ill n a tio n a l le a d e rs  a llo w  th e ir  c itiz e n s  
freed o m  o f  exp ression , ta k e  up  th e  ta s k  o f p e rfe c tin g  th e  c o n s titu tio n , a n d  
w o rk  w ith  o th e r  le a d e rs  fo r a n  in te rn a tio n a l  s ta te  o f  p eace?  W ill h o rr ific  
e v e n ts  l ik e  e th n ic  genocide im pact o u r se n s ib ilitie s  to  th e  e x te n t t h a t  w e lose 
(a lm o st)41 a ll  o f ou r m o tiv a tio n  for m o ra l w illing? B o th  s e ts  o f q u e s tio n s  
re q u ire  f a i th  in  a  n a tu r e  w hich  w ill a llow  fo r th e  m o ra l p ro jec t to  c o n tin u e  i ts  
p ro g re ss .
B. Reason and Practice
T h e  second re a so n  fo r th e  p o s tu la te  o f God’s  ex is ten ce  h a s  to  do w ith  
th e  fa c t t h a t  K a n t sa y s  t h a t  rea so n  ta k e s  tim e  a n d  p ra c tic e  to p e rfec t. In  a ll 
o f  h is  w ritin g s , K a n t m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  m o ra l u se  o f  re a so n  ta k e s  t im e  to  
im prove . P u t  sim ply, “one  can n o t s tra ig h tw a y  do w h a te v e r  h e  w ills  i f  h e  h a s  
n o t  t r ie d  a n d  exerc ised  h is  pow ers b e fo reh an d .”42 W e h a v e  seen  th is  no tion  
a t  se v e ra l p o in ts  above, especially  C h a p te r  O ne. In  th e  “Id ea ,” K a n t  c la im s 
t h a t  “re a so n  i ts e lf  does n o t  opera te  on in s tin c t, b u t  re q u ire s  tr ia l, p rac tice , 
a n d  in s tru c tio n  in  o rd e r  g rad u a lly  to p ro g ress  ...”43 I n  th e  Metaphysics o f 
Morals h e  a rg u e s  th a t  th e  v e ry  concept o f v ir tu e  n e c e ss ita te s  th a t  i t  m u s t  be  
a c q u ire d  w ith  p rac tice  s in c e  “th e  m o ra l cap ac ity  o f m a n  w ould  n o t b e  v ir tu e  i f  
i t  w e re  n o t a c tu a lize d  b y  th e  s tre n g th  o f one’s re so lu tio n  in  conflict w ith  pow ­
e rfu l opp o sin g  in c lin a tio n s ;”44 in  o th e r w ords, since  o n e  a sp ec t o f th e  te rm  
“v ir tu e ” m e a n s  th e  a b ility  to  dom inate  or m a s te r  (sen su o u s) in c lin a tio n s , a n d  
s in ce  w e ta k e  th is  to b e  so m e th in g  w hich  re q u ire s  a  s tru g g le  of so rts , v ir tu e
41 Kant, of course, argues that the moral law as Wille always remains a source of moral motiva­
tion. This is how “pure” reason can be “practical.” Thus we can never lose all our motivation for moral 
willing.
42 Metaphysics o f  Morals, Ak. 477.
43 “Idea,” Ak. 19.
44 Metaphysics o f  Morals. Ak. 477.
Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
393
m u s t be  so m eth in g  w h ich  is p e rfe c te d  th ro u g h  tim e . A ll of th is  in d ic a te s  th a t  
re a so n  ta k e s  tim e  to  develop.
B u t su ch  developm en t does n o t  ta k e  p la c e  in  a  vacuum ; th u s ,  m uch  of 
th is  deve lopm en t d e p en d s  on e m p ir ic a l su r ro u n d in g s . W ill one b e  s p u r re d  by  
c u ltu re  to  exercise  one’s  reaso n , o r  w ill o n e  s lip  in to  a  s ta te  o f com placency  
a n d  n o t a tte n d  to  th e  perfec tion  o f  re a so n ?  A n d  w h a t  leve l o f c u ltu re  w ill be 
a v a ila b le  to  ch a llen g e  one’s th in k in g ?  W ill o ne  b e  a b le  to  develop a n d  disci­
p lin e  one’s m o ra l ab ilitie s , o r w ill one  b e  sh ip p e d  o ff to  w ar?  W ill m oney  
w h ich  cou ld  b e  av a ila b le  for e d u c a tio n  b e  w a s te d  on  th e  w a r ch est?  W ill ef­
fo rt w h ich  could  be s p e n t  on d ev e lo p in g  a  m o ra l re lig io n  be sp e n t in s te a d  on 
c ru sa d e s  o r p e rh a p s  w a s te d  by  w ra n g lin g  o v er u n im p o r ta n t  m a t te r s  o f fa ith?  
T h ese  q u estio n s a n d  m a n y  m ore c a n  be  a s k e d  re g a rd in g  th e  co n d itio n s  w hich 
in flu e n ce  a n d  gu ide  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  re a so n .
B ecause  m a n y  o f th e se  c o n d itio n s  a re  n o t  u n d e r  ou r d ire c t con tro l, we 
m u s t  h o p e  th a t  n a tu r e  w ill be o f  a  s o r t  t h a t  a llow s fo r rea so n  to  c o n tin u a lly  
im prove . W e m u s t h o p e  th a t  n a tu r e  w ill in d e e d  c o n tin u e  to m ove u s  to w ard  
h ig h e r  leve ls o f c u ltu re , to w ard  in t r a -  a n d  in te rn a t io n a l  peace, a n d  to w a rd  
a n  e lim in a tio n  of po v erty . Aga in , i t  is  c ru c ia l to  k eep  in  m in d th e  fa c t th a t ,  
a s  w e d iscu ssed  in  C h a p te r  T h re e  above, w h e re a s  occurrences su c h  a s  w a r  do 
seem  to  be  p rim a rily  e v en ts  w h ich  w e o u rse lv es  con tro l, w e m u s t f in d  a  guar­
antee t h a t  th ey  w ill n o t occur. R eca ll t h a t  th is  is  d u e  to  th e  fac t t h a t  w e a re  
d e a lin g  w ith  h u m a n  b e in g s  as s e n su o u s  a n d  ra t io n a l ,  both sides o f which can 
cause a  (tem porary ) reversal o f progress: o ne  th e  o n e  h a n d , th e  se n su o u s  a s­
p ec t o f  h u m a n s  can  le a d  u s  a s t r a y  b e c a u se  o f in c lin a tio n s  w hich, i f  follow ed, 
can  o b s tru c t m o ra lity , an d , on th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  r a t io n a l  a sp ec t is  p rec ise ly  
free , a n d  th u s  th e re  a lw ay s re m a in s  th e  p o ss ib ility  t h a t  w e can  c h a n g e  ou r 
m in d s . T hus, w e n e e d  a  g u a ra n te e  t h a t  th e  e m p ir ic a l cond itions re q u ire d  as 
th e  b a s is  for m o ra l p ro g ress  w ill in d e e d  com e to  f ru itio n . N a tu re  is  th e  g u a r­
a n to r  o f  peace  b ecau se  i t  a lone c a n  p ro d u ce  th o se  cond itions in  w h ich  w e
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w ould  n o t w a n t to go to w ar a g a in . N a tu re  is  a lso  th e  sp u r  to  c u ltu re , for 
w ith o u t i t, we w o u ld  n a tu ra l ly  d e s ire  a  s ta te  of to ta l  com placency; “m a n  w ills 
concord; b u t n a tu re  b e t te r  k n o w s w h a t is  good fo r th e  species: s h e  w ills  d is­
cord .”45 T hus, i t  m u s t  b e  a  p o s tu la te  o f p rac tica l re a so n  th a t  n a tu r e  w ill in ­
d eed  cooperate  w ith  o u r  m o ra l n e e d s  to  b rin g  a b o u t th e  h ig h e s t good.
T h is a rg u m e n t seem s p a r t ic u la r ly  im p o r ta n t  since  i t  h a s  th e  follow ­
in g  corollary: even  i f  every  s in g le  in d iv id u a l w illed  to  w ill in  acco rd  w ith  th e  
m o ra l law , th is  w o u ld  n o t a u to m a tic a lly  le a d  to  th e  h ig h e s t good. W h a t th is  
show s is  th a t, w h ile  a  la c k  o f d e s ire  to  h av e  a  good w ill is  c e r ta in ly  a n  im ­
m en se  im p ed im en t to  th e  h ig h e s t  good, i t  is  n o t th e  on ly  one. I t  w o u ld  tak e  
tim e  a n d  p rac tice  to  m ove to w a rd  th e  perfection  o f  each  in d iv id u a l’s  rea so n  
a n d  v irtu e , even  i f  a l l  in d iv id u a ls  chose th e  p ro p e r  o v e ra rch in g  m ax im .
W h a t is  necessary , th e n , a re  th e  em p irica l s tru c tu re s  w hich  w ill e n a b le  u s  to 
m ove to w ard  th is  p ro g ressio n , to  b eg in  th e  u n iv e rsa l m o ra l p ro jec t in  ea rn es t.
C  Ecclesiastical Faith
W hile th is  does n o t n e c e ssa r ily  deserve i t s  ow n h e ad in g , i t  is  su ch  a n  
im p o r ta n t  fac to r in  K a n t’s acco u n t o f  th e  h ig h es t good th a t  i t  sh o u ld  b e  fu r ­
th e r  d iscussed . R eca ll (from  C h a p te r  T hree) th a t  K a n t  in s is ts  in  th e  Religion 
t h a t  th e  h ig h es t good in  th e  w o rld  w ou ld  tak e  th e  fo rm  o f a n  “in v is ib le  
c h u rc h ,” a n  e th ica l co m m onw ealth  w ith  God as th e  law -g iver. T h u s , th is  
c h u rc h  w ould be a  “p u re  re lig io u s  f a i th ” b ased  on  m o ra l law s. B u t, re c a ll also 
t h a t  K a n t believes th is  invisible c h u rc h  to  be  im possib le , a n d  “i t  r e m a in s  tru e  
once fo r a ll th a t  a  s ta tu to ry  ecclesiastical faith  is  a sso c ia ted  w ith  p u re  re lig ­
io u s  fa i th  a s  i ts  veh ic le  a n d  a s  th e  m e a n s  of pub lic  u n io n  of m en ...”46 “because  
o f  th e  n a tu ra l  n e e d  a n d  d es ire  o f  a ll  m en  for so m e th in g  sensibly tenable, an d  
fo r a  confirm ation  o f som e s o r t  fro m  experience o f th e  h ig h e s t concep ts  a n d
45 “Idea,” Ak. 21.
46 Religion, p. 97.
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g ro u n d s  of re a so n ...”47 T h u s  K a n t concludes t h a t  w e m u s t  a lw ays h a v e  som e 
“v is ib le” ch u rch  o r  o th e r  in  o rd e r  to  u n ify  p e rso n s  in to  a n  e th ic a l com m on­
w e a lth , th a t  “som e h is to r ic a l ecc lesiastica l f a i th  o r o th e r, u su a lly  to  be  found  
a t  h a n d , m u s t be  u tiliz e d .”48
W h at th is  in d ic a te s , th e n , is  th e  e x tre m e ly  e m p irica l c h a ra c te r  o f th e  
“veh ic le” w hich  is  to  u n i te  a ll  in d iv id u a ls  of s e p a ra te  fa i th s . In  fac t, K a n t 
goes so fa r  as to  s ta te  t h a t  “i t  is  also possib le  t h a t  th e  u n io n  o f m en  in to  one 
re lig io n  c an n o t fe a s ib ly  be  b ro u g h t ab o u t o r m ad e  a b id in g  w ith o u t a  holy  
book a n d  a n  ecc le s ia s tic a l f a i th  b a sed  u p o n  i t ,”49 a n d  goes on  to  c la im  th a t  i t  
is  a n  a c t of “a  g rac io u s  P rov idence”50 th a t  w e h a v e  su c h  a  book w h ich  m ig h t 
accom plish  th is  goal. K a n t  em p h asize s  th a t ,  re g a rd in g  th e  e th ica l com m on­
w e a lth , “a ll w e k n o w  is  th e  d u ty  w h ich  d raw s  u s  to w a rd  su c h  a  u n ion ; th e  
p o ss ib ility  of th e  a c h ie v e m e n t h e ld  in  v iew  w h e n  w e obey t h a t  d u ty  lie s  
w holly  beyond  th e  l im its  o f o u r  in s ig h t.”51 H ow  w ill i t  be  possib le  to  f in d  a n  
em p iric a l “vehicle” w h ich  w ill be  ab le  to  u n ite  u s  a ll?  H ow  w ill th e  H in d u , 
B u d d h is t, C h r is tia n , a n d  M u slim  fa ith s  a ll  jo in  to g e th e r?  F o r K an t, th is  is  
n o t s im p ly  a  q u e s tio n  o f m o ra l w illing , fo r acco rd ing  to  h im , th e re  w ill always 
be a n  em p irica l co m p o n en t to  relig ion ; w h ile  th e  in v is ib le  c h u rc h  o u g h t to  be 
b a se d  on  p u re  re a so n  a lone , re lig io n  a n d  th e  c h u rc h  m u s t  a lw ays m an ife s t 
i ts e lf  em p irica lly  i n  one  w ay  o r a n o th e r.
T hus, th e  q u e s tio n  re m a in s  a s  to  w h a t th is  em p iric a l m an ife s ta tio n  
m ig h t look like, a n d  th u s  w e look to  n a tu re  to  p ro v id e  th e  a n sw er. T h e  in ­
v isib le  chu rch , “a  m o ra l  com m onw ealth , re q u ire s  a  public covenan t, a  c e rta in  
ecc lesiastica l fo rm  d e p e n d e n t u p o n  th e  cond itions o f experience . T h is  form  is
47 Ibid., p. 100.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 123.
50 Ibid., p. 98.
51 Ibid.. p. 130.
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in  i ts e l f  c o n tin g en t a n d  m an ifo ld ...”52 W e do n o t kn o w  w h a t  c o n tin g en t form  
i t  sh o u ld  ta k e , a n d  “i t  w ould  b e  a s  g re a t self-conceit to  d en y  p e rem p to rily  
t h a t  th e  w a y  in  w hich a  c h u rc h  is  o rg an ized  m ay  p e rh a p s  be  a  sp ec ia l d iv ine 
a rra n g e m e n t, if, so f a r  a s  w e c a n  see, i t  is  com plete ly  h a rm o n io u s  w ith  th e  
m o ra l re lig io n ...”53 God’s ex is ten ce  a s  th e  m o ra l c re a to r  o f n a tu r e  is  a  neces­
sa ry  p o s tu la te  fo r th is  im p o r ta n t  rea so n  t h a t  th e  a ch iev e m e n t o f th e  h ig h es t 
good d e p e n d s  upon  a n  e th ic a l com m onw ealth , w h ich , in  tu rn , d ep en d s upon  a  
c o n tin g e n t ecc lesiastical f a i th  th a t  is  of a  n a tu r e  w e c a n n o t env is ion . I t  w ill 
be u p  to  n a tu re ,  w ork ing  w ith  m o ra l needs, to  gu ide  u s  to  th e  co rrec t form  of 
th is  c h u rc h .54
D. Effects o f Moral Willing
W hile  th e  f irs t  th re e  p o in ts  focused  m ore  on th e  cond itions o f  m oral 
w illing , th is  p o in t concerns th e  effects o f su c h  w illing , th o u g h , o f course , th e  
two a re  o ften  in  fac t th e  sa m e .55 In  sh o rt, w h e re a s  th e  h ig h e s t  good req u ire s  
c e r ta in  e m p iric a l effects to  com e abou t, n a tu r e  m ay  b e  u ltim a te ly  
u n re sp o n s iv e  to  our w ill. F o r in s ta n c e , w e a re  re q u ire d  to  d ra w  up  a  
re p u b lic a n  co n stitu tio n . B u t w h a t  form  sh o u ld  th is  c o n s titu tio n  tak e ?  How 
w ill i t  so lve a ll  th e  em pirica l p ro b lem s w hich  n e c e ssa rily  a rise?  H ow  w ill i t  
be p o ss ib le  fo r a  race  o f devils? A n d  w h a t o f a ll  th e  p ro b lem s co n ce rn in g  a 
c o n s titu tio n  w h ich  w ould a llow  fo r th e  peacefu l coex istence  of a ll  n a tio n s .
52 Ibid., p. 96.
53 Ibid.
54 In connection with the discussion of ecclesiastical faith, there is also the suggestion in the 
Religion of an additional, fifth reason as to why God’s existence may be a necessary postulate. In short, 
the suggestion is this. Kant makes the analogy between a “juridical” and an “ethical” commonwealth in 
that they are both a collection of individuals united in accord with laws and under a law-giver (p. 90). If 
we recall Kant’s discussion in the “Doctrine of Right,” we note that any juridical commonwealth must 
have a law-giver who is not him/herself directly subject to these laws; without this separation, Kant be­
lieves the law-giver would not logically have any authority. Following this analogy, then, God is a neces­
sary postulate because the ethical commonwealth needs a law-giver who is not directly subject to these 
laws, and “there must therefore be someone other than the populace capable of being specified as the pub­
lic law-giver for an ethical commonwealth” (p. 90). This “someone” must be God.
ss As I noted above, I have tried to separate the two aspects of conditions and effects for the 
purpose of elucidation whereas they do not seem to be quite so separable.
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C o n sid e r th e  p ro b lem s w hich face  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s . H ow  is  i t  p o ss ib le  to 
c o n s tru c t a n  a g re e m e n t w hich  w o u ld  allow  each  n a tio n  to m a in ta in  i t s  ow n, 
in d iv id u a l s e ts  o f la w s  w hile  n o t  on ly  w ork ing  to g e th e r  in  p eace , b u t  p o ss ib ly  
also  u n ify in g  to  enfo rce  th is  in te rn a t io n a l  ag reem en t?  T he  p ro b lem s su c h  a n  
o rg an iz a tio n  faces a re  m o n u m e n ta l. B u t, again , th e y  m u s t n o t on ly  b e  faced , 
b u t  solved.
W h a t th e s e  few  exam ples sh o w  is  th a t  n a tu r e  m u s t be  c o o p era tiv e  i f  
so lu tio n s  a re  e v e n tu a lly  going to  b e  fo rthcom ing . A n d  th is  in d ic a te s  th e  n e e d  
for a  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l rea so n . R e a th ’s dep iction  o f th is  co n d itio n  is  h e lp ­
ful:
in m any situations, it may become (or appear to become) irra tiona l for indi­
viduals to act from w hat they recognize as their duty... It m ight be irra tional 
in  the sense th a t  individuals who act from moral principles leave them selves 
liable to being taken  advantage of by others, or m anipulated so th a t  th e ir ac­
tions have consequences which they do not intend. Or it m ay sim ply be th a t 
m oral conduct, as a rule, is ineffective and fails to achieve any good results. 
The recognition of either kind of fact can be detrim ental to m oral m otivation 
and erode the individual’s com m itm ent to the m oral life. Moral conduct will 
appear pointless, a t  best, if nothing, or the wrong thing, comes of it  m ore often 
th an  not.56
D e sp ite  R e a th ’s  e m p h a s is  on th e  p ro b lem  of m o tiva tion , h is  p o in t is  w e ll 
ta k e n : n a tu re  co u ld  be  o f such  a  c o n s titu tio n  th a t  th e  consequences o f  m o ra l 
w illin g  w ould  be  e i th e r  in effica tio u s or, a t  w orst, d e tr im e n ta l. W e m u s t  h o p e  
th a t  n a tu r e  is  n o t c o n s titu te d  in  th is  fash io n . T h us, w e m u s t p o s tu la te  t h a t  
G od h a s  c re a te d  n a tu r e  -- a n d  e sp ec ia lly  h u m a n  n a tu r e  — in  su c h  a  w a y  t h a t  
i t  w ill b e  resp o n siv e  to  m o ra l w illing .
56 Reath, Andrews, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” p. 618. For reasons I 
have argued in Chapter Five above. I think this statement is too strong as it stands, though it is helpful in 
this instance.
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IV. God or N ature?
In  th is  l a s t  sec tion  I  w a n t  to  ra is e  a  question  to w h ich  I do n o t see  an  
im m e d ia te  an sw er: g ra n te d  th a t  w e m u s t  have  fa ith  in  a  n a tu r e  t h a t  w ill be 
responsive  to  m o ra l w illing , does th is  re q u ire  a  b e lie f  in  G od per se? In  o th e r 
w ords, does th is  n a tu r e  h av e  to  h a v e  a  m o ra l c rea to r?  O r is  i t  po ssib le  th a t  
n a tu re  sim p ly  is re sp o n siv e  to  h u m a n , m o ra l needs, a n d  t h a t  i t  d id  n o t have  
a  m o ra l au th o r?  W h a t, exactly , m u s t  one  postulate in  o rd e r  to  c o n tin u e  th e  
p u r s u i t  o f th e  h ig h e s t  good w ith o u t e n co u n te rin g  th e  p ro b lem s d iscu ssed  in  
C h a p te r  F ive  above?
R ecall th a t ,  a s  m ade  e v id e n t in  th e  Critique o f Judgment, n a tu r e  is  
n o t itself morel, i t  is  m ere ly  re sp o n siv e  to  m oral w illin g  (in  a  g re a te r  o r le sse r  
degree). T hus, w h ile  n a tu re  m ay  re q u ire  a  m oral a u th o r , c e r ta in ly  i t  does no t 
re q u ire  su ch  a n  a u th o r  because  i t  h a s , say , m oral c h a ra c te r is tic s . N a tu re  can  
only  p rom o te  m o ra l w illin g  in h u m a n  beings, a n d  p r im a rily  th ro u g h  a n tag o ­
n ism  a n d  cu ltu re , n e i th e r  o f w h ich  a re  m o ra l tra its . I  c an  see  no im m ed ia te  
w ay  to  reso lve th is  q u es tio n  sa tis fac to rily .
T h e  Critique o f Judgment does n o t seem  to  give u s  a n  a n sw e r. O n 
th e  one h a n d , a s  w e s a w  above in  S ec tio n  O ne, C h a p te r  F ive , th e  so lu tio n  to 
th e  an tinom y57 o f th e  th i rd  Critique forces u s  to “th in k ” o f a n  in te llig en c e  dif­
fe re n t th a n  ou rs, a  n o n -d iscu rs iv e  in te llig en c e  w hich  w ou ld  b e  ab le  to  see th e  
necessity o f co n tin g en c ies . In  th is  re sp ec t, w e a re  n o t fo rced  to  th in k  o f n a ­
tu re  a s  c re a te d  in  o rd e r  to  u n d e rs ta n d  w h a t  we conceive o f a s  a  “p u rp o se ” in  
n a tu re , for su ch  p u rp o se s  w ould  d is a p p e a r  for a  n o n -d iscu rs iv e  in te lligence . 
T h u s, i t  w ou ld  n o t se em  n ecessa ry  to  th in k  of a  c re a to r  o f th e  w orld , l e t  a lone 
a  m o ra l c rea to r. O n  th e  o th e r h a n d , th e  so lu tion  to th e  a n tin o m y  also  
show ed  th a t  w h ile  w e a re  ab le  to  “th in k ” o f such  a  n o n -d iscu rs iv e  in te l l i ­
gence, w e a re  n o t a b le  to  “conceive” o f i t ,  th u s  we a re  fo rced  to  tu r n  to  th e  
conception  o f a  c re a to r  w ho w ou ld  h a v e  a  pu rp o se  in  m in d In  o th e r  w ords, in
S7 I am taking there to be only a single, underlying antinomy.
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o rd e r  to  m ak e  a. judgment ab o u t n a tu re ,  w e m u st ju d g e  as i f  i t  w e re  c re a te d  
w ith  a  p u rpose  in  m ind . T hus, fro m  th is  p o in t of view , we m u s t  ju d g e  n a tu re  
a s  h a v in g  been  c rea ted , a n d  th is  w o u ld  re q u ire  th a t  th e  p o s tu la te  o f p u re  
p ra c tic a l rea so n  concern  God a s  th e  m o ra l a u th o r  o f th e  w orld. I  c a n  see  no  
so lu tio n  to  th is  q u a n d a ry , a n d  lea v e  i t  a s  a  puzzle  to be solved.





A  p ro p e r a n a ly s is  o f th e  “Id ea  for a  U n iv e rs a l H is to ry  w ith  a  Cosm o­
p o lita n  In te n t” i s  a b so lu te ly  e sse n tia l for u n d e rs ta n d in g  K a n t’s conception of 
th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  m o ra lity  a n d  po litics. I t  g ives u s  th e  necessa ry  
fo u n d a tio n  for th e  in te rd ep e n d en c e  of m o ra l p ro g re ss  a n d  p o litica l in s t i tu ­
tio n s , a n d  p re s e n ts  u s  w ith  a  r ich e r no tion  of p o litic a l th eo ry  th a n  we receive 
from  a n  an a ly s is  o f th e  Metaphysics o f Morals a lo n e . T he  “Id e a ” rep re se n ts  
th e  b eg in n in g  o f a n  e le m e n t o f K an t’s ph ilo so p h y  w h ich  p e rs is ts  th ro u g h o u t 
a ll  h is  la te r  w ritin g s . I t  h e lp s  u s  to fill in  d e ta ils  w h ich  w ou ld  o therw ise  be 
u n c le a r , such  a s  w h y  c o n s titu tio n s  a re  so im p o r ta n t, w hy  peace  needs to  be 
g u a ra n te e d  by  n a tu re ,  how  th e  h ig h es t good on  e a r th  cam be defended , a n d  
how  w e ough t to  th in k  ab o u t th e  fu tu re  o f h u m a n k in d . F a r  from  be ing  an  
im m a tu re  a n d  u n e s s e n tia l  p iece  of K a n t’s p h ilo sophy , i t  o u g h t to  be ree v a lu ­
a te d  a s  am im p o r ta n t  fo u n d a tio n .
S evera l t r a d i t io n a l  in te rp re ta tio n s  of K a n t  o u g h t f in a lly  be p u t  to 
re s t . T he  f irs t  is  th e  d ism issa l o f th e  “Id ea ” a s  in v o lv in g  a  s im p le  a n d  n a iv e  
conception  o f te leo logy  w h ich  K a n t o v e rtu rn s  in  th e  Critique o f Judgment. I  
h a v e  ad d re ssed  th is  p ro b lem  a t  len g th  in  S ection  O n e . T h e re  is  every  reaso n  
to  th in k  th a t  K am t k n e w  th e  lim ita tio n s  o f th e  n o tio n  o f teleology before h e  
begam w ork  on  th is  p iece, a n d  th u s  every  rea so n  to  th in k  K a n t is  up  to  som e­
th in g  d iffe ren t in  th e  “Id e a .” W hen w e beg in  to  a s k  q u e s tio n s  w ith  th is  fraime
n
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o f m in d , I  th in k  w e w ill m ak e  im p o r ta n t  discoveries, som e o f w hich I h av e  
t r ie d  to  p o in t out.
Second, I  th in k  w e o u g h t to  accept, once a n d  fo r  a ll, th a t  K a n t b e ­
l ie v e d  th e re  to  be  tw o lo ca tio n s fo r th e  h ig h e s t good. I  th in k  i t  is  ab so lu te ly  
c le a r  t h a t  K a n t does n o t in te n d  m o ra l p ro g ress  fo r h u m a n ity  to  be ach ieved  
on ly  in  a n  a fte rlife . In  a d d itio n , K a n t  g ives u s  se v e ra l re a so n s  w hy th is  
m ig h t  b e  so, ch ie f am ong  w h ic h  is  h is  b e lie f  t h a t  i f  no  p ro g re s s  is  possib le  on 
e a r th ,  th e n  th e  w orld  a s  a  c re a tio n  c a n  h a v e  no  v a lu e  w h a tso ev e r. W hile  th e  
n e x t  w o rld  m ig h t be  a  b e tte r  w orld , th is  is  no excuse fo r “a llow ing  vice to 
m o u n t u p o n  en d less  vice in  th e  r e a l  w orld .” T h e  w orld  a s  m o ra lly  responsive , 
a  b e lie f  a lso  ju s tif ie d  by  th e  conclu sions o f th e  th i r d  Critique, m u s t e x is t sp e ­
c ifica lly  fo r th e  sa k e  of m o ra lity  i f  i t  is  to  h av e  a n y  m e a n in g  o r va lue .
T h ird , i f  w e accep t tw o lo ca tio n s  fo r th e  h ig h e s t good, reg a rd le ss  o f 
o u r  a n a ly s is  o f th e  “a fte rlife” w e o u g h t to  co n ce n tra te  o n  th e  defense for i ts  
a c h ie v a b ility  h e re  on  e a r th . A n d  i f  w e d esire  su c h  a  d efense , how  is  i t  to  be  
sp e lle d  ou t?  W e o u g h t to  recogn ize  t h a t  a  defense  w ill h a v e  to  involve p o s tu ­
la te s  o f  p ra c tic a l reaso n , fo r re a so n  c a n n o t accep t t h a t  m o ra l p ro g ress  is  im ­
p o ss ib le  before  we even  beg in  to  try . W e o u g h t a lso  to  recogn ize  th a t  su c h  a  
d e fe n se  is  going  to  h a v e  to  be  m o re  concre te  th a n  th e  p o s tu la te s  req u ire d  fo r 
th e  “o th er-w o rld ly ” h ig h e s t good; w e w ill h a v e  to  sp e ll o u t  in  som e d e ta il how  
m o ra l p ro g re ss  m ig h t ta k e  p lac e  in  l ig h t  o f possib le  e m p iric a l ev idence to th e  
c o n tra ry . K a n t  tac k le s  one s id e  o f th e  d ilem m a b y  m a in ta in in g  th a t  re a l  
m o ra l p ro g re ss  on e a r th  co n ce rn s th e  species a lone, a n d  b a r r in g  n a tu ra l  d is ­
a s te r s ,  w e o u g h t to  th in k  th a t  i t  is  possib le . T he d e ta ils  o f  how  i t  m ig h t be 
p o ss ib le  re p re s e n t  th e  o th e r  s id e  o f th e  d ilem m a, a n d  K a n t  offers u s  tw o ex ­
c e lle n t p o ss ib ilitie s  fo r i ts  so lu tio n , n a m e ly  “social u n so c iab ility ” a n d  th e  
th in k in g  o f th e  sp ec ta to rs  o f th e  F re n c h  R evolu tion . O f  co u rse , th e se  d e ta ils  
co u ld  b e  w rong: p e rh a p s  a  m e sse n g e r  from  God w ill com e to  e a r th , a n d  w ith  
w id e sp re a d  te lev ision  coverage o f h is /h e r  m irac les, w e w ill a ll  be  convinced
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n e v e r to w a r  a g a in . T he  p o ss ib ilitie s  a re  end less, o f course, b u t  n o t  like ly . 
T he  b e s t e x p la n a tio n  w e h av e  fo r i ts  poss ib ility  is  a  n a tu re  w h ich  is  re sp o n ­
sive to  m o ra lity . B u t su ch  a n  e x p la n a tio n  h a s  to be g iven in  o rd e r  to  accoun t 
fo r th e  p o ss ib ility  a n d  to  give re a so n  th e  necessa ry  c le a rin g  fo r e n th u s ia s t ic  
m o ra l w illing .
F o u r th , I  th in k  i t  is  ab o u t t im e  t h a t  w e no t only  re jec t th e  in te rp r e ­
ta tio n  o f K a n t’s m o ra l p h ilo sophy  a s  a n  em p ty  form alism , b u t  a lso  re je c t a n  
in te rp re ta t io n  o f  i t  a s  concerned  w ith  on ly  th e  (good) w ill o f th e  in d iv id u a l. 
W e o u g h t to  re je c t in te rp re ta tio n s  in  w h ich  o u r sui generis d u ty  i s  o v e r­
looked, fo r e v en  b a s e d  upon  a  re a d in g  o f th e  Metaphysics o f Morals a lo n e  i t  
o u g h t to be  c le a r  t h a t  w e h av e  a  d u ty  to  b e  concerned w ith  th e  w e ll-b e in g  a n d  
c u ltu ra l  e d u c a tio n  o f o th e r  people. I n  fac t, w h a t w e le a rn  from  a n  e x a m in a ­
tio n  o f th e  id e a  o f  m o ra l p rog ress is  th a t ,  even  being  se lfish ly  co n ce rn e d  on ly  
w ith  o u r ow n m o ra l co n stitu tio n , w e h a v e  to  be  concerned  w ith  o u r  n a tu r a l  
su rro u n d in g s , fo r  th e re  ex is ts  a n  im p o r ta n t  reciprocal re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  
th e  two. I f  K a n t  is  r ig h t,  a n d  I  b e liev e  h e  is , th en  w e c an n o t ev en  b e g in  o u r 
ow n m o ra l p ro je c t in  e a rn e s t  i f  th e  e x te rn a l  conditions a re  n o t s e t  up  co r­
rec tly . M o ra l p ro g re ss  req u ire s  a n ta g o n ism , b u t fo rb ids w ar. I f  w e a re  n o t to 
h av e  ou r m o ra l, econom ic, a n d  c u l tu r a l  resou rces d ra in ed , w e m u s t  e s ta b lis h  
th o se  e x te rn a l  co n d itio n s  w hereby  w a r  is  p reven ted . I f  w e a re  to  a l l  h a v e  a n  
e q u a l ch an ce  a t  m o ra lity , we m u s t e lim in a te  poverty  a n d  o th e r  o v e rw h e lm in g  
in cen tiv es  to  v io la te  th e  m o ra l law . A n d  i f  w e axe n o t to  fa ll  in to  a  s ta te  of 
bovine c o n te n tm e n t, w e h av e  to m a k e  s u re  th a t  (peaceful) a n ta g o n ism  is  r e ­
ta in e d  a n d  t h a t  a n  em p h a sis  is  p la c e d  on  m o ra l a n d  c u ltu ra l  e d u ca tio n . B e­
yond  th e  fa c t t h a t  o th e r  in d iv id u a ls  o u g h t to  be  ends in  th em se lv es , a n d  b e ­
yond  th e  co n clu sio n s o f  th e  Metaphysics o f Morals a n d  Religion, o u r  e n v i­
ro n m en t, p a r t ic u la r ly  o u r  po litica l e n v iro n m en t, h a s  a n  im p a c t on  m o ra l 
s triv in g .





F ifth , we o u g h t to  re ject K a n t’s in s is ten ce  th a t  m o ra lity  o u g h t to  be 
re w a rd e d  w ith  p ro p o rtio n a te  h a p p in e ss . T h ere  seem s to  b e  no  ju s tif ica tio n  
fo r th e  c la im  th a t  m o ra lity  o u g h t to  b e  rew ard e d  a t  a ll, n o r  th a t  som ehow  we 
h a v e  a  r ig h t  to  h ap p in ess . C e rta in ly  m o ra lity  allow s u s  to  sy s tem a tize  th e  
tw o e n d s  o f v ir tu e  a n d  h ap p in ess , b u t  th e  conclusion s im p ly  le a d s  to  p e rm is­
sib le  h a p p in e ss . A nd  I  th in k  w e o u g h t to  b e  m orally  co n ce rn ed  w ith  a  m in i­
m a l a m o u n t o f h a p p in e ss  for a ll p e rso n s . B u t K a n t’s e q u a tio n  o u g h t to be 
re jec ted .
S ix th , I th in k  w e now  h av e  a  s tro n g e r  a rg u m e n t fo r  a  ju s tif ic a tio n  of 
th e  p o s tu la te s  of p rac tic a l reason . I t  is  d ifficu lt to  see w h y  G od is  n eed ed  in  
th e  a fte rlife , g iven o u r lac k  of a n y  k now ledge  as to  i ts  n a tu r e .  I  th ink  a n  a r ­
g u m e n t is  ce rta in ly  possible, th o u g h  i t  w ou ld  have  to  be  fo u n d ed  on  som e­
th in g  o th e r  th a n  th e  “w o rth in ess  e q u a tio n .” H ow ever, co n ce rn in g  th e  h ig h e s t 
good on  e a r th , we see th e  im m ed ia te  n e e d  fo r p o s tu la te s . H e re , G od seem s to 
b e  n e ed e d  so th a t  n a tu re  can  be resp o n siv e  to  a n d  even  p ro d u c tiv e  for m o ra l­
ity . N o t im m o rta lity  o f th e  in d iv id u a l, b u t  o f th e  species is  need ed . And, th e  
s im p le  p rem ise  of som e ty p e  o f im m o rta lity  o f th e  species i s  n o t enough , for 
im m o rta lity  w ith o u t p rog ress  w ould  re n d e r  po in tle ss  th e  w o rld  a s  a  c reation . 
T h u s , th e  m o ra l p rog ress of th e  species m u s t  be p o s tu la te d  a s  w ell, a n d  I 
th in k  c an  be  ju s tif ie d  a s  a  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l reason .
n .
W ith  th is  accoun t o f K a n t’s ph ilo sophy , I th in k  som e b enefic ia l con­
c lu s io n s  can  be  d raw n , a n d  th e  ph ilo so p h y  en riched . L e t m e  p o in t o u t ju s t  a  
few  o f th ese .
To beg in  w ith , one re s u lt  w h ich  I  ta k e  to  be  a  b e n e f it  o f  su ch  an  
a n a ly s is  is  th a t  w e a re  b ro u g h t b ack  to  a  lev e l of p o litica l d iscu ss io n  a n d  ac­
tiv ity  w h ich  is  fam ilia r  a n d  m ostly  tra d itio n a l. T he co n cern  w ith  K a n t’s po ­
lit ic a l  p h ilo sophy  m ig h t b e  th a t  i t  is  too fo rm alis tic  or t h a t  i t  is  too concerned  
w ith  m o ra lity  to be of m uch  u se  in  “p ra c tic a l” app lica tions. T he  “T heory  a n d
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P rac tice” a r tic le  aside, I  th in k  we c a n  p u t  som e of th ese  concerns to  re s t . 
C e rta in ly , m o ra lity  m u s t be  th e  fo rem ost co n ce rn  o f a  po litic ian . B u t le t  u s  
keep  tw o th in g s  in  m ind . F irs t, p o litic ian s  o u g h t n ev er to  leg is la te  m o ra lity . 
T he se p a ra tio n  o f  ch u rch  a n d  S ta te , o f  e th ic s  a n d  S ta te  re m a in s  com plete . 
O ne o u g h t n e v e r  to a tte m p t to  te ll a  p e rso n  ho w  to th in k . T he  S ta te  co n ce rn s 
R igh t, n o t v ir tu e . Second, w ise  p o litic ian s  o u g h t to recognize t h a t  slow  
c h an g e  is  to  b e  p re fe rre d  to  ra p id  rev o lu tio n . O bviously  h is to ry  p re s e n ts  u s  
w ith  m a n y  ex am p le s  o f th is , th o u g h  I r a n ’s  “W h ite  R evolution” sp r in g s  im ­
m ed ia te ly  to  m in d . E v en  w h en  th e  p o litic ia n  recognizes a  deficiency in  th e  
c o n s titu tio n , su c h  ch an g es  m u s t be  m ad e  slow ly  so as n o t to  overly  u p s e t  th e  
c o n s titu e n ts . T h u s , som e em p irica l kn o w led g e  of people m u s t com e to  b e a r  
on  th is  q u estio n .
L ikew ise , m an y  po litica l p ro b lem s m u s t  h a v e  empirical so lu tio n s .
F o r exam p le , ta k e  th e  n e e d  fo r a  m in im a l s ta te  o f req u is ite  w ell-being . H ow  
can  w e feed  a n d  c lo the a  n a tio n  of people?  T h is  is  c learly  a n  em p irica l q u e s ­
tion . H ow  do w e b a lance , say , th e  n e e d  fo r  freedom  of speech w ith  th e  n e e d  
to  p ro te c t som e m em bers a n d  in s t itu tio n s  o f  society  in  accord w ith  R ig h t?  O r 
w h a t a b o u t th e  fed e ra tio n  o f n a tio n s; how  a re  w e going to  ge t a ll p a r t ie s  to  
ag ree  on som e form  of leg a l o rg an iza tio n  fo r  th e  aversion  of w ar?  T h is  too 
c an  on ly  be  so lv ed  w ith  som e know ledge o f  n a tu re . Yovel p u ts  i t  th is  w ay:
since the  political organization is the em bodim ent of morality in legality, there 
m ay be a  considerable overlap betw een the  political institutions advocated by 
the u tilita rian  approach th a t K ant rejects, and  those required by purely ra ­
tional motives. Indeed, the highest practical principle sta tes th a t reason m ust 
always also be an  end in itself and  not ju s t  an  instrum ent for increasing u til­
ity; b u t th is  does not exclude the possibility th a t these two approaches will 
produce partly  sim ilar results on the  level of empirical institutions.1
H ence, d e sp ite  K a n t’s  e m p h a sis  on th e  n e e d  to  focus on m o ra lity  a n d  n o t  
h a p p in e ss , a n d  d esp ite  th e  sh a rp  c o n tra s t  b e tw e e n  th e  m ora l p o litic ian  a n d
'p.  173. Yirmiahu Yovel. Kant and the Philosophy o f  History.
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th e  po litica l m o ra lis t, I  th in k  th e r e  is  room  fo r a  t r a d i t io n a l  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
p o litic ian s , ru le rs , a n d  s ta te s m e n  w ho  w ould  h a v e  to  em ploy  se v e ra l aspec ts 
o f  em p irica l know ledge in  o rd e r  to  b e  effective le a d e rs .
N ext, a s  I  m en tio n ed  above, I  th in k  w e h a v e  a n  e n ric h e d  conception  
o f  K a n t’s p o litica l theo ry . W e se e  w h y  i t  is th a t  in te rn a l  a n d  e x te rn a l  consti­
tu t io n s  a re  so im p o rta n t. W e se e  th e  exac t re la tio n sh ip  b e tw ee n  p o litica l in ­
s t i tu t io n s  a n d  m o ra lity . W e se e  w h y  n a tu re , n o t in d iv id u a ls , is  to  be  th e  
g u a ra n to r  o f th e  fo u n d a tio n s  fo r  m o ra l p rog ress. W e see  w h y  po litica l in s t i­
tu t io n s  a re  n e ce ssa ry  b u t  n o t  su ff ic ie n t for m o ra l p ro g re ss . W e see  how  we 
c a n  r e tu r n  to o u r  m ore  “ev e ry d ay ” conception  o f p o litic a l ac tio n  a n d  leg is la ­
tio n .
T he “c ritiq u e  o f M o d e rn ity ” h a s  been  p a r t ic u la r ly  d e v a s ta tin g  for 
th o se  ph ilo soph ies w h ich  e sp o u se  w h a t  we m ig h t c a ll  th e  “G ra n d  N a rra tiv e ” 
o f  p ro g ress . A  “G ra n d  N a rra t iv e ,” to  u se  th e  te rm in o lo g y  p ro v id ed  b y  K en ­
n e th  J .  G ergen in  The Saturated Self, is  typ ica lly  c o n ce rn ed  w ith  science a n d  
technology, a n d  o ften  sees th e m  a s  a llow ing  for a n  im p ro v e d  life -sty le . G er­
g en  e x p la in s  t h a t  “th e  g ra n d  n a r r a t iv e  is  one o f c o n tin u o u s  u p w a rd  m ove­
m e n t — im provem en t, co n q u est, a ch iev em en t — to w a rd  som e goal,”2 a n d  
c h a ra c te riz e s  M o d ern ity  a s  th e  p e rio d
in  w hich  i t  w as  possib le  to  be lieve  t h a t  because  rea so n  a n d  o b se rv a tio n  c a n  re ign  s u ­
p erio r, a  s in g le  form  o f  g o v e rn m e n t -- dem ocracy  o r fasc ism  -- o r  a  s in g le  econom ic 
sy stem  -- ca p ita lism  o r  c o m m u n ism  — m ig h t fina lly  so lve th e  a c c u m u la tin g  a n d  in tra c ­
tab le  p roblem s dogging  th e  s te p s  o f  th e  species a s  i t  lu rc h e d  th ro u g h  h is to ry .3
T h e  c ritiq u e  of M o d ern ity  a t ta c k s  th e  effectiveness o f  sc ience  a n d  technology 
from  sev e ra l d iffe ren t p o in ts  o f v iew , a rg u in g , am o n g  o th e r  t h in gs, t h a t  i t  
s im p ly  h a s  n o t im p ro v ed  o u r  w e ll-b e in g  o r q u a lity  o f life.
2 Gergen, Kenneth J., The Saturated Self: Dilemmas o f Identity in Contemporary Life, Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1991, p. 30.
3 Ibid.. p. 31.
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Now, i f  w e a re  r ig h t  to  re jec t th e  “w o rth in e s s  e q u a tio n ” a s  I th in k  we 
a re , th e n  w e se e  t h a t  K a n t  re m a in s  c le a r o f th is  ob jection . I  th in k  w e ough t 
to  re a d  K a n t’s  p h ilo so p h y  as b e in g  u n c o n ce rn e d  w ith  a ll  b u t  th e  m o st m in i­
m a l accoun ts o f  h a p p in e ss . A s f a r  a s  I  u n d e rs ta n d  K a n t, h u m a n s  a re  simply 
not designed for happiness. N o r sh o u ld  th is  b e  o f p r im a ry  concern  to  them . 
T he  “C o p e m ica n  rev o lu tio n ” in  e th ic s  se ts  th e  s ta g e  fo r a  rea so n  w h ich  h a s  a  
d u ty  to  im p ro v e  m o ra lly , n o t a  re a so n  th a t  c a n  p e rfe c t th e o re tic a l know ledge 
o r p h y sica l w ell-be ing . I f  th e  fu tu re  s ta te  o f h u m a n  ex is ten ce  is  one  o f h igh - 
tech  b u ild in g s  a n d  devices, or i f  i t  is  of s im p le  r u r a l  fa rm  com m unities, th is  is  
n o t im p o rta n t. O v e ra ll w ell-be ing  is  n o t im p o r ta n t .  I n  fac t, too m uch  sa tis ­
fac tion  w ith  o u r  p h y s ic a l cond ition  can  le a d  e i th e r  to  a  su b o rd in a tio n  of th e  
m ora l la w  to  co n ce rn s  o f h a p p in e ss , o r to  th e  d a n g e ro u s  cond ition  o f bovine 
co n ten tm en t. K a n t’s m o ra l ph ilo sophy  a n d  h i s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of p rog ress 
sh o u ld  h a v e  n o th in g  to  do w ith  a n y  b u t m in im al h a p p in e ss , a n d  th a t  h o rn  a  
m ora l p o in t o f v iew .
T h e  c r i t iq u e  o f M o d ern ity ’s  a tta c k  on  re a so n  i ts e l f  is  o f m uch  m ore 
concern. T h e  “P o s tm o d e rn ” in s is te n c e  on  “p e rsp e c tiv a lism ” a n d  “re la tiv ism ,” 
i f  accepted, w o u ld  lik e ly  m ean  th e  e n d  o f m o ra l  p ro g re ss  a s  K a n t u n d e r ­
s ta n d s  it. I f  th e r e  c an  b e  no developm en t o f re a so n , th e n  m o ra l p rog ress is  
th re a te n e d , d u e  to  th e  fa c t th a t  m o ra lity  is  p u r e  p ra c tic a l  reason . Indeed , 
postm odern  c r i t iq u e s  w o u ld  deny  th e  v e ry  n o tio n  o f “p ro g re s s” i ts e lf  because  
i t  w ould  d en y  a n y  p o ssib le  know ledge o f a  “b e tte r” o r  “w orse” se t o f va lues 
w ith  w hich  to  ju d g e  p ro g ress . C lea rly  th e se  a r e  is su e s  w h ich  w ould  ta k e  sm­
o th e r book to  in v e s tig a te  in  d e ta il.
O f cou rse , som e o f th e se  q u estio n s  w e re  a  p ro b lem  in  K a n t’s  tim e  as 
well, a n d  le d  to  th e  d e b a te  b e tw een  Jacob i, M e n d e lsso h n , a n d  K an t, a n d  th e  
ch a llen g es o f th e  R o m an tic  Sturm and Drang m o v em en t. O f im portance  
th e n , a s  now , is  th e  q u e s tio n  of w h e th e r  a  d isp o s itio n  g iven  over e n tire ly  to 
rea so n  w ill d e s tro y  th e  v e ry  a sp ec ts  o f life  t h a t  i t  h o p e d  to  save. Does K a n t’s
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p e rh a p s  overly -reasonab le  app roach  to  life  le a d  u s  to th e  la n d  o f th e  
H o u y h n h n m s in  Gulliver’s Travels, a  p lace  seem ing ly  devoid  o f fee ling , color, 
a n d  m ean ing?  A gain , th ese  a re  com p lica ted  questions. B u t I  do n o t believe 
t h a t  i t  is  rea so n  a lone  w hich  is  c a u s in g  o r h a s  c au se d  su ch  p rob lem s. T ake, 
fo r exam ple , th e  c u r re n t  loss of p o p u la r ity  o f C h ris tian ity . A  p ro p e r 
(K a n tia n )  in te rp re ta tio n  of C h r is tia n ity  is  h a rm o n io u s w ith  th e  n e ed s  of 
p ra c tic a l reaso n . C h ris t a s  th e  m odel fo r h u m a n  m o ra l p e rfec tio n  a n d  th e  
n e e d  o f God as th e  m o ra l c rea to r o f th e  w o rld  su p p o rt C h ris tia n ity . K a n t’s 
conclusions from  th e  f ir s t  Critique c le a r  th e  w ay for re lig ion , a n d  h is  conclu­
sio n s from  th e  th i r d  Critique force u s  to  th in k  o f th e  w orld  a s  c re a te d . P e r ­
h a p s  a  b e tte r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  w o rk in g s  of n a tu re  h a s  c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  
dow nfa ll o f relig ion , b u t  i t  is  h a rd  to  see  how  th is  touches th e  core o f C h ris ­
t ia n  b e lie f  or K a n t’s philosophy. I f  a n y th in g , th e  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l re a ­
son  o u g h t to b o ls te r  such  fa ith . In  m y  opinion, i t  is  n o t re a so n  w h ich  is  to  be 
b la m e d  fo r th e  c u rre n t  tre n d , b u t a n  excess o f in fo rm ation : i t  seem s to  m e 
th a t  th e  p roblem  lie s  in  m ass  overexposure  to  so m an y  d iffe ren t lifesty les, 
re lig io n s , fa ith s , in d iv id u a l choices, e tc . in  too sh o rt o f a  tim e  a n d  w ith  few  
tools to  d igest th is  in fo rm ation .
F ina lly , w e sh o u ld  n o t try  to  m a k e  K a n t in to  a  p re c u rso r  o f H egel.
W e h a v e  good re a so n  to  th in k  th a t  n a tu r e  m ay  be responsive  to m o ra lity .
B u t th is  is  n o t to  say  th a t  w e could kn o w  th is , t h a t  conflict le a d s  to  som e type 
o f sy n th e s is , or t h a t  th e  “w orld” is becom ing  m ore ra tio n a l. L e t u s  n o t c riti­
cize K a n t  for n o t h a v in g  a  s tru c tu re  t h a t  is  u n d e s irab le  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace. I 
th in k  K a n t’s po sitio n  saves u s  bo th  fro m  a  c ritiq u e  w hich  to p p le d  H egel’s 
p h ilo so p h y  of R ig h t a n d  a  c ritique  w h ich  ta k e s  K a n t a s  sa y in g  m ore  th a n  he  
does a b o u t th e  p ro g ress  o f reason .
In  add ition , a  th o rough  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of K a n t’s ph ilo so p h y  sav es us 
from  th e  follow ing type  of objection: one o u g h t to c o n s tan tly  w age w a r  in  o r­
d e r  to  b r in g  ab o u t a  condition  w here  peop le  becom e sick of w ar, in  o th e r
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w ords, w age w a r to  p re v e n t w ar. W hile so m e th in g  lik e  th is  m ig h t p rove  a  
good objection to  H egel, I  th in k  i t  is  a  g ross m is re a d in g  of K an t. F irs t, w e do 
n o t know  i f  n a tu re  w ill b e  responsive  to  th is  ty p e  o f tac tic , for w e do n o t know  
i f  n a tu re  w ill u ltim a te ly  cooperate  w ith  m o ra lity . N o r do we know  th a t  th e  
n a tu r e  of h u m a n  b e in g s  is  su ch  th a t  th e y  w ill e v e r ac tu a lly  becom e conv inced  
o f th e  evils o f w ar. W e hope, b u t  w e do n o t know . Second, th is  p ro ced u re  
w ou ld  destroy  m a n y  a re a s  of positive , n o t n e c e ssa rily  m oral, cooperation , 
p a r tic u la r ly  tra d e . T h ird , i t  w ill su re ly  c re a te  s i tu a tio n s  w here  th e  m o ra l 
p ro jec t is  overw helm ing ly  d ifficu lt to  p u rsu e , su c h  a s  poverty . F o u rth , i t  
w ou ld  m ig h t m ak e  i t  m ore  d ifficu lt to  love o r re sp e c t o th e r  pe rsons, a n d  th u s  
w ou ld  v io la te  th e  d u tie s  o f v ir tu e  to w a rd s  o th e rs  a s  sp e lled  o u t in  th e  Meta­
physics of Morals. F if th , a n d  p e rh a p s  m o st im p o rta n tly , any  ac tion  of th is  
ty p e  is  in  d irec t v io la tio n  o f th e  m o ra l law , a  la w  w h ich  i t  w as th e  in te n t  to  
a id  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace. K illin g  is  c lea rly  a g a in s t  th e  m o ra l law , a n d  i t  is  d iffi­
c u lt  to  see how  su c h  a  tra n sg re s s io n  co u ld  b e  ju s tif ie d . E ven  th e  F re n c h  
R evolu tion , i ts  success so hoped  for by  th e  sp e c ta to rs , ca n n ot be  so m e th in g  
w h ich  is  approved  fo r  each  m o ra l agen t; w h ile  th e  outcom e m ay  be a d v a n ta ­
geous, th e  m ean s a re  d ep lo rab le .4 I  th in k  a n y  a rg u m e n t w hich  v a lid a te s  th e  
u s e  of v iolence in  th e  n a m e  of (K an tian ) m o ra lity  is  lik e ly  to b e  grossly  m is ­
c o n s tru e d  a n d  p ro b ab ly  in s in ce re .
m.
T he im m e d ia te  concern  w h ich  m ay  w ell re m a in  is  w h e th e r  K a n t h a s  
p re s e n te d  u s  w ith  a  p o sitio n  th a t  is  so d e p e n d e n t u p o n  fa ith  u n d e r  so m a n y  
c ircu m stan ces th a t  i t  is  im perv ious to  c ritic ism . I  am  rem in d ed  o f F re u d ’s 
th e o ry  o f th e  unconscious w hich  is, ipso facto u n a b le  to  be  d isc red ited  by  
m e re  defin ition  of b e in g  unconscious. Is  K a n t’s  p o sitio n  lik e  th is?  In  m a n y  
w ay s i t  seem s th a t  i t  is . I t  seem s u n lik e ly  t h a t  w e cou ld  come up  w ith  v a s tly
4 And, of course, the final bloody and dictatorial outcome of the French Revolution only serves 
to prove Kant’s belief that constitutional reform ought to be brought about slowly, and from the top down.
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ov erw h elm in g  ev idence  w h ich  w ou ld  show  once a n d  fo r a lw ays th a t  m oral 
p ro g re s s  is  im possib le . I f  m o ra lity  “m ay  w ell b e  o ccasio n a lly  interrupted, 
b u t...  n e v e r  be broken o f f”* a n d  i f  “w e a re  d e a lin g  w ith  b e in g s  who, from  th e  
fe e lin g  o f se lf-in flic ted  evil, w h e n  th in g s  d is in te g ra te  a lto g e th e r, know  how  to  
a d o p t a  s tre n g th e n e d  m o tive  fo r m a k in g  th e m  ev en  b e t te r  th a n  th e y  w ere  be­
fo re  t h a t  s ta te ,”6 th e n  i t  seem s u n lik e ly  th a t  th e  q u e s tio n  cou ld  even  be given 
a  f in a l  ju d g m e n t. B u t  is  th is  fa c t a  problem ?
I  th in k  w e m u s t  k eep  se v e ra l th in g s  in  m in d . T h e  f ir s t  is  th a t ,  i f  
K a n t  is  co rrect in  h is  th in k in g  t h a t  rep u b lica n  c o n s titu tio n s  m u st be  th e  
fo u n d a tio n  for m o ra l p ro g re ss , th e n  I  th in k  w e h a v e  som e good rea so n s  to  be­
liev e  in  th is  p rog ress . I f  w e r e a d  th e  tex ts  c a re fu lly , K a n t  say s  th a t  m ora l 
p ro g re s s  c a n  be  “seen ” th ro u g h  p o litica l developm en t, re g a rd le ss  o f how  we 
ju d g e  o u r  m o ra l d ev e lo p m en t a lone. I f  we accep t th is ,  th e n  K a n t seem s to 
h a v e  b e e n  a  good p red ic to r  o f  th e  p o litica l c lim a te  o f  th e  p a s t  two cen tu rie s . 
W e h a v e  in d e e d  seen  th e  r ise , b u t, fo r th e  m o st p a r t ,  a lso  th e  fa ll o f  com m u­
n ism . W e h a v e  se e n  n a tio n s  t ry in g  fo r peace. M o st im p o rta n tly , w e h a v e  
se e n  a  la rg e  deve lopm en t o f re p u b lic a n  c o n s titu tio n s . K a n t  seem s to  be  cor­
re c t  in  h is  a sse ssm e n t o f th e  sp e c ta to r’s  a tt i tu d e s  re g a rd in g  th e  F ren ch  
R evo lu tion ; i t  w a s  in d e e d  a n  e v e n t t h a t  w as n o t to  b e  fo rg o tten , a  w ill for a  
c o n s titu tio n  w hich  m oved  c lo se r to  R ig h t a n d  to  re sp e c t. S ince  th a t  tim e, th e  
g ro w th  o f su ch  c o n s titu tio n s  h a v e  f a r  ou tw eighed  d ic ta to rsh ip s .
W e o u g h t also  keep  in  m in d  w h a t K a n t sa y s  re g a rd in g  how  f a r  a long  
h e  co n sid e rs  th e  h u m a n  rac e . W hile  th e re  a re  few  s ta te m e n ts  d irec tly  con­
c e rn in g  th is  issu e , K a n t  does o ffer som e th o u g h ts . I n  th e  “Id e a ” h e  w rites , 
c o n ce rn in g  a  u n iv e rsa l c iv il society , t h a t
its perfect solution is impossible; from such warped wood as is man made, nothing 
straight can be fashioned... That it is also the last task to be solved also follows from 
this: it requires the correct concept of the nature of a possible constitution, great
5 “Theory and Practice,” Ak. 309.
6 “Is the Human Race Continually Improving?” p. 149.
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experience during much of the world’s course, and above all else a good will prepared 
to accept that constitution;... when it happens, it will only be very late, and after 
many futile attempts.7
H e  goes on  to  c la im  th a t  “h o w ev er fanc ifu l th i s  id e a  m ay  seem  to  be — a n d  i t  
w as la u g h e d  a t  a s  su c h  w h e n  ad v an ced  b y  a n  A bbe S t. P ie rre  o r a  R o u ssea u  
(p e rh a p s  b ecau se  th e y  b e liev ed  i ts  re a liz a tio n  w a s  too n e a r)  — i t  is  n o n e th e ­
le ss  th e  in e v ita b le  outcom e...”8 Also in  th e  “Id e a ” K a n t  m a in ta in s  t h a t  “th is  
l a s t  s te p  ( th e  fe d e ra tio n  of n a tio n s) ... is  no  m o re  th a n  h a lfw ay  in  m a n k in d ’s  
fo rm a tio n ...”9 C le a rly  th is  sh o w s th a t  K a n t  does n o t th in k  th a t  th e se  c ru c ia l 
s ta g e s  o f m o ra l p ro g re ss  a re  n e a r  a t  h a n d . T h is  is  p a r tic u la r ly  so s in ce  i t  is  
th e  p e rfe c t so lu tio n  o f th e  political p rob lem  w h ich  w ill ta k e  su ch  a  lo n g  tim e , 
n o t  to  m e n tio n  th e  m o ra l p ro b lem . A  f in a l d e fin itiv e  q u o ta tio n  com es from  
th e  Lecture on Philosophical Theology w h e re  K a n t  w rite s  th a t  h u m a n k in d 
“w ill p e rh a p s  n o t a t t a in  th is  id e a  for m illio n s  o f y e a rs .”10 I  th in k  w e o u g h t to  
ta k e  th is  a s  a  f a i r  s ig n  of K a n t’s  som ew hat sk e p tic a l  th in k in g . T h ese  q u o ta ­
tio n s , co u p led  w ith  h is  m an y  s ta te m e n ts  to  th e  e ffect t h a t  “in  th is  e a r th ly  
w orld , th e re  is  on ly  p ro g ress . H en ce  in  th is  w o rld  goodness a n d  h a p p in e ss  
a re  n o t th in g s  to  b e  p ossessed , th e y  a re  on ly  p a th s  to w a rd  perfection  a n d  c o n ­
te n tm e n t ,”11 o u g h t to  p ro tec t K a n t  from  a n  o v e rly  o p tim is tic  in te rp re ta tio n .
F in a lly , le t  m e  p re s e n t  th is  in te re s tin g  q u o ta tio n  from  “T h eo ry  a n d  
P ra c tice ”:
One can also offer evidence showing that the cry over the irresistible growth in hu ­
man depravity is due to the fact that, when man attains a higher stage of morality, 
one can see further still and can make more rigorous judgments regarding what man 
is in comparison with what he ought to be; consequently, our self-censure will always 
be the more rigorous the more stages of morality have been ascended in the known 
course of the world.12
7 “Idea,” Ak. 23.
8 Ibid., Ak. 24.
9 Ibid., Ak. 26.
10 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 117.
11 Ibid., p. 117.
12 "Theory and Practice.” Ak. 310.
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H ere , K a n t a rg u e s  t h a t  th in g s  re a lly  o u g h t to  seem  w orse a t  exac tly  th a t  
p o in t w h e n  th e y  a re  g e ttin g  b e tte r . A n in c re a se d  c ritiq u e  o f th e  c u r re n t  s ta te  
o f m o ra lity , a n d  a  ju d g m e n t t h a t  th in g s  a re  n o t a s  good a s  th e y  could  be, in ­
d ica te  a  c e r ta in  a w a k e n in g  o f m o ra l ju d g m e n t, a n d  a  p rog ression  o f re a so n ’s 
a b ility  to  ta k e  stock  o f th e  s itu a tio n . T h is  is, o f  course , a  m u ch -d eb a ted  issu e , 
w h e th e r  th in g s  h a v e  a lw ay s b e en  th is  b a d  or w h e th e r  i t  is  ju s t  th a t  we a re  
w itn ess in g  a n d  recogn iz ing  m ore  o f i t  now .
U ltim a te ly , in  e v a lu a tin g  K a n t’s  position , th e  qu estio n  com es b a ck  
once a g a in  to  th e  q u es tio n  o f m o ra l p ro g ress  in  h is to ry  a n d  i ts  fu tu re . W h a t 
c an  w e say  a b o u t th e  m a n y  bloody w a rs  to  w h ich  K a n t w as n o t w itness?  H ow  
c a n  th is  p oss ib ly  re p re s e n t  m o ra l p ro g ress?  I t  seem s th a t  w e can say  a n y  one 
o f a  n u m b e r  o f th in g s . W e c a n  ta k e  e ith e r  a  sk e p tic a l or op tim istic  ap p ro ach  
to  th is  q u estio n . U ltim a te ly , I ’m  n o t su re  w h a t k in d  of experience  w ou ld  le t  
u s  d e fin itive ly  a n sw e r th is  q u e s tio n  from  w ith in  th e  bounds o f know ledge 
rigo rously  defined . B u t w h a t  ought w e to  say? T h is , i t  seem s, is  th e  m ore 
im p o r ta n t  q u e s tio n  of th e  tw o. I f  K a n t  is  correct, w e seem  to  h a v e  no  w ay  to 
decide th is  q u e s tio n  th eo re tica lly . C a n  w e decide i t  p rac tica lly?  I  th in k  th a t  
K a n t gives u s  m a n y  re a so n s  to  th in k  th a t  we c an , a n d  to th in k  th a t  we m ay  
h a v e  so m e th in g  lik e  a  d u ty  to  do so. M ora l p ro g ress  m u st be  affirm ed, i f  only 
a s  a  p o s tu la te  o f p ra c tic a l rea so n .
J
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